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This study traces the (ethnically German) Danube Swabians’ embrace of national 
identity in interwar Yugoslavia with attention to the German national movement’s 
antecedents in Croatia-Slavonia and Vojvodina under the Habsburgs. We examine the 
important role of German national activists in Yugoslavia and survey the institutions they 
built to stimulate, shape and mobilize Yugoslavia’s German population as a specifically 
national minority based on the Swabians’ history and collective memory as colonists in 
the region. Finally, we discuss the rift that emerged inside the German minority during 
the 1930s, when the German leadership and its conservative variety of German 
nationalism were confronted by brash, young challengers who sought to “renew” the 
German minority in a Nazi image. These young enthusiasts for National Socialism 
directed their extreme nationalism not at the repressive Yugoslav authorities, but rather at 
their older rivals in the Germans’ main cultural and political organization, the 
Kulturbund. German culture and national authenticity became key criteria for German 
leadership in this struggle to control the Kulturbund. Meanwhile, German Catholic priests 
  
also resisted the Nazi-oriented Erneuerungsbewegung insurgency. Ultimately, in this 
clash of generations, we see both support for and resistance to local manifestations of 
Nazism in Southeastern Europe.  
One of this study’s major finds is the stubborn endurance of national indifference 
and local identity in Southeastern Europe throughout interwar period, when national 
identity was supposed to be dominant. Many Germans embraced national identity, but 
certainly not all of them. The persistence of this indifference confounded the logic of 
twentieth century nationalists, for whom national indeterminacy seemed unnatural, 
archaic, and inexplicable. Even after years of effort by German nationalist activists in the 
nationalized political atmosphere of interwar Yugoslavia, some ethnic Germans remained 
indifferent to national identity or else identified as Croats or Magyars. There were also 
those who pined for Habsburg Hungary, which had offered a dynastic alternative to 
national identity before 1918. Still others’ identity remained shaped by confession as 
Catholic or Protestant. We conclude therefore by observing the paradoxical situation 
whereby Nazi-oriented extreme nationalism coexisted with instances of German national 
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October 1977’s National Geographic featured “The Danube: River of Many 
Nations, Many Names,” an article whose author followed the Danube from its source 
in Donaueschingen, Germany to the Romanian delta where it meets the Black Sea.1 
Along the way, the magazine celebrated the peoples along the banks of the Donau, as 
the river is known in German, and devoted numerous pages to the countries of 
Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Remarkably, however, the article never 
mentioned the one people in those countries for whom the river had held such 
meaning as to literally define them. The Donauschwaben, or “Danube Swabians”, 
were ethnic Germans who had settled along the Danube in the two centuries before 
Second World War and who endured (in greatly reduced territory and numbers) into 
the postwar era.2 National Geographic dwelled at some length on the German town of 
Ulm but failed to mention that many of the Danube Swabians’ forbearers had struck 
out from that very city centuries earlier as colonists bound for the recently conquered 
lands of southern Hungary. So forgotten had the Danube Swabians become by the 
1970s that an article devoted to peoples and cultures along the Danube’s banks 
overlooked the one to whom the river had given its very name.3 
                                                 
1 The Danube is said to begin where two rivulets, the Breg and Brigach, converge to form a river that is 
still little more than a stream. Before this, several springs vie to be considered the “true’ source of the 
Danube.  
2  National Geographic’s only reference to the Danube Swabians is indirect, a single sentence which 
almost dismisses the millions of Donauschwaben as unimportant. After conversing with a man of 
Slovak descent in northern Serbia, the article’s author notes that “Austria also settled Germans in this 
region, called Vojvodina” after vanquishing the Ottomans.  Mike Edwards, "The Danube: River of 
Many Nations, Many Names," National Geographic, October 1977. 472. 
3  The omission of the Donauschwaben is all the more astonishing because Romania remained home to 
many thousands of Germans until the early 1990s. Many of these were in Transylvania, but others 




 The villages of Slavonia and Vojvodina, are aggressively claimed as 
“Croatian” or “Serbian” today but such assertions ignore the area’s complex history 
before the mass flight or expulsion of the region’s German population at the end of 
the Second World War.4 Ethnic Germans were once numerous in the region, forming 
large pluralities or even outright majorities in many villages and towns. Indeed, some 
places, such as Novo Selo near Vinkovci (also formerly known as Neudorf) were 
exclusively German, but their Swabian roots are today obscured behind South Slav 
populations and names. Tombstones endure, however, and local cemeteries quickly 
betray a history of German settlement, cultural exchange, and even assimilation. The 
proud family tombs of German burghers often reveal adaptations the Germans made 
to their Slavic surroundings, such as the adoption of Slavic first names and the 
writing of German surnames names using Slavic orthography. German inscriptions on 
building façades likewise recall their former owners, and the trained eye even today 
may distinguish a foreign hand in regional architecture and town planning, relics of 
imperial colonization. 
The interwar period in Yugoslavia was at once a time of suppression for the 
ethnic Germans but also one of self-discovery, growth, and organization. The break 
up of the Habsburg Monarchy was shocking but nevertheless offered the Swabians 
new opportunities for national organization, education and expression which had been 
highly circumscribed in the Hungarian Kingdom and its Croatian dependent. Men 
who had been local German leaders in pre-Trianon Hungary redoubled their efforts as 
national activists in the Yugoslav Kingdom. The Paris peace settlements had 
transformed Central and Eastern Europe’s old empires according to the national 
                                                 




principle. Now Yugoslavia’s German leadership hoped to rouse the Swabian 
peasantry, which may have been German speaking but was not necessarily nationally 
conscious.  
The following study pursues several lines of inquiry in order to evaluate the 
Danube Swabians’ embrace of national identity in Yugoslavia. As we shall see, 
German ethnicity was no sure predictor of German national identity.5 On the one 
hand, the below an investigation of the process by which the Germans “became 
national” between the world wars, with attention to the antecedents of the interwar 
German national movement in Habsburg Hungary (including Croatia-Slavonia).  This 
study is furthermore an examination of the content of the Swabians’ “minority 
nationalism.”6 We analyze the important role of German national activists in 
Yugoslavia and survey the institutions they built to stimulate, shape and finally 
mobilize the German national movement in the country. Finally, we discuss the deep 
rifts that emerged inside the German minority during the 1930s, when the Swabians’ 
dominant leadership and its traditional variety of German nationalism were 
confronted by brash, young challengers who sought to remake the German minority 
in the image of National Socialism. 
                                                 
5  The concept of ethnicity has recently been problematized by such scholars as Jeremy King and Pieter 
Judson, who correctly observe that many persons in Eastern Europe would have been bilingual (at 
least) and well-versed in the various traits and customs of Germans, Magyars and/or South Slavs. For 
the sake of presenting a coherent narrative, I will frequently speak of ethnic Germans and Swabians in 
this study. Nevertheless, I have noted throughout the enduring cultural and linguistic overlap in Eastern 
Europe’s individuals which frequently allowed them to actually opt for one ethnicity or nation over 
another when pressed to do so. For more, see Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A 
Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).   
See also Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial 
Austria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).  Judson’s book, which was published only 
shortly after my own research had been completed, is particularly germane to my work as he focuses 
on similar German populations in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy. My own work focuses 
on the Germans in Croatia-Slavonia and Vojvodina, which was part of Hungary, of course. 




This dissertation began as an inquiry as to why the Danube Swabians 
abandoned their customary national indifference and embraced German national 
identity during the brief interwar period. Since the Swabians lacked nationally-
oriented institutions in the first interwar years but concluded the era in a single, nearly 
universal organization, I cautiously expected this embrace of national identity to have 
been as rapid and total as the nationalists’ own rhetoric sometimes suggested. Closer 
examination, however, revealed Swabians to have turned to German nationalism not 
at all abruptly. To be certain, many Swabians did embrace national identity between 
the wars, but that embrace was neither immediate nor universal. Moreover, this 
“national awakening” was far less spontaneous than it was induced by the tireless 
labors of professional German national activists, who created a German national 
community from disparate Swabian settlements through a clever mix of culturo-
linguistic politics, national conflict, and local appeal. Yet even as late as the eve of 
the Second World War, not all Swabians cared to identify as national. Indeed, many 
identified as Croats, Magyars or by region. Others pined for Habsburg Hungary, 
which had offered them a dynastic alternative. Still others’ identity was shaped by 
confession as Catholic or Protestant. And naturally, Swabians’ identity also 
frequently derived from a combination of some or all these influences. 
The German movement in Yugoslavia was a conscious project led by a 
determined cadre of German national activists. These national activists labored to 
craft and impart an identity that was both nationally German but locally Swabian. My 
work traces their increasingly successful efforts to organize the Swabians as a 




cultural-qua-political organization, the Swabian-German Cultural Union 
(Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund). The Swabian activists targeted their co-ethnics 
and worked to bind them to their organizations and ideas, arguing that Swabian needs 
could only be met by a German national agenda. They had no patience for the 
wayward or indifferent, whom they regarded harshly as deserters.  
The original Swabian leadership which emerged in the 1920s achieved many 
successes. During the 1930s, however, a rival, more extreme vision of German 
national identity developed in the Nazi-inspired Erneuerungsbewegung (“Renewal 
Movement”), whose young protagonists directed their hyper-nationalism not at South 
Slav repression, but rather at the older generation of German leaders in the 
Kulturbund. The Kulturbund being the Germans’ principal organization in 
Yugoslavia, German culture and national authenticity became the criteria for 
leadership of the minority. Thus the Erneuerungsbewegung insurgency frequently 
fought its battles on the basis of national legitimacy, of allegedly being the “most 
German” group for its adherence to the neue deutsche Weltanschauung emanating 
from the Third Reich.  
One of this study’s more unexpected finds was the stubborn persistence of 
German national indifference in Yugoslavia until late in the interwar years and even 
beyond. The defiant survival of such ambivalence challenged the logic of the 
nationalist, for whom national indeterminacy seemed unnatural, indeed, inexplicable 
and consequently intolerable. Perhaps nothing so frustrated the Swabian nationalists 
than their coethnics who took no interest in their allegedly urgent project. That said, 




Europe’s new nationally-based order. As we shall see, even such cosmopolitan 
institutions as the Catholic Church ultimately found it necessary to address their 
Swabian flock in national terms in order to resist the Erneuerungsbewegung. Not 
everybody may have embraced nationalism, but the German nationalists (and the 
South Slavs) certainly labored to create the impression that a national worldview was 
the only legitimate game in town. And their efforts were hardly without success. 
In summary, the below investigates the process by which the Swabians came 
to embrace German national identity belatedly and incompletely during the 1920s and 
confronted mutually antagonistic visions of that identity during the fateful following 
decade. This intense conflict over German identity was, in fact, a competition for 
moral authority and institutional power within the minority, and the 
Erneuerungsbewegung ultimately prevailed in this struggle. Nevertheless, their elders 
resisted fiercely and only surrendered after years of deep division within 
Yugoslavia’s German community. Thus, I reveal that German identity in Yugoslavia, 
frequently assumed to have been monolithically National Socialist by the 1930s, 
actually remained complex, nuanced and contested. As we shall see, the rather 
conservative variety of German nationalism which had characterized the German 
community during the 1920s lingered even until the Third Reich’s invasion of 
Yugoslavia in 1941. Ultimately, much of what follows is the history of the Swabians’ 
interwar crisis of identity, a conflict for hearts and minds waged on highly politicized, 
nationalist terms between elites. 
To insist that not all Swabians were boundless enthusiasts for National 




Erneuerungsbewegung came to enjoy, especially among younger Swabians. Many 
Swabians were Hitlerites, of course, but their understanding of National Socialism 
was often questionable. The Nazis had successfully equated National Socialism and 
Germandom in the minds of many ethnic Germans abroad, whose own Nazi-oriented 
leaders further encouraged that equation. Others, particularly the Swabian Catholic 
clergy, opposed Nazism and its sympathizers outright. In fact, the Yugoslav Germans 
were at once less nationalistic and more conflicted about their own identity than is 
often assumed. They came to understand themselves in German national terms only 
slowly and remained very firmly anchored in a local identity as Donauschwaben.7  
It is difficult to underestimate the resonance of the Swabians’ regional and 
historical identity, unarticulated though it might have been before the twentieth 
century. Many Swabians who would have found the notion of German national 
identity foreign or exotic nevertheless possessed a powerful local and ethnic identity 
as the descendents of German colonists who had come to southeastern Europe at 
Imperial request. Thus, the German national activists and their Erneuerungsbewegung 
rivals constantly turned to the collective memory of this colonization in their effort to 
forge a German national community from the country’s Swabian peasant settlements. 
They would mobilize the memory of long deceased colonists in the service of a 
                                                 
7  Actually, the term “Donauschwaben” was not indigenous to Yugoslavia but rather was the interwar 
product of the field of Suedostforschung, the academic study of Germans in southeast Europe. The 
term’s creation is often attributed to German academic Herman Ruediger in 1922, although at least one 
account attributes its invention to Robert Sieger in 1920. Sieger was head of the Department of 
Geography at the university in Graz and he led a reorientation of the department toward human 
geography.  Whatever its exact origins, certainly Ruediger popularized the term to describe those 
Germans in southern Hungary along the Danube and distinguish them from the Transylvanian Saxons, 
with whom they shared neither history nor confession. As editor of the Stuttgart-based Deutsche 
Ausland Institut’s influential journal, Der Auslanddeutsche, Ruediger was well placed to popularize 
the “Donauschwaben” term. GenealogyROGroup, "Some Basic Info on Banat" 
http://www.genealogy.ro/cont/1.htm (accessed July 31 2008). Swabian leaders in Yugoslavia were 
already using the term in public discourse by 1923. "Das Doppelfest in Weisskirchen," Deutsches 




modern German national identity. Profound though sometimes vague, the local and 
historical aspects of Swabian identity were less subject to controversy than its 
specifically German national quality. Indeed, Swabian identity underwent a 
reification during the interwar years, literally being cast in stone as monuments at 
anniversary celebrations marking the centennial, sesquicentennial, and even 
bicentennial celebration of Swabian colonization. Meanwhile, the rise of National 
Socialism in Germany forced a new urgency onto the matter of national identity, 
rendering the German minority ever more suspect to Yugoslavs and provoking a 
generational struggle and confessional confrontation which deeply divided the 
German minority in Yugoslavia just as it coalesced into a proper community. 
 
Sources 
The German national movement and the Swabians’ internal conflict of the 
1930s was a public debate conducted between elites, often in the pages of the 
extensive German press in Yugoslavia. These elites founded newspapers, which 
circulated broadly and served as not merely the bearers of news but also as the 
transmitters of ideas and identity. Ultimately, the Third Reich’s initial successes in 
economics and foreign policy were needed to draw Swabians en masse into the 
Kulturbund, which local activists intent on educating and mobilizing their German 
coethnics in the national spirit founded in 1920. Nevertheless, public debates did 
shape “regular” people’s ideas and stimulate their German national consciousness. 
Such debates occurred frequently and with much passion in the very public forums of 




letters and sermons in the surprisingly sophisticated Swabian press form a treasure 
trove from which this dissertation draws heavily. Of particular importance were 
Deutsches Volksblatt, Volksruf, and Die Donau, which were respectively associated 
with the mutually hostile original leadership of the Kulturbund, the Nazi-oriented 
Erneuerungsbewegung or “Renewal Movement,” and the Catholic Church. Even 
before the appearance of Die Donau in 1935, German Catholics in Yugoslavia 
explored themes of nationalism and nationhood in Jugendruf and St. Raphaelsblatt, 
while German Protestants expounded upon the same in the pages of, Neues Leben, 
Gruess Gott and Kirche und Volk.  
In addition to editorializing, the Swabian press regularly reported happenings 
in Austrian, German and Yugoslav politics as well as internal Swabian matters. As 
such, the press serves as a valuable barometer of German attitudes toward South 
Slavs, Austria, Germany, democracy and National Socialism. Furthermore, the 
Swabian press monitored such cultural happenings as art exhibitions, festivals, and 
public commemorations in the Swabian community itself. In the process, newspapers 
became deliberate shapers of identity and community consciousness and therefore 
yield particular insight into the strategies of the various national activists. Their pages 
contained numerous articles designed to create historic memory, erect national 
symbols, and craft public identity. By asserting a noble vision of the Swabian past, 
the German press sought to inspire national confidence among the sometimes 
indifferent or insecure German peasantry and weld them into a community of 
common national interest. The Swabians’ press also revealed the limits of the German 




indifferent co-ethnics alongside boasts of great accomplishments. A public forum for 
the mutually antagonistic factions and visions which defined the Donauschwaben in 
the 1930s, the German press represents a nearly bottomless source of information on 
the issues which shaped Swabians’ identity and community during the interwar years. 
Whenever possible, I have drawn on original statutes, papers, and publications 
from the German’s eponymous political party, the Partei der Deutschen, as well as 
from the Kulturbund and that organization’s 1930s Slavonian rival, the Culture and 
Welfare Association of the Germans, known in German as Kultur- und 
Wohlfahrtsvereinigung der Deutschen or KWVD. Though the Erneuerungsbewegung 
was the principal rival of the original leadership of the Kulturbund during most of the 
1930s, it was never a proper organization with statutes of its own. Rather, the 
Erneuerungsbewegung is best understood as a movement, a loosely organized group 
which followed Jakob Awender and his associates at the Pančevoer Post and 
Volksruf. Less than an organization, the Erneuerungsbewegung was nevertheless 
more than a simple opposition current within the Kulturbund.8 By contrast, the 
KWVD effectively was an institutionalized variant of the Erneuerungsbewegung in 
Slavonia. 
Although I have approached the Swabians’ internal leadership dispute at the 
elite level, where the richest debates occurred, I have nevertheless also sought more 
“grassroots” input and evaluations of nationhood wherever possible. The Swabians 
being largely a peasant people who were poorly educated compared to their 
contemporaries in, say, Germany or France, such grassroots evidence is rare and 
                                                 
8  Johann. Wuescht, Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, 1934-1944 (Kehl am 




difficult to come by. The files of the various police and security forces in Yugoslavia 
do nevertheless contain evocative descriptions of the state of German nationhood and 
identity among the Donauschwaben. These frequently belie both the sometimes 
confident public claims of the Swabian national activists and the apocalyptic 
histrionics of Serbian and Croatian nationalists. The files of the German foreign 
ministry are also sources of valuable evaluations of the state of Germandom in 
Yugoslavia. 
Research for this project was conducted in Croatia in Zagreb at the Croatian 
State Archive (Hrvatski državni arhiv), the Croatian Institute for History (Institut za 
povijest) and the National and University Library (Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica). In Osijek, 
the Museum of Slavonia (Muzej Slavonije), the Gallery of Visual Arts (Galerija 
likovnih umjetnosti) and the State Archive Osijek (Državni arhiv Osijek) proved to be 
rich sources of information, as was the library of the German National Union 
(Njemačka narodnosna zajednica). I found further original sources from Yugoslavia 
and Germany itself at the Institute for Danube Swabian History and Regional Studies 
(Institut fuer Donauschwaebische Geschichte und Landeskunde) in Tuebingen and in 
Stuttgart at the Institute for Foreign Relations (Institut fuer Auslandsbeziehungen). 
The latter is the successor organization to the German Foreign Institute (Deutsches 
Ausland Institut or DAI), which during the interwar period was a leading 
Volkstumarbeit organization, i.e. an organization working to promote the cultural 
welfare of ethnic Germans beyond the borders of Germany and Austria.  
A study of this sort is complicated by shifting borders and jurisdictions, 




The sections that follow seek to address these challenges and provide a demographic 
overview of the German presence in Yugoslavia. 
 
Demographic Disputes 
There is much disagreement in the historical literature about the accuracy of 
various sets of population data for the Germans of Yugoslavia. The principal sources 
for demographic information about the ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia are the 
Austrian and Hungarian censuses of 1910 and the Yugoslav censuses of 1921 and 
1931. Owing to methodological discrepancies and shifting political pressures, these 
censuses were frequently suspected of inaccuracy and manipulation. Contemporary 
Germans questioned the 1910 Hungarian data and roundly rejected the Yugoslav 
census data. The Kulturbund leadership, for example, asserted the German population 
was higher than recorded and was widely supported in this conclusion by various 
Volkstumarbeit organizations such as the Deutsche Ausland Institut. DAI’s highly 
influential journal, Der Auslanddeutsche, claimed that the Yugoslav German 
population was 600,000 in 1925 and 710,000 by 1937.9 Since this dissertation is a 
political and cultural history and not an evaluation of statistical methods, I shall 
conservatively rely whenever possible on the official Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav 
census data and the figures published by the West German Federal Ministry for 
Expellees, Refugees and War-Injured in the Yugoslav volume of its series 
                                                 
9  "Die Lage der Deutschen in Jugoslawien-Suedslawien," Der Auslanddeutsche 8, no. Sonderheft 




Dokumenation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa 
(“Documentation of the Expulsion of the Germans from East-Central Europe”).10 
Unfortunately, neither methodology nor political context were consistent 
across the Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav censuses, making it difficult to compare 
their results with total exactitude. Moreover, shifting political winds as well as 
genuine multilingualism, multi-nationality, opportunism and national indifference 
rendered census measurements of nationhood imperfect at best. Indeed, the above 
mentioned West German documentation series’ volume on Yugoslavia observes that 
the situation in such a nationally diverse region as Yugoslavia defied all reified 
expectations of nationhood. 
In a nationally mixed zone (Voelkermischzone) like Yugoslavia, with 
areas with different political and cultural histories, the common, 
official and standard high level languages were often used alongside 
one another, blended together, or the areas of their appropriate use 
overlapped. The close interleaving of the various settlement areas and 
the intermixed nature of the nationalities in individual parts of the 
country encouraged the exchange of nationhood, forging a “floating” 
nationality in border zones, that decided for this or that nationality 
according to opportunity or was assimilated by the then-people of state 
of the dominant nationality in the region in question. Germandom was 
also subject to this process, whose effects had been in evidence since 
the previous century, since there was no longer any recourse to an all-
                                                 
10  According to Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, more than 14,500,000 ethnic Germans fled or were expelled 
from eastern Europe at World War II’s end and shortly thereafter. More than 2,100,000 Germans 
perished or disappeared in the process of their flight or expulsion. In order to contend with the massive 
influx of refugees, West Germany established the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War-
Injured (Bundesministerium fuer Vertriebene, Fluechtlinge und Kriegsgeschaedigte) in 1949 with the 
task of integrating and caring for the refugees and the like from Europe’s east. The ministry also 
sought to document the mass expulsions and terror visited upon ethnic Germans in eastern Europe and 
thus produced the remarkable, multivolume “Documentation of the Expulsion of the Germans from 
East-Central Europe” (Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa). For this 
project, leading German historians gathered witness testimony, original documents, and contemporary 
reports in order to provide an overview of the events following the Second World War. For more in 
English on these events, see Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of 





state-dynastic identity option in the wake of the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
collapse.11 
 
Under such circumstances, even the best-designed census could be confounded by 
qualities of national amphibianism. 
The Austrian and Hungarian censuses from 1910 found a total of 577,252 
ethnic Germans in the lands that would become Yugoslavia.12 Of these, the majority 
or 312,507 were in Banat, Batschka (Bačka) and Baranja, and 133,855 were in 
Croatia-Slavonia.13 The census also found a considerable number of Germans in 
Slovenia, where they numbered 106,377.14 
Yugoslavia did not conduct its first census until 1921, so the actual size of its 
German minority was uncertain for many years. New borders, wartime deaths, and 
postwar migrations rendered the already questionable Austrian and Hungarian 
censuses numbers even more so. As such, early German estimates put the German 
population between 560,000 and 1,000,000. (Census figures from formerly Hungarian 
areas were particularly mistrusted as too low.) Several months before the census in 
1921, future Kulturbund Chairman Johann Keks estimated Yugoslavia’s total German 
population to be around 700,000.15 
The Germans sought to justify their claims to certain cultural privileges in the 
Yugoslav Kingdom based on a strong showing in the 1921 census. Through the 
census they hoped to demonstrate that they were a significant portion of the 
                                                 
11   Bundesministerium fuer Vertriebene, Fluechtlinge, und Kriegsgeschaedigte, Das Schicksal der 
Deutschen in Jugoslawien, ed. Theodor Schieder, Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus 
Ost-Mitteleuropa, vol. 5 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1961; reprint, 
2004).9E-10E. 
12  Ibid. 3E. 
13  Figures for Croatia-Slavonia include Murinsel, Krk and Castua (Kastav).  Ibid. 3E. 
14  Figures for Slovenia include include Prekomurje. Ibid. 3E. 
15  Johann Keks, "Das Deutschtum in Jugoslawien," Kulturbund-Kalender des Schwaebisch-Deutschen 




population and not merely a “contemptible minority.”16 However the German 
nationalists feared their coethnics would fail to identify themselves as Germans to the 
Yugoslav census takers, as they suspected had occurred in the past. In the days before 
the census, the front pages of Novi Sad’s new German daily, Deutsches Volksblatt, 
urged, “Germans, do not deny your mother tongue on the census!”17 and “Fellow 
Germans, take care to properly fill out Point 8 of the census!”18  The Swabian 
national activists were particularly anxious that their co-ethnics would misunderstand 
the census questionnaire, which was written in Serbo-Croatian. To avoid such 
misunderstandings, Deutsches Volksblatt printed a step by step explanation of the 
census questionnaire in German.19 
The 1921 census results were a disappointment for the German minority, 
which again received them skeptically. Even allowing for methodological differences 
and the manipulation of results, the 1921 census revealed some remarkable changes 
in the ethnic German population since 1910. Overall and in most regions, the number 
of ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia had declined precipitously by 1921. However, the 
German population in Batschka, Baranja, and Banat, that is, the Germans’ main 
settlement area, actually increased to 328,173. Slovenia showed the greatest German 
                                                 
16  The actual German phrasing was “verächtliche Minderheit.” "Die Volkszaehlung," Deutsches 
Volksblatt, January 9 1921. 
17  Despite the similarity of name, this newspaper was distinct from the pre-WWI Ruma weekly. 
"Deutsche, verleugnet bei der Volkszaehlung eure Muttersprache nicht!," Deutsches Volksblatt, 
January 3 1921. 
18 I translate “Volksgenossen” here as “Fellow Germans” but the translation does not fully capture the 
meaning behind the term. Volksgenossen implies a kind of national comradeship, a bond of 
membership and destiny that is difficult to render succinctly in English. Unfortunately, there are many 
such terms in German, usually involving the term “Volk”, which is frequently translated as “people” or 
“national” but loses an earthy, organic, blood-borne dimension in the process. "Volksgenossen, achtet 
auf richtige Ausfuellung des Punktes 8 der Volkszaehlungsliste!," Deutsches Volksblatt, January 26 
1921. 




losses both absolutely and as a percentage.20 Overall, the preliminary results for the 
1921 census found 513,472 Germans in the Kingdom of Serb Croats and Slovenes. 
However, this figure was later revised downward to reflect territorial adjustments 
from 1923, when the town of Jimbolia (Hatzfeld) and its Banat surroundings were 
ceded to Romania. Ultimately, then, the final census results found 505,790 Germans 
in the country. At 4.2 percent of the overall population, therefore, Germans were 
Yugoslavia’s largest minority.21  Germans were located in many parts of northern 
Yugoslavia, but they were most concentrated in Vojvodina.22 
What explains these changes, especially the losses? In part the decline of the 
German population from 1910 to 1921 may be ascribed to the Hungarian policy of 
Magyarization, which persisted until the kingdom’s dismemberment in 1918. And 
though the process of Magyarization may have been interrupted by Hungary’s 
collapse, the parallel process of Croatization in Croatia and Slavonia was not. On the 
contrary, in many respects, Croatization only intensified after 1918.23  
Section VII of the Treaty of Trianon and section VI of the Treaty of St. 
Germain also worked to reduce the German population. These sections had allowed 
for the relocation of German and Hungarian individuals and guaranteed the right to 
                                                 
20  There the German population declined from 106,377 to a mere 39,377. Additionally, the German 
population of Croatia-Slavonia fell by 11,019 souls to 122,836. Slovenian statistics include 
Prekomurje. Statistics for Croatia-Slavonia include Murinsel, Krk and Castua.  
21  Bundesministerium fuer Vertriebene. 119E. The census additionally found 467,658 Magyars and 
439,657 Albanians. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, A History 
of East Central Europe, vol. IX (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974). 
22 In March 1921, Deutsches Volksblatt reported the final census results for Vojvodina’s main city, 
Novi Sad, according to which Germans comprised 16.6 percent of the city’s population. Germans’ 
relative population was greater elsewhere in the region, but owing to Novi Sad’s commercial 
importance and central location in Vojvodina, that city quickly emerged as a key center of the German 
movement in Yugoslavia during the interwar years. Germans were 16.6 percent of the city’s 
population. Magyars comprised 32.5 percent of the town’s inhabitants and “Serbo-Croats” comprised 
another 41.8 percent. "Resultat der Volkszaehlung in Neusatz," Deutsches Volksblatt, March 24 1921. 




opt for citizenship in either Austria or Hungary, should one choose not to remain in 
the successor state of one’s current residence. In practice, these apparently very 
reasonable “Clauses Relating to Nationality” of the Treaties of Trianon and St. 
Germain would be later used to justify political discrimination against Germans and 
Hungarians in Yugoslavia. For those who wished to relocate to the truncated Austrian 
and Hungarian states, however, the clauses promised new citizenship, the right to 
emigrate and the right to export property. Unsurprisingly, many people expressed 
their lack of confidence in the Habsburg successor states by voting with their feet. No 
doubt many Imperial officials also opted to emigrate to Austria after the interwar 
borders had become clear. 
Perhaps the greatest factor in the decline of German numbers was simply the 
reduced birthrate among the Germans themselves. Owing to the limited supply of 
land, Germans had long restricted the size of their families, following a “one or two 
children system” so as to preserve the size of landholdings across generations. This 
was more typical of wealthier families but the pragmatic practice also gradually 
spread to the lower and less prosperous levels of German society.24 It was eminently 
practical, of course, but for German nationalists (and Swabian clergymen), it was a 
perennial source of concern. Both before the First World War and in its aftermath, 
contemporary Swabian observers regularly remarked on Yugoslavia’s declining 
German birthrate with considerable apprehension.  
Having been a part of Cisleithania (Austria), which was torn by national 
conflict during most of the Ausgleich period, Slovenia had a different history from 
Slavonia and Vojvodina, and interethnic relations there were considerably more 
                                                 




strained.25 The nationality competition which had so paralyzed Cisleithania had been 
particularly intense between Slovenes and Germans and grew worse during the First 
World War.26 In Yugoslavia, however, the tables were decisively turned in favor of 
the Slovenes, who launched aggressive policies designed to both “denationalize” the 
Germans and deprive them of their livelihoods in the evident hope that many would 
indeed choose to emigrate. 
In terms of religion, Yugoslavia’s German-speaking population was 
overwhelmingly Christian, though it did include a handful of Jews. The 1921 census, 
which had asked respondents for their mother tongue and religion, found a total of 
64,746 “Israelites”. Thus Jews made up a mere .54 percent of the Yugoslav 
population in 1921. Ten years later, Yugoslavia’s 1931 census found 68,405 Jews or 
.49 percent of the population.27 Of these, only 10,026 also declared German as their 
mother tongue. 2788 lived in Croatia-Slavonia while Batschka contained 3282 and 
Banat 1874. Belgrade itself counted 653. Finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina and eastern 
Srijem featured 521 and 539 Jews respectively.28  
Yugoslavia’s Jews seemed little interested in the Danube Swabians, though 
they were intensely concerned with anti-Semitic measures in Germany and Hungary 
                                                 
25  “Cisleithania” was the unofficial name of the lands in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, that 
is, the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867. The lands of the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy were 
informally known as “Transleithania.” Both names derived from the Leitha River, which separated the 
Monarchy’s two halves.  
26  Such tensions were frequently instrumental inventions of the nationlsits themselves, seeking to 
consolidate their own nationally-defined communities through negative integration. For more on 
German-Slovene relations, see  Judson. 
27 Rothschild. Table 33, p. 203. According to Harriet Pass Freidenreich, by 1931 approx 40 percent of 
Yugoslavia’s Jews considered themselves native speakers of Serbo-Croatian. Half of the Ashkenazim 
considered German (24 percent) or Hungarian (26 percent) to be their native tongue. Meanwhile, two 
thirds of Yugoslavia’s Sephardic Jews spoke Ladino as their mother tongue in 1931. Harriet Pass 
Freidenreich, The Jews of Yugoslavia: A Quest for Community (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society of America, 1979). 63. 




during the 1930s.  Likewise, Yugoslavia’s largely rural Swabians seem to have been 
little attuned to the country’s scattered and urbanized Jews, especially during the 
1920s.29 This changed somewhat in the 1930s, when Yugoslavia’s Swabian Nazi 
imitators, the Erneuerer, launched their campaign against the original leadership of 
the Kulturbund.30 The Erneuerer were quick to denounce Jews in the ways made 
familiar by their Nazi role models in the Third Reich and they sought to slander the 
Kulturbund’s original leadership through association with Jewry (frequently conflated 
with Magyardom). For its own part, the original leadership never concerned itself 
much with Jews and possessed a vision of German national identity that was infused 
with Christianity. However, while that leadership did not engage in overt anti-
Semitism itself, neither did it not bother to speak out against it. Meanwhile, their 
mouthpiece Deutsches Volksblatt regularly reported the passage of anti-Semitic laws 
in such a matter-of-fact way as to suggest tacit approval or at least acceptance of their 
content and/or spirit.  
To be sure, anti-Semitism certainly lurked in the hearts of some Swabians and 
was indeed attractive to the Erneuerer, inspired as they were by Nazi racism. 
However, anti-Semitism does not appear to have been a prominent matter in the 
Swabians’ discourse on national identity until the intrusion of Nazi ideology in the 
1930s, when the young Nazis deployed it against their older rivals. Any study of the 
German population in Banat or the Independent State of Croatia during the Second 
World War would have to devote considerable attention to anti-Semitism among the 
                                                 
29  Yugoslavia’s Jews were also highly urbanized, with 77.5% of them living in towns by 1931. For 
more figures on the Jewish population in Croatia, see Melita Švob, Židovi u Hrvatskoj, Migracije i 
promjene u židovskoj populaciji (Zagreb: Židovska općina, 1997). 
30  The singular of “Erneuerer” is “Erneuer.” In an attempt to remain true to the original German as 




Swabians, who participated in the crimes of the Holocaust under local German 
(Erneuerungsbewegung) leadership. During most of the interwar period, however, 
Swabian anti-Semitism appears to have been a largely silent (if hardly non-existent) 
phenomenon. Owing to this and the limited number of German-speaking Jews, 
neither anti-Semitism nor Jews will feature prominently in this analysis.31  
Although the majority of ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia were Catholic, a not 
inconsequential number were Protestants, divided among two churches. The 1931 
census found 383,674 German Catholics in the country as well as a total of 100,806 
German Protestants. 85,369 of the latter (84.69 percent) were members of the 
(Lutheran) German Evangelical Christian Church of the Augsburg Confession in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Deutsche Evangelische Christliche Kirche Augsburgischen 
Bekenntnisses im Koenigreiche Jugoslawien), an institution which was formally 
constituted after Yugoslavia’s proclamation and had a decidedly German nature.32 
The remaining 15,369 German Protestants (15.25 percent) belonged to the (Calvinist) 
Reformed Church of Yugoslavia (Reformierte Christliche Kirche Suedslawiens). By 
contrast with the German Lutheran Church, the Calvinist Church was predominantly 
Magyar. As such, it could not play the nationhood-reaffirming role for the Germans 
                                                 
31  For more on Jewry in the former Yugoslavia, see Freidenreich. For more on the role of anti-
Semitism in Yugoslav society, see Anti-Semitism, Holocaust, Anti-Fascism, ed. Ivo Goldstein (Zagreb: 
Židovska općina, 1997). For information specifically on the Jewish community in Zagreb, see Ivo 
Goldstein, Židovi u Zagrebu, 1918-1941 (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2004). In addition to the above book by 
Melita Švob, another excellent source on Jewish history in Croatia is Dva stoljeća povijesti i kulture 
Židova u Zagrebu i Hrvatskoj, ed. Ivo Goldstein (Zagreb: Židovska općina, 1998). 
32 By “Evangelical” (evangelisch), the reader should understand “Lutheran.” These Swabian 
Evangelicals were merely Lutheran Protestants and shoud not be confused with American 




that the German Lutheran Church did during the interwar period. Most Calvinist 
communities were located in Batschka.33 
In conclusion, the Germans of Yugoslavia were not a huge population in 
absolute numbers. At 4.2 percent of the 1921 Yugoslav population and furthermore 
divided between Slovenia and distant Slavonia/Vojvodina, the Germans might even 
first appear to be a rather insignificant minority.34 However, the weight of their 
presence was dramatically increased by their relative concentrations in Slovenia, 
Slavonia, and Vojvodina. Indeed, in 1921, they comprised 22.5 percent of the 
population of Banat, 23.9 percent of the population of Batschka, and 32.9 percent of 
the population of Baranja. As such, the Germans comprised 23.7 percent of the 
overall population of the country’s most developed regions, where they frequently 
lived in German majority communities and tended to be among the more affluent 
inhabitants.35 Under such circumstances, it was quite possible to live in a largely 
German world, even in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Indeed, anti-
German discrimination in the military, commerce, and government employment 
encouraged the German community to turn increasingly inward. 
 The Germans of Yugoslavia lived in a variety of types of settlements, which 
were “easily recognizable by their cleanliness, orderly structure and well-cultivated 
farmlands,” according to one Hungarian contemporary.36 In some places they 
constituted the majority while in others they were but a minority, albeit an important 
one. Settlement types included monoconfessional and purely German villages, 
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34  Ibid. 119E. 
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ethnically and/or confessionally mixed villages, and ethnically and religiously diverse 
market towns, such as Apatin, Osijek, Palanka, Vršac, Zrenjanin and Vrbas, among 
others.37 (Apatin, about which we shall read more in Chapter eight, had a large 
German majority.) Some German communities were purely agricultural places, while 
others were partly characterized by trade and administration. At 84 percent, the vast 
majority of Yugoslavia’s ethnic Germans in their main settlement area of Baranja, 
Batschka and Banat lived in rural communities. 65 percent of the rural population and 
30 percent of the urban population were involved in agriculture. However, more than 
40 percent of Vojvodina’s urban population and slightly less than 30 percent of its 
rural dwellers were involved in trade and industry, especially handicrafts 
(Handwerk).38 The economic structure of the Germans was similar in Srijem. In 
Slavonia, the situation varied somewhat, though agriculture again predominated. The 
1910 census found 52.6 percent of the German population there involved in 
agriculture, 26.8 percent in handicrafts (Handwerk) and 4.4 percent in commerce and 
lending (Handel und Kredit). Additionally, 5.9 percent of Slavonia’s German 
population worked as day laborers.39 
Finally it will be useful to consider Yugoslavia’s Danube Swabians in the 
context of interwar Europe’s other successor states. Sizable German minorities 
existed in nearly all of the states of interwar Eastern Europe, of course, but the 
situation of the Swabians differed from that of German minorities elsewhere in 
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important ways. Unlike the 1,059,194 Germans in Poland,40 Yugoslavia’s Swabians 
had never been citizens of the Kaiserreich. Moreover, their lands did not border 
Germany and Germany did not harbor irredentist aspirations toward Yugoslavia. 
Compared to the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, who did share a border with 
Germany, the Swabians were few in number and not nearly as mobilized or strident in 
their nationalist demands. Czechoslovakia’s 3,123,568 Germans comprised 23.4 
percent of its population,41 whereas Yugoslavia’s Germans made up only 4.2 percent 
of that country.42 As such, the Yugoslav Germans had to content themselves with 
moderate demands for schools and the like while the strident Sudeten Germans were 
numerous enough to plausibly demand a real share in power and even regional 
autonomy. The Swabians in Yugoslavia also lacked the history of deep national 
tensions that characterized German relations with the respective nations of state in 
Poland and Czechoslovakia.  Meanwhile, the Germans of Romania lived in a state 
that was not the object of German irredentist intentions but was deeply coveted by 
Trianon Hungary, with which it shared a border. Romania also contained a huge 
Magyar (and Szekler) minority, of course. At 745,421 or 4.1 percent of the country’s 
overall population, Romania’s German population was larger than Yugoslavia’s and 
considerably more diverse, since it included the well organized and Protestant 
Transylvanian Saxons as well as several hundred thousand (mostly Catholic) Danube 
Swabians in Banat.43 (Smaller groups of Germans also lived in Bukovina, Bessarabia, 
Dobruja and elsewhere.) Finally, the Yugoslav Germans’ situation even differed from 
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that of the Germans in Hungary. The Germans in rump Hungary (many of them 
Danube Swabians) typically felt genuine loyalty to that state as their historic 
fatherland. Even with the Habsburgs eliminated, the Hungarian state idea endured and 
retained a powerful attraction for them. Indeed, one could say that little had changed 
for them compared to the Germans in Yugoslavia and Romania, who at once had to 
accustom themselves to new borders, new peoples of state, and the dynasties of their 
recent, Orthodox enemies. And the Germans in the Yugoslavia had to deal not only 
with one aspiring nationalism but with three, in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia 
respectively.  
 
Place Names in Yugoslavia 
Swabians used the term Siedlungsgebiet or “settlement area” to informally 
describe the regions colonized by their ancestors. Within Yugoslavia, the settlement 
area typically meant the German-settled regions along the Danube, that is Vojvodina 
and Slavonia. Nevertheless, since Swabians also lived in the Romanian Banat and 
southern Hungary, these regions were likewise understood as part of the Swabians’ 
broader settlement area. This said, many Swabians had only a vaguely developed 
sense of land or nation beyond their immediate village or region, especially at the 
outset of the interwar years. 
Usually the main settlement area was understood between the wars to include 
only the lands settled by Swabians along the Danube and thus excluded the German 
regions of Slovenia. The ethnic Germans of Slovenia had a long history distinct from 




distant main settlement area of the Donauschwaben lay in the Hungarian half of the 
Monarchy. Though the Germans in Slovenia and the Danube Swabians became 
increasingly involved with one another during the interwar period, they nevertheless 
had different histories and traditions and are usually treated separately by scholars. 
German ethnicity notwithstanding, they themselves recognized this distinction. 
Slovenia’s Germans, in point of fact, were not Danube Swabians. 
Historical boundaries aside, it can be difficult to satisfactorily identify places 
across the Siedlungsgebiet with a single appellation. As noted above, the regions of 
German settlement in what ultimately became Yugoslavia were famously multiethnic. 
As such many places in the region have multiple names deriving from three or more 
languages. Unsurprisingly in this multiethnic, multilingual region, locals (who were 
often bilingual) did not always restrict themselves to place names in a single language 
or even their own language. Convention, official regulation and national 
consciousness competed to determine linguistic preference for place names. And 
while legislation and official usage may have often determined place names in 
monolingual terms, alternative appellations endured, of course.  
Recognizing that the German appellations have faded, I will give general 
preference to Serbo-Croatian place names in this dissertation.44 In fact, the Swabians 
who are the subject of this work frequently used German, Serbo-Croatian and even 
Hungarian names to describe their region and especially its major towns such as Novi 
Sad and Osijek. Indeed, the remarkable ethnic and linguistic diversity of the region 
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was such that a monolingual approach to place names was neither possible nor 
desirable. To resolve any confusion, I include a table of important German place 
names and their Slavic equivalents in the Appendix of this dissertation. In conclusion, 
some agility will be required of the reader, but the linguistic topography of the land 
should quickly make itself clear. 
This study will discuss the ethnic Germans of Yugoslavia as “Germans” and, 
when appropriate “Swabians.” It will do so mostly out of pragmatism, however, for 
identity was slippery and complex enough among the Swabians that they themselves 
continued to argue over who counted or not as a Swabian or German into the interwar 
years and beyond. As we shall see, assimilation was not uncommon, and Magyarized 
or Croatized ethnic Germans frequently considered German nationalism quite foreign. 
Discussing the challenges faced by the census taker, the leading German historian of 
Yugoslavia, Holm Sundhausen, commented on the protean nature of nationhood in 
southeast Europe. “If there is no general answer to the question of who or what a 
German was, then no accurate population numbers can be determined,” Sundhausen 
notes. “And if in light of the complicated ethnic relations in broad sections of 
Yugoslavia it was not uncommon to speak of a ‘floating nationality’ and ‘national 
opportunism,’ then there is no convincing reason to exclude the German minority 
from this same environment. Not all persons whose ancestors had come from the 
German speaking parts of Central Europe still understood themselves in the interwar 
period as Germans, and not all those who did understand themselves as such 
possessed a German heritage.”45 
                                                 




Many readers may be familiar with the term “Volksdeutsche” and should think 
this term preferable to the more pedestrian “German”, as I once did. I will use the 
term only sparingly however, for the Volksdeutsche term did not properly emerge 
until well after the years in which this study begins. Thus the term threatens to be 
anachronistic in many cases here. And although the Volksdeutsche term did gain 
general acceptance by the German public, it was also frequently associated with 
National Socialism and is thus somewhat problematic for the historian. Though used 
by non-Nazis to denote those people beyond the Reich’s borders who were culturally 
and linguistically German but lacked Reich citizenship and thus were not German 
citizens or ‘Reichsdeutsche,” such a pale definition fails to capture the full mystique 
of the Nazi concept of Volksdeutsche which was intrinsically bound to voelkisch 
notions of blood and race, themselves tied to history and destiny. In short, 
Volksdeutsche was an especially important term and concept for National 
Socialism.46 “Auslandsdeutsche” was another term commonly used to denote ethnic 
Germans beyond Germany’s (or Austria’s) borders. This term generally lacked the 
connotations of blood and soil that rendered Volksdeutsche so compelling to National 
Socialists and the voelkisch-inclined. Since Auslandsdeutsche predates the interwar 
era and thus applies to the entire period of this study, I will frequently use it in place 
of Volksdeutsche. I will also use German, (Danube) Swabian and Donauschwaben to 
denote Yugoslavia’s ethnic Germans as appropriate. As with place names, then, a 
little terminological adroitness will be required of the reader, who must additionally 
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bear in mind that ethnic and national identities were often unformed or in flux in the 
region that became Yugoslavia.  
 
On Nationalism Theory 
 The topic of nationalism is infamously protean and literature on the subject is 
as broad as it is contentious. Indeed, even basic definitions of “nation” and 
“nationalism” are matters of dispute. The criteria for nationhood is disputed among 
scholars and variously includes language, religion, historical memory, common 
territory, and shared traditions. I take the approach of a selective scavenger in 
nationalism theory and have been particularly influenced in this study by the works of 
Anthony Smith, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Jeremy King, 
and Rogers Brubaker. 
 The theoretical discord of nationalism studies becomes quickly apparent when 
considering challenges to the influential “modernist paradigm.” Advocates of 
modernism such as Ernest Gellner, emphasize the transformative impact of 
modernization (industrial dislocation and such institutions as schools and the 
codification of high culture, both guided by intellectuals), to fashion proper nations.47 
Likewise, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities has been seminal for its 
observations of the transformative power of print capitalism and revolutions in 
conceptions of time.48 Yet, as Anthony D. Smith has argued in both the Ethnic 
Origins of Nations, National Identity, and most recently in Nationalism and 
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Modernism, a nation cannot be created, invented or imagined out of thin air. Modern 
institutions are important and nationalism as a practice may “invent” nations, as 
Gellner asserts, but this is not to say that there are no limits as to what kind of 
community can be imagined or invented. Examining the premodern period, Smith 
writes that  
I came to see clusters of myths, symbols, memories, values, and 
traditions emerging from the shared experiences of several generations 
of cohabiting populations, as the defining cultural elements from 
which ethnic groups emerged. On the other hand, their crystallization 
as self-aware communities, as opposed to other-defined categories, 
was the product of external factors such as folk cultures resulting from 
shared work and residence patterns; group mobilization in periodic 
inter-state warfare producing memories and myths of defeat and 
victory; and especially the impact of organized religions with 
scriptures, sacred languages, and communal priesthoods.49  
  
Thus Smith argues for the importance of available “ethnies” or ethnic communities in 
the formation of nations.50 True, in a very real sense nations are imagined 
communities. Still, there must be a limit to what can be invented and inventions must 
somehow build upon preexisting symbols and shared memory. Nations may 
“crystallize” as Rogers Brubaker also later observed, but they must crystallize out of 
something. Thus a worthy course of study would perhaps ask not only “what” but 
also “when” is a nation.51 
 Doubts about the limits of imagined communities, however, do not (even for 
Smith) challenge the fundamental notion of the nation as a fundamentally modern 
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phenomenon. Though nations assert a historical pedigree and eternal destiny through 
what Eric Hobsbawm famously labeled “invented traditions”, nations remain modern 
products and modern institutions are essential to modern nationhood.52 Furthermore, 
the social and economic dislocations of modernism and the existence of such modern 
institutions as schools are not by themselves sufficient to crystallize nationhood. 
 I concur with Anthony Smith regarding the importance of ethnicity in nation 
formation. Jeremy King reminds us in Budweisers into Czechs and Germans that one 
may be ethnically German or Czech (for example) without being nationally so. For 
that matter, King considers ethnicity itself a problematic term and observes many 
“biethnics” in the Bohemian city of Budweis.53 King’s case study reveals that it was 
only during the later part of the nineteenth century that life and politics became 
nationalized as Czech or German in Bohemia. Indeed, his local history of Budweiser 
politics is not the story of Budweisers “awakening” from their national slumber to the 
sudden realization of their innate Czech- or Germanness. On the contrary, King’s 
history details a revolutionary transformation of politics, society, and indeed 
consciousness over the course of slightly more than a century. He argues basically 
that German speakers and Czech speakers came variously to embrace a national 
identity but insists that the events leading to this embrace were complex. Moreover, 
the process was not complete until the collapse of a triadic structure of identity 
(Czech, German, and Habsburg) under the Monarchy. I assert that a not dissimilar 
process unfolded later and at an accelerated pace for the Danube Swabians through 
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the First World War, the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, and its replacement by 
Yugoslavia.  
I have drawn from many authors in coming to my own understanding of 
nationalism, but the bulk of the influence on my thinking and analysis in this 
dissertation comes from Rogers Brubaker and Anthony Smith, whose work is not 
always harmonious, but whose observations nevertheless provide us with an 
understanding of nationalism generally as well as a framework for interpreting and 
understanding nationalism as it unfolded among the Swabians in the context of 
interwar Yugoslavia. Smith teaches us why many of the preconditions for nationhood 
were present with the Swabians and also points to the important role of national 
activists. Meanwhile, Brubaker explains why nationhood emerged as salient for the 
Swabians after 1918 and highlights the contingency of national identity. 
After his groundbreaking Ethnic Origins of Nations, Anthony D. Smith 
extended his analysis into the modern era. In National Identity, he seeks to explain the 
continuity between the premodern ethnies he detailed in his previous work and 
modern nations. That is, he seeks to identify the process by which modern nations 
were formed and created, especially in Western and Eastern Europe. National Identity 
is particularly useful for a number of reasons. First, Smith provides generally clear 
definitions and explanations, which are fundamental to the analysis of this 
dissertation. Likewise, he identifies different forms of nationalism and different roads 
to nationhood in Western and Eastern Europe. He furthermore identifies the key role 
of intellectuals in the ethnic nationalism that came to so characterize Eastern Europe. 




crystallization and cultivation of national consciousness is especially helpful for my 
own study of Danube Swabians and enables us to interpret the Swabian national 
activists’ penchant for history, language, music, symbolism, and culture. 
 Smith defines “nation” broadly as a “named human population sharing an 
historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”54 The nation 
“signifies a cultural and political bond, uniting in a single political community all 
who share an historic community, all who share an historic culture and homeland.”55  
Indeed, one function of the nation is to provide social bonds between individuals, 
groups and classes within an ethnic community by providing evidence of shared 
values, traditions, symbols and heritage. Such artifacts of the nation as anthems, 
emblems, uniforms, monuments, commemorations, ceremonies and especially flags 
have key functions here, he writes. The nation enables, even demands, members to 
feel exalted by their sense of common identity, and may thus be said to serve as a 
kind of “faith achievement group, ” a vessel of collective consciousness and belief 
which to overcome challenges and surmount obstacles and hurdles.56 In its many 
manifestations, the nation variously combines a civic and territorial aspect with an 
ethnic and genealogical aspect, yielding a multidimensionality and complexity that is 
also highly flexible and may be partnered with other movements.57  
As Smith reminds us, the nation is not necessarily congruent with the state, 
though such congruence has been the aspiration of many nationalisms. Smith again 
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defines nationalism broadly as “an ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some 
of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation.”58 Its core doctrine consists 
of the proposition that the world is naturally divided into nations with unique history, 
character, and destiny; that loyalty to the nation is paramount for it is the source of all 
political and social power; that an individual’s proper freedom and prospect to realize 
his full potential depends on his willingness to identify with the nation; and that peace 
and justice in the world require that nations be free and secure. In short, “nationalism 
is primarily a cultural doctrine, or more accurately, a political ideology with a cultural 
doctrine at its center.” It is an “ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
the autonomy, unity and identity of a nation.”59 The reader should bear in mind such 
definitions when examining the actions of the German activists in Yugoslavia, 
especially during the first decade after the First World War. It was in large part 
through their efforts to spread awareness of their ethnic community’s history, myths, 
symbols, language and the like that the idea of national identity became crystallized 
in Swabian minds.  
Smith identifies collective cultural identity as referring “not to a uniformity of 
elements over generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive 
generations of a given cultural unity of population, to shared memories of earlier 
events and periods in the history of that unit and to notions entertained by each 
generation about the collective destiny of that unity and its culture.” Continuity need 
not imply permanence, however. Changes in cultural identities plainly occur, often 
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through profound or traumatic developments which shake up the basic “patterns of 
myth, symbol, memory and value that bind successive generations together while 
demarcating them from ‘outsiders.’” But disruptive cultural changes need not 
adversely affect the sense of common ethnicity. On the contrary, that sense of 
common ethnicity and identity may be renewed by such traumatic developments as 
war, exile, or religious conversion. Indeed, “a combination of often adverse external 
factors and a rich inner or ‘ethno’ history may help to crystallize and perpetuate 
ethnic identities,” Smith writes. Key forces in the process of the coalescence and 
survival of ethnic identification include state-making, warfare, and organized 
religion.60 As we shall see, all three of these forces were important in the emergence 
of a specifically national consciousness in the Swabian (German) ethnic community 
in Yugoslavia. 
Smith identifies two ideal models of the nation, a civic model which 
developed in Western Europe and an ethnic variety that emerged in Europe’s east. It 
is the latter variety that concerns the Danube Swabians. Briefly put, “historical 
territory, legal-political community, legal political equality of members, and common 
civic culture and ideology” form the central components of the basic, civic model of 
the nation as it developed in Western Europe. However, in Eastern Europe a different 
concept of the nation developed, which retained the central components of the 
Western variety but reprioritized them and exaggerated the importance of ethnicity. 
Smith calls this alternative to the Western model of the nation the “ethnic conception 
of the nation”, which was most distinguished from the Western variant by its 
emphasis on a community of birth and native culture. In the ethnic variant, 
                                                 




nationhood is indelibly ascribed at birth, while the Western variety ostensibly allows 
for individual choice. The central elements of the ethnic concept of the nation were 
“genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, 
customs and traditions.”61 It is primarily this latter, ethnic conception of the 
nationhood that concerns the Danube Swabians of this dissertation.  
 Nationalism is a myth at whose center stands the nation, Smith explains. It is a 
modern mythology but paradoxically asserts the nation’s ancient origins. The nation 
having allegedly lapsed into a deep slumber (often due to subjugation by another 
group), it becomes the task of the nationalist to reawaken the nation and restore and 
purify it such that it may realize its unique potential in a world defined by nations. By 
purging the nation of allegedly “foreign” elements and thereby supposedly recovering 
its original essence, nationalists promise group salvation and future national greatness 
using a language of past glory and achievement. The means to this end of salvation 
are historical symbolism, myths, anthems, celebration of the vernacular, and other 
such artifacts of nationhood.62  
 The path to nation formation which Smith identified in Central and Eastern 
Europe, that of popular or vernacular mobilization, differed from the above 
mentioned route of bureaucratic incorporation by an aristocratic community in that 
the bureaucratic state played a lesser and more indirect role. In this route to nation 
formation (and unlike in the West), the ethnic communities typically were subject 
peoples in large, polyethnic empires governed by ethnically “foreign” elites. These 
subject communities were often bound by religious bonds, whose scriptures, liturgy, 
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priesthood, and rituals and ceremonies provided the means of ethnic survival over the 
centuries by defining a distinct social and cultural space for the ethnic community. 
Transformation from ethnic community to nationhood for such communities was 
frequently slow and traumatic, however, and often resulted in a kind of ethnic 
exclusivity, since it was difficult for the nascent nation to break free from its 
“habitual conceptual ethnic framework and lifestyle.”63 
Lacking a coercive authority such as the bureaucratic state, the ethnic 
intelligentsia played a key part in the development of a properly national 
consciousness on the vernacular mobilization route. In this model, the intelligentsia’s 
task is to “mobilize a formerly passive community into forming a nation around the 
new vernacular historical culture that it has rediscovered.” Nothing less than a “moral 
and political revolution” would be necessary in order to emancipate the people and 
form a political community of equal citizens. The interrelated processes of this 
revolution included  
 “A movement from passive subordination of the community to its active political 
assertion 
 A movement to place the community in its homeland, a secure and recognized 
compact territory 
 A movement to endow the territorial community with economic unity 
 A movement to place the people at the center of concern and to celebrate the 
masses by re-educating them in national values, memories and myths 
 A movement to turn ethnic members into legal ‘citizens’ by conferring civil, 
social and political rights on them”64 
 
The degree to which the above undertakings might be successful depended in large 
part on the embrace of a living and usable past by the intelligentsia. History would be 
made the common property of the people in which the people’s common sentiments, 
                                                 
63  Ibid. 61-62. 




traits and traditions could be identified. Smith writes that the intellectuals sought to 
create “maps and moralities” for the ethnic community based on the history and 
landscape of the ethnic community’s claimed territory. In this way, such 
topographical features as mountains, valleys and rivers might assume new symbolic 
importance as representations and evidence of presumed national values or 
experience. Likewise, historical experience assumed a new importance. The people 
were the new source of national salvation. (Often imagined, idealized, sanitized or 
even fabricated) memories of a vanished national golden age were mobilized to offer 
the people inspiration and suggested a direction for national destiny that was 
simultaneously clear and Janus-faced. “Hence the return to that past through a series 
of myths of origins and descent, of liberation and migration, of the golden age and its 
heroes and sages, perhaps of the chosen people now to be reborn after its long sleep 
of decay and/or exile. Together,” Smith concludes, “these myth-motifs [could] be 
formed into a composite nationalist mythology and salvation drama.”65 
 In National Identity, Smith is principally writing about the process by which, 
for example, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians emerged as nations from under imperial 
tutelage. However, many of his observations are highly applicable to the experience 
and collective cultural identity of the Danube Swabians, who developed a national 
consciousness during the interwar years as a local branch of the greater German 
nation. As we shall see, German intellectuals and activists played a central role in the 
development of national consciousness among the Germans. They furnished maps 
and moralities for the ethnic community that provided myths of common origins and 
descent, offered historical figures and heroes embodying the supposed national 
                                                 




virtues and traits of these Danubian Germans, and held the landscape to be proof of 
German industry the legitimacy of the German presence in their adopted Heimat. In 
the history of wars against the Ottomans and the subsequent colonization of the 
Pannonian Plain, the intellectuals furnished a lost historical golden age. In 
contemporary Germany the intellectuals recognized a national homeland as well as 
proof of modern German greatness, which could likewise be attained locally by 
Swabians if only they would embrace their national identity, for national salvation lay 
in the people themselves.  
Of the many volumes on nationalism, Rogers Brubaker’s Nationalism 
Reframed has been especially important for this study. Brubaker provides a 
framework for analyzing the situation of the Swabians between the world wars and 
also provides a vocabulary by which to discuss the particularities of German and 
Yugoslav attitudes, policies, objectives and organizations. He also offers us the ability 
to distinguish between the nationalism of Germans in Germany proper and that of the 
Yugoslav Germans, who were different and sometimes pursued different goals or had 
different interests despite their common ethnicity. Finally, Brubaker’s work yields a 
theoretical explanation for why German nationalism, after so many years of relative 
unimportance, suddenly became salient and meaningful as an organizing principle 
and basis for group cohesion outside of the churches and even in spite of confessional 
differences.  
In Nationalism Reframed, Brubaker complains that scholars, though 
recognizing nations as constructs, nevertheless often treat them as substantial, 




proposes that scholars reconsider it as a category of practice. Indeed, “nationalism can 
and should be understood without invoking ‘nations’ as substantial entities. Instead of 
focusing on nations as real groups, we should focus on nationhood and nationness, on 
‘nation’ as practical category, institutionalized form, and contingent event.”66 In this 
understanding, , nationhood should not be accepted as a given but rather something 
that variously “crystallizes” in response to events. In large part, this dissertation is a 
study of such a local crystallization of German nationalism in Yugoslavia. 
 The drift of the category of “nation” eastward in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century  meant a fundamental transformation of the way in which the 
region’s diverse empires were understood by their residents. Where before the 
Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires had been experienced and understood as 
polyethnic, polyreligious, and polylingual, in the national age they were understood 
(and often resented) as multinational. The “principle of nationality,” the notion that 
states should be by and for a specific nation, “became the prime lever for reimagining 
and reorganizing political space.”67 However, Brubaker points out, nationalism was 
not only the agent of the reorganization of political space in the empires of Central 
and Eastern Europe, it was also a byproduct of that reorganization process. “But the 
forms of nationalism that resulted from the nationalization of political space are 
different from – and less familiar than – those that helped engender it.”68 
Brubaker observes a triadic interplay between three often antagonistic types of 
nationalism: nationalizing nationalism, homeland nationalism, and minority 
nationalism. Characteristic of states which perceive themselves as not yet fully 
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realized nation-states, is a “nationalizing nationalism” which articulates claims in the 
name of an ethnoculturally defined “core nationality” that understands itself as the 
“owner” of the state. As happened in Yugoslavia, core nations may use state power to 
effect discriminatory measures against non-fellow-ethnics with the goal of fully 
realizing the nation-state. Such measures might include discriminatory language laws, 
school laws, laws on administration or state employment, ethnic preference in state 
employment and the awarding of state contracts, uneven land reform, and other 
measures to redress past “injustices” through an inversion of the former, “unjust” 
order by a new, national one. Nationalizing nationalism is simultaneously a reaction 
to perceived past injustices as well as an effort by newly dominant elites to reverse 
the situation by which their states are “insufficiently” national, that is, they are 
“unrealized” or “incomplete” nation-states.69 States which seek to resolve this 
situation through the abovementioned discriminatory measures are “nationalizing 
states.” Interwar Yugoslavia was an example of such a state. 
Where ethnic minorities find themselves beyond the borders of their own 
ethnoculturally defined state, nationalizing nationalism (and states) may collide with 
a “homeland nationalism” practiced by the declared nation-state of the ethnocultural 
minority. Homeland nationalism asserts its duty to monitor the welfare of its co-
ethnics abroad. Typically, homeland nationalism activity may include cultural, 
educational, or linguistic support as well as political agitation for the rights for “its” 
minority coethnics abroad. It is a reaction to nationalizing nationalism. Indeed, 
homeland nationalism and nationalizing nationalism exist in a condition of direct 
opposition and conflict yet (or rather because) both share the common trait of 
                                                 




addressing the “nation” which is understood as distinct from the citizenry of the state, 
that is, the nation to whom the nation-state ostensibly “belongs.”70 
“Minority nationalism”, such as a strident local movement in the nationalizing 
state, completes the triad but may do so in unexpected ways. A national minority 
exists caught between conflicting nationalizing nationalism and the homeland 
nationalism which makes claims on its behalf. Brubaker cautions against 
automatically treating “national minority” as an ethnodemographic reality. Rather, 
“national minority” is a political stance, just as “external national homeland” or 
“nationalizing state.” “Minority nationalist stances characteristically involve a self-
understanding in specifically “national” rather than merely “ethnic” terms, a demand 
for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of 
certain collective, nationally-based cultural or political rights.” Like homeland 
nationalism, minority nationalism is a stance in direct opposition to nationalizing 
nationalism. However, minority nationalism and homeland nationalism may not 
always share the same interests or objectives. The two nationalisms need not always 
be harmonious and may in fact be divergent, particularly when the homeland pursues 
homeland nationalism for reasons parallel to, apart from or even contrary to the goals 
of the national minority. In other words, a homeland nationalist stance may in fact be 
deployed for strategic purposes quite distinct from the welfare of the national 
minority in question.71 
Finally, it is important to note that the three fields in this nationalist triad exist 
with each other in a constant state of interaction characterized by mutual monitoring 
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but also are themselves the loci of interaction and competition. They are “fields of 
differentiated and competing positions, arenas of struggle among competing stances. 
The triadic relation between these three “elements” is therefore a relation between 
relational fields.” This, Brubaker writes, “is part of what makes it so unstable and 
potentially explosive.”72 
 The Donauschwaben in Yugoslavia found themselves in a complex version of 
this nationalist triad. On the one hand, they were subject to the nationalizing 
nationalisms (themselves often mutually antagonistic) of Yugoslavia. Additionally, 
they were exposed to the homeland nationalism of Weimar and later Nazi Germany 
through state and private Volkstumarbeit organizations, organizations devoted to 
promoting the welfare of Germans abroad.73 Finally, they expressed their own 
minority nationalism through the cultivation of a local Swabian identity and the 
establishment of German cultural and political organizations which sought, above all, 
to maintain a system of German schools. This effort was particularly difficult because 
of the intensity of Yugoslavia’s nationalizing nationalism, supplemented by the 
conflict between Serbs and Croats over the nature of the state.  
War, political uncertainty, and inclusion in the new Yugoslav state 
transformed the Swabians’ social and political environment. Indeed, irrespective of 
how they viewed themselves, the new Yugoslav state plainly understood the 
Donauschwaben as Germans and discriminated against them as such. This in 
particular had a catalyzing effect, as ethnic Germans found themselves excluded from 
the political process and their lands targeted for redistribution by the new kingdom’s 
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agrarian reform. Meanwhile, contact with ethnic Germans from Germany and 
elsewhere in the Habsburg Monarchy had inspired new feelings of national 
consciousness and ethnic solidarity among the hitherto passive Swabians. Thus 
shocked into a new self-awareness and group cohesion by the First World War, the 
Habsburg collapse, and South Slav triumphalism, Swabian national activism in 
Yugoslavia looked to nationalism as it had been locally pioneered and modeled by 
South Slavs. The Germans were spurred into redefinition, transformation, and 
mobilization by the agenda, actions and successes of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene 
nationalists, whose previous methods also provided a template. 
 German national identity developed particular salience among Yugoslavia’s 
ethnic Germans because they were treated as national Germans, social and political 
aliens in the nationalizing state which was the Kingdom of the Serbs Croats and 
Slovenes. As its ungainly name suggested, this aspiring nation-state (which formally 
understood Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to be “tribes” of a single Yugoslav nation) 
was at best awkwardly suited to the nation-state paradigm and was furthermore 
inconveniently saddled with a large number of ethnic minorities. As such, the state 
(and its “tribes”) were intent on promoting the assimilation of the minorities in their 
midst. The Swabians’ almost two centuries of settlement in Croatia-Slavonia and 
Vojvodina and Germans’ much longer history in Slovenia mattered little to the 
nationalists in Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana. Additionally, the shock of the loss of 
the war and the respective destruction or humiliation of the Habsburg and German 
empires produced disillusionment and a crisis of identity among German ethics and 




a Habsburg or supranational identity, they simultaneously discovered themselves to 
be an unwanted minority in somebody else’s nation-state. The new circumstances led 
to the intensification of efforts by Volkstumarbeit organizations in Germany and 
Austria, as well as later Nazi advocacy on behalf of German ethnics abroad. In other 
words, both in Germany/Austria and in Yugoslavia, teams of German national 
activists and self-styled “awakeners” worked to stimulate and shape German identity 
and pride among the Swabian population. Their message found new resonance in 
these new circumstances after 1918. 
While Anthony D. Smith identifies and argues for ethnies as the raw material 
from which to form nations, Brubaker holds that nationness should be understood as 
an “event,” something that “happens” in response to circumstances. Thus nationness 
becomes for Brubaker a “contingent, conjunctually fluctuating and precarious frame 
of vision and basis for individual and collective action, rather than a relatively stable 
product of deep developmental trends in economy, polity, or culture.”74 Ultimately, 
Smith’s and Brubaker’s approaches are more complementary than contradictory. 
Smith does not argue for the exclusivity of ethnicity in nation formation, only that it 
is a necessary component. Likewise, Brubaker does not deny the salience of ethnicity. 
Rather, he asserts that an interplay of political and social forces activates ethnicity as 
meaningful, producing nationalism. Though Brubaker is skeptical of how 
substantially we should treat nations, both authors acknowledge that nations 
“crystallize” and are contingent. Mindful of Brubaker’s triadic theory of interacting 
minority, homeland and nationalizing nationalisms as well of the work of Benedict 
Anderson, Ernst Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, this study will observe how mutually 
                                                 




antagonistic national entrepreneurs variously imagined the German community in 
Yugoslavia and competed to invent and command its traditions. 
 
 
The Road from Swabian to German 
This dissertation directs considerable attention to the 1930s, when the 
Swabian community was riven by ideological and personal division. However, the 
work also pays significant attention to the development of national identity in 
Yugoslavia in the 1920s and its antecedents in Austria-Hungary. The dissertation’s 
structure is chronological and gradually reveals the contested content of the German 
national idea and how it was variously deployed by mutual antagonists who claimed 
to speak for the soul of the German Volk in Yugoslavia.  
In the following chapters we show that the Danube Swabians were an 
ethnically aware but not nationally conscious, largely rural population which required 
the shock of the First World War and the twin influences of Yugoslav nationalizing 
nationalism and German homeland nationalism to stimulate its own national 
consciousness and minority nationalism on a broad scale. We additionally reveal the 
central role played by a handful of Swabian activists working tirelessly to craft and 
impart a German national identity upon their fellow Germans, who had frequently 
assimilated to their non-German milieu. Chapters One and Two outline the process of 
German colonization in Vojvodina and Croatia-Slavonia before 1918. Here we see 
the antecedents of Yugoslavia’s interwar German national movement in the form of 
regional German political parties, newspapers, and the early involvement of certain 




abroad. In Chapters Three and Four, we observe the effects of the First World War’s 
military mobilization on the Swabians and their institutional responses to the new 
Yugoslav Kingdom, where they were a national minority in a foreign nationalizing-
state. The Germans’ responses included the creation of publishing enterprises, 
cultural associations, a specifically German political party, and the German Lutheran 
Church. In these chapters we maintain our attention to homeland nationalism 
emanating from the Weimar Republic. Chapter Five, considers the central role of the 
Swabian activists who led the German minority nationalism movement in the 
Yugoslav Kingdom and examines the content of the national identity they sought to 
impart to their German co-ethnics. In Chapter Six, we discuss the German movement 
in an environment transformed by the imposition of royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia 
in 1929 and the Nazis’ accession to power in Germany in 1933. During this decade, 
the interaction of homeland, nationalizing and minority nationalisms resulted in both 
heightened German national consciousness as well as deep instability in the Swabian 
community. Here and in the following chapters we devote particular attention to the 
Nazi-oriented challenge to the conservative German identity which Swabian leaders 
had cultivated during the 1920s. Chapter Seven discusses the Swabian original 
leadership’s attempt to resist their young, Nazi-oriented challengers (gathered loosely 
in a Erneuerungsbewegung or “renewal movement”), who sought control of the 
Swabians’ principal organization, the Kulturbund. In Chapter Eight we turn to 
religious responses to the Nazi-oriented Erneuerungsbewegung. Our particular focus 
here is on the determined resistance movement led by the Swabian Catholic clergy 




Church. Finally in Chapter Nine we review the triumph of the Erneuerungsbewegung 
in the Kulturbund and its imitation of Nazi models only after the outbreak of the 
Second World War in 1939 and the subsequent German advances that preceded the 
invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941. 
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Chapter 1: German Settlement and the Origins of the German 
National Movement in Hungary before the First World War 
The Hungarian lands that were incorporated into Yugoslavia after the First 
World War provide two principal sites for analysis of the Danube Swabians. Those 
parts of the Hungarian Kingdom were Vojvodina and the associated but in certain 
respects separate Croatia-Slavonia, which then included Srijem. The Swabians in 
these two regions had experiences before and during the interwar years which were 
similar and yet distinct. We begin by discussing the colonization of the Hungarian 
lands which were reconquered from the Ottoman Empire in the decades after the 
Ottoman’s 1683 defeat in Vienna. We then turn to the process of Magyarization by 
which many descendants of those German colonists variously embraced Magyar 
national identity. Finally, we turn to an important manifestation of resistance to 
official Magyarization in the activities of Edmund Steinacker and likeminded 
supporters who founded the basic political and media institutions of the German 
national movement in southern Hungary before the First World War. We will 
principally deal with German immigration to Croatia-Slavonia and the origins of the 
German national movement there in a separate chapter. Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed a 
certain autonomy inside Hungary before 1918 and the circumstances of that 





Colonization in Hungary 
The Germans’ initial immigration to southern Hungary was principally driven 
by Habsburg economic and security considerations, not German nationalist 
expansion. On the contrary, the final Schwabenzug, or process of German 
immigration to Hungary, was over even before the French Revolution announced the 
new, national age in Europe. Thereafter, the Habsburgs had many reasons to distrust 
German nationalism, not act as its agent or sponsor. The colonization did have a 
certain political aspect but this was aimed at diluting or limiting the mass of 
troublesome Magyars who might otherwise reestablish their territorial claims and 
provide a source of resistance to Vienna. The dispatch of so many German colonists 
furthermore should be understood as part of the rationalizing administrative reforms 
of the 1700s. Ultimately, “hostility to Magyar nationalism was definitely a motive in 
the colonization in question, but it came second to the principal one of economic 
rehabilitation.”82 As for contemporary Serbs and Croats, they were also suspicious of 
the colonizing Germans. But their criticisms were often more symptomatic of their 
own nationalism than that of the German settlers, who generally remained indifferent 
toward German nationalism into the twentieth century. 
Although this dissertation will concern itself principally with the Yugoslav 
Germans after 1918, it is impossible to discuss those Germans in isolation from other 
historic German populations in Trianon Hungary and Romania. The Schwabenzug in 
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the eighteenth century formed only one episode in the long history of German 
settlement in Hungary launched by St. Stephen himself.83 The Schwabenzug followed 
the Habsburg victories over the Ottomans in Southeastern Europe in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These new Swabian immigrants interacted with 
the earlier German communities, but in many cases remained distinct from them.84  In 
sum, Hungary’s German colonists were a historic presence in the kingdom, invited en 
masse by Hungarian kings and Habsburg emperors as bearers of culture, engines of 
prosperity, defenders of the land, and factors of stability. 
The eighteenth century colonization of the reconquered Hungarian lands 
differed from previous German immigration in several respects. It was far larger than 
the preceding immigration to Transylvania and the Carpathians and it was much more 
organized, featuring extensive imperial support and coordination. Whereas previous 
immigrants had largely been artisans or miners, the eighteenth century colonists were 
overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, peasant farmers. The Schwabenzug, as the 
colonization later came to be known, may be broken down into three waves, usually 
named for the Habsburg ruler under whom they occurred (Charles VI, Maria Theresa, 
and Joseph II) between 1718 and 1787. These waves of settlement were sponsored 
affairs, in which varying levels of financial and material support or privileges were 
guaranteed to settlers as incentives to move east. Many came to the region by boat, 
floating down the Danube in temporary crafts that were then dissembled for their 
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wood at the end of their one way journey to the land which they embraced as their 
new Heimat.85  
Although the settlers came to be known among themselves and surrounding 
nationalities as “Schwaben”, the majority did not actually originate in the Swabian 
region of what is today southwest Germany. Rather, the German colonists had highly 
diverse origins, coming from Bavaria, Hessen, the Pfalz, Lothringen, the Saarland, 
and the Sudeten regions of Bohemia, among other places. Danube Swabian historian 
Vladimir Geiger suggests the “Swabian” appellation may be attributed to a 
preponderance of Swabians at the outset of colonization. The first two waves of 
emigration consisted exclusively of Catholics. According to Geiger, the Carolean 
wave consisted of approximately 10,000 people who were settled in 57 colonies. 
While the first of these were German artisans, later colonists were overwhelmingly 
peasant farmers. During the second, Theresian wave, approximately 5000 families 
settled in 50 new places and reinforced 30 preexisting colonies. These colonists went 
mostly to Banat. However, during the final, Josephinian wave, colonists also settled 
in Batschka. This wave of 3500 German families also differed from previous ones in 
that it included Protestants as well as Catholics.86 True to its reforming sponsor, 
Joseph II’s Ansiedlungspatent of 1781 had offered limited guarantees of freedom of 
thought and freedom of religion.87 Over the course of the eighteenth century, the 
colonization became progressively better organized to include not just supplies and 
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financial incentives, but also village layout and housing designs. Ultimately, more 
than 150,000 ancestors of the Danube Swabians emigrated to Hungary over the 
course of the eighteenth century as part of a sophisticated settlement enterprise. The 
settlers’ and their descendents long favored large families, thus greatly swelling the 
German population in southern Hungary.  
Colonization was an arduous affair, far more difficult than its organizers 
acknowledged when soliciting colonists in the Habsburg Monarchy and the west 
German lands with descriptions of tidy villages and bountiful harvests. The 
eighteenth century colonists came to a region devastated and depopulated by war. 
Economically, the region was economically underdeveloped and much of its land had 
never been cleared for cultivation. Extensive swamps had to be drained and forests 
cut back. Additionally, colonists had to contend with hunger, outbreaks of disease 
and, during the early years, occasional raids by Turkish forces. Many colonists 
perished or gave up and returned home. Indeed, many of the early settlements would 
not have endured had they not been reinforced by later colonists, and often the 
sacrifices of one generation could only be reaped by its successor. One common 
refrain, “to the first [generation] death, the second danger, and the third bread” held 
that only the third generation of colonists prospered, after the first two had 
experienced death and peril.88 Such tales of trial and toil became woven into the 
Danube Swabians’ narrative of their ancestors’ struggle and shaped their own sense 
of self as pioneers who had won their land through perseverance and sacrifice. 
Ultimately, then, the Swabian colonization was a complicated and complex 
process featuring various patterns of settlement over many turbulent decades. Banat 
                                                 




and Batschka were the first areas to be colonized extensively, while Croatia-Slavonia 
(including Srijem) received settlers only later. (As we shall see in the following 
chapter, these later German settlers were largely the descendents of earlier colonists 
north of the Drava and Danube rivers.) The extent of colonization was such that by 
1787 the population of expanded Hungary was 9 million (up from 3.5 million in 
1720). While this repopulation represented a form of success, it also had the 
consequence of transforming Hungary “into a multi-ethnic state in which the 
Hungarians [Magyars] lost their absolute majority.”89 The colonists adapted to their 
surroundings, however, often embracing Magyar culture and language. Intermarriage, 
integration, and acculturation often blurred the lines between cultures, resulting in 
many hybrid identities or outright “defections” from Germandom. Blurring these 
ideal types of the contemporary nationalist were the parallel pressures of 
Magyarization and Croatization.  
Though they were nominally joined, the relationship between the Kingdoms 
of Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia was never an easy one, being characterized by 
Budapest’s constant ambitions to dominate what remained a nominally separate 
territory and repeated Croatian resistance. As we shall see in the following chapter, 
tensions persisted between Budapest and Zagreb even after an 1868 arrangement 
designed to regulate relations between them. Meanwhile, Magyar control of Hungary 
proper was near total after the Austrian concessions in the Ausgleich of 1867. Policies 
of Magyarization accelerated and intensified during the dualist era and not dissimilar 
Croatization measures were enacted in Croatia-Slavonia. The upshot of this situation 
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was that, depending on their place of residence, the Swabians in Transleithania 
effectively existed under two regimes as far as political matters and social and 
cultural issues were concerned. Swabians were subject to the Magyar and Croatian 
hegemonic nationalisms. These nationalizing nationalisms were intent on assimilating 
them but were sometimes at odds themselves. In such an environment, the nascent 
German national movement often encountered official hostility and popular 
impatience, but the Swabian national activists nevertheless succeeded in planting 
certain organizational and ideological seeds which would grow and bear fruit during 
the interwar era. To understand the beginnings of the German national movement in 
the lands that would become Yugoslavia is to study these early national protagonists. 
In their actions we see the methods which would be later deployed to stimulate 
German national consciousness and forge political unity in Yugoslavia. 
 
Magyarization 
In 1924, the aged Hungarian German activist Edmund Steinacker recalled 
that, during the dualist era, Germans in Hungary were characterized by a certain 
national “tepidity” and that the Germans’ apathy toward nationhood derived from 
their history and circumstances in Hungary. Having prospered there, they considered 
Hungary their fatherland and were often sympathetic to the strivings of the Magyars 
in culture and against absolutism. The Germans, however, did not recognize the 
danger to their own national identity when legitimate Magyar cultural strivings 
evolved into assimilationist, Magyarizing tendencies, he claimed.90 After the 1867 
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Ausgleich, Hungarian Germans, naturally sought to benefit materially from the 
national political changes and join in the administration of the new state. 
Magyarization being the price of participation in the affairs of Ausgleich Hungary’s 
state and society, however, Hungary’s Germans lost their intellectual elite. This loss 
hobbled any prospect of a German national movement. Indeed, it was the urban 
Germans, who might otherwise have been the most inclined toward German 
nationalism, who were most susceptible to Magyarization.91   
Broadly speaking, Magyarization was a kind of assimilation or acculturation, 
a process by which non-Magyar elements came to adopt Magyar culture and 
language. Magyarization reflected Magyar cultural hegemony within the bounds of 
the Hungarian kingdom and was regarded by proponents as a self-evidently good 
thing both for the Hungarian state and for the individuals adopting the state people’s 
culture. Ultimately, however, Magyarization was more than a policy that could be 
turned on and off. It was a social current and pressure that permeated Hungarian 
society. Indeed, Magyarization was a kind of cultural hegemony that exerted a 
magnetic attraction on certain sectors of non-Magyar society and whose attractions 
radiated the values, lifestyle and prosperity of the Hungarian gentry. As a policy and 
social pressure, it was a manifestation of nationalizing nationalism for it was a 
strategy by which to consolidate the Magyar nation-state through policies designed to 
forge Magyars out of the many ethnic groups in the kingdom. Finally, some saw in 
Magyarization a civilizing mission to bring higher culture to the benighted peasantry, 
a kind of “Magyar’s burden”. Magyarization, thus, was at once coercive policy, 
voluntary assimilation, socio-economic betterment, cultural appeal and a social 
                                                 




phenomenon. The Magyars believed themselves to have a historic duty to maintain 
their kingdom’s independence, and recognized that strength to this end would come 
from the linguistic and cultural homogenization of the population. Indeed, advocates 
of Magyarization asserted that their assimilationist project differed little from what 
had occurred earlier in France, when Paris had reached out to the diverse French 
countryside in the interest of forging French nationhood and consolidating its state. 
Acculturation to Magyardom was regarded as a reasonable, self-evident, and even 
desirable requirement for socio-economic advancement and participation in the 
affairs of Hungarian state and society. Magyarization, thus, could be both an artificial 
kind of cultural engineering but also a natural form of assimilation. It operated though 
pressure but also through appeal. 
Despite Hungary’s vastly improved position under the terms of the Ausgleich, 
the country plainly remained incomplete according to the emerging paradigm of the 
nation-state. For the purpose of enhancing the position of Hungary viz. Austria in the 
joint state (and thereby becoming the dominant partner), assertive Magyar voices 
increasingly called for policies that would complete the transformation of Hungary 
into a modern nation-state by homogenizing its population in Magyar language and 
culture. The 1875 ascension of the Liberal regime meant an atmosphere of 
increasingly radical Magyarization saturated with mutual nationalist mistrust.  
As contemporary Oscar Jaszi observed, the radicalization of Magyarization 
intensified across the Ausgleich era with each consecutive generation’s assumption of 
power. Those who had concluded the Ausgleich remembered the conflict with the 




have to be taken to secure the nationalities’ cooperation in the new era. However, in 
1875, a new generation assumed the helm of Hungary, led by Kalaman Tisza and the 
Liberal Party. This new generation was “a generation of the gentry which forgot the 
great lessons of 1848-49 and which regarded the situation of the country exclusively 
from the point of view of their momentary interests.”92 Tisza remained in office until 
1890 and presided over an intensification and expansion of Magyarization measures 
and sentiments that paled only compared to the impatient Magyar nationalism of the 
succeeding generation in the 1890s and twentieth century.93  
Though official Magyarization’s opponents decried it as highly pernicious, the 
efficacy of state sponsored Magyarization was sometimes questionable. Oscar Jaszi 
has observed that Magyarization policies in education, for example, were often 
ineffective and even counterproductive. While Magyarization might have been more 
successful in urban areas, large sections of the overwhelmingly agrarian population 
remained far less affected by it. Those in the non-Magyar countryside who did attend 
schools in Hungarian often learned the language imperfectly at best, having scant 
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opportunity to use it after the end of the school day. The real tragedy in many such 
cases was that village students learned neither their native tongue nor Magyar with 
any sophistication.94 
If Magyarization was often ineffective in basic education, it sometimes had 
unintended consequences in secondary education. Secondary schools were typically 
located in larger towns and cities, where the quality of both students and instruction 
were higher. In every such case, there was at least some Magyar milieu in which to 
use the language socially. Jaszi writes, 
As a matter of fact, the greater part of the intelligentsia of the non-
Magyar peoples learned the Magyar language very well, nay some of 
them became excellent Magyar orators and writers. But from the point 
of view of Magyar assimilation there was no advantage in this process 
because the non-Magyar youth, recruited from these schools, became 
the most ardent supporters of the claims of their races, and the 
mechanical drill of Magyarization had as its result the embittered fight 
of these “Magyarized” elements against the school system of 
assimilation and sometimes against the Hungarian state itself which 
they identified with the system of forcible Magyarization. Another part 
of the non-Magyar youth went abroad into the schools of their co-
nationals beyond the frontiers and this intercourse kindled even more 
the fire of irredentism.95 
 
Most of the men who first assumed leadership of the ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia in 
the interwar period would have come from precisely such an educational background 
and many had studied in Austria or Germany.  
Ultimately, Magyarization may be best described as a kind of “soft 
oppression,” or perhaps a “guided repression,” whose end goal was theoretically the 
enrichment of the assimilates and the state. Its main instruments were education, the 
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Magyar monopoly on the public sphere and administration, discrimination, prejudice, 
the reflexive assumption of Magyar cultural superiority, and finally the expectation 
that professional success in Hungary necessarily and self-evidently required 
assimilation. The Catholic Church was also a promoter and vehicle of Magyarization. 
Many of its priests were themselves Magyarized from German, Slovak or other ethnic 
stock and embraced the Hungarian state project passionately. Ultimately, the Church 
and instruments of public policy and social expectance aimed at compelling an 
identity shift among the huge non-Magyar populations of the state. It reflected the 
ascendant national principle in Hungary, by which Magyars reconceived Hungary as 
being not merely polyethnic but regrettably multinational. Magyar nationalism 
became increasingly imperialistic in Hungary after the 1880s, when “it became a 
political axiom that either the Magyars would assimilate the nationalities or the 
nationalities would destroy the Hungarian state.”96 The cacophonic chaos of multi-
national Cisleithania only confirmed Magyar convictions of the imperative of national 
unity and the drive to Magyarize. 
 
Magyarization and the Danube Swabians 
Hungary’s many nationalities considered official Magyarization menacing 
until the very end. Some groups were clearly more disposed to assimilate than others, 
however, and numerous factors, including demographics, geography, ambition, 
prosperity, religion, education, and occupation served as key determinants of this 
interethnic emigration. Indeed, susceptibility even varied within groups. The Germans 
                                                 




of central Hungary in particular were quite susceptible to assimilation, their 
transformation being most notable in booming Budapest.97 Meanwhile, the rural 
Germans of southern Hungary remained comparatively immune to the seduction or 
coercion of Magyarization and endured into the twentieth century, when they formed 
the basis of southeastern Europe’s interwar German minorities. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, Hungary had successfully trained a 
competent class of Magyar state administrators and had thus embedded Magyar 
national feeling throughout the state apparatus. Particularly in the cities of the central 
part of the country, public life became Magyar life and Magyar nationhood was 
ascendant in language, custom and public spirit. Magyarization consolidated its 
biggest gains in central Hungary, especially in the towns, among immigrant Jews, the 
German burghers, and other immigrants from the kingdom’s fringe who swelled the 
ranks of the urban working class.98 Between 1880 and 1910, more than half a million 
Germans acculturated to Magyardom, especially in Budapest and the kingdom’s 
interior.99 Such Magyarization “success” was hardly decisive, however, and as late as 
1910 Magyars only constituted 48.1 percent of the kingdom’s population.100 
Meanwhile, Magyarization effects were much more limited on the kingdom’s 
peripheries, as we shall see.  
                                                 
97  For more on the Germans of Budapest, see Robert Nemes, The Once and Future Budapest (DeKalb, 
IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005). For a broader discussion of the history of Germans in 
nineteenth century Hungary, see Ingomar Senz, Doanuschwaebische Geschichte, Reihe III des 
Donauschwaebischen Archivs, Muenchen, vol. 2 (Munich: Universitas Verlag, 1997). 
98  C.A. Macartney, Hungary: A Short History (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962). 186-7. 
99  Schoedl. 82. 
100  Bundesministerium fuer Vertriebene, Fluechtlinge, und Kriegsgeschaedigte, Das Schicksal der 
Deutschen in Ungarn, ed. Theodor Schieder, Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-





Table 1.1: Germans in Selected Cities of Hungary101 
 1880 1910 
City Percentage Absolute Percentage Absolute 
Budapest 33.0 119,902 8.9 78,882 
Novi Sad 25.1 5353 17.6 5918 
Vršac 57.5 12,839 49,6 13,556 
Bela Crkva 69.4 6825 52.6 6062 
Timişoara 56.6 18,539 43.6 31,644 
 
In Vojvodina, German population declines were not so sharp and the German 
population even increased in some cases. Unlike the Germans in the towns of central 
Hungary, those in the south benefited from rural surroundings thick with German 
settlements. In many cases, the towns had close ties with the surrounding German 
villages, which somewhat insulated them from the pressures and attractions of 
Magyarization. Although each isolated village in many ways constituted a “world 
unto itself”, the peasantry did regularly travel to the towns to sell their produce.102 In 
this way Swabian burghers and peasants enjoyed circumstances of mutual cultural 
support and economic interaction. Several market towns such as Vršac, Ruma, Novi 
Sad, and Pančevo would emerge as early centers of nascent the German national 
movement in Vojvodina. Nevertheless, German national consciousness before the 
First World War was rare among the region’s ethnically German but nationally 
indifferent inhabitants. Moreover, the urban dwellers and well to do peasantry were 
also not immune to the appeals of Magyar culture. 
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Shades of Assimilation and German Identity 
Assimilation is best understood not as an absolute but rather as a continuum, a 
spectrum of acculturation that allows for total conformity but also the simultaneous 
coexistence of multiple loyalties and traits. As immigrants of highly diverse origins, 
the Germans along the Danube underwent several acculturations: both to fellow 
immigrant German groups as well as to the peoples and circumstances of new 
homeland. New dialects developed through interchange between the various German 
colonists’ Staemme, and the appropriation of words from Hungarian and Serbo-
Croatian. Customs brought from German lands evolved and often gradually adopted 
local (Hungarian, Serbian, Croatian) elements. The settlers brought new architecture, 
methods of construction, crops and advanced farming techniques, all of which had to 
be adapted to their new environment.103 Succeeding generations embraced, to varying 
degrees, Magyar (or Croatian) culture, language, values, and political outlook. As we 
have seen, this process of acculturation accelerated in central Hungary, where the 
German-Hungarian bourgeoisie so assimilated during the 1800s that it no longer 
played a role as Germans in the cities by the twentieth century.104 Yet if the Germans 
in the central part of the country (most notably Budapest) “disappeared” into 
Magyardom, those in the southern periphery of the country remained isolated in their 
own ethnic milieus, nationally indifferent, and politically passive.  
A subtle but important shift occurred slowly and incompletely in the 
consciousness of many Germans in Hungary during the nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries, from “Deutschungarn” to “Ungarndeutsche.”105 This exchanged 
placement of noun and modifier signaled a response to the nationalizing Magyar state 
project and betrayed the intrusion of modern German national identity. 
“Deutschungarn” and “deutschungarisch” had long described a kind of state 
patriotism, a German loyalty to the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. Saint Stephen 
had been an early advocate of diversity in his kingdom, and the dynastic principle 
was such that there had long been no contradiction between one’s personal ethnicity 
and loyalty to the Hungarian state and king. One might be ethnically German, yes, but 
one’s political loyalty was vested in Hungary and the Habsburg dynasty. One was 
therefore, an ethnically German Hungarian. Over the course of the (especially late) 
nineteenth century, however, the “deutschungarisch” viewpoint became ever less 
tenable in a country which was so transformed by the Magyar national movement and 
the Ausgleich that the nationalities came to be considered a regrettable liability and 
an obstacle to the consolidation of Hungary as the nation-state of the Magyars. 
Gradually, the switch toward an “ungarndeutsch” perspective occurred, signifying 
not disloyalty to the Hungarian kingdom but rather indicating a new appreciation of 
German ethnicity that specifically legitimized a non-Magyar identity and recognized 
the Germans of Hungary as a uniquely Hungarian branch of the greater German Volk. 
This notion of being a Hungarian German was gradually displacing the idea of being 
a German Hungarian, but its penetration was gradual and still shallow by the outbreak 
of the First World War. 
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Swabian historian Ingomar Senz provides a useful taxonomy of assimilation 
in Hungary. The unassimilated countryside defines one extreme of assimilation’s 
continuum. Scattered across the continuum’s middle lie the so-called 
“Kulturdeutsche,” people of German heritage who outwardly adopted Magyar forms 
and language, but nevertheless retained a lingering German sensibility and may have 
preferred German in the home. Finally, the fully assimilated Magyarones occupied 
the other extreme of the continuum of Magyarization.  
Unassimilated ethnic Germans requiring little explanation, we begin with a 
discussion of the Kulturdeutsche. Consciously or unconsciously, the Kulturdeutsche 
worked to reconcile their German heritage and Hungarian patriotism, indeed identity, 
with the country’s increasingly assertive Magyar nationalism. They were only rarely 
political, however. In any event, the Kulturdeutsche often coped with their situation 
through partial assimilation or a progressively deeper embrace of Magyar culture, 
norms and language.106  
If the Kulturdeutsche sometimes struggled to reconcile their proud German 
heritage and real or opportunistic enthusiasm for Magyardom, Magyarones did not 
share their dilemma. These assimilationist zealots effectively sought a total break 
with their ethnic origins as Germans and identified totally with the Magyar nation and 
nationalism. Theirs was the most extreme form of assimilation and often involved the 
Magyarization of names and surnames as an outward demonstration of their total 
embrace of things Magyar. Whether out of social insecurity or nationalist rapture, 
Magyarones in many cases sought to further prove their legitimacy by advocating the 
                                                 




most nationalist of policies and showing the least tolerance of ethnic dissent. Their 
assimilation was ecstatic, extreme, and often very public. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, there was still no ungarndeutsch association or 
group to speak of. Moreover, there was basically no German national elite that could 
lead such a movement outside of Transylvania.107 However, the increasingly 
chauvinist nature of Ausgleich Hungary would change this to a limited degree. In the 
decades after 1870, Hungary’s Germans frequently displayed either an accelerating 
inclination to Magyarize or else showed a flickering interest in vague notions of a 
transborder German Kulturnation.  Nevertheless, no German national movement 
emerged in the kingdom  before the twentieth century. 
Why did German national identity continue to lack much appeal in Hungary 
even after the erection of Bismarck’s Reich and the intensification of the nationality 
competition in neighboring Cisleithania during the nineteenth century’s later 
decades? After all, German nationalism was increasingly strident elsewhere during 
these decades. Confessional differences, historical difference, physical distance, and 
the lack of German national unity in Austria itself must each be recognized as being 
partially responsible for frustrating the emergence or appeal of a German national 
movement in Hungary. The German state of the Hohenzollerns only confirmed that 
German unification would proceed without the Germans of the Monarchy and thus 
may have undermined German identity for many. Moreover, the German Reich was 
too distant and too Protestant to spark much inspiration in Hungary, where most 
ethnic Germans were Catholic. Moreover, inside Hungary, confession divided the 
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Catholic Swabians from the more nationally conscious, confident, and Protestant 
Transylvanian Saxons, who also had a very long and distinct history.108 Thus there 
was little sense of ethnic unity among most of the country’s Germans. Additionally, 
Magyar culture continued to retain its appeal for many ambitious Germans, 
particularly in the kingdom’s core regions. Yet even as the German burghers of 
central Hungary embraced Magyardom or at least quietly coexisted as 
Kulturdeutsche, a small contingent of nationally conscious Germans became 
convinced that action was necessary to rescue the country’s Germans from further 
assimilation. German national identity being weak in central Hungary’s cities, they 
turned their attention to the rural settlements in the country’s southern periphery, 
where Magyarization had made fewer inroads. 
 
Edmund Steinacker and the Origins of the German Movement in Hungary 
The story of German political organization in southern Hungary is 
inextricably bound with the name of Edmund Steinacker. In his 1929 obituary, Novi 
Sad’s Deutsches Volksblatt proclaimed Steinacker “the dean of the German 
movement” in Hungary.109 Ten years later, on the 100th anniversary of his birth, 
Osijek’s Slawonischer Volksbote would call him the “political awakener of the 
Danube Swabians” and one of the men principally responsible for the Germans’ 
“national rebirth” and “rescue from national extinction and being forgotten”110 
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Indeed, it was Steinacker who recognized the potential constituency for a German 
national movement in the rural Swabian population of Vojvodina. Even before his 
own years of political activity, however, Steinacker was seemingly always at the 
center of the German national movement in Hungary. Born in Debrecen in 1839, he 
attended an Lutheran elementary school (evangelische Elementarschule) before 
attending Gymnasium in Sopron and Weimar, and finally the Technische Hochschule 
in Stuttgart.111 Returning to Hungary in 1867, he married the daughter of Eduard 
Glatz, long-time editor of the Pester Lloyd newspaper and one of the earliest 
opponents of Magyarization. In these years, Steinacker also became acquainted with 
leading Transylvanian Saxon members of parliament and their own struggles in 
Hungary.  
Though raised in a German home pervaded by a devotion to Hungary, in his 
origins and his thoroughly German education Steinacker came to feel ever more 
German. Still, by his own admission, there was little cause for German national 
agitation in the first years after the Ausgleich, when the tolerance and equal rights 
promised by the 1868 Nationalities Law seemed as if they might become an enduring 
reality.112 It was only during the negotiations on the unification of Budapest in the 
mid-1870s that Steinacker was stirred to action, when it was decided that the 
administration in the newly unified (but still hugely German) city would not be 
bilingual, as before, but in the Magyar language alone. Steinacker organized a 
petition demanding the continued use of German in city affairs, but his effort was 
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unsuccessful and the Magyarization of Budapest rolled onward. Nevertheless, 
Steinacker was not deterred and continued his advocacy for the country’s Germans. 
Steinacker had been optimistic about the Ausgleich, which seemed to offer 
much hope for the liberalization and modernization of Hungary. As a member of 
parliament in 1870s and 1880s, however, he soon recognized that entrenched feudal 
interests would sacrifice such liberalization and modernization to preserve their own 
eroding position in the state, society, and economy. Magyarization of the nationalities 
was one goal of such a policy. Indeed, in the Hungary of Kalman Tisza and his 
successors, Steinacker’s ideas became positively anachronistic. Where before 
Steinacker had hoped that the deutschungarisch burghers would serve as a driving 
force in the modernization of the whole state and society, he now recognized that this 
was unlikely.  
During these years, Steinacker gradually came to recognize that the urban 
Germans of Hungary’s center were too complacent or too Magyarized to form the 
basis of a successful German national movement. The Transylvanian Saxons retained 
their proud tradition of ethnic solidarity and limited autonomy, but they were already 
organized as Transylvanian Saxons and showed little interest in a broader German 
movement. Thus it was that Steinacker eventually turned to the Swabians in the 
kingdom’s south, especially in Banat. There, the Swabians dwelled either in 
Timişoara, which boasted so many Germans that it was frequently called 
Temeschburg, or in smaller towns or villages where Magyarization’s successes had 




Although Steinacker was instrumental in fostering and organizing the German 
national movement in Hungary, he was never disloyal to the kingdom and felt 
wounded by accusations to the contrary. Rather, Steinacker sought to preserve the 
Germandom of Hungary by organizing it politically and reinforcing it culturally. 
Germans should be free and encouraged to be German in spirit, language and culture, 
he believed. Furthermore, they should be tolerated as such by their fatherland, which 
was Hungary. Though it appeared positively insurrectionary or even treasonous to 
many Magyars, the small movement he led was a loyal one. As such, Steinacker was 
defined by two cultures, being “German in his heritage, ways and thoughts but 
manifoldly devoted to the Magyar people, bound to the Hungarian homeland, and 
loyal to his fatherland Hungary.”113  
As late as the final decade before the outbreak of the First World War, 
German national identity remained weak even in the kingdom’s Danubian south.114 
Nevertheless, the Monarchy’s final decades witnessed the gradual development of a 
small Swabian-based German movement in Hungary. This movement crystallized due 
to a number of factors, including provocative actions by the state and socio-economic 
changes in the countryside. The Germans reacted to their circumstances, and the 
conditions of late nineteenth century Hungary were ones of increasing national 
intolerance and aggressively integral Magyar nationalism, as we have seen. Where 
before one could expect to exist unmolested as a German-speaking Hungarian patriot 
in Hungary, in the Ausgleich era one was increasingly expected to transfer not only 
political loyalty but even personal identity to the Magyar state and culture. Gradually 
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this pressure to totally Magyarize engendered resentment among many Germans, who 
increasingly recognized that Transleithania offered them neither place nor prospects 
as such. The 1898 Magyarization of place names provoked further exasperation 
among the minorities.  
As the nascent German national movement organized in Hungary, it faced 
repressive measures by the Hungarian government, the displeasure of threatened 
Magyars and expressions of Magyar cultural chauvinism. Naturally, such 
unpleasantness provoked much disquiet among many Swabians, who began to 
suspect that this country was not for them. Many more Swabians were shaken from 
their political passivity and indifference to national identity by political developments 
in the Monarchy’s last decades, especially the crisis of 1903-06 and the installation of 
the strident Magyar nationalist coalition cabinet, which succeeded the long, liberal 
regime. These developments alienated broad sectors of Hungary’s national minorities, 
shocked many Swabians from their political lethargy, and conferred a new urgency 
upon the German national movement, first manifest in the form of rallies, articles, the 
founding of newspapers and new, local political groupings.115 It was in this 
atmosphere that Edmund Steinacker and a likemeinded circle of ethnic Germans 
reasoned the timing ripe for the establishment of a German political party in Hungary.  
During the 1890s, a relatively lively associational life developed in the 
Swabian villages of Vojvodina and Srijem. As we shall see in detail in Ruma in 
Chapter Two, a limited number of Germans became increasingly aware around the 
turn of the century that they had to organize themselves politically to forestall their 
being collectively disadvantaged and subsumed by Magyardom (and Croatdom in 
                                                 




Croatia). To this end, German-oriented local reading clubs, volunteer fire brigades, 
singing clubs, and gymnastic associations were founded and even held regional 
gatherings. In many cases, the German clubs were inspired by the already extant 
nationalist organizations of their neighboring nationalities (especially Serbs and 
Croats) whose national movements were far more developed than the Swabians’. But 
it was principally the appearance of men who understood how to articulate Swabian 
dissatisfaction and channel it into a political program that transformed German social 
and economic discontent and flickering national identity into a proper, if still nascent, 
political movement. Such men, often connected to local newspapers, served as the 
distillers and mobilizers of German national identity in the towns of southern 
Hungary. Many of the men who would become leaders in interwar Yugoslavia thus 
gained experience in prewar Hungary’s young German institutions under the 
guidance of Steinacker. He was the movement’s unofficial but broadly acknowledged 
leader and his extensive contacts in Austria and especially Germany were 
indispensable for the movement’s success.116 
Newspapers were of key importance in the German national movement in pre-
Trianon Hungary and the interwar successor states. Hungary had long had many 
German language newspapers, but few advocated for the German national cause or 
could be described as German-national in spirit. (The Hungarian authorities often 
ensured that this remained the case through legal measures.) Abroad, the Germans 
were little informed about Germans in the Hungarian Kingdom. As such, one task for 
Steinacker and his collaborators was to raise awareness abroad about the 
circumstances of Hungary’s Germans. Meanwhile, at home they resolved to launch a 
                                                 




nationally-oriented German newspaper in order to propagate national consciousness 
among Swabians and offer them a German nationalist perspective on the news.  
Steinacker began his own career in print with “On the Waking and 
Strengthening of National Consciousness in German-Hungarian Circles” (“Zur 
Weckung und Staerkung des nationalen Bewusstseins in den deutschungarischen 
Kreisen”), an article series he wrote under the pen name “Sincerus” for the 
Preßburger Zeitung in the 1870s. Perhaps predictably, the controversial articles 
provoked outrage in Magyar nationalist circles, as did his many speeches as a 
member of the Hungarian parliament.117 The year 1888 was a watershed moment for 
Steinacker. When finally accused that year by Prime Minister Kalman Tisza of 
seeking to spread hatred against Hungary abroad, Steinacker resigned his seat in 
parliament and moved his residence to Klosterneuburg, Austria. Although Steinacker 
lived thereafter in a form of exile in Austria, he nevertheless remained active in 
German national matters in Hungary and continued to promote awareness in 
Cisleithania and the Reich about the Hungarian Germans’ circumstances. Moreover, 
he often returned to Hungary and traveled to Banat. There he collaborated in the 1899 
establishment of the short-lived Timişoara daily, Deutsche Tageblatt fuer Ungarn, 
and its successor, the weekly Deutschungarische Volksfreund. Steinacker was a 
regular contributor to both newspapers.  
Having established a supraregional German-national press to nurture the 
nascent German movement in Hungary, Steinacker and his likeminded collaborators 
turned their attention to politics. Their efforts culminated in the establishment in 1906 
of the Hungarian German People’s Party, known in German as the Ungarlaendische 
                                                 




Deutsche Volkspartei or UDVP. Ludwig Kremling, who would later become the 
formal head of the Partei der Deutschen in interwar Yugoslavia, served as the 
UDVP’s chairman. The party’s founders intended the UDVP to be a nationally 
oriented party that would transcend region and speak for all Hungary’s Germans. The 
party was founded at a time of much nationalist suspicion, however, and its 
establishment was certainly not appreciated by the Hungarian authorities. As such, 
the UDVP had to tread somewhat cautiously. The UDVP held its constitutional 
meeting in Vršac in 1906 and subsequent meetings across Banat in Bela Crkva, 
Velika Kikinda and Novi Sad, and Timişoara.118 Thus the UDVP had a presence in 
many parts of Batschka and Banat which would be awarded to Yugoslavia after the 
First World War.  The party hoped to create a greater sense of community among the 
country’s disparate and indifferent German groups and resolved to participate in the 
upcoming election in 1918. The party additionally hoped to strengthen ties between 
the Germans of Hungary and those of Cisleithania and Imperial Germany.  
The UDVP’s party program called for a new legal arrangement guaranteeing 
German minority rights as well as the proper implementation of already existing 
legislation to the same end. It demanded modernizing, liberalizing, and electoral 
reforms, including “the universal, secret, direct and equal right to vote,” and the free 
use of the German language, especially in churches and schools. Moreover, it called 
for tax reforms and legal protections for the peasantry and all other “productive 
classes.” The UDVP’s program furthermore explicitly insisted upon the Germans’ 
loyalty to their Hungarian fatherland and language and was signed by UDVP 
Chairman Ludwig Kremling as well as 5000 other Germans from across the 
                                                 




kingdom.119 Five UDVP candidates, including Steinacker, competed in the 1910 
elections in Hungary, but the party failed to win any seats. This was a 
disappointment, but the existence of the party and Steinacker’s newspapers revealed 
that the German national movement was indisputably growing in southern Hungary. 
In fact, Steinacker’s achievements were such that they even attracted the attention of 
some important Transylvanian Saxons. 
The founding of the UDVP in Vojvodina was a historic event for the nascent 
German national movement in Hungary. Although small, its existence offered the 
prospect of greater German mobilization in the future. Local or regional political 
parties of Germans had existed before in Hungary but the UDVP was the first to seek 
to organize Germans on a transregional basis on the basis of national identity.120 
Success was often elusive, even in the central towns of southern Hungary, however, 
owing to the thin stratum of nationally conscious Germans interested in political 
activity. Confession, distance, and the disapproval of Hungarian authorities were also 
hindrances, but by 1912 the UDVP boasted 60 local chapters with over 10,000 
members.121 Even as it adopted the Ungarnlaendische Volksfreund as its official 
mouthpiece, however, the UDVP was never more than a marginal group in Vojvodina 
and there was little change in the pre-national attitude of the bulk of Swabian 
peasants.  
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Volkstumarbeit: Help from Abroad before the First World War 
At this stage it is necessary to introduce briefly Volkstumarbeit, a subject to 
which we shall return in Chapters Three and Seven. Volkstumarbeit was the field 
concerned with the study and reinforcement of ethnic German communities outside of 
the core regions of German settlement in Europe, that is, in lands where the Germans 
were minorities.122 Some Volkstumarbeit organizations were strictly academic, 
cultural or charitable while others such as the Pan-German League were overtly 
political, chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, or xenophobic. In many cases, such as the 
General German School Association (which was principally interested in supporting 
German schools abroad with materials, books and funding) Volkstumarbeit activities 
might have seemed innocuous enough but actually would have been intensely 
political in the nationally charged context of Cisleithania.123  
The nature of the Volkstumarbeit field varied over time as did the names and 
goals of the key players in it. Before the First World War, however, the 
Volkstumarbeit field was relatively small and characterized by few institutions. They 
were particularly active in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the 
Czech national movement in particular seemed to threaten the dominant position of 
the German language, culture, and persons in Austria’s political, economic, and social 
affairs. By contrast, Volkstumarbeit organizations paid little attention before 1918 to 
the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, where there were far fewer Germans. 
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Nevertheless, some Volkstumarbeit attention and funding did come to Hungary 
before the First World War, largely as a result of Edmund Steinacker. Living in 
Austria near Vienna, Steinacker was well informed of the nationality conflicts in 
Cisleithania. He was also well connected to the Kaiserreich-based Volkstumarbeit 
organizations and secured essential funding for the nascent German movement in 
Hungary.124 Ultimately, we may say that the German movement in Hungary did not 
occur in isolation. There were connections to the broader German national movement 
in Germany and Austria. Nevertheless, Hungary’s Swabians and particularly the 
Danube Swabians received considerably less attention or funding than did allegedly 
“endangered” German populations in Cisleithania.  
 In conclusion, the German movement largely remained in its infancy in 
Vojvodina on the eve of the First World War but it had made important progress 
under the guidance of Edmund Steinacker. Indeed, Steinacker was indispensable in 
the German national movement in Hungary. He served as a journalist, 
parliamentarian, and founder of the first political organization to properly embrace 
the Germans of all Hungary. However, he was additionally significant for the work he 
did to raise awareness and resources abroad for the Hungarian German movement. 
Steinacker’s recognition that the foundation of that movement could no longer be the 
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cities, where Germans had already become too Magyarized, would have lasting 
impact for the Swabians of Vojvodina. It was in his Ungarlaendische-Deutsche 
Volkspartei that many of the future German leaders of Yugoslavia first experienced a 
political movement based on German national identity. Steinacker’s work thus gave 
major impetus to the future German movement in Yugoslavia.  Meanwhile, a group 
of German activists and agitators was pursuing a program similar to Steinacker’s 
across the Danube in Croatia-Slavonia in a town called Ruma. Like Steinacker’s, their 
efforts, to which we now turn, would yield valuable experience and lessons for the 









Chapter 2: German Settlement and the Origins of the German 
national Movement in Croatia-Slavonia before the First World 
War 
 
German settlement in Croatia-Slavonia differed from that in Vojvodina by 
beginning earlier after key Turkish defeats in the region and accelerating in the late 
nineteenth century after a long lull, during which colonists mostly went to Batschka 
and Banat. The initial German settlers in Croatia, especially before the mid-
nineteenth century, had shown little inclination to assimilate. On the contrary, they 
displayed a sometimes haughty attitude to the South Slavs in their midst for their 
supposedly evident backwardness. Nevertheless, scholars generally agree that 
Germans, Croats and Serbs  came to get along well in daily interaction and at the 
individual level.125 By the turn of the twentieth century, a great many Germans in 
Croatia had assimilated or were at the least indifferent toward German national 
identity. Yet it was in town of Ruma in east Srijem that the Swabians of Croatia-
Slavonia took some of their earliest and boldest early steps in Transleithania. As we 
shall see in Chapter Three, the experience gained by German activists in Ruma under 
the Habsburgs would prove highly valuable during the interwar era. 
 
German Settlement in Croatia 
In addition to the state sponsored colonization measures discussed in Chapter 
One, many colonists who came to Batschka and Banat responded to the private 
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initiatives of local lords, who required settlers in order to make their lands 
prosperous. Such was also the case with the German settlements in Slavonia and 
Syrmien, although some German administrators and artisans also settled the towns of 
Osijek and Petrovaradin only shortly after the Ottoman retreat.126 Most German 
colonization in Slavonia and Syrmien represented a third pattern of settlement, 
however, which stemmed from the rising price of increasingly scarce land in the 
regions north of the Drava and Danube. There, the practice of primogeniture, 
according to which the Swabians did not divide landholdings into smaller plots, 
compelled the unfortunate sons who did not inherit property to either seek land 
elsewhere or pursue another profession. In this manner, many Tochtersiedlungen or 
“daughter settlements” sprung up across Slavonia and Srijem, where land was more 
cheaply and readily available. Such Tochtersiedlungen were also planned affairs and 
frequently were the result of noble initiative or invitation. 
The majority of the German immigrants to Slavonia and Syrmien, thus, came 
not from afar, but rather from previous settlements in Vojvodina from the mid-
nineteenth century even until the First World War.127 Besides overpopulation and 
scarce, expensive land north of the Drava-Danube line, new opportunities in the later 
nineteenth century drove colonists to settle the still relatively untamed regions of 
Slavonia and Srijem. These included opportunities deriving from the end of serfdom 
as well as the 1859 lifting of the immigration ban for Protestants. Finally, the 1881 
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imperial decree announcing the incorporation of the Habsburg military border made 
available yet more land for settlement.  
In the wake of the mid-century liberation of the serfs, a second form of 
settlement, Einsiedlung, became typical in Slavonia. By contrast with previous 
settlements directed by the state or lords, Einsiedlung was a disorganized affair. In 
essence, Einsiedlung was merely the purchase of land and housing by German 
families or groups of families in preexisting villages, often populated by non-
Germans. Ultimately, such German settlers would come to comprise two thirds of the 
Swabians in Slavonia. In some cases the German settlers were so numerous that 
South Slav villages became majority German over the course of a relatively short 
period. No such result was guaranteed for Einsiedler, however, and many German 
families ultimately became assimilated by the South Slav communities in which they 
settled.128 The organized settlements of Vojvodina, it seems, were often better able to 
maintain ethnic/national cohesion than the scattered Einsiedler. As such, the nature of 
Einsiedlung and its extent in Slavonia must be considered an important contributing 
factor to the population’s comparatively weak German national consciousness and the 
high degree of German assimilation there under the Habsburgs.129 Such immigration 
was most intense during the later nineteenth century and continued in reduced 
numbers into the twentieth.130 
The German population in Croatia-Slavonia rose from 83,139 in 1880 to 
134,078 or 5.1 percent of the total population in 1910 according to Habsburg census 
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figures. German settlements stretched from Djakovo in the west to Srijem in the east. 
More than half of the German population lived in German majority communities and 
61,500 were concentrated in Srijem, which had been part of Slavonia since 1745.131 
 
Der Deutsche Michel 
The German movement in Slavonia began against a background of Swabian 
indifference and even shame regarding German national identity. Moreover, it began 
in the context of long-standing hostility towards things German in Croatia and amid 
important changes in Croatian (and Serbian) politics. Anti-German hostility was 
institutionalized in various legal measures as well as in the Croatian press, which 
bemoaned the German colonizers as intruders and was suspicious of their 
intentions.132 Croatian nationalists became increasingly intolerant of the limited but 
conspicuous German presence, which seemed an affront to Croatian aspirations to 
assert the Croatian national character of their historic kingdom. Some regarded the 
Swabian presence as evidence of a German Drang nach Osten from which Europe’s 
smaller peoples could only expect to lose. For their own part, the German peasants 
and burghers typically lacked the national identity and zeal of their South Slav 
neighbors.133 Most, especially the newer immigrants, were fundamentally interested 
only in improving their livelihoods. Quicker to organize and faster to agitate, the 
Serbs and Croats provided many of the models upon which the eventual German 
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movement in Croatia-Slavonia would later base itself in the Monarchy’s final 
decades. Yet even after some important successes, the region’s German movement 
was still a work in progress in 1914. While the German national movement had 
scored many successes in Ruma and its surroundings, its limited impact in Osijek, 
Slavonia’s principal city, was a daily reminder that the future of Germandom in 
Croatia-Slavonia was far from assured on the eve of the First World War.  
 Croatia-Slavonia’s status inside Hungary resembled Hungary’s position in the 
overall Habsburg Monarchy as a result of the Nagodba, an 1868 arrangement 
between Zagreb and Budapest. According to the terms of this arrangement, Budapest 
formally recognized Croatia-Slavonia as a distinct entity under the suzerainty of the 
Hungarian crown. That is, Croats attained the status of a political nation in Hungary, 
with which they formed a single state. Croatian nationalists bristled at continued 
Hungarian political influence in the kingdom, however. Indeed, the Nagodba was 
signed with Budapest only after the withdrawal of the National Party from the Sabor. 
It was the Hungarophile Unionist party that concluded the arrangement with 
Budapest. Even after a revised Nagodba was signed in 1873, Croatian nationalists felt 
that the arrangement left Croatia-Slavonia far too dependent on Hungary. 
Nevertheless, compared to other lands in Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed 
considerable autonomy in its daily affairs.134 
Resentment of Budapest in Croatia-Slavonia perhaps reached its post-
Nagodba apogee during the administration of Ban Karolyi Khuen-Hedervary from 
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1883 to 1903.135 Among other things Khuen-Hedervary, was accused of violating the 
terms of the Nagodba by introducing the Magyar language and Hungarian symbolism 
where inappropriate and of undermining liberalism and Croatian autonomy.136 In 
Croatia-Slavonia, Magyarization was regarded not with the benevolence it enjoyed 
across the river in Batschka, but rather as an existential threat. Indeed, in Croatia-
Slavonia, even hints of Magyarizing measures were sufficient to provoke a Croatian 
nationalist backlash. Thus, Croatian sensitivities meant that anti-Hungarian and anti-
German sentiment and Croatizing pressures pervaded policy and society, making the 
press, school, and streetscape loci of contention for the nascent German national 
movement. Budapest’s pretensions to political and social dominance in the 
contentious relationship with Zagreb rendered Croats quite ill-disposed toward non-
Croatian influences in their country. One result of Croatization pressures was national 
uncertainty and attrition among the region’s Germans, many of whom increasingly 
identified as Croats out of shame, confusion, or opportunism. 
Germans in Croatia lived overwhelmingly in Slavonia and Srijem. The 
population of Slavonia’s principal city, Osijek, was majority German at the turn of 
the century,137 and the nearly 60,000 German speakers in Srijem comprised more than 
16 percent of that region’s population.138 Despite a historic presence in Croatia-
Slavonia, the Germans there were characterized by indifference toward national 
consciousness around the turn of the twentieth century. Even as the Hungarian, 
                                                 
135  The “ban” was a viceroy appointed by Budapest to administer Croatia-Slavonia. 
136   John R Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, 2 ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 62-63. 
137  Velemir Petrović, "Kroatische Einfluesse im Essekerischen," Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne 
zajednice 2 (1996). 108. 





Serbian and Croatian national movements consolidated and asserted themselves, the 
Germans of Croatia-Slavonia remained politically passive qua Germans. A brief 
essay in Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien observed the lamentable state of 
Germandom in the country in 1906.  
A large part of the Germans in Croatia-Slavonia as well as in Hungary 
is not only indifferent in a national sense, but all too often is also not 
grounded in their character. The Germans form the most turncoats and 
renegades. Some have too little and others absolutely no national self-
awareness. They feel and behave all too often as Croats in Croatia-
Slavonia and as Magyars in Hungary. They cannot distinguish between 
the concepts of geographic and ethnographic. Many of these Germans 
don’t know what disgrace, what abasement they bring upon 
themselves in denying the privilege of their German ethnic identity 
(Stammeszugehoerigkeit).139 
 
As late as the early twentieth century, thus, many Germans in Croatia-Slavonia (and 
elsewhere in southern Hungary), were not only indifferent toward German national 
identity but were actually confused about the very meaning of the concept, freely 
describing themselves as Croats and Hungarians based on their place of residence or 
political loyalty. 
The reasons for German assimilation to Croatdom were generally similar to 
those for the “defection” to Magyardom across the Drava and Danube rivers. There 
was considerable Croatian pressure to assimilate and Swabian recalcitrants frequently 
had to endure anti-German remarks or epithets. Moreover, as with Magyarization, 
there were undeniable material advantages in work, school, and society for those who 
“unburdened” themselves of their Germandom.140 Living in Croatian surroundings, 
assimilation was a gradual and even unreflective process for many Germans. As with 
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Magyarization in Hungary proper, the assimilation of the educated seriously depleted 
the ranks of the German intelligentsia in Croatia-Slavonia. German nationalists 
therefore regarded Croatization as doubly problematic, for it reduced the overall 
German population and stymied the formation of a Swabian intellectual class. As in 
Hungary, therefore, one major cause for local Germans’ national “timidity” or apathy 
was the near absence of an intelligentsia to lead a national movement. 
The goals and methods of Croatization will be familiar from our study of 
Magyarization. Precisely because of that Magyarization and simmering tensions with 
Croatian Serbs, Croats remained jealous of their autonomy and the Croatian character 
of their lands even after the Nagodba. Suspicion of things German or especially 
Hungarian was particularly intense and the Swabians in Croatia-Slavonia found 
themselves affected by national issues greater than themselves. Generally speaking, 
Croats failed to correctly perceive German immigration for what it primarily was: 
economic migration driven by the scarcity of available and affordable land in 
Batschka and Banat. Instead, Croats tended to see in German immigration “an act of 
high politics, by which the ‘outposts of the Drang nach Osten’ were being brought 
into the country.”141 The authorities sought to affirm Croatian identity of Croatia and 
Slavonia through schools, the subsidizing of Croatian theater and denial of the 
German stage, discrimination in daily life, glorification of all things Croatian, a 
hostile press, and the official imposition of the Croatian language. Many Croats 
perceived a surreptitious program of German or Magyar imperialism in German 
immigration and condemned it accordingly. The press was especially vocal in this 
                                                 




regard.142 Additionally, Germans were pressured to consider themselves Croats based 
on their residence in Croatia-Slavonia and the notion that those who “ate Croatian 
bread” must logically be Croats, as a contemporary saying went.  
Though it seems that Germans and Croats (and Serbs) generally got along 
well at the personal level, tensions were definitely mounting in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Such tensions generally derived from the relatively recent 
immigration of the Germans, their enviable prosperity, and their propensity for 
reproduction and land acquisition. Moreover, they were often regarded as stubborn 
aliens by Croats, already prickly from national competition with Hungarians and 
Serbs. Such tensions often manifested themselves in vituperative articles and 
speeches, personal confrontation, discrimination and public pressure not dissimilar to 
Magyarization, and legal measures against the German language. After the 1860s, 
Croatian authorities increasingly placed restrictions on or impediments before 
German language schooling. The Catholic Church in Slavonia (under Djakovo 
Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer after 1849) was increasingly reluctant to provide 
German-speaking priests or hold church services in German.143 As in Hungary, 
schools and especially the church thus became agents of what German nationalists 
called “denationalization”, in this case, Croatization. Finally, the Swabians sometimes 
found themselves caught in the nationalist crossfire between Croats and Serbs in 
Slavonia and Srijem. 
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The political situation in Croatia during the final decades before World War I 
was complex and often unpredictable. The Croatian Ban Khuen-Hedervary had ruled 
since 1883, using his office to enable Hungarian encroachment on the terms of the 
Nagodba while forestalling the kind of opposition that had undermined his 
predecessor Levin Rauch by generally privileging Serbs and stoking the fires of Serb-
Croat division as part of a divide-and-conquer policy in Croatia. Meanwhile during 
the 1890s, the supporters of Bishop Josip Strossmayer and many followers of 
Croatian Party of Right cofounder Ante Starčević had agreed to come together to 
form the United Croatian Opposition in the Sabor, Croatia’s assembly, which was 
elected from a narrow and elite franchise. The twentieth century would bring further 
important shifts in Croatian politics and a radicalization of public opinion on Croatian 
national issues. 1903 was a year of important changes not only for the Germans of 
Ruma, who took major organizational steps that year, but across the region. That 
year, a coup in Serbia, ushered out the Obrenović dynasty and its Habsburg-friendly 
foreign policy, inspiring many Serbs in the Monarchy to cast a wondering gaze across 
the Danube. In the Budapest parliament, the Hungarian opposition began a test of 
wills with Vienna that would evolve into a major constitutional crisis for the country. 
Finally, Khuen-Hedevary resigned as Croatia’s ban to become Hungary’s prime 
minister in a climate of Croatian nationalist hostility and public protest.  
These Croatian anti-Magyar and anti-German demonstrations of 1903, known 
as the Narodni pokret or “National Movement”, led to the forced removal of certain 
place names in German. Also around this time, the Novi kurs or “New Course” 




Hungarian and German threat. “In the center of the New Course’s ideology stood the 
thesis that the most dangerous enemy of the [Croatian] nation was the [German] 
Drang nach Osten and the system which served it. Accordingly arrangements were 
sought with all those who were likewise threatened by this danger.”144 Among the 
primary goals of this “New Course,” therefore, was the consolidation of organized 
opposition to the perceived economic and demographic Drang nach Osten. Such 
suspicions of German imperialism and ambition led to general animosity toward 
things German and those who had connections with German interests, which would 
not abate until the end of the First World War.145  
Croatian resentment toward things German was nothing new, but the open, 
anti-German hostility of the New Course and the gradual radicalization of public 
opinion after 1903 were not welcome developments. Indeed, the Germans felt the 
uncomfortable pressures of multiple nationalist trends. On the one hand, the various 
Starčevist currents asserting the exclusively Croatian character over a very broadly 
conceived Croatia were unwelcome, for they implied potential Croatian chauvinism 
and tension with Serbs. Such could have the consequence of further Croatization of 
Germans. On the other hand, Yugoslavism in its most extreme form threatened the 
integrity of the Monarchy, which was their home. This was undesirable because the 
Habsburgs still provided a dynastic roof which offered at least some resistance to the 
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nationalization of socio-political space and territory. Moreover, even in its lesser 
form, Serb-Croat rapprochement threatened to render the Germans yet a smaller 
relative minority. Genuine Yugoslav solidarity furthermore threatened to potentially 
transform the Monarchy in ways that might well be detrimental to the German 
interests or national development.  
In summary, Germans (especially the nationally conscious ones) in Croatia 
had considerable ground for disquiet in the decade before the First World War. The 
above political developments suggested that dark days had arrived indeed. Nationally 
conscious Germans saw little benefit in Yugoslavism and real menace in the 
exploitation of the Monarchy’s weaknesses. The political shift, moreover, had the 
added disadvantage of introducing Cisleithania’s cancerous ethnic relations into 
Croatia, where Germans were hopelessly outnumbered. The peasant Swabians, some 
of whose ancestors had arrived as Habsburg colonists during the 1700s, stood accused 
of being the vanguard of German or Hungarian imperialism. German attempts to 
organize themselves became seen by nationalists as proof that the dreaded Drang 
nach Osten was real. Meanwhile, some Germans increasingly came to regard 
themselves as a threatened minority. That is, they assumed the self-understanding and 
stance of a national minority viz. Croatia-Slavonia and its nationalizing pretensions. 
Though Croatia’s Swabians had long been characterized by political passivity, a 





The Birth of the German National Movement in Croatia-Slavonia 
German national activists in Syrmien railed against their guileless coethnics 
for their susceptibility to alleged Slavic manipulation. They feared that Croatian 
Germandom, heir to one of the world’s great cultures and part of the celebrated nation 
of 90 million, would disappear in Croatia-Slavonia because “der Deutsche Michel,” 
the proverbial embodiment of the simple-minded and easy-going German everyman, 
could not be roused out of his national indifference. Or could he? In 1903 a group of 
likeminded German nationalists in the east Srijem town of Ruma resolved to try. The 
following sections will discuss the aspirations and institutions of the German 
movement in Srijem as well as contemporary Croatian reactions to it. We will 
consider the Germans relationship to the Catholic Church and the Germans’ 
relationship with Germans elsewhere in Hungary, Austria and Imperial Germany. 
Finally, we will consider the state of the German community in Slavonia’s largest city 
and evaluate the German national movement’s impact upon it.  
The German national movement in Croatia-Slavonia began in the market town 
of Ruma in eastern Srijem. German colonists had first come to Ruma in the 
eighteenth century. Srijem was then as it largely remained in the early twentieth 
century, a region of good soil whose peasant population was mostly engaged in 
agriculture. Croatization had made significant inroads in west Srijem but had been 
less successful in the region’s east, which contained a Serb majority in addition to 
Swabians and Croats. The presence of so many Germans irritated Croatian 
nationalists, but the Swabians also represented an opportunity for Croatian 




region of Croatia-Slavonia. Such frustration conferred an added urgency to already 
aggressive Croatizing efforts during the later 1800s, since it was hoped that the Croats 
could improve their numerical inferiority in the region by absorbing Germans. The 
result was an atmosphere increasingly punctuated by outbursts of Croatian and 
Serbian nationalism. In such an environment, many Swabians did sheepishly 
assimilate or at least come to identify as Croats.146 Others, however, reacted 
negatively to such nationalist pressure and began to develop a distinct national 
consciousness as Germans.  
A kind of German middle class had formed during the nineteenth century in 
Ruma, which was one of Srijem’s principle towns. With its sizable German 
population (over 31 percent), the market town was receptive to both goods and ideas. 
In recent years, some Germans had gone abroad to study in Cisleithania’s German 
provinces, the Kaiserreich, and other German areas in Hungary proper. There they 
had become attracted to the ideas of German nationalism, which was variously locked 
in conflict with Slavs in Austria, struggling to fully realize Germany as a Great 
Power, or engaged with Magyardom in Hungary. They returned to Ruma having 
developed a German national consciousness and were able to articulate local 
frustration with Croatization measures, especially in education. In connection with 
local affluent farmers and entrepreneurs, they formed the basis of a spirited German 
national movement.147  
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Table 2.1: Ruma’s Population by Mother Tongue148 
Year German Croatian/Serbian Total 
1910 15,447 (31.8%) 26,662 (54.77%) 48,675 
 
In November 1903 Ruma’s nationally conscious German notables gathered to 
establish the Publishing House of German Books and Periodicals (Verlag deutsche 
Buecher und Zeitschriften, AG) , an enterprise through which they planned to publish 
a nationally oriented newspaper and rouse coethnics from their indifference toward 
German national identity. The resulting Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien (initial 
circulation 2000149) would quickly become the most outspoken German newspaper in 
Croatia-Slavonia and the principle indigenous transmitter of German nationalism 
across the region.  
The newspaper’s premier issue set the new tone. Ruma German Josef 
Servatzky sought to reinforce the Swabians’ pride and sense of history and legitimize 
their historic presence in the region in the prominent article “An die Deutschen 
Syrmiens.” He emphasized the Swabians’ origins as colonists who had brought 
culture and economic prosperity to Srijem and now comprised 15 percent of its 
population. He encouraged Swabian pride in the face of Croatian nationalism and 
called upon Germans to embrace their national identity just as Croats and Serbs took 
pride in their own. The time had come, he asserted, for Swabians to come together in 
a community of their own national interest.150 
“An die Deutschen Syrmiens” was a rallying cry for the region’s Germans. 
Servatzky reviewed their desperate state even as he proudly announced recent moves 
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by Ruma’s self-styled national awakeners. Something had to be done to counteract 
the Germans’ “ever more far-reaching indifference” toward their own nationhood! To 
this end, the newspaper explained, Ruma notables had established the Publishing 
House of German books and Periodicals to promote German national identity and 
expose Srijem’s Germans to the written word of their beloved mother tongue. The 
men behind the publishing house resolved to serve as activists and advocates on 
behalf of the “syrmier Schwabenschaft.” Servatzky laid out their agenda,  
We will instruct our readers not only of the events in matters of 
social and economic life, agriculture and crafts – we will also endeavor 
to awaken in our coethnics the love of our precious mother tongue and 
of our nation; we want to strengthen and consolidate German 
[national] consciousness. 
To that end, we will strive to see that no German of Srijem, 
seduced by the conceit and self-interest which unfortunately often 
accompany the struggle for existence, discards and denies his 
Germanness, but rather that every German assert himself as such under 
all circumstances. 
We will encourage the Germans of Srijem under all 
circumstances and at all times to thank God for leading our ancestors’ 
steps to blessed Srijem, which has become for us our beloved 
fatherland, whose welfare and prosperity we wish to promote by every 
means along with all inhabitants of this land, irrespective of nationality 
and religion.151 
 
This was less a program than an outlay of German national sentiment and aspirations. 
Later, however, the German movement in Syrmien would articulate the specifics of 
its platform more boldly. Far from being a mere journal of record, or “just another 
Ruma newspaper,” the staff at Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien openly regarded 
their weekly as an instrument of resistance against undesired assimilation and 
German national indifference.152 
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Unsurprisingly, the nascent German national movement in Ruma was not well 
received by many Croats. Mitrovica’s Hrvatski Branik marked the appearance of 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien by calling it a “pan-German newspaper” which did 
not hide its subversive intentions. “The first issues,” Hrvatski Branik charged, “have 
already shown that the land which these newcomers settled is not sacred to them, nor 
do they plan to adapt to their new homeland, Croatia.”153 Several years later, Hrvatski 
Branik again decried the “pan-Germanism in Srijem” and bemoaned its successes, 
especially the spread of German language reading rooms. The newspaper was 
noteworthy for its observation of the foreign origins of the German movement in 
Srijem. This “pan-German” movement in Srijem dated from only the past ten to 
fifteen years, the newspaper charged, and was instigated by Germans who had studied 
abroad in Vienna and at other German universities. There they had imbibed pan-
German ideas “and returned home to begin spreading German thought among our 
countrymen.” Indeed, Hrvatski Branik remarked, the Ruma pan-German headquarters 
worked tirelessly at activities which would be considered high treason in Hungary 
proper. “To hear their speech and see their symbols,” it claimed, “is to think one is in 
Prussia!”154 Thus, while the Germans feared imminent absorption by Croatdom, 
Hrvatski Branik accused the Germans of executing a Drang nach Osten and refusing 
to learn the Croatian language.155 
Despite Croatian fears of looming pan-Germanism, much of the press in 
Croatia-Slavonia was actually published in German at this time, and many educated 
Croats would have known the language. The fact of appearing in the German 
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language, however, did not necessarily imply that a newspaper had a German national 
orientation. On the contrary, most German language newspapers did not express a 
German national outlook at all and would have been actively hostile to such a 
perspective. German nationalists often derided such newspapers as being written in 
German but lacking a German perspective. That is, they were deutschgeschrieben but 
not deutschgesinnt, in contemporary parlance. 
In fact, the German language press in Croatia showed little enthusiasm for the 
nascent German movement in Syrmien. Osijek’s Die Drau greeted the publication of 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien not dissimilarly from the hostile Hrvatski Branik, 
Narodna obrana, Agramer Tagblatt, Obzor and the rest of the Croatian press. With 
the appearance of Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien “’Pan-Germania’ was extending 
its feelers,” the Osijek broadsheet charged.  Die Drau furthermore berated the Ruma 
weekly for its alleged ingratitude to the Germans’ Croatian fatherland, its opposition 
to Swabian acculturation to Croatdom, and for its rejection of all that was not 
German. Speaking for “our” (Croatian) nation, it continued,  
Whoever lives in this land must first and foremost respect Croatdom, 
and we demand that he socially and nationally nurture the [Croatian] 
people with all the unique attributes of his own nationality. The 
Germans who have lived here for hundreds of years and who, as they 
themselves admit, have achieved property and status, must possess 
much gratitude as to love the landscape which has brought them such 
abundant profit. They must strive to contribute to all national 
accomplishments which form the ideal of this nation, and thereby 
express their high intelligence in all areas. Any effort by the Germans 
to isolate themselves socially and nationally can bring them no 
success, but rather must lead to the spitefulness and 
opposition/resistance of the Croatian people, who will never allow a 
German-national island to unfurl in the heart of Srijem, the richest and 





Finally, the newspaper concluded that Croats should establish cultural associations in 
the heart of Srijem, so as to win over the region’s Germans to Croatian culture and 
language. “We [Croats] do not demand a denial of [the Germans’] heritage, the 
newspaper insisted, but the Germans must nevertheless aspire to take on Croatian 
culture.” Second generation Germans should profess their love to the Croatian 
fatherland in the national language, Croatian. Thus, far from objecting to excessive 
Croatization, Die Drau insisted that there had not been enough. This Osijek German 
language daily plainly had little time for German nationalism.  “The time of national 
islands,” Die Drau cautioned, “is over.” 156 
To be sure, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien wore its politics on its sleeve. 
Yet its celebration of things German in no way implied a denigration of local 
Swabian identities. On the contrary, the newspaper embraced both the national and 
local identities that characterized the German movement in both Croatia and Hungary 
proper. The population was at once both German and Swabian, and contemporaries 
regularly used both appellations.157 The task for the German national movement was 
to convince Swabians of their belonging to the German Volk and persuade them of the 
Volk’s supreme importance.  
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien’s staff sought to instill pride in its readers 
and enlighten them as to their history, the place of Germans in the world, and the 
situation of Germans in Croatia and Hungary proper. Articles regularly explored the 
history of German colonization in Croatia and Hungary, celebrated the beauty of the 
German language, and extolled the Germans as Kulturduenger, bearers of culture 
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who had effectively brought civilization to the Danubian region (and their Slavic 
neighbors).158 Moreover, they soon demonstrated their connections with various 
German national associations in Germany and elsewhere in the Monarchy, such as 
Volkstumarbeit groups and the Association of German University Students from the 
Lands of the Hungarian Crown (Vereinigung deutscher Hochschueler aus den 
Laendern der ungarischen Krone or VDH). The VDH’s members regularly 
contributed articles to the newspaper while spreading awareness about the Germans 
of Croatia through lectures and other activities in Cisleithania and Hungary. 
The Ruma Germans’ publishing house also sought to spread German national 
and Swabian regional consciousness by promoting works of German literature and 
Suedostforschung, the academic study of Germans in Europe’s southeast. One way to 
shape a common German consciousness was through common national symbols and 
celebrations. To this end, serial newspaper articles were devoted to the German 
tricolor and cultural or historical notables. The Ruma publishing house promoted such 
works as The German Language Islands in Southern Hungary and Slavonia (Die 
Deutschen Sprachinseln in Suedungarn und Slavonien) and similar books in order to 
encourage a regional sense of collective German history and solidarity. Cultural ties 
to Europe’s core German regions were also promoted. For example, the German 
movement and Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien made much of the 100th 
anniversary of Friedrich Schiller’s death in 1905. On the date when celebrations in 
the poet’s honor were held across Germany and Habsburg Austria, the German 
associations of Ruma organized a Schillerfeier, a celebration of Schiller’s life and 
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work, in the town. Through this commemoration, the nascent German movement in 
Ruma sought to bridge the distance between themselves and the distant German 
heartland. Local participants would know that Germans hundreds of miles away were 
simultaneously sharing in the same rapturous emotions and celebration of their 
common national poet. In the Schiller celebrations, the German movement had found 
a common cultural moment which transcended time and space.  
Like the Schiller celebration and the many historical articles in Deutsches 
Volksblatt fuer Syrmien, the display and veneration of the German tricolor was a 
component in the national activists’ project to inspire and forge a common identity 
among the Swabians as Germans. When Ban Theodor Pejačević, Khuen-Hedervary’s 
successor as Croatian ban, briefly visited Ruma in 1905, the town’s Germans 
proposed to welcome their honored guest by hanging both the Croatian flag and the 
German tricolor from their homes. The tricolor was not illegal, after all, and therefore 
the ban’s visit offered an occasion to welcome him as “German citizens of Slavonia.” 
The dual flag display was forbidden by state authorities, however, prompting many 
offended Germans to refrain from welcoming celebrations altogether, on the grounds 
that one could not feel celebratory about the ban’s arrival while repressed as a second 
class citizen.159  
The Ban’s visit and a later series of articles in Deutsches Volksblatt fuer 
Syrmien on the German, Croatian, and Hungarian tricolors was revealing, for the 
Swabian leaders in Ruma insisted on a stance of dual loyalty to both the German Volk 
and the Croatian state. The Croatian flag, they explained, was a symbol of 
Staatlichkeit or statehood. By contrast, the German tricolor was a Volksfahne, the flag 
                                                 




of a nation, and not the flag of the Kaiserreich, as was often supposed in Croatia. As 
such, the German tricolor was merely a symbol of Volklichkeit, a symbol of 
Germandom unassociated with any state territory. “With the black-red-gold flag we 
document our Germandom, with the red-white-blue, on the other hand, we document 
our citizenship,” they explained.160 Croatia was, after all, the Vaterland of the Srijem 
Swabians, who considered themselves not to be pan-Germanic aliens but rather 
natives of Croatian soil. During the interwar years, the Germans’ premier 
organization in Yugoslavia, the Kulturbund, would insist on a similar formulation of 
dual loyalty to the South Slav state and German nation. Such duality was never easily 
accepted by the South Slavs, however.  
Professions of devotion to Croatia and such paeans as “Hail red-white-blue 
and black–red-gold”161 aside, there was much tension between Germans and South 
Slavs in Croatia-Slavonia. Croats hurled epithets or worse at the Swabians, who 
themselves sometimes responded abruptly, as when a group of German burghers 
insisted upon the removal of the Croatian tricolor from a Ruma church tower in 1906 
on the occasion of the parish’s annual Kirchweih, the yearly celebration of the 
consecration of the church. Nationally conscious Germans perceived themselves as 
very much second class citizens in the country, discriminated against in church, 
school and workplace. Shortly after the death of Bishop Josip Strossmayer, Deutsches 
Volksblatt fuer Syrmien even observed that there was a national hierarchy in Croatia. 
The Croats were the people of the state with full rights below whom stood the Serbs, 
a people with lesser rights. Germans and Magyars, however, stood at the bottom of 
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this hierarchy as the people with the least rights, the Germans being lucky to even get 
a parish priest who could speak their language.162 As such, one of the consistent 
demands voiced by the German movement was the awarding of equal rights in 
exchange for their equal obligations to the state and church.163 The two areas of 
greatest national concern for the Germans were education and religion, both of which 
they regarded as vehicles of Croatization.  
The nationally conscious Germans regarded the Catholic Church as a willing 
agent of unabashed Croatization, a situation Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien 
addressed with particular urgency during its early years under the editorship of Karl 
Stürm.164 Under Stürm, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien revealed particular alarm 
about the state of Christianity among the Swabians, a paramount concern in an era, in 
which religion remained highly important in everyday life and society. As such, the 
rarity of German language in the classroom or the pulpit was a situation of dire 
concern. The newspaper was particularly concerned about Germans in villages of 
mixed ethnicity. Protestant Germans were insulated from at least one instrument of 
Croatization by their separate churches. Not so the numerically vastly superior 
Catholic Germans, who often shared parishes with their Croat coreligionists. 
Frequently deprived in such cases of sermons or religious texts in their language, 
Germans’ Christian knowledge and practice was visibly diminishing, according to 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien. The situation was particularly difficult for 
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children, who often had to learn in a foreign language owing to the lack of German 
schools, and therefore allegedly did not learn their lessons well.  
Across Croatia-Slavonia, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien observed, the 
situation was everywhere different for German Catholics but rarely satisfactory. 
Though perhaps nationally indifferent in a political sense, most Germans of Croatia-
Slavonia and especially Srijem were nevertheless aware of their everyday ethnicity as 
Swabians. Consequently, they often reacted negatively to the infiltration of their 
parish by Croatian nationalism and resented the absence of their mother tongue in 
religious services. Priests who either could not or would not speak German were 
increasingly dispatched to German parishes. Worse, such priests often spoke 
disdainfully of things German, they claimed. In the Monarchy’s final decades, the 
situation gradually so deteriorated that pastors and their congregations sometimes 
even came to view one another uncomprehendingly. True, the conservative German 
peasants did not formally break with the Church and continued attending mass. 
Nevertheless, their deeper connection to their church weakened considerably.165 The 
suspicious legacy of the Croatizing and Magyarizing priest would haunt the 
nationally conscious German priests in interwar Yugoslavia who sought to rally their 
flocks away from the seduction of National Socialism, as we shall see in Chapter 
eight. 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien was pessimistic for Ruma, which was 
awaiting a new pastor in 1904. “It is probably out of the question to get a nationally 
conscious German priest,” the newspaper declared, “because such priests may well 
not exist. The least that the people of Ruma can demand, however, is that they might 
                                                 




be given a man who understands how to explain the word of God to them in their 
mother tongue, who understands how to read in the [spirit of the] German national 
soul, who delights in his parishioners and sympathizes with them, who does not see in 
us contemptible, stupid “Šwabe” or “pan-Germans” but rather as men, Germans and 
Christians who consciously love their fatherland.” We need, the article concluded, “a 
patient man and not a chauvinist.”166 
The sharpest expression of German national bitterness toward the Croatizing 
Catholic Church came in the wake of the death of the Croatian/Yugoslav advocate 
and politician Bishop Josip Strossmayer in 1905.167 Deutsches Volksblatt fuer 
Syrmien’s acid obituary of the bishop was nothing less than a total indictment of 
Strossmayer as man and priest. It was also a condemnation of his alleged Croatian 
chauvinism. “He was more of a politician than a priest” the newspaper charged, and 
he loved the Croatian people above all others. Of course, a preference for one nation 
was permissable even for a priest, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien allowed, but no 
priest should persecute other nations with the “burning hatred” that had so driven 
Strossmayer. Strossmayer neglected the spiritual needs of non-Croats, the newspaper 
continued, and was behind the creation of a chauvinistic priesthood which had 
worked to severely retard German national development in Croatia-Slavonia. Should 
Germans mourn the death of Strossmayer? “Not at all as Germans nor as Catholics,” 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien insisted. Strossmayer was a renegade who 
betrayed both his German heritage and the non-Croat Catholics of his diocese.168 “In 
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spite of his German origins, he was the greatest enemy of the German nation in 
Croatia-Slavonia, and as such he forgot his clerical duties toward his German 
Catholics,” the newspaper charged.169 The editors’ condemnation of Strossmayer, 
who was widely popular among Croats, is highly significant. The bitterness of that 
condemnation of Strossmayer indicated the degree of the German national activists’ 
frustration with the Croatian national project in so far as it seemed to threaten their 
own survival as Germans. The men at Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien elected to 
remember Strossmayer not as a Catholic priest or Croatian politician but as a German 
traitor. 
As in Hungary proper, the nationally conscious Germans in Croatia-Slavonia 
were concerned about education. They feared that Croatia’s elementary schools and 
middle schools (Volksschulen and Mittelschulen) were failing them in two ways. On 
one hand they failed to properly educate German students. At the same time, they 
failed to inculcate a proper sense of German nationhood and, worse, Croatized the 
student body through the curriculum, language, and discrimination. By 1904, one 
nationally conscious Rumaer complained, “the notion had appeared that an 
elementary school should be nothing less than a Croatizing institution and have no 
other task.”170 Middle schools and Gymnasien, Swabians feared, were only even more 
advanced institutes of assimilation.  
Language, curriculum and even the instructors themselves attracted Swabian 
ire. Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien complained that Swabians were usually denied 
a German education even when laws seemed to guarantee a German school based on 
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local population. Moreover, many of the few allegedly “German” teachers, were not 
even native German speakers and often had an insufficient command of the language 
in which they were meant to instruct. Language was key, the Swabians believed, for 
one could only expect to properly grasp classroom material in one’s mother tongue. 
Thus, instruction in anything other than one’s native language was an impediment to 
proper learning and an act of discrimination. Finally, the nationally conscious Rumaer 
feared, in some cases even those teachers with proper German origins had been raised 
to love Croatian, not German, nationhood. Such renegades could not be trusted to 
instill a spirit of German pride among the young, impressionable Swabians, and the 
failures of the whole system of education were clearly manifest in the Swabian 
children.171 Added to such institutionalized Croatization, schoolyard taunts of 
“Švabo” (meant as an epithet) or “švapski gad” (“Swabian scoundrel”) often had the 
poisonous effect of compelling young Swabians to identify as Croats.172 
The situation of German schools only deteriorated in the years leading to the 
First World War, as Croatian increasingly displaced most lingering German in the 
classroom. In 1907, there were 16 municipal (“kommunale”), 10 confessional and 6 
private elementary schools with German as the language of instruction. These had 
approximately 12,500 pupils. Croatian gradually penetrated even these few schools 
however. A January 29, 1910 government decree required that the Germans schools 
should henceforth be bilingual, but the “bilingual” aspect was usually applied only in 
larger communities. Elsewhere, Croatian was to become the exclusive language of 
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classroom instruction.173 In 1913, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien complained that 
there were no purely German schools in Croatia-Slavonia and that only the 
elementary schools in Ruma, Indjija and Putnici properly enjoyed partial German 
instruction. Yet even these schools often lacked enough properly German teachers.174 
As such, one cannot speak of truly German schools in Croatia-Slavonia during this 
period.175 However, cautions Danube Swabian historian Vladimir Geiger, neither can 
one speak of any forced assimilation. Though confronted with Croatian nationalism, 
the pressure of that nationalism, Geiger believes, was less intense than proper 
Magyarization in Hungary.176 Be that as it may, the two processes plainly were 
sometimes not so dissimilar in means or aims. 
 
From Multi-Ethnic Clubs to German Associations: Gruendet Volksvereine! 
Swabians had been slower to embrace the national principle than their South 
Slav neighbors, who had eagerly established nationally oriented clubs or adapted 
already existing associations to this purpose during the 1800s. The nationally 
conscious Swabians of Ruma, however, sought to change this situation and promote a 
thriving, German associational life, not only in their own community but elsewhere in 
Croatia-Slavonia. There were already numerous civic associations, of course, even in 
remote Slavonia and Srijem. Many towns had long had fire brigades, for example.177 
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A German choral society was founded in Ruma in 1894, but far more typical in 
Slavonia was an associational life that included both Croats and Germans, often 
without overt national orientation.  Vladimir Geiger has revealed in his study of 
Germans in Djakovo that associational life around the turn of the century and before 
the First World War was frequently not segregated along ethnic lines.178 That is, 
before there was a German associational life in Croatia-Slavonia, there was a 
multiethnic one.  
German nationalists considered the multiethnicity of these associations a 
sham, however, at least as regards their intent. They suspected that these 
organizations, although they may have had both German and Slav members, had been 
commandeered by Croats as Croatian national associations on the model of the Czech 
Sokols and other such Slav groups. Themselves recognizing the change, Serbs in 
some cases had left to form their own groups. “Der deutsche Michel”, however, had 
patiently stayed on and often found himself in groups devoted to the exaltation of 
another nationality. German nationalists found this intolerable. Worse still, they 
lamented, the multiethnic associations diverted potential German membership and 
talent from German ones, thereby retarding the German national movement in 
Croatia-Slavonia even further.  
To be successful, the German national movement would need to grow and 
spread beyond Ruma. The men who founded the German publishing house in Ruma 
had never intended to confine their efforts to that town, of course. The publishing 
house’s founding meeting was attended by men from surrounding towns as well as 
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Ruma, and it was immediately resolved to post representatives of the publishing 
house in places of significant German settlement in Srijem. Moreover, they resolved 
to establish “[German] national libraries, reading and choral groups, which would be 
active in every German part of Croatia-Slavonia.”179 From its organizational 
inception, then, the German national movement in Srijem had been thinking in terms 
of growth beyond its immediate region. 
The German Choral Society of Ruma which was established in 1894 was 
about more than just music. Rather, such groups were ways of likeminded men to 
gather and discuss the matters of the day in a framework conducive to cultivating 
national identity. Other German associations were established in the following 
decades. To promote Swabian economic prosperity, Karl Stürm, founding editor of 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien, was also instrumental in establishing the 
Deutscher Volksbank A.G. in Ruma in 1905. This Ruma-based bank soon became the 
largest financial institution in the town and consciously maintained its German 
national character.180 Many other cultural groups were established elsewhere in the 
region with the help of a coordinating committee to promote them. One of the most 
important associations was the German “Turnverein” or gymnastics club, which was 
founded in Ruma in 1909. German gymnastics clubs had a long and nationally 
oriented pedigree dating back to Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (commonly known as 
“Turnvater Jahn”) and German reactions to Napoleon in the early 1800s. In Ruma, 
the Swabians consciously borrowed from this tradition and also looked to the Czech 
Sokol and its Croatian and Serbian variants as models. That is, in a pattern that would 
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be repeated in the coming three decades, the Swabians found inspiration in the Slavic 
nationalities around them.181 The German gymnastics club was not an end in itself, 
however. Rather, it also served as the basis of one of the earliest gatherings of 
Germans in Croatia-Slavonia to date, the German gymnastics festival, or Turnfest, 
held in Ruma in August 1909.  
This 1909 Turnfest was a peaceful “festival of all Germans” in Croatia-
Slavonia as well as an event to rally the German community against Serbian and 
Croatian chauvinism. In the years before the First World War, the language of 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien and the Swabian leadership increasingly became 
one struggle and even warned of “Slav efforts” toward the “eradication” and the 
“extermination” (“Ausrottung” and “Vernichtung”) of the Germans in Austria-
Hungary.182 At the 1909 Turnfest, for example, German citizens of Croatia-Slavonia 
were called upon to join together and form a bulwark against looming [Slav 
nationalist] dangers.183 Meanwhile, German participants came from Novi Sad, Indjija, 
Nova Pazova and especially Zemun, whose German men’s choral society and 
German gymnastics club performed. (Zemun and Indjija were also early centers of 
German nationalism in Srijem.) Turnfest organizers read out greetings from the 
editorial staff of the Semliner Volksblatt (from Zemun) and the Association of the 
Germans from Hungary in Berlin (Verein der Deutschen aus Ungarn in Berlin). The 
stars of this 1909 national festival, of course, were the gymnastics clubs of Ruma and 
Indjija. Nevertheless, the greater purpose of the event was the creation of a common 
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space and moment for the Germans of Srijem to gather and demonstrate their 
Germanness to themselves and others.184  
 
Swabians and the Karpathendeutsche Movement, 1911-1914 
Ruma and its Germans took part in one of the largest movements to build 
bonds among Transleithania’s Germans before the First World War, the 
Karpathendeutsche movement, in spite of their remoteness from the Carpathian 
mountains for which the movement was named.185 As we saw in Chapter One, 
Edmund Steinacker’s Ungarlaendiesche Deutsche Volkspartei was the first 
organization to take an all-Hungary approach to the political organization of the 
Germans of Transleithania on a national basis. The UDVP was not the only group 
addressing itself to the country’s Germans however, and four major rallies devoted to 
promoting German pride, culture and welfare were held in the years before the First 
World War under the Karpathendeutsche banner. These Tagungen der 
Karpathendeutschen, or “Carpathian German Conventions,” were held annually from 
1911 until the outbreak of the war, and Ruma played host to the second annual 
gathering. Officially the conventions were not political events, but they had major 
political aspects, of course, and featured speeches by several prominent UDVP 
leaders. Their purpose was ostensibly cultural and the annual gatherings sought to 
forge a kind of common consciousness among the Germans of Hungary (and 
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especially those of the Carpathian Mountains). They were, moreover, networking 
opportunities for the Germans of Hungary to get to know each other and forge 
contacts with Volkstumarbeit activists from Cisleithania and the Kaiserreich.  
The Karpathendeutsche movement was inseparable from the name Raimund 
Friedrich Kaindl. Kaindl’s importance to the German cause in Hungary was double in 
that he was both a founder of systematic research on east and southeast European 
Germandom and also one of the Hungarian Germans’ earliest and most important 
organizers.186 A professor by trade, he authored many publications, including the 
multivolume History of the Germans in the Carpathian Lands (Geschichte der 
Deutschen in den Karpathenlaendern), which was excerpted in Deutsches Volksblatt 
fuer Syrmien and other newspapers as part of their identity-creating project. As an 
organizer, he was the founder of the Association of the Christian Germans in 
Bukovina (Verein der christlichen Deutschen in der Bukowina) and the principle 
driver and organizer behind the annual Karpathendeutsche rallies. 
The first such Karpathendetusche convention was held in Kaindl’s native 
Czernowitz from June 30 to July 4, 1911 in conjunction with the first German 
Turnfest there. Attendees included “the eminence grise and father of the German-
Hungarian movement,” Edmund Steinacker and also the General secretary of the 
Berlin Association for the Spread of Germandom Abroad (Verein zur Verbretitung 
des Deutschtums im Auslande). Ferdinand Lindner, editor of Deutsches Volksblatt 
fuer Syrmien, came as representative of the Germans of Slavonia. Many others also 
attended, including members of parliament, priests, and notables from German 
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oriented groups across Hungary. One speaker championed German solidarity in 
Hungary under the slogan “To be German, means to be unified!”, which became a 
kind of leitmotif at the gathering.187 In a speech on the convention’s first evening, 
Kaindl observed that the event marked the first occasion to actually gather Germans 
from all Carpathian lands.188 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien editor Lindner spoke on behalf of the 
Germans of Slavonia (which included Srijem) and rather lamely apologized for the 
limited Slavonian attendance, which he blamed on the harvest. His assurances of 
Slavonian enthusiasm for Germandom must have been compelling, however, for the 
leaders of the Karpathendeutsche movement decided to hold their next annual 
convention in Ruma. Preparations for that 1912 convention were extensive and 
involved German choral societies and gymnastics clubs from all over Srijem and 
elsewhere in Hungary, especially the Swabian south. Croatian authorities made a late 
effort to prevent the convention, yet its organizers persevered and from August 18 to 
August 20, 1912, Ruma became the focal point of the German movement in Hungary 
and Croatia.189 In addition to Kaindl, the movement’s founder, speakers included 
editor Lindner, Edmund Steinacker, the Transylvanian Saxon parliamentarian Rudolf 
Brandsch, and German notables from Vienna, Timişoara and Novi Sad. Up to 3000 
onlookers gathered at the gymnastics field during the gymnasts’ three hour 
performance. Convention participants celebrated German language and folk song in 
poetry readings and concerts. Additionally, Franz Moser, Sabor member for Ruma, 
addressed a crowd of 3500 in connection with the 82nd birthday of Kaiser Franz 
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Josef.190 It was always good form to honor the Austrian Emperor and Hungarian 
King, of course. 
 1913 was also a momentous year for the German movement in Transleithania, 
being marked by further gatherings, a new organization, and an important date for 
Deutsches Volksblatt in Syrmien. The annual Karpathendeutsche convention was held 
not in Hungary but in Vienna during that year, from May 10-13. Vienna was chosen 
in order to facilitate the participation of Germans from central Europe, who 
organizers hoped would learn more about the Germans of Hungary and form personal 
connections with the Karpathendeutsche attendees.191  
This third Karpathendeutsche convention was held much in the spirit of the 
previous two. Convention organizers hoped to raise Karpathendeutsche awareness 
and stimulate more Volkstumarbeit organizations’ involvement in the cause of the 
Hungarian Germans. (Compared to Cisleithania, Volkstumarbeit organizations took 
little interest in Hungary, as we have seen.) One purpose of the gathering, Kaindl 
intoned, was to reintegrate the “estranged” brothers of the east into the German 
Muttervolk and reestablish connections with Europe’s core German regions. The 
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UDVP was again present and Steinacker, Brandsch and Kaindl all spoke, as usual. 
The Association of German University Students from the Lands of the Hungarian 
Crown (Vereinigung deutscher Hochschueler aus den Laendern der ungarischen 
Krone or VDH) also held a meeting on the occasion of this year’s Karpathendeutsche 
rally. There, the main speaker was an impressive young Swabian and VDH member 
named Stefan Kraft,192 who would become one of the most prominent German 
activists in interwar Yugoslavia, as we shall in Chapter Four.193  
 
Early German National Voices in Politics 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien promised readers that 1913 would be no 
ordinary year. 1913 marked the newspaper’s tenth anniversary and the editorial staff 
used the occasion to both survey what the German movement had accomplished and 
what remained to be done. Over the years, the newspaper had consistently defined the 
German movement as a defensive struggle and rejected accusations of pan-
Germanism or that the Swabians sought to Germanize their neighbors. Gradually, the 
German movement had become more confident and considerably more strident in its 
language. As we have seen, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien had adopted a 
vocabulary of struggle and even apocalypse on occasion. The German movement, 
according to its mouthpiece, explicitly refused to be cowed by its “enemies” and their 
“attacks.” The newspaper spoke of “dangers” and “threats” to Germandom and 
assured readers that the movement would be “fearless and loyal” in its service to the 
German nation. Reviewing its accomplishments, the newspaper (very optimistically) 
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observed that the majority of the Germans in Croatia Slavonia had awoken from 
national indifference and had engaged in the struggle to maintain German customs 
and language and improve Swabian economic standing. Furthermore, Deutsches 
Volksblatt fuer Syrmien announced that it had become a Kampfblatt, a newspaper 
which would fight for the national, economic, and social position of the Germans in 
Croatia-Slavonia. These were important accomplishments to be sure, yet the 
movement’s success was far from certain.194 
 The Ruma Germans had recently had a political voice in the venerable 
Ferdinand Riester, a long time German activist who had also been Ruma’s mayor, a 
Sabor member, and finally a member of parliament in Budapest before his 
unexpected death in 1911.195 He had long spoken on behalf of the Germans and 
shaped the Ruma Germans’ values. In fact, he had been so influential that the 1912 
Karpathendeutsche convention in Ruma included an official service of 
commemoration at his graveside.196 Riester’s name, thus, must be central to any 
history of the Germans of Ruma and his career is synonymous with early German 
political strivings in Croatia-Slavonia.197 Though men of German origins had 
certainly been involved in politics before, Riester distinguished himself as a pioneer 
by participating in politics as a nationally oriented German.198 Riester’s successor, 
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Franz Moser, was actually a kind of stopgap candidate, a compromise agreed upon to 
ensure that the Sabor seat of the Ruma electoral district remained in German hands 
after Riester’s abrupt death in 1911. Moser’s election, therefore, demonstrated that 
the German movement had reached sufficient political maturity that it could survive 
even the loss of its leading political figure.199 
 Moser’s selection was significant in that it announced a new organizational 
phase for the German movement in Srijem. On September 3, 1911, representatives 
from the Ruma electoral district held a meeting and agreed unanimously on Moser’s 
compromise candidacy. Moser would stand as a government-friendly, independent 
candidate against the candidates of the Serbian Radical and the Serbian Independent 
Parties.200 Rather than formally join the government party, the Germans offered it 
their backing in exchange for concessions to German priorities, which would be 
worked out at an upcoming meeting on September 3. “The meeting was therefore of 
considerable importance, because Swabians came together for the first time in a “rally 
of the Germans of Croatia and Slavonia”, laid down their position on fundamental 
constitutional and legal questions, proclaimed the need of an independent 
organization of Germans and set down its tasks. As one might expect, this meeting 
and proclamation were not well received by Croatian-and Yugoslav-oriented parties. 
Likewise, the Croatian press decried it as yet further evidence of pan-Germanism in 
Srijem.201 
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 By this time, the Germans considered themselves ready for their own political 
organization. They had already worked toward a formal, if non-political, organization 
since earlier in the year. The election of Moser and the process by which the German 
meeting on September 3 both confirmed his candidacy and hammered out a German 
program, however, proved a heady tonic.202 That month, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer 
Syrmien announced the need for an “independent organization of all the German 
comrades [Volksgenossen] of our Croatian fatherland”, since the government party 
could not be fully trusted to preserve German interests and consequently there was no 
point in formally joining the government party. The newspaper’s editorial staff 
announced at year’s end that the German movement had proven its political unity and 
a wide network of German associations had been established. The situation therefore 
was ripe for the establishment of a political party. The combined accomplishments of 
the past decade were “as if a crown prince had kissed awake the Sleeping Beauty, the 
love of nationality, in our Volksgenossen,” the editors claimed.203 Indeed, based on 
the September 3 program, this “independent German party in Croatia-Slavonia, 
should already be said to exist” in practice, the newspaper confidently announced, 
even if it did not yet possess its full framework and structure.204 
 On June 17, 1913, the authorities in Zagreb approved the statutes of the 
“League of the Germans in Croatia and Slavonia” (“Bund der Deutschen in Kroatien 
und Slawonien”), the first German-oriented organization to embrace all of Croatia-
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Slavonia’s Swabians. The organization’s statutes specifically proclaimed the group to 
be a “non-political association” authorized to work across Croatia-Slavonia and 
having its seat in Ruma. Articles 2 and 3 listed the Bund’s purpose as the “promotion 
of the national, cultural and economic interests of its members”, which would be 
accomplished through the publication of printed materials “of economic and 
instructive content,” the holding of economic lectures, the promotion and founding of 
economic associations and loan offices, the promotion of German primary schools 
(Volksschulen), the promotion and founding of German libraries, and the holding of 
nationally oriented social gatherings. Article 5 made membership open to men and 
women and article 6 allowed for the establishment of a local chapter any place with 
more than 10 members. According to article 9, a party congress would be held 
annually.205 The Bund’s statutes were published in Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien 
on August 28, 1913 and the organization was formally constituted on September 28, 
1913.206  
There was little time for the Bund to become active before the outbreak of the 
First World War, of course. Nevertheless, the organization quickly established itself 
and was able to boast a network of 30 local chapters and 2373 confirmed members by 
its first annual congress on June 2, 1913.207 The Bund hardly contained the majority 
of the region’s Germans, of course.  Nevertheless, in the Bund, the German 
movement had demonstrated that it was capable of regional organization. Moreover, 
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in recent elections the Germans had proven that their votes were important for 
political victory in Srijem.208 Yet even as the movement reached its prewar crescendo, 
events were occurring elsewhere in Europe that would result in the fall of the 
Habsburgs and the dismemberment of Hungary. Such events would also transform 
and accelerate the German movement in Croatia and the future Yugoslavia, shifting 
its center definitively across the Danube to Novi Sad. 
 
Osijek: Immigration, Acculturation, Ambivalence 
While Ruma revealed that the German national movement had indeed taken 
root in Croatia-Slavonia, Osijek demonstrated that the German activists would have 
to swim hard against a tide of Swabian acculturation, linguistic assimilation, and 
national indifference elsewhere in the country. As the avowed center of the German 
movement in Slavonia (then including Srijem), Ruma unsurprisingly boasted the 
largest total membership in the Bund with 283 regular members and 22 founding 
ones. In  contrast, Osijek had a far larger population of ethnic Germans but counted 
only one founding and one regular member as late as the Bund’s 1914 annual 
congress.209 Osijek was one of the earliest places of German settlement in Croatia-
Slavonia soon after the Turkish expulsion. For those early settlers, life had been 
difficult. Indeed, so many Germans had died during the early years of settlement in 
Osijek that the city became known as “a cemetery of Germans.” Two centuries later, 
however, the city was a German cemetery in quite another sense as far as the German 
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nationalists were concerned, for Osijek’s German population was by then 
characterized by assimilation to its Croatian surroundings and ambivalence toward 
German identity. The German nationalists in Ruma disapproved, remarking acidly in 
1904 that “for those who were buried in the earlier cemetery we have sympathy and 
heartfelt regret; for those who are interred in the cemetery of today we have burning 
shame and fury.”210 Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien was especially concerned 
about Croatization in Osijek, which it considered rampant. And indeed, as the city’s 
token Bund membership suggested, Germandom was far from “awakened” in the 
Slavonian capital even in 1914. 
In the nineteenth century, Osijek was heavily settled by Germans who came to 
form the city’s largest ethnic group by the second half of the nineteenth century. If 
according the 1857 census 10,020 Croats and Serbs, 3272 Germans and 408 Magyars 
lived in Osijek, by the turn of the century the situation had changed dramatically. The 
1900 census found that the 5516 Croats, 1602 Serbs and 1328 Magyars in the city 
were outnumbered by the 10,657 Germans. As Velimir Petrović notes in his study of 
the German dialect peculiar to the town, “the German ethnic [though not necessarily 
national – my italics] element had the main role in the cultural and economic life of 
the city of Osijek all the way until the founding  of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes in 1918.” Meanwhile, the city was a mosaic of mutlilingualism and 
multiculturalism.211 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien noted the population of Osijek in 1910 was 
approximately 32,000, of whom around 12,000 or one third of the city’s population 
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identified as native-German speakers. This represented a notable decline from 1900, 
when self-identified German speakers made up 52 percent of the city’s inhabitants. 
Observing that the decline could not be counted for by German deaths, the newspaper 
blamed German losses on Croatization. Schools, it charged, were to blame for they 
were the surest means of “denationalization” and there were no properly German 
schools. It complained that German language newspapers such as Die Drau and Die 
Slavonische Presse had large circulations but were not properly German newspapers. 
Though printed in German, they were not German national in spirit. On the contrary, 
they often joined with the Croatian nationalist Narodna obrana in attacking 
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien and the German movement in Croatia. The Ruma 
paper complained that many men with German names held leading positions in the 
city but they had been Croatized or were ambivalent about their heritage. German 
associations were lacking. Worse, Germans could be found in many South Slav 
associations, including Sokol and the choral society “Lipa.” Indeed, many 
associations that were originally founded without national orientation had been 
captured by Croatian nationalists and redirected toward Croatian purposes, often 
without losing the participation of the hapless “deutscher Michel”. Osijek lacked a 
German theater and also lacked a movement to push for one, the population being 
satisfied by a handful of German language performances by visiting troupes annually. 
As in Vinkovci and elsewhere, there was also pressure to replace German with 
Croatian as the fire brigade’s language of command. In sum, from a German 




If Osijek had lacked a German national consciousness in the past, at least its 
German inhabitants had raised their children not as Croats necessarily but as 
Essegger.  (Deriving from Osijek’s German name “Essegg,” “Essegger” connoted 
Osijek residency and frequently implied German ethnicity but it was not a German 
national term.) By 1904, however, the situation had changed precipitously in Osijek, 
and cunning Croatian nationalism had gotten the upper hand, the Ruma German 
nationalists charged.212 Ten years later, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien lamented 
the degree to which things Croatian had permeated society and even the German 
sense of self in nearby Osijek,  
Recognize the truth in your hearts, German citizens, that there indeed 
lies a mighty difference between Germans and Croats. I know, of 
course, that that is today more difficult to admit, because today 
Germans and Croats frequently bear the same names, because it is 
typically believed that the educated and the intelligentsia must be 
Croatian, because the entire country, even in its German areas, has 
been marked with the stamp of Croatism [Kroatismus], because it is 
considered offensive to Croatian patriotism to promote the German 
language instead of only the official Croatian national language.213 
 
At such a rate of decline, soon there would be no Germans left in Osijek, the 
newspaper complained.214  
Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien was consistently critical, indignant, and 
even baffled by the German population of Osijek and its frustrating ambivalence 
toward German national identity. Not only did the city’s Germans have a weak 
national consciousness, they offered little to no resistance to Croatization. Rather than 
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become a bulwark of Germandom, the multinational city had become a bastion of the 
Croatian national movement, even spawning Croatian radical nationalist Josip Frank. 
Unlike the Germans of Vršac or Novi Sad, who may have enjoyed close ties with the 
surrounding German countryside and thus enhanced national consciousness, the 
German bourgeoisie and peasantry were largely isolated from each other in Osijek, 
and the assimilation of both groups was foreseeable.215 Further contributing to the 
separateness of the German population of Osijek was the fact that many Germans had 
settled there earlier and had different origins than those Germans who later settled the 
regions around them.216 Indeed, in 1913 Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien scornfully 
observed that the Essegger Germans preferred not to be called Swabians.217 
 In 1914, Zagreb’s Obzor printed a thoughtful appraisal of the state of German 
identity in Osijek, a city over which ambitious Croatian and German nationalists 
elsewhere argued. Identity in Osijek, Obzor claimed, was more complicated than 
statistics or appearances might suggest. 
A large part of true Osijek citizens did not call themselves by any 
national name at all [in the recent past]. Those who spoke German, 
whom the statistics counted among Germans, knew only that they 
were “Essekeri” [Essegger], and those who spoke Croatian called 
themselves “Slavonians” a decade ago. These “Essekeri” today 
comprise the core of the Osijek Germans and in their national 
conviction, or better, non-conviction, nothing has changed. To speak 
of a national consciousness among them would be superfluous. They 
identify nationality and national struggle with politics and among them 
the principle holds: “I don’t get involved in politics.” 
 
Obzor further noted that Germans were the element from which many “new” Croats 
had been recruited, and that Croatian schools had been so successful in this regard 
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that there was no longer any German youth to speak of in Osijek’s upper or lower 
towns. Indeed, “the boy in Osijek who today calls himself a German is rare and an 
exception in a sea of Croatian youth.” Even the children of the well-to-do German 
intelligentsia, who were anyway usually involved in the economy, were growing up 
Croatian under the influence of Croatian schools. As for pan-Germanism, that outlook 
was out of the question among the Osijek Germans, Obzor cautioned. Ultimately, 
Obzor concluded, the German element of the city was rapidly declining and therefore 
appeared harmless to Croatdom. In fact, Germans would likely “disappear” in the 
future.218 
Essekerisch, the aforementioned German dialect is a very useful tool with 
which to examine the multiethnic nature of life in Slavonia’s capital city. Osijek 
German Lujo Plein recognized the importance of Osijek’s German dialect between 
the world wars and compiled a five-volume collection of the local vernacular between 
1929 and 1938.219 More recently, Croatian professor Velimir Petrović has produced a 
study of the rich and unique Osijek dialect, which was part of the cultural heritage 
lost following the Swabian community’s destruction at the end of the Second World 
War. Osijek featured such a cacophony of German settlers’ different dialects already 
by the nineteenth century that Petrović surmises the various German colonists must 
have had a difficult time understanding each other, much less the Slavs and Magyars 
in their midst.220 From their mutual interaction emerged Essekerisch, a very special 
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local dialect of German. Essekerisch (Croatian – Esekerski) was a mélange of mostly 
German but also Croatian, Serbian, Magyar and even Yiddish words and phrases. In 
addition to contributing vocabulary, neighboring languages also influenced the 
spelling of many words in written Essekerisch and even the dialect’s syntax. Proper 
high German also endured in the socially stratified city, of course, and Essekerisch 
was commonly regarded as the purview of Osijek’s less educated classes. Essekerisch 
did not represent linguistic degeneration, however, so much as the emergence of a 
unique and peculiar dialect, one which well reflected the everyday multi-ethnicity of 
the region.  
There was an exchange of linguistic influences, attributes, and words in both 
directions between Croatian and German (as well as other languages), and even today 
certain German words persist in the Croatian spoken locally in Osijek. Osijek 
Germans borrowed Croatian words for those things for which German lacked a 
suitable term or for which the Croatian term seemed preferable or more 
appropriate.221 Borrowed elements functioned just like other foreign words 
appropriated by German and were blithely integrated into sentences with no second 
thought. “In some cases, the borrowed Croatian element was combined with a 
German element to form a new, hybrid lexical unit,” Petrović notes. He continues, 
“the speaker adapted the borrowed lexical unit to the system of the borrower.” Thus 
from the Croatian verb peglati (German – bügeln, to iron) was formed the German 
participle kpeglt, for example. Sometimes a Croatian word such as nogomet (German 
- Fussball) was combined with a German one, such as spielen, to form the uniquely 
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Essekerisch verb nogomet špiln.222 Meanwhile, the word order of Essekerisch was 
sometimes influenced by Croatian word order, to the detriment of the strict syntax 
dictated by high German grammar.223 With little experience in writing German, many 
Swabians wrote in Esskerisch, frequently using Croatian orthography. 
Perhaps the best description of Essekerisch was given by Osijek German 
author Wilma von Vukelich in her memoirs. Von Vukelich described Essekerisch as 
“not a language at all, but rather a mix of languages” with which locals grew up and 
communicated. It was “an idiom with swallowed final syllables, consonants, and 
vowels, no pure tone, but rather everything as if in a fog.” There was, moreover, “no 
sentence in which not at least a few foreign elements were mixed.” There was “no 
trace of syntax, grammar or orthography.” Esskerisch was a “conglomeration of the 
Hernals German imported by Viennese artisans and the Wuertemberg-Hessian 
elements of the Swabian peasants.”224 It additionally featured aspects deriving from 
the relocation of certain soldiers from Bohemia, copious “words and expressions from 
the vocabulary of the Jewish peddlers,” and the “underworld lingo of the drifter and 
traveling journeyman.” Moreover, it showed the influence of the Serbian population 
in Osijek’s lower town, “the corrupted official German and Croatian of the nearby 
military border, the poor style of the German local newspapers and the false stage 
pathos of the traveling theater troupes from Olomouc and Pressburg.”225 The Croatian 
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common street language (Umgangsprache) in particular had considerable influence 
on Essekerisch.226 
Traces of the Past, Hints of the Future 
In summary, a German national movement was underway in Croatia-Slavonia 
before the First World War. Its leaders, the Germans of Ruma, considered themselves 
to have made good progress toward nationally “awakening” the Germans of Srijem 
and Slavonia by 1914. They had established their publishing house to make available 
printed materials for the Swabians of the region. Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien 
had successfully emerged as the mouthpiece of the nascent German movement and 
had become a platform from which to promote German national consciousness and 
also advertise the circumstances of Slavonia’s Germandom to other Germans and 
national activists in Hungary, Cisleithania, and Imperial Germany. The electoral 
successes of Ferdinand Riester and Franz Moser demonstrated that the Swabians 
could act as a coherent and significant political force and provided Croatia-Slavonia 
with its first nationally conscious German Sabor members. So confident did the 
German leadership in Ruma feel that it announced the existence of a de facto German 
political party by the end of 1911. Moreover, Ruma’s German national leadership 
brought the attention of the whole Hungarian-German movement to their small 
market town when they organized the second Karpathendeutsche rally there in 1912. 
Finally in 1913, as Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien celebrated its tenth anniversary 
and boldly trumpeted that it had become a proper Kampfblatt for Germandom, the 
movement won approval of the statutes of the Bund der Deutschen in Kroatien und 
                                                 




Slawonien and soon had established a network of local chapters, just as it had earlier 
fostered German-based associations and clubs across the region. The Swabian 
activists looked to the future with pride and confidence. 
Despite the positive pronouncements of Deutsches Volksblatt Syrmien and the 
assured speeches at Bund meetings about the spread of the German national 
movement, however, it was clear to all from the case of Osijek that the movement’s 
impact in Croatia-Slavonia remained limited. Even in 1909, as Deutsches Volksblatt 
fuer Syrmien extolled Edmund Steinacker as a “hero of our German nation” and “an 
early fighter for our German mother tongue in Hungary” on the occasion of his 70th 
birthday, the newspaper lamented that readers in Croatia-Slavonia might be 
unfamiliar with his name.227 Nevertheless, the incomplete accomplishments of the 
German movement in Srijem would prove to have lasting influence on the German 
movement as it evolved during the interwar era. The electoral politics of Ferdinand 
Riester and Franz Moser foreshadowed German participation in the Yugoslav 
Skupština. As we shall see in the following chapter, Ruma provided a precedent and 
an example for the later political strategy of Stefan Kraft and his colleagues in the 
Germans’ political party of the 1920s, the Partei der Deutschen. The annual 
Karpathendeutsche conventions revealed Swabian involvement (and Stefan Kraft’s 
early participation) with students’ organizations and Volkstumarbeit organizations 
from Germany and elsewhere in the Habsburg Monarchy.  
The matters that had so troubled the Swabians in Ruma, such as anti-German 
hostility and insufficient German in the church and classroom, would also persist into 
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the interwar era. Swabian concerns about the weak state of German national 
consciousness would endure and inspire new generations of national activists 
determined to rouse Swabians from their national indifference or ambivalence. 
Finally, in Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien and the short-lived Bund der Deutschen 
in Kroatien und Slawonien, one observes models upon which similar organizations 
would be built in the interwar era. Indeed, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien would 
be the basis of the Swabians’ main newspaper in the interwar era, Novi Sad’s 
Deutsches Volksblatt. The 1920s and especially the 1930s would feature many 
activist newspapers and self-described Kampfblaetter, which sought to stimulate 
German awareness and construct German identity. Like the Bund der Deutschen in 
Kroatien und Slawonien, Yugoslavia’s Schwaebish-Deutsch Kulturbund would 
ostensibly be non-political and exclusively devoted to cultural matters. Moreover, like 
the Bund, the interwar Kulturbund upon its simultaneous devotion to the Volk and 
loyalty to the state. Alas, as we shall see in the following chapters, the South Slavs in 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were little more convinced of this dual 
German loyalty than had their predecessors been in Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary 
under the Habsburgs. 
After Hungary’s collapse in 1918, the center of the German movement would 
swing definitively toward Novi Sad and little attention would be paid to the Slavonian 
lands west of Ruma until the 1930s. Despite the successes in Ruma, German national 
identity in Slavonia seemed so weak that many in Yugoslavia’s nascent German 
movement gave it up for lost after 1918 and focused their energies on Batschka and 




Slavonia an opportunity for Volkstumarbeit, however. One such German national 
opportunist was the former Habsburg and Yugoslav army officer and Osijek native 
Branimir Altgayer, who would assume a leading role in Slavonia during the 1930s as 




























Chapter 3: Constructing the Institutions of German Identity 
within Interwar Borders 
 
In the autumn of 1918, the Swabians were faced with a chaotic and 
unprecedented situation. Following the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, the 
Swabians suddenly found themselves to be an unwanted minority in the aspiring 
South Slav nation-state known, awkwardly, as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. The final boundaries of this state did not become clear for several years, but 
it was evident that the old order had been irreparably smashed. Hitherto collected in 
one Hungarian Kingdom, the Danube Swabians would now be divided among the 
three successor states of Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Numerically diminished, 
politically inexperienced, and generally lacking group coherence, much less a 
national consciousness, the German population would hence have to negotiate its way 
in the nation-states of other, often feuding, ethnic groups. The limited German 
leadership in Yugoslavia met this extraordinary challenge not through rejection of the 
state, as the Sudeten Germans initially did in Czechoslovakia. Nor did the Swabian 
leaders retreat into irredentism or nostalgia for the lost Hungarian fatherland. Instead, 
the Yugoslav Swabians pursued a patient strategy of working within the bounds of 
the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon and relying upon the minority protection 
treaties negotiated between the successor states and the victorious allies. They 
embraced the uncertain framework for parliamentarism and liberalism in the new 
Yugoslav state and established their own political and cultural institutions. Finally, 
they sought to nurture and define the uncertain German community in the new 




sense of national purpose and ethnic cohesion. With the oppressive but stable hand of 
Hungarian hegemony finally lifted, the German future in Yugoslavia appeared 
fraught with uncertainty. Yet insightful Swabians recognized that the South Slav state 
also offered new opportunities for German national activism.  
Although many of the original German leaders in Yugoslavia were roughly 
middle-aged in 1918, overall their ages varied, as did their origins in the Austrian and 
Hungarian halves of the Monarchy. As we shall see in Chapters Six and Seven, their 
later rivals for power would denigrate the early Swabian activists as the outmoded 
“old leadership” in the 1930s. Such a pejorative characterization was doubtless unfair, 
but it is not inappropriate to speak collectively of the men who launched the German 
national movement in Yugoslavia after the war’s end. As a group, they can best be 
thought of as the Swabians’ “original leadership” or “Swabian activists,” for they 
founded the Germans’ principle institutions in the 1920s and led them from the 
turbulent years after the Habsburg collapse until the late 1930s.228 It was their vision 
of national identity that largely shaped the German national movement, its institutions 
and its sense of self during the interwar period. This chapter will deal principally with 
the chaos following the collapse of Hungary in 1918 and the cultural and 
organizational responses of the Swabian activists to their radically changed 
                                                 
228  Although not all of the German activists in Yugosalvia were actually descendants of the Danube 
colonists, I will nevertheless often refer to them collectively as “Swabian activists.” The Germans in 
Slovenia, of course, were not Swabians at all and had distinct traditions and a national consciousness 
that was comparatively highly developed. Nor did the Slovene Germans and Swabians have a shared 
historical experience, the former having lived in turbulent Cisleithania and lacking the history of 
colonization that defined the Danube Swabians. Nevertheless, several Slovene Germans assumed 
prominent positions in the original leadership of the German national movement and its institutions in 
Vojvodina. Accordingly, even such Slovene Germans as Deutsches Volksblatt editor Franz Perz and 
Oskar Plautz may be counted under the rubric of “Swabian activists”, for the bulk of their time and 




circumstances in the post war era. In Chapter Four, we turn to the Swabians’ premier 
political organization in the 1920s, the Partei der Deutschen. 
 
Disintegration and Disorientation 
Until the end of 1918, the history of Germans in the South Slav lands was the 
history of Germans in Hungary, and Hungary was chaotic and disintegrating during 
the autumn of that year. Desperate to hold the Monarchy together, Emperor Karl 
issued an imperial manifesto on October 16 authorizing the reorganization of Austria 
along national-federal lines. That same day, Hungary renounced the Ausgleich and on 
October 31, Count Mihaly Karolyi was catapulted into the premiership as the result of 
a nearly bloodless coup in the streets of Budapest. This came just a week after 
Karolyi’s limited supporters had established a National Council, which quickly 
transformed itself into a cabinet. Karolyi and his supporters took radical steps, 
including announcing Hungary’s emancipation from its formal ties to Austria and 
proclaiming it a republic.229 However, such moves to establish order in Hungary were 
swiftly overtaken by events, since the country was already in an advanced state of 
disintegration by late October. Defeated in war, the main threat to Hungary would 
now come from below, in the form of the long suppressed national minorities with 
their advocates in the West. As the traditional order broke down, various regional and 
national councils formed across Hungary, asserting their legitimacy based on national 
self-determination. These councils, such as Zagreb’s National Council (Narodno 
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vijeće), produced declarations for or against a future in Hungary.230 Additionally, the 
Allies authorized the military occupation of huge swathes of historic Hungary by 
troops from Romania, Serbia and the nascent Czechoslovak state. Finally, besides 
nationalist unrest, Hungary was also faced with peasant uprisings in the countryside 
and an increasingly radical labor movement in its cities.  
Hungary’s Germans were buffeted by the same storms that shook the Magyars 
during the autumn of 1918. However, lacking a developed political tradition, 
scattered across the kingdom, divided by confession, and having distinct origins and 
settlement histories, Hungary’s Germans found themselves with unclear or 
irreconcilable visions of their future at the war’s end. Resentful of their historic 
treatment in the kingdom but often lacking in national identity and generally 
concerned about the increasingly assertive (especially Yugoslav and Romanian) 
nationalisms in their midst, the Germans were pushed to collective action but were 
not always of the same mind on key issues. Moreover, as a traditionally unpolitical 
minority which was territorially separated from its ethnic motherland, the Germans 
were limited in their options compared to their South Slav and Romanian neighbors. 
Ultimately, there was no clear consensus on the road forward for the Empire among 
Hungary’s Germans, and rival German national councils formed with different 
visions around the persons of Jakob Bleyer and Rudolf Brandsch. Bleyer and 
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Brandsch had cooperated in German matters in the past, but by the fall of 1918, their 
relationship had become a struggle for leadership in Budapest.231 
While the Germans talked in Budapest, the situation was evolving on the 
ground in southern Hungary. Romanians and Slavs exploited the disorienting 
situation to claim territories for their respective states while the Swabians in their 
midst strove to defend their own interests. Living in Croatia-Slavonia (including 
Srijem), the Germans could expect that they would become part of an eventual 
Yugoslav state, should the Dual Monarchy collapse. However, the situation was far 
less certain in Batschka and the Schwaebische Tuerkei between Lake Balaton and the 
Danube, where Magyarization had made great inroads and where the Swabians were 
most inclined toward remaining in Hungary.232 Meanwhile, in Banat, Romanian 
territorial claims competed with German and Serbian and Hungarian ones. Timişoara, 
Banat’s largest city and home to a German plurality, was the prize coveted by all 
parties. The Swabians, for their part, were generally inclined to remain in Hungary 
but were also concerned to keep their Swabian settlement area intact. As such, if 
remaining in Hungary were not an option, many hoped for the wholesale inclusion of 
Banat in Yugoslavia or Romania.233 
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Timişoara from February until the end of the Serbian occupation of that city in July 1919. 
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Table 3.1: Population Growth of Timişoara234 






































Perhaps the most curious vision for the future of the region was the November 
1, 1918 proclamation of the “Banat Republic,” an “independent” if ephemeral 
republic. Proclaimed from the balcony of the Timişoara city hall by Social Democrat 
Otto Roth, the Banat Republic was a short lived affair that sought to preserve Banat 
on a multiethnic basis. Its legitimacy supposedly derived from the military councils of 
the various ethnic groups which had met on October 31, when Roth had emphasized 
the urgency of establishing a Banat People’s Council as a body to represent all the 
region’s peoples. Seeking unification with the Regat,235 however, the Romanians 
distanced themselves from the project, which never achieved meaningful international 
support and had only the briefest of existences.236 To the degree that the Banat 
Republic existed in a meaningful sense at all, that life ended definitively with the 
entry of Serbian troops into Banat on November 15, 1918.237 
The German national councils in Budapest, with their goals of maintaining 
Hungarian territorial integrity, were being overtaken by events. In Batschka, an 
overwhelmingly Serbian Great Popular Assembly (Velika narodna skupština) 
                                                 
234 Table 3.1 based on Table 37 in Bundesministerium fur Vertriebene, Fluchtlinge und 
Kriegsgeschadigte, Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Rumaenien, ed. Theodor Scheider, 
Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, vol. 3 (Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1957; reprint, 2004). 15E. 
235  The lands comprising Romania before 1918 are colloquially referred to as the “Regat” or 
Romanian Old Kingdom. 
236 Richard Weber, "Die Turbulenzen des Jahre 1918-1919 in Temeschburg" 
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gathered at Novi Sad on November 25, 1918 to proclaim the unification of Vojvodina 
with the Serbian Kingdom.238  Less than a week later, Alexander (acting as Regent) 
proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Also that day, the Romanian 
army occupied Transylvania and the Romanian-Transylvanian National Assembly 
voted in Alba Iulia for unification with Romania proper.  
The abortive Banater Republik a memory, Otto Roth organized a Swabian 
National Council (Schwaebischer Nationalrat or Schwabenrat) in Timişoara on 
December 8, 1918. Rejecting the territorial claims of the respective Serbian and 
Romanian national bodies at Novi Sad and Alba Iulia,  protesting recent actions by 
Romania and the Yugoslav Kingdom, and ultimately pro-Hungarian in its orientation, 
this Swabian Council (Schwabenrat) produced a “Swabian Manifesto” that called for 
the fate of Batschka and Banat to be decided by plebiscite with the hope of asserting 
their indivisibility. The manifesto additionally demanded guarantees of minority 
rights, autonomy for Batschka and Banat and due representation at the Paris peace 
conference.239 Such goals, however, were never to be realized by the Swabians, who 
were ignored by the victors in Paris.240 Meanwhile, the Transylvanian Saxons had 
chosen to leave Hungary themselves. Their representatives (now including Brandsch) 
negotiated relatively favorable terms with Bucharest for their annexation by the 
                                                 
238 Zoran Janjetović, Between Hitler and Tito: The Disappearance of the Vojvodina Germans, 2 ed. 
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623. 
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Romanian state, and the Saxon National Assembly (Nationalversammlung) voted in 
Mediaş for unification with the Regat in January 1919.241  
In sum, the Swabians’ predicament in 1918 was extremely difficult. Unlike 
their South Slav or Romanian neighbors, they did not have a neighboring nation-state 
to sponsor or receive them. They could expect no army of coethnics to establish a 
new order and elevate them to the people of state. On the contrary, anti-German 
sentiment was strong in 1918, and realistically the Swabians had little hope for 
influence in the construction of a new, national order in southern Hungary. True, the 
destruction of old Hungary would mean a corresponding end to Magyarization 
measures, which was attractive to some Swabian minds. However, Hungary had 
seemed eternal to many ethnic Germans and it was, after all, their homeland. Lacking 
a nation-state to deliver them, the solution to their predicament seemed to lie in the 
reform of Hungary, not its destruction. As such, the Germans largely remained 
sympathetic to Hungary, opposed secession, and especially hoped to prevent the 
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A New Kingdom 
The outline of the German community of Yugoslavia was determined by the 
peace treaties of St. Germain and Trianon from September 10, 1919 and June 4, 1920 
respectively. The former treaty addressed the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy and 
thus concerned the Germans living in the western, Slovenian regions of Yugoslavia. It 
was the Treaty of Trianon that affected the bulk of Yugoslavia’s Germans, however, 
simultaneously dismembering Hungary and dividing the Danube Swabians’ main 
settlement areas in Batschka and Banat. By this treaty, Croatia-Slavonia and Srijem 
were also awarded to the Yugoslav Kingdom. 
The basics of the Treaties of Trianon and St. Germain are well known but 
several details merit closer consideration in connection with Yugoslavia. Though 
intended to unite prewar Hungary’s ethnic populations in their own nation-states, the 
Trianon Treaty had exactly the opposite effect on the country’s Germans (who were 
not consulted anyway). The more than 1.5 million Germans in southern Hungary 
were divided between the successor states of Yugoslavia, Romania and rump-
Hungary, with Romania receiving the largest share. 
Table 3.2: Official 1930s Census Statistics for  
Germans in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania 
State Population 
Yugoslavia  (1931) 499,969 (Mother tongue)243 
Hungary (1933) 477,153 (Mother tongue)244 
Romania (1930) 760,687 (Mother tongue)245 
            745,421 (Nationality)  
 
Despite Swabian efforts to preserve its integrity, Banat was divided between Romania 
and Yugoslavia, the latter of which would also share Batschka and Baranja with rump 
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Hungary. Many Swabians in these regions would have preferred to remain in 
Hungary, but the Wilsonian principle of self-determination was interpreted such that 
the presence of a plurality of Slavs mandated union with Yugoslavia, even if a 
combined majority of Magyars and Swabians might have preferred to remain in 
Hungary.  
Since the mosaic of the Habsburg Monarchy could not be disassembled 
without leaving some ethnic populations as minorities, the Allies included articles in 
the peace treaties obliging the successor states to respect the rights of national 
minorities and then negotiated specific minority protection treaties with the successor 
states. In practical terms, these treaties dealt with minority rights in education, 
religion, language use with officials, and the like and were to be enforced by the 
League of Nations. The original postwar Swabian leadership counted on the 
meaningful implementation of these treaty obligations and based their national goals 
upon them. The (largely Serbian) Yugoslav authorities, however, considered these 
obligations an offensive and unwarranted intrusion on their own national sovereignty 
and were thus reluctant at the state and local levels to allow Germans the 
opportunities and protections the treaties granted. In fact, the minority issue was so 
controversial that it was only after massive international pressure that the Yugoslav 
government consented to sign the conventions on minority protection.246 As we shall 
see, the government’s signature did not guarantee treaty enforcement. 
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The situation in southern Hungary remained unclear throughout the winter of 
1918-1919, with the Yugoslav, Romanian and Hungarian states making rival claims 
to many of the same territories and dispatching occupying troops to create facts on the 
ground, as we have seen with Serbia in Banat. According to the Wilsonian principles 
upon which the final peace settlement was to be based, the fate of these lands was to 
be decided by self-determination, with the possibility of plebiscites in contested areas. 
Given this possibility of plebiscites and the large numbers of Germans in Batschka 
and Banat, it behooved Yugoslav authorities to treat the Germans there generously 
and win their sympathy. The Yugoslavs also worried that lingering German 
sentimentality for Hungary could become outright irredentism.  
In order to prevent the formation of a Swabian-Magyar irredentist front, the 
shrewd Yugoslav authorities initially privileged the Germans, offering them generous 
cultural concessions and opportunities that they had not enjoyed in Hungary before its 
collapse. An unprecedentedly free German press was tolerated as was German 
associational life. Having occupied Timişoara, the Serbs installed Banat German and 
early Swabian activist Reinhold Heegn as the region’s governor or Obergespan247 
from February 17 to July 20, 1919.248 Seeking to win the whole of Banat for 
Yugoslavia, the authorities also promised the Germans far-reaching educational 
rights. Thus, in the immediate wreckage of Hungary, the Swabians were able to 
develop their own schools as never before. The Serbs even promised the Swabians a 
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German university, should they support the successful, wholesale inclusion of Banat 
in Yugoslavia.249  Many of Belgrade’s promises soon proved to be empty, however. 
Ultimately, the Yugoslavs did not realize their maximalist claims in Banat, 
most of which was awarded to Romania. However, Yugoslavia did persuade the 
Allies in Paris to grant it extensive claims to Batschka, the territory in Yugoslavia 
which would contain the most Germans as well as a large number of Magyars. 
Meanwhile, the cultural and especially educational privileges the Yugoslav 
authorities had extended to the Vojvodina Germans in the immediate postwar period 
were gradually eroded after the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. Furthermore, as will 
be discussed later, the Yugoslav government interpreted Part III, Section VII of the 
treaty, “Clauses Relating to Nationality”, as endorsing the actual denial of German 
political rights until early 1922, well after the 1920 election of the Constituent 
Assembly and its adoption of the Vidovdan Constitution. As we have seen, the 
Yugoslav government was hardly enthusiastic about the minority protection treaty. 
Thus, the very treaties that were intended to safeguard minority rights in the post 
Habsburg order were either selectively implemented, ignored, or even became 
instruments of exclusion in the hands of Belgrade. The country’s Germans could have 
no voice in the affairs of state until the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had shaped the 
kingdom’s constitution by themselves. “The South Slavs had sought minority rights 
with mixed success from Austria-Hungary before the war,” John Lampe has 
observed. “The new Yugoslav Kingdom now faced the dilemma of respecting such 
rights or encouraging the breakup of the state.”250  
                                                 
249  Anton Scherer, Kratka povijest podunavskih Nijemaca (Osijek: Pan liber, 1999). 98. 




I have described interwar Yugoslavia as a nationalizing-state and sometimes 
as a nation-state. In fact, the country was dominated by the three rather distinct 
cultures for which it was named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Despite 
their different languages and alphabets, these were understood as three tribes of a 
single Yugoslav nation. Yugoslav authorities and the peoples in the state alternated 
over the years between insisting on a single integral Yugoslav culture and variously 
tolerating the differences of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian peculiarities.251 There 
was considerably less tolerance of the country’s minorities, however. 
The Yugoslav Kingdom was a constitutional monarchy governed by a 
unicameral assembly known as the Skupština and with a relatively liberal 
constitution. It was a complex place however. In addition to the three tribes of the 
state nation, the country contained huge populations of Magyars, Albanians, 
Romanians and, of course, Germans. Although this paper only concerns itself with 
the lands formerly under the Habsburgs, Yugoslavia also included the Serbian and 
Montenegrin Kingdoms. “By virtually every relevant criterion – history, political 
traditions, socioeconomic standards, legal systems, religion and culture – Yugoslavia 
was the most complicated of the new states of interwar East Central Europe,” 
historian Joseph Rothschild has observed.252 During the interwar years the country 
would be dominated by competing unitarist and federal forces, a struggle which is 
frequently represented by a Serbian drive for centralized hegemony and a Croatian 
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defense of the autonomy and integrity of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia.253 The 
country was ostensibly a Rechtstaat, a state governed by law. Yet as we shall see, the 
primacy of politics in Yugoslavia frequently trumped the niceties of law, and 
opposition politicians often found themselves under arrest.  
 With the single exception of Monsignor Anton Korošec, all of interwar 
Yugoslavia’s prime ministers were Serbs. The brief tenure of Korošec, leader of the 
Slovene People’s Party, followed the 1928 murder of the leading Croatian politician 
Stjepan Radić, who had dominated the Croatian Peasant Party until his death. Politics 
on the state level were ethnic politics and each nationality eventually embraced 
nationally-based parties. Thus, most Slovenes rallied behind the Slovene People’s 
Party and most Croats supported the Croatian Peasant Party. Serbs also supported 
their own parties, but the Serbian political scene was more diverse as it included 
Serbian politicians from Habsburg Vojvodina and the old Serbian Kingdom south of 
the Danube. The most important political forces from the Serbian Kingdom were the 
Radical Party led by Nikola Pašić and the Democratic Party led by Ljubomir 
Davidović. The Democratic Party for several years also included the lead Serb 
politician from Vojvodina, Svetozar Pribićević and his backers. But after several 
years, Pribićević and his supporters withdrew from the common party to form the 
Independent Democrats. Additionally, Yugoslavia’s Bosnian Muslims, Albanians and 
Germans had their own political parties. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which 
was quite strong for a brief period, was banned in 1921. 
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Becoming National in War and its Aftermath 
As we have seen, the German national politicians of the Ungarlaendische 
Deutsche Volkspartei and the editorial staff of Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien had 
had to confront German national indifference or even incomprehension in the era 
before the First World War. The interwar period, however, was characterized by an 
increasing Swabian embrace of national identity, a development which asks the 
obvious question of what prompted the Germans of Yugoslavia to suddenly “become 
national.” In fact, the Swabians’ reorientation was not as sudden or spontaneous as it 
at first appears. The turn toward national identity, or differently put, the emergence of 
nationhood as politically salient, was both gradual and revolutionary, profound and 
incomplete. In large part, it was the result of the military mobilization, political 
organization, and religious organization which Anthony D. Smith has identified as 
among the most crucial forces for coalescing, that is crystallizing, a sense of national 
consciousness from an existing ethnic identity.254 For many, it derived from the 
transformational experiences of the First World War, which shook many Swabians 
out of their provincial isolation and exposed them to new places, persons and ideas 
for the first time. National identity crystallized for many others in reaction to the 
heightened South Slav nationalisms before and especially after the war. The collapse 
of the familiar Hungarian fatherland (and its replacement by a nation-state based on a 
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nation to which many Swabians felt little or no sense of belonging) certainly 
provoked some self-reflection among the Germans.255 Additionally, the eventual 
insensitivity and repressive policies of the Yugoslavs and their government toward 
the Germans had the unintended consequence of helping coalesce a collective sense 
of nationhood among them.256  
Also essential to forging the Swabians’ sense of nationhood were certainly the 
tireless efforts of a band of nationally conscious German activists. These men 
founded Swabian organizations in the wake of the First World War and would devote 
the next twenty years to the classic activities of “national awakening” pioneered by 
the ethnic entrepreneurs of nineteenth century Europe. This “national awakening” 
was anything but the natural process its advocates described it to be, of course. 
Rather, the Swabian national “awakeners” were faced with the formidable task of 
crafting a national identity, imparting it to the people and mobilizing it politically. As 
we shall see in Chapter Four, in the new Yugoslav nation-state, German leaders 
organized a German political party and mobilized a great many Swabians politically 
for the first time. Additionally, as detailed in Chapter Five, the country’s German 
Protestants became organized in a specifically German Lutheran Church which had 
relatively close ties to Germany itself and cultivated an increasingly well developed 
sense of German identity under its young and ambitious head bishop, Philipp Popp. 
Ultimately, these institutions and others established by the original leadership shortly 
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after the Habsburg collapse were instrumental in forging German group identity and 
purpose. 
Although the establishment of the UDVP, the election of Ferdinand Riester to 
the Croatian Sabor, and the regular publication of Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien 
before 1914 must be recognized as highly important achievements in themselves, 
their greatest significance would not emerge until the interwar period, when they 
served as models for a much more developed German life in Yugoslavia. As we saw 
in Chapters One and Two, the state of Germandom on the eve of the First World War 
was precarious indeed. Nonetheless, the German national movement did gradually 
develop in the first decades of the twentieth century. As such, one may say that the 
Swabians’ embrace of national identity after 1918 was not as sudden as it might 
appear, since their interwar institutions were in part built on the pre-war traditions and 
expertise of the UDVP, Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien and the like. The impact of 
the First World War and the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy cannot be 
underestimated as catalysts for national identity formation, however. Henceforth, the 
Swabians’ embrace of nationhood as a political principle would occur at a notably 
accelerated rate.  
The First World War and subsequent Paris peace settlement were 
revolutionary for the Swabians. Until that conflict, the Germans of Croatia-Slavonia 
and Vojvodina had frequently developed only a local consciousness that bound them 
to their village (Dorfgemeinschaft) or perhaps via family to a neighboring 




regions of German settlement themselves.257 The First World War marked a turning 
point, however. During the conflict, many Swabians were exposed to other Germans 
in the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary, with whom they shared the war’s 
savage experience at the front. Marched in uniform beyond the confines of parish and 
village, they were thus exposed to new people, ideas and philosophies. In ethnic 
Germans from distant corners of the Kaiserreich and Austria-Hungary, they 
recognized commonalities and began to develop a sense of nationhood. Moreover, 
they learned that the Magyars’ narcissistic celebration of their own fatherland was not 
absolute truth, nor should Magyar disregard for Swabians as country bumpkins go 
unquestioned. In the wartime military, the Swabians discovered a world where the 
Magyars were not everywhere lords and the language of command was their own, 
German. Furthermore, in Kaisserreich Generalfeldmarschall Gustav von 
Mackensen’s 1916 Balkan campaign, the Swabians of Batschka and Banat saw 
firsthand how German forces were better equipped and visibly more formidable than 
the Hungarian National Guard, or Honvéd.258 The Swabians were seized by the 
connection between Imperial German and Habsburg forces in their common struggle 
against the other Great Powers. They watched the unfolding of German power with 
astonishment and came to identify with it. This experience expunged the sense of 
inferiority from many Swabians, who had grown accustomed to Magyar dismissals of 
them as dimwitted and simple-minded, especially compared to the magnificent 
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Magyar nation. Swabians in the military were exposed to modern German 
nationalism as well as the “Heimat novels” of Banat Swabian and German nationalist 
author Adam Mueller-Guttenbrunn, who distributed his books among the Swabian 
troops on several occasions.259 Finally, the Swabians could not help but take note of 
the Wilsonian principles of self determination and equality that were meant to define 
the postwar order and govern future relations between peoples.260  
Thus liberated from assumptions of Hungarian superiority and Swabian 
inferiority, many Swabians came to aspire to a higher sense of nationhood. Indeed, on 
the occasion of the 1920 founding of a local chapter of the Schwaebisch-Deutsch 
Kulturbund, Chaplain Christian Mueller observed that a new spirit was in the air after 
the fall of Hungary.   
This new spirit has now awoken the Germans. And just as our 
forefathers were greeted as Swabians by all others during the 
settlement and were not ashamed of this greeting but rather were proud 
of it, so will we also not be ashamed when somebody calls us 
Swabians. No, we want to be proud of it, we want to emulate our 
forefathers, since we have won back our self-confidence through the 
new spirit, we have recognized that as Germans we are worthy of this 
soil of the fatherland given to us by God.261 
 
As among the Czechs and other central European nations, Swabian national activists 
portrayed this embrace of nationhood as a “revival,” a “reawakening,” or a “rebirth.” 
The turn to nationhood and nationalism was not something new, in this depiction, but 
rather the “winning back” of something ancient and authentic, which had fallen 
dormant. Allegedly the shock of the World War and the subsequent Trianon 
settlement had merely jolted the Swabians back to their senses. 
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Although the contemporary Swabian activists likely exaggerated the 
pervasiveness of the new German national spirit in their speeches and articles, there is 
no question that the destruction of old Hungary, Wilsonian idealism, the example of 
Slav nationalisms, and the wartime exposure to Germans from elsewhere in Austria-
Hungary and the Kaiserreich had made a profound impression on the Swabians. The 
transformation of the political, cultural, and social landscape had been extreme. As 
one contemporary observer described the profound changes wrought by the 
destruction of old Hungary in 1920: 
The sudden end of the greatest clash of nations of all time tore away 
the rotten roof from over the heads of us Germans of the former 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It separated us from friend and brother 
and blocked all living connections with a single blow. There we 
suddenly stood, helpless and abandoned, divided in different national 
states. 
 
The rawness of the postwar situation and the nakedness of the Swabian position were 
nothing less than shocking. Yet the war that had cast the Swabians from the familiar 
if oppressive security of Hungary had also imparted a new urgency to the question of 
Swabian identity and hope of deliverance in German nationalism. “The old world had 
sunk behind us,” this observer concluded, “and before us in hopeful brilliance shone 
the sun of our newly invigorated national consciousness.”262  
The destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy was traumatic to be sure. 
However, the men who would emerge as the leaders of the nascent Swabian-German 
national movement recognized that the collapse of the old order also offered new 
opportunities. As the interwar Novi Sad daily Deutsches Volksblatt commented in 
1921,  
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One cannot give enough thanks to fate, which cut us off from the 
source of our national misfortune and allowed us to finally breathe 
freely. What thinking Swabian would wish to return to the old 
Magyarophile, unfortunate circumstances? The Yugoslav state has 
held out to us the prospect of national freedom.263 
 
True, there was much room for improvement in the Germans’ position in the new 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and such Swabian statements were no doubt 
partly intended to curry favor with the Yugoslav authorities. However, much sincerity 
also lay in such words. After all, was such an imperfect situation still not better than 
had been the case in Hungary?264 True, the Hungarian state idea, even after it was 
eclipsed by a prewar rising tide of Magyar chauvinism, had always had a certain 
cosmopolitan appeal. Trianon, however, had eliminated it as an available identity 
option at least for those Germans in the Yugoslav Kingdom and Romania. Yet 
nationhood had survived the destruction of the old Hungarian state, eternal in its 
mythology. “Our Swabian Volk” wrote one contributor to Deutsches Volksblatt in 
1920, “remains a Volk irrespective of the state to which it is politically bound.”265 
Thus, the destruction of Hungary forced many Swabians to confront the inconvenient 
questions about their own identity and place in the post-Habsburg order. 
The postwar transformations in the lands annexed by Yugoslavia were not 
merely administrative. On the contrary, a dynasty that had seemed ancient and 
everlasting had been deposed and replaced by the cult of the nation, which had 
equally eternal pretensions. In such a national age, cosmopolitanism lost most of its 
attraction, and there was obviously no more cosmopolitan Habsburg Emperor/King 
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behind which to hide. (Though the Karadjordjević dynasty now ruled all of the 
Yugoslav Kingdom, the House of Karadjordjević was, of course, the Serbian royal 
family.) As Novi Sad’s Deutsches Volksblatt observed in December 1920, 
cosmopolitanism had been dragged to its grave by the First World War.266 As such, a 
vacuum emerged where before there had before been a well defined identity for 
literally centuries. The new appeal of German nationalism to the Swabians was one 
result of this sudden vacuum.  
One unsurprising reason why the Swabians became national in the interwar 
period, of course, was that they suddenly could. Once the repressive framework of 
Magyarization had been removed, their leaders were free (or freer) to develop 
national institutions of the sort that had been so successful in shaping and mobilizing 
groups based on nationalism elsewhere. Thus the Swabian activists were not 
reinventing the wheel in their program to “awaken” to Germandom the “dormant” 
Swabians. On the contrary, they merely applied the same lessons and methods that 
had been so evidently successful among other ethnicities in the Monarchy. The 
(initially) relatively liberal Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes provided an 
environment where the seeds of their efforts might grow and bear fruit. Indeed, the 
Swabians had observed the development of South Slav nationalisms in their midst 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Serbs and Croats, had participated in 
the same general movement of European nationalism that had mobilized peoples 
across central and eastern Europe during the nineteenth century. In the heightened 
nationalism that followed the war, the Swabian leadership took lessons from its South 
Slav neighbors. The Swabian activists and their supporters engaged in classic 
                                                 




awakening activities, establishing such institutions as Deutsches Volksblatt, the 
Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund, and as we shall see in Chapter Four, the Partei der 
Deutschen. Their speeches often invoked a vocabulary of struggle and they regularly 
spoke of the labor and sacrifice necessary for the national construction and cultivation 
ahead. They evangelized for Germandom and created a nationally based social and 
organizational environment which was open to all German ethnics.  
 
German Reactions in the New Kingdom 
Though many Swabians long retained a lingering nostalgia for the prewar 
Hungarian Kingdom, they soon came to accept the Yugoslav Kindgom and began to 
negotiate their new circumstances. For the German activists, one immediate but 
enduring task was simply forming a basic group coherence upon which to base their 
national movement. A common identity and consciousness remained elusive, 
however. Recalling the situation two decades later, Swabian media man Oskar Plautz 
observed, there were no close relations between these German groups in Vojvodina, 
Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia and Slovenia before the First World War. Moreover, 
national consciousness was itself differently developed among the various groups, 
with the Germans in Slovenia typically having the most sophisticated sense of 
national identity.267 One of the primary tasks of the Swabian activists, thus, was to 
forge not only a sense of national identity but also one of common group 
consciousness. Even within the Swabian main area of settlement, German 
communities from Banat, Baranja, and Batschka often felt little in common and could 
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be furthermore divided by confession and class as well as by urban or rural residence. 
The Paris peace treaties had drawn new borders around the German population. Now 
the Swabian activists had to forge a sense of shared community within them.  
Future Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund chairman Johann Keks revealed the 
scope of the challenge of forging community out of such a disparate collection of 
burghers and peasants in a 1921 popular article elementarily entitled “Germandom in 
Yugoslavia.” Keks confidently predicted that the disparate German communities 
across the country would ultimately come together in the nascent Kulturbund but 
basically acknowledged that the country’s Germans, far from comprising an organic 
community, actually had little knowledge of one another.  The inclusion of the 
Slovene Germans meant that the overall German minority could not be characterized 
as properly Swabian, he noted. And even the Swabians themselves had had distinct 
historical experiences, for some had spent the past under the Croats while the rest 
lived directly under the Magyars.268  
In order to promote a group consciousness among the disparate Germans, it 
would be necessary to provide the German minority with some basic information 
about itself. As such, Keks briefly introduced the “three more or less coherent 
settlement groups” within the Yugoslav borders in Vojvodina, Srijem and Slovenia. 
His article optimistically estimated the German minority at over 700,000 and was 
followed by a series of essays on the Germans of Vojvodina, Croatia-Slavonia, 
Slovenia, and north Bosnia, their declared goal being simply to acquaint the disparate 
German communities in Yugoslavia with one another. 269   
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The Swabian leadership responded to their inclusion in the Yugoslav 
Kingdom by establishing political institutions to work within the new system and 
founding cultural organizations to nurture their own national community. In this, they 
sought to continue the traditions of the UDVP and Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien, 
two prewar institutions whose activities would be adapted and expanded to suit the 
interwar era. In the immediate term, however, uncertainty reigned in the aftermath of 
the war. Both the boundaries of the new state and the methods that would be used to 
determine them were also unclear. As we have noted, many had initially held out 
hope for the practical extension of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination to 
Germans as well. Failing this, the Yugoslav Swabians hoped that a sizable piece of 
Banat would be assigned to their kingdom.270 Ultimately, the final borders of the new 
state would not become clear for the Germans until late 1923, when they learned to 
their dismay that the important west Banat Swabian town of Jimbolia, then known as 
Hatzfeld and 74.2 percent German, would be ceded to Romania. This border 
concession, of course, reduced the Yugoslav Kingdom’s Swabian population and 
share of Banat even further.271 It was only one in a series of disappointments. 
The evaporation of Magyar hegemony provoked confusion about many 
fundamental aspects of daily life, not least of which were the proper language and 
spelling of place names. The masthead of the biweekly Gruß Gott: Evangelisches 
Gemeindeblatt fuer die Bácska serves as a good example of just how disorienting 
these initial postwar years were. Though written in German, Gruß Gott had regularly 
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used Hungarian spellings for place names before 1918 and continued to do so after 
the Habsburg Monarchy’s collapse. As such, the newspaper described itself until 
1921 as being produced in cooperation with the Lutheran clergy of the “Bácser” 
Seniorat (district) and directed by managing editor J. Jahn, Pastor of “Kiskér.” Most 
indicative of the disorientation of these early post-Hungarian years was how the 
newspaper dealt with the mere place of its publication. Whereas in 1920 the masthead 
still listed this as the Hungarian “Ujverbász,” in 1921 that town’s name morphed into 
a combination of the Hungarian and German as “Neuverbasz,” which was still located 
in “Bácska.” Later that year the masthead switched to calling the town “Neuwerbass” 
before settling on “Neu-Werbaß” in 1926. Finally, Gruß Gott conceded its place of 
publication as the Serbo-Croatian “Novi Vrbas” in January 1930, by which time it 
had expanded its horizons beyond Batschka to become an “Evangelical community 
newspaper for Yugoslavia.” This uncertainty regarding the language and spelling of 
place names is especially indicative of the Swabians’ postwar disorientation, since 
Novi Vrbas with 40,000 Protestants was the strongest of the Protestant Senioraten in 
Yugoslavia and evolved into a principal Protestant spiritual and publishing center 
between the wars.272 With their Kaiserreich-trained clergy, the German Evangelicals 
had always been more nationally oriented than their Catholic counterparts in the 
Swabian region, as we shall see. Yet in the wake of the Monarchy’s collapse, even the 
Evangelicals found themselves unsure in a world marked by great uncertainty. 
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 Although the principle institutions of Volkstumarbeit in Yugoslavia would by 
and large feature different leaders than those who had led the nascent German 
national movement in prewar Hungary, in fact there was also much continuity from 
the previous era. The three main institutions of the Germans in interwar Yugoslavia, 
Deutsches Volksblatt, the Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund and the Partei der 
Deutschen (PdD) had their roots in Srijem, Batschka and Banat. Moreover, some 
important personalities who were active in the German movement before the war 
remained so in the postwar era. Nevertheless, the drivers behind the German national 
activism in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes largely came from a small 
group of German intellectuals, many of whom belonged to a younger generation.273 
 One of the prewar organizations that had served as a school for the young 
German nationalists of Hungary was the Association of German University Students 
from the lands of the Hungarian Crown (Vereinigung Deutscher Hochschueler aus 
den Laendern der ungarischen Krone or VDH), which we briefly discussed in 
Chapters One and Two. The VDH was established in Vienna in 1900 and advocated 
on behalf of Hungary’s Germans both inside the kingdom and beyond its borders. The 
VDH organized lectures and voelkisch celebrations in Vienna and enjoyed a close 
relationship with the nationalist Banat Swabian author Adam Mueller-Guttenbrunn, 
who was regarded as a national inspiration and named an honorary member.274 The 
VDH also made Edmund Steinacker an honorary member in 1909 and was in close 
contact with Karl Stuerm, editor of Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien, which 
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reprinted the texts of its lectures and covered its activities. The association’s goal was 
the voelkisch education of its members, such that they could return to their homes in 
Hungary and spread national ideas, impart enthusiasm for German education and 
raise awareness about the importance of resistance to denationalization measures, 
especially among students studying in Croatia and Hungary. In prewar Hungary itself, 
the VDH promoted German libraries, distributed nationalist leaflets, and participated 
in a number of the annual conventions of the Karpathendeutsche. It was a small but 
significant association which gathered many important, young Germans who would 
assume leadership in their communities after 1918. The leadership of the VDH 
included a high proportion of Germans from the future Yugoslavia, including Stefan 
Kraft, who led the organization from 1909-1910.275 Kraft, as we saw in Chapter Two, 
was a featured speaker for the VDH on the occasion of the 1913 Convention of the 
Karpathendeutsche in Vienna.  
 Although such key figures as former UDVP Chairman Ludwig Kremling 
would continue to play key roles in the Yugoslav Kingdom, in many cases the prewar 
nationalists were quite old and ceded practical leadership to their younger colleagues. 
Ferdinand Riester had died even before the war, Reinhold Heegn would not live much 
longer, and Karl Stuerm died in 1927 at the age of 52. Ludwig Kremling remained 
active into the interwar period but died in 1930, only one year after Hungarian-
German eminence grise Edmund Steinacker had passed away in Austria. Well before 
that time, however, the younger cadre of Swabian activists, which had emerged with 
the denouement of 1918, had confirmed its leadership of the German national 
movement in Yugoslavia.  
                                                 




 The early Swabian activists sought not only to establish institutions but also 
variously impart a new way of thought for a shaken community, which remained 
poorly defined and uncertain of itself. Thus the Swabian activists had not only to 
shape the community, but also to define its identity as German and determine the 
content of its national identity. To meet this goal, they founded a daily newspaper and 
publishing house, a state-wide cultural union, and a political party, all within a few 
hectic years. As we shall see below, they had help from abroad in their endeavors in 
the form of Volkstumarbeit organizations. Thereafter, we turn to the two formally 
non-political of these institutions, Deutsches Volksblatt and the Kulturbund, reserving 
discussion of the Partei der Deutschen (PdD) for the next chapter. 
 
German Homeland Nationalism and the Volkstumarbeit Organizations 
As we have seen, two powerful forces that contributed to the crystallization of 
German national consciousness in interwar Yugoslavia were the experience of the 
First World War and the replacement of the dynastic order of the Habsburg Monarchy 
with the national order of the aspiring Yugoslav nation-state. The Yugoslav Kingdom 
was in fact a nationalizing state of the sort Rogers Brubaker identifies in Nationalism 
Reframed and sought to extend the hegemony of its titular people through 
discriminatory land reform, education, taxation, politics, and preferential hiring in the 
state sector.276 Another key contributor was Germany’s homeland nationalism, 
manifested as foreign policy in the state sphere. Parallel with this official sphere, 
homeland nationalism manifested itself unofficially through the many private and 
                                                 




non-governmental Volkstumarbeit organizations that worked on behalf of ethnic 
Germans beyond Germany and Austria’s borders. These Volkstumarbeit 
organizations conducted cultural and sociological studies of German communities 
abroad and raised public awareness of their circumstances in Germany. Additionally, 
they provided key moral support, a psychological lifeline to Germany, and materials 
and funds with which to reinforce German communities abroad. Simultaneously, 
German governmental bodies provided covert financial support and resources to 
Germans in eastern Europe. Ultimately, Volkstumarbeit was an important expression 
of German homeland nationalism and an important part of the nationalism triad in 
which the Danube Swabians’ national identity crystallized. 
As we noted in Chapter One, some Volkstumarbeit organizations had been 
active before the First World War in nationally contested Cisleithania and, to a lesser 
degree, Hungary. The defeat in 1918 leant their work a new urgency, however, since 
the lands lost by the Kaisserreich to Poland contained many Reichsdeutsche, whose 
welfare and culture would need support to endure, they believed. Similarly, the 
Habsburg collapse gave added impetus to Volkstumarbeit in central and southeastern 
Europe, since the Germans there had now been definitively reduced to national 
minorities in foreign nation-states. Henceforth, Volkstumarbeit organizations would 
proliferate inside Germany itself while the new German minorities sought to organize 
themselves and negotiate life in the successor states.  
As we have seen, Volkstumarbeit was not an invention of the German state or 
the Nazi Party. It had a long history dating back to the nineteenth century. This 




groups and institutions devoted to promoting, nurturing, and reinforcing Germandom 
in areas where it was neglected or culturally “under siege.” In his impressive study, 
The Sudeten Problem, Ronald Smelser succinctly describes Volkstumarbeit as “an 
intense concern for the welfare of ethnic [German] groups and an attempt to foster 
closer ties between these groups and the Reich German population though social, 
economic, and cultural assistance.”277 The might of the Germans’ core settlement area 
was seen as a resource for the Auslandsdeutsche before the First World War. At that 
time, Volkstumarbeit reflected the troubled political, cultural, and economic position 
of the Habsburg Monarchy’s Germans viz. the politically mobilizing Slavs (especially 
the Czechs and Slovenes). Moreover, it was then the exclusive purview of non-state 
organizations, for the Kaiserreich pointedly took no official interest in the ethnic 
Germans beyond its borders. This changed during the interwar period, however, when 
Volkstumarbeit increasingly became the purview of the German state, which regarded 
it as a tool of foreign policy. 
Bitterness over the defeat in the First World War and outrage at the perceived 
injustices of the Versailles treaty stimulated an upsurge in popular interest in Weimar 
Germany for the Germans abroad, many of whom had only recently been German 
citizens.278 This new interest increasingly manifested itself in calls for the Weimar 
government to take action on behalf of the Germans abroad. Weimar Germany being 
mostly interested in reintegrating itself into the European state system, however, any 
such action necessarily had to be limited to avoid charges of violating others’ state 
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sovereignty. As such, Weimar Germany, especially under Gustav Stresemann, 
pursued a role that was active on behalf of the Germans abroad particularly in the 
League of Nations, where Europe’s Auslandsdeutsche were represented by the 
League of German Volksgruppen in Europe (Verband Deutscher Volksgruppen in 
Europa) after 1922. Meanwhile, the government was covertly providing financial aid 
to Germans abroad, especially those in lands lost through the Versailles treaty. The 
German government anxiously wanted to reinforce German communities in those 
lands as part of a long-term strategy of treaty revision and territorial recovery. 
The stuff of Volkstumarbeit at first seems benign. Typical activities included 
the funding and supplying schools and libraries, promoting cultural festivals and local 
German publishing, facilitating educational exchange, and generally nurturing ties 
between Germany (and to a lesser degree Austria) and the ethnic German 
communities in the east.279 During the interwar period, Volkstumarbeit organizations 
were so numerous that the field was sometimes characterized by competition, 
redundancy and even intrigue. Nevertheless, several organizations such as Deutsches 
Ausland-Institut and the Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland eventually emerged 
as the non-state leaders in the field. Following the shocking defeat of 1918, voelkisch 
thought made increasing inroads into Volkstumarbeit, rendering the field potentially 
explosive.280 Ultimately, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, the Nazi Party would 
reorganize the entire field during the 1930s with the intent of harnessing 
Volkstumarbeit for its own purposes.  
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 Generally, the myriad Volkstumarbeit organizations may be broken down into 
rough categories according to the nature of their work. Some were essentially think 
tanks or research institutes devoted to exploring and celebrating the rich and diverse 
cultural heritage of Germandom abroad. Probably most prominent of these was the 
German Foreign Institute (Deutsches Ausland-Institut or DAI). Based in Stuttgart, 
DAI maintained relations with the various German minorities around the world and 
collected their many publications in its extensive archive and library. Additionally, it 
provided German cultural materials to the minorities and published the monthly Der 
Auslandsdeutsche, a kind of National Geographic of Germandom abroad.281 DAI 
achieved real prominence in the crowded field of Volkstumarbeit and received 
regular funding from the German government. Munich’s Deutsche Akademie was 
another prominent research institute. Though their work was not necessarily political, 
the academics at these institutes produced scholarly pieces which were sometimes 
aimed at swaying policy makers to endorse a certain view of ethnic politics in foreign 
relations.  
Another type of more activist Volkstumarbeit organization focused on 
reinforcing the Germanness of the beleaguered German minorities abroad, usually 
through educational and cultural support. During most of the interwar period, the 
most important of these Volkstumarbeit organizations was the aforementioned Verein 
fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland or VDA. This organization pursued the traditional 
path of Volkstumarbeit and was especially active in providing money, books and 
teachers to insufficiently funded or staffed German schools abroad. Receiving annual 
subsidies from the German foreign ministry and having its own sophisticated 
                                                 




fundraising apparatus, the VDA emerged as a powerful Volkstumarbeit organization 
with a very broad and sizable membership. Like many Volkstumarbeit organizations, 
it channeled monies to the ethnic German communities abroad. As the urgency of its 
task and the weight of its resources grew, so did the VDA expand the scope of its 
activities in politics and culture.282 
Importantly, these Volkstumarbeit organizations were not the exclusive 
purview of the esoteric or academic. On the contrary, they were public and influential 
institutions which commanded respect in policy circles. Moreover, they had powerful 
connections at home and clients abroad. Indeed, during the interwar period the field 
of Volkstumarbeit became rather crowded and featured many rival organizations 
competing with one another for access, favor and funding. Some Volkstumarbeit 
organizations specialized in a certain geographical region, while others might have 
specialized in a particular social area of concern, such as libraries or schools. 
Ultimately, however, all were affected by the shifting priorities of Volkstumarbeit 
after 1933, when the political triumph of National Socialism and its consequent 
Gleichschaltung (coordination) of society’s institutions infiltrated the boardrooms of 
the important Volkstumarbeit organizations and drove them in new directions. As we 
shall see in Chapter Seven, many remained nominally independent but their work was 
increasingly coordinated and subordinated to Nazi principles and objectives. Indeed, 
the very nature and priorities of Volkstumarbeit changed after 1933, when prevailing 
Nazi winds sought to celebrate not the rich diversity of Germandom but rather impose 
a biological and/or foster a cultural monolithicness. In the 1920s, however, 
                                                 




Volkstumarbeit played a generally beneficent role among the Danube Swabians and 
helped them consolidate their moderate institutions. 
 
The Establishment of Deutsches Volksblatt 
 As they demonstrated with Der Deutschungarische Volksfreund, Das 
Deutsche Tageblatt fuer Ungarn, and Deutsches Volksblatt fuer Syrmien, the German 
national activists of southern Hungary well understood the importance of the press for 
forging a national movement. The German press had a long tradition in the region and 
was arguably more sophisticated than its Serbian or Hungarian rivals. Indeed, the 
area’s first German newspaper was published in 1771 in Timişoara, which later 
evolved to become the region’s main publishing center. Additionally, many towns in 
Croatia-Slavonia and Vojvodina had their own German language newspapers, as we 
have seen. These were intended for consumption by the educated South Slav or 
Magyar, as well as ethnic Germans. In their distribution, moreover, the local German 
newspapers reflected the general situation of the Swabians at the end of the First 
World War in that they had only a local or perhaps regional reach and outlook. When 
it appeared in 1919 that Timişoara would be awarded to Romania, a number of 
German entrepreneurs and activists gathered in Novi Sad to found a German 
publishing enterprise and daily to serve those lands that would fall to Yugoslavia. The 
resulting newspaper, Novi Sad’s Deutsches Volksblatt, was in large part based on 




German national movement in Croatia-Slavonia before the First World War.283 It 
would distinguish itself not only in its aspiration to distribution throughout all 
German inhabited parts of Yugoslavia, but through its overtly German-national 
perspective. Indeed, Deutsches Volksblatt would rapidly become the chief transmitter 
of German national identity in the country. 
Several months of deliberation and preparation culminated in the founding 
meeting of the Deutsche Druckerei- und Verlags-A.G. on September 29, 1919 in Novi 
Sad. The first board of directors of DVAG, as the publishing house was commonly 
known, was led by Chairman Josef Bolz and included future German 
parliamentarians Stefan Kraft and Samuel Schumacher, among others. According to 
its statutes, DVAG would raise capital with the intention of founding Deutsches 
Volksblatt and opening a German bookstore. It moved quickly on both fronts and 
published the newspaper’s premier issue on October 25, 1919. Its promised bookstore 
opened a couple of months later in Novi Sad. In addition to its own staff of reporters, 
DVAG was also able to rely on content from Germany. Stuttgart’s Deutsches 
Ausland-Institut in particular looked after the auslandsdeutsche press and later also 
worked closely with the Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund, of which Deutsches 
Volksblatt soon became a virtual department.284 Within a matter of years, Deutsches 
Volksblatt commanded an average circulation of 10,000-12,000, making it the 
principle organ of the nascent German national movement in Yugoslavia and one of 
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the largest circulation dailies in Vojvodina.285 The Swabian Georg Grassl served as 
the newspaper’s first editor-in-chief until May 1921, when that position was assumed 
by the Franz Perz. Perz, a German from the long-standing German enclave of 
Kočevje in Slovenia, remained at the helm until 1941. During his tenure, DVAG grew 
to be the most powerful newspaper- and publishing-house in Vojvodina.286 
Invoking the disruption of government, business and communications 
unleashed by the chaotic collapse of Austria-Hungary, Deutsches Volksblatt observed 
in its premier issue how public life had been shaken to its core. Yet Deutsches 
Volksblatt optimistically looked to the prospect of a future based on equality, civil 
rights, and cultural and economic freedom. The newspaper declared its intention to 
serve as the Germans’ compass toward this bright future, deliver them from their 
current situation, and liberate them to take part in public life. Moreover, it asserted its 
determination to oppose excesses and trespasses against citizens’ rights and declared 
fealty to the principles of freedom and the equality, the peaceful coexistence of 
peoples, national and cultural equality, and national self-determination. “These,” the 
newspaper concluded, “are our guiding stars.”287 
Although DVAG produced other publications geared more specifically toward 
the interests, economics and concerns of the overwhelmingly rural Swabians, 
Deutsches Volksblatt was intended for the masses and was the country’s most widely 
circulated German newspaper. It claimed to stand above class and confession and 
confidently advanced an identity that was above all nation-based. Deutsches 
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Volksblatt promised objectivity, concern for public welfare and freedom from 
partisan strife. It would stand sentinel against German oppression, but it proved 
especially adept in its other principle task, the forging of a German community from 
disparate parts and imparting an identity to that community which honored it as both 
Swabian and as part of the greater German cultural community or 
Kulturgemeinschaft.  
One year later in October 1920, Deutsches Volksblatt reviewed its own 
accomplishments and considered the road ahead in its anniversary issue. Having 
survived the year was an achievement in itself, of course. Despite the still dawning 
state of the Swabians’ national consciousness in the Yugoslav Kingdom, there clearly 
was a market for a nationally-oriented German daily there. Moreover, the promising 
start of the Kulturbund earlier that year (to be discussed in the next section) augured 
well for the national movement the newspaper hoped to foster.288 That movement 
remained controversial among sections of the Swabian population, however, as 
Deutsches Volksblatt itself acknowledged. Indeed, it had been “greeted with 
boisterous jubilation by some and with hesitation or even open hostility by others.” 
Many Swabians had evidently considered the nationally oriented newspaper’s 
appearance recklessly premature and its tone likely to upset the Swabians’ precarious 
position in the new country. Yet on its first anniversary, the newspaper claimed 
vindication in its achievements. Though the daily’s publication had provoked 
objections by some so-called Auchdeutsche (people of German descent for whom 
ethnicity and nationality were not paramount and who were therefore only “also 
                                                 





German” – usually a term of derision), Deutsches Volksblatt reiterated its 
commitment to educate and enlighten cadres of future, nationally oriented 
collaborators.289 Indeed, throughout its existence, Deutsches Volksblatt was never shy 
about the fact that it was executing a classic agenda of national “awakening” among 
the Swabians.290 
Deutsches Volksblatt was a genuinely impressive daily that strove to be the 
only newspaper a German would need in Yugoslavia. In addition to its German 
identity- and community-building functions, the newspaper also devoted considerable 
attention to Yugoslav politics, especially in so far as they affected the German 
population or the Partei der Deutschen (PdD), of which we will learn more in the 
following chapter. It printed more international news than many twenty-first century 
American dailies and also had sections devoted to business and community 
developments. The newspaper contained cultural features, serialized novels and 
offered reviews and recommendations of German books. Special sections were aimed 
at women and youth. Meanwhile advertisers pushed products ranging from Nivea 
cream and Horniman’s tea to sophisticated farm machinery and transatlantic passage 
from Hamburg. During its earliest years, the newspaper featured some Magyar and 
Serbian ads in addition to German ones. The language of advertisements quickly 
became exclusively German, however, and the products, such as automobiles, 
increasingly expensive.  
In its politics, Deutsches Volksblatt was simultaneously resolute and relatively 
cautious. It insisted upon its loyal attitude towards the state and regularly observed 
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that there was no contradiction between that loyalty and opposition to certain 
government policies. The newspaper did not shy away from engaging in the many 
political issues of the day but it did consciously avoid the dispute between Serbs and 
Croats during the heated constitutional debate and afterward. Especially during the 
1920s, Deutsches Volksblatt stood at the vanguard of the German national movement 
in Yugoslavia and it remained the main journal of record for the country’s German 
population throughout the interwar period. Although it clearly obtained a portion of 
its content from Weimar German sources, Deutsches Volksblatt was fundamentally a 
newspaper by and for Yugoslavia’s Germans. So thorough was it in its coverage and 
so numerous were the other German publications in Yugoslavia that the most 
comprehensive study of the interwar German press has concluded that one can 
dismiss entirely the possibility of any influence by the Serbian press on the country’s 
Germans in Vojvodina.291 
Although many of the newspaper’s articles were unsigned, Deutsches 
Volksblatt must be understood as truly being the mouthpiece of the German national 
movement in Yugoslavia, especially during the 1920s. True, Deutsches Volksblatt 
was a nominally independent newspaper, preceding the founding of both the 
Kulturbund and the Partei der Deutschen. Nevertheless, the notion of true 
“independence” was tricky in such a small German community, especially given the 
limited size of the Swabian intelligentsia. If the newspaper, Kulturbund and Partei der 
Deutschen were formally independent of each other, to believe in such separation in 
practice would be folly.  
                                                 




The men behind Deutsches Volksblatt, the Kulturbund and the Partei der 
Deutschen all knew one another and served the same movement. They had common 
goals and worked very closely with one another in multiple institutions. Georg Grassl, 
for example, was the first editor of Deutsches Volksblatt, a founder of the Kulturbund, 
and the Kulturbund’s first leader (General Secretary). From 1925-1929 Grassl served 
as a member of parliament for the Partei der Deutschen and he was appointed a 
senator in 1931. In recognition of his service to the Swabian cause during 
Yugoslavia’s first decade, he was elected Honorary Chair of the Kulturbund in 1928. 
Throughout this period, he was a regular contributor to Deutsches Volksblatt, as were 
later Kulturbund Chairman Johann Keks, Partei der Deutschen leader Stefan Kraft 
and many others. From April 1922 until March 1924, the ubiquitous Kraft was even 
Chairman of DVAG itself. Grassl’s successor at Deutsches Volksblatt, Franz Perz, 
was a member of the board of the Kulturbund and also spoke at numerous rallies of 
the Partei der Deutschen. In fact, Deutsches Volksblatt even briefly acknowledged 
that it was an organ of the Partei der Deutschen on its masthead in 1922.292 Other 
such examples abound. Deutsches Volksblatt, after occasionally attempting to blur the 
obvious connection between itself and the Kulturbund, acknowledged the intimate 
relationship in 1928 when it commented that the Druckerei- und Verlags- A.G. could 
be viewed as the nucleus or germ cell (Keimzelle) of the Schwaebisch-Deutsch 
Kulturbund, whose very founding was arranged at the publishing house’s own 
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meetings. Moreover, DVAG readily put Deutsches Volksblatt at the disposal of the 
German organizations in the Yugoslav Kingdom. In summary, there was a close, 
organic connection between the newspaper, the Kulturbund, and Partei der Deutschen 
from their earliest days.293 
During the 1920s, the above three principle institutions of the Swabians 
mutually reinforced each other, informing the public of their various activities and 
advancing a common agenda in society and politics. Moreover, Deutsches Volksblatt 
was the single most important platform for communication in a society where there 
no was comparable German media with a national reach.294 The newspaper published 
letters and essays by all of the important German national activists in Yugoslavia 
during its first decade and a half and therefore can be legitimately regarded as the 
authentic expression of their movement. Even during most of the contentious 1930s, 
Deutsches Volksblatt remained representative of the views of the original Swabian 
activists.295 True, the 1930s, when a cadre of young radical nationalists sought to 
wrest control of the German community from the original leadership and reorient it 
toward National Socialism, were characterized by acrimonious debate, as we shall 
see. Yet even when such divergent currents emerged within the German population, 
so tight was the original leadership’s grip on Deutsches Volksblatt that the young 
challengers had to establish their own periodicals in order to air their views. 
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Deutsches Volksblatt, therefore, represented the authentic and consistent expression 
of the German national vision of the Swabians’ original leadership.296 
 
The Establishment of the Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund 
As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, Germans in the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were prohibited from participation in 
political affairs until January 1922. Nevertheless, such restrictions did not prevent 
them from organizing culturally, even though the line between culture and politics is 
easily blurred in the national age. In this spirit, the Swabians founded their first 
statewide institution, the Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund, in 1920. Frequently 
referred to simply as the “Kulturbund” or the “SDKB,” the organization went through 
several stages of development during the interwar period. It was twice banned (in 
1924 and 1929) and was always an object of suspicion for South Slav nationalists, 
who regarded its “cultural” activities as frequently straying into the political realm. 
Indeed, such is the political nature of culture in the national age that in some cases 
these suspicions were arguably correct, although the Kulturbund usually avoided any 
overt involvement in politics. (An exception to this was perhaps its direct advocacy 
for German language education.) In actual fact, the Kulturbund’s greatest political act 
was forging a national community and group consciousness among the Germans of 
Yugoslavia. Though not a mass movement for most of its history, the Kulturbund 
nevertheless did seek the broadest possible membership and was the first all-German 
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organization in Yugoslavia. As such, it was the Germans’ voice in public affairs 
during the years of their political exclusion. In its nation-building project, the 
Kulturbund was another essential instrument of the Swabian activists.  
In a less national age, the activities of the Kulturbund would appear rather 
innocuous. It held historical and cultural lectures, offered German language classes 
(for Swabians), and organized youth groups. It praised German song and encouraged 
the founding of German choral groups. Likewise, it promoted nationally oriented 
gymnastics clubs like the prewar Turnvereine in Srijem. Moreover, it gathered 
preexisting German clubs and organizations under its own wings, such that the 
important areas of German associational and civic life became part of national life, 
which in turn was synonymous with the Kulturbund. It promoted education in the 
German language and spirit and advocated strongly on behalf of German schooling. It 
opened German reading rooms and libraries and celebrated the beloved German 
language. Having ties with Germany-based Volkstumarbeit organizations, it served as 
a bridge between the Yugoslav Vaterland and the German Mutterland. As its name 
indicated, it celebrated the ethnic community in Yugoslavia as both German but also 
Swabian, and promoted appreciation for the colorful local German traditions and 
customs peculiar to the region. It organized its own festivals and balls to showcase 
German folk dress, known as Tracht or Volkstracht, and sent representatives to local 
balls and folk festivals, called Trachtenbaelle or Trachtenfeste, wherever they were 
held across the country. Similarly, the Kulturbund organized many other festivals of 
various types (choral, historical, youth, sporting, etc.) and ensured that its annual 




made itself central to the many settlement anniversary celebrations of the 1920s and 
1930s. In all these activities, it promoted a national identity that was simultaneously 
German and Swabian, defining local and national myths, icons, heroes, and values. 
The fathers of the Kulturbund announced their intention to establish a cultural 
organization in a February 1920 appeal in Deutsches Volksblatt, well before the 
organization’s actual founding.  The German community, they claimed, required an 
all-embracing, German organization. To this end, a “Schwaebisch-Deutsch 
Kulturbund” would soon be founded to promote the material, intellectual, aesthetic, 
and moral culture of the German population in all its areas of settlement. 
Headquartered in “Novi Sad-Neusatz”, the Kulturbund would have local chapters and 
representatives in all places with appreciable German populations. It would aspire to 
activity across the Germans’ settlement area and in many spheres of public life. From 
the very beginning, however, the Kulturbund was careful to assert that it would 
eschew all political activity.297  
The Kulturbund’s founding committee continued its preparatory work 
throughout the spring, drafting and submitting the organization’s statutes for 
government approval. Finally, the founding meeting of the Kulturbund took place in 
Novi Sad on June 20, 1920. A public invitation to the meeting in the days preceding it 
had indicated the Kulturbund’s comprehensive ambition by stressing that all Germans 
with Yugoslav citizenship were invited to attend. It was to be a public affair at which 
the organization’s statutes would be promulgated and the Kulturbund leadership 
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determined.298 Deutsches Volksblatt was at no loss for grandiloquent words or lofty 
statements to commemorate the event. Weeks before the meeting, the newspaper 
breathlessly established the momentousness of the Kulturbund’s impending founding 
and exclaimed that the hour of German liberation in southeastern Europe had finally 
struck!299 The founding meeting would be nothing less than a “patriotic and national 
religious service”300 to be celebrated as a historic day in the history of the Volk. 
Indeed, the day meant the “rebirth of our nation, which after 200 years of hard labor 
in the service of our land could finally reflect upon itself, kissed awake by the sun of 
freedom and the winds of a new era.”301 
Like its later annual congresses, the Kulturbund’s founding meeting was 
intended to be more than a simple administrative gathering. It was conceived of as a 
major, open event that exuded a festival atmosphere. Numerous choral groups and 
several gymnastics clubs performed from across the Germans’ settlement area, 
including a significant number from Srijem. In addition to the main meeting of the 
Kulturbund, a banquet was held followed by a festival attended by approximately 
2000 guests. Speakers at the meeting itself were numerous and reflected the 
Kulturbund’s intention to be inclusive of all Yugoslavia’s Germans, irrespective of 
class or confession. 
Deutsches Volksblatt emphasized three key moments at the founding meeting 
in its coverage of the event. First was the deep avowal of absolute loyalty to the 
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Yugoslav state and loyalty to the German Volk. The Kulturbund sought to allay Slav 
and government fears about its intentions by emphasizing the Swabians’ loyalty to the 
state and even their appreciation of Yugoslavia’s relatively liberal atmosphere, which 
had enabled them to pursue their national aspirations in the first place. Secondly, the 
newspaper observed the Germans’ readiness to make sacrifices in the service of 
nationhood. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, was the meeting’s insistence on 
the exclusion of any confessional conflicts. Like Deutsches Volksblatt, the 
Kulturbund faced early opposition from some Swabian Catholic circles which either 
disapproved of a German national movement or suspected the organization of undue 
Protestant influences. Also like the newspaper, the Kulturbund sought to straddle 
such confessional challenges by emphasizing the primacy of German nationhood over 
religious differences. The organization regularly sought to include both Catholic and 
Protestant clergy in its activities and its founding meeting conspicuously featured 
speeches by both Catholic and Protestant priests calling for unity on the basis of 
German nationhood.302  
Deutsches Volksblatt’s then-editor Georg Grassl was a central participant in 
the Kulturbund’s founding meeting and as its General Secretary would be a dominant 
force in the organization for years to come. Born in Pančevo in 1863, he was more 
than twenty years older than Stefan Kraft, Johann Keks and many of the other leading 
Swabian activists, but his energy and activity belied his age. At the Kulturbund’s 
founding meeting he gave a major speech in which he elaborated on the purpose and 
tasks of the new organization. Grassl’s words reveal the degree to which he believed 
the postwar years to be revolutionary times. The horrible carnage of the world war 
                                                 




and the tumult of its aftermath, he observed, had meant disruption, but the postwar 
situation also offered the possibility of human transformation. Grassl was a religious 
man and invoked God as he celebrated the liberal circumstances (without calling 
them that) of the new age. “Freedom, right, and justice, self-determination, protection 
of the weak,” he exclaimed, “after unspeakable suffering and aberrance, afflicted 
humanity has come to recognize these ideals as a gift from Heaven, and in reverence 
and thankfulness we bow before divine providence, which has turned all suffering 
into good.” The Lord had delivered the Swabians, he said, who could finally stand 
proudly as free men on the soil of their homeland in Yugoslavia.303  
As one of the guiding figures at Deutsches Volksblatt, in the Kulturbund, and 
later in the Partei der Deutschen, Grassl exuded a major influence on the shaping of 
German identity and community in Yugoslavia. His views on culture, state and nation 
regularly filled the pages of the Swabian daily and manifested themselves in the 
Kulturbund’s goals and methods. Having assured the Yugoslavs of the Kulturbund’s 
harmless intent, Grassl turned to its fundamental mission, which he understood to be 
one of nation-based community development and the cultivation of German identity. 
In practice, the Kulturbund would pursue these goals through a combination of 
educational work (Volksaufklaerungsarbeit), advocacy, and economic programs. The 
Kulturbund would work for the general promotion of the entire German community 
and lead Swabians to realize their potential as “complete persons” (vollkommene 
Menschen) through the embrace of national identity.304 
                                                 





In the above, Grassl laid out much of the organizing philosophy behind the 
Kulturbund. The nation was fundamental to the goals of the Kulturbund because of 
nationhood’s inherent, transformational power. Thus, only through the embrace and 
development of national culture could a people approach its true potential. Grassl 
took a broad view of national culture, regarding it not merely as an intellectual or 
bookish affair of the sort imparted through formal education (although that was 
certainly important) but also recognizing material and especially moral dimensions of 
culture to which he pledged the Kulturbund’s energies. In practice, this meant the 
Kulturbund would engage in a wide spectrum of activities ranging from education to 
economics and social welfare.  
The protection and cultivation of the German language was a chief goal of the 
Kulturbund and Grassl announced that its promotion in the school and the home 
would form the starting point for the Kulturbund’s cultural activities. One of the 
Kulturbund’s principle aims throughout its history was the establishment and 
development of a German system of education in Yugoslavia. To this end it 
advocated on the Germans’ behalf with the government and even drafted a 
comprehensive school program, which it submitted to the Ministry of Education in 
July 1920.305 Additionally the Kulturbund would establish German libraries, hold 
lectures and presentations, and run winter courses in the cold months following the 
harvest. Finally, the Kulturbund would pay particular attention to the needs of the 
German peasantry, to whom it would attend through the establishment of agricultural 
cooperatives. Such cooperatives would form only one level of the organization’s 
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promotion of the German peasantry, however. To promote a more prosperous 
economy, Grassl promised, the Kulturbund would hold trade exhibitions and run 
specialized courses to enhance skills in agriculture, trade and industry. And indeed, 
the collective and self-help organizations or Genossenschaften at which Grassl hinted 
would become characteristic of the German community during the interwar period, 
the most prominent among them being the agricultural cooperative Agraria. These 
German-oriented cooperatives, whose network grew quite extensive, were also 
important in developing a sense of community among the disparate German 
settlements in the new country and maintaining German prosperity.  
Ultimately, the Kulturbund aspired not only to be an organization above class 
and confession, but also to embrace the country’s entire German population, 
including the Germans in distant Slovenia. “Every German in our country must join 
the Kulturbund,” Grassl bluntly stated at the organization’s founding meeting. 
Moreover, the Kulturbund must be everywhere present in German life. “Gatherings 
must accompany baptisms, weddings, church consecrations (Kirchweihen), and social 
occasions. In short, the Kulturbund must be moved to the forefront of our interests, it 
must become our national sanctuary, in which every German of our [Yugoslav] 
fatherland, whether rich or poor, has a share.”306 Feeling empowered to pursue a 
(moderate) German national agenda in the Yugoslav Kingdom, the Swabian activists 
were thinking big and had high hopes for the Kulturbund. 
Ultimately, then, the Kulturbund aspired to serve as the center and champion 
of the German community in matters of education, culture, association, entertainment 
and even social welfare. It aimed not merely to care for the German language or even 





promote a sense of German nationhood. Rather the Kulturbund sought to put the 
nation and itself at the center of life’s most important personal and community events. 
In short, it sought to make daily life national life for the country’s Germans. But not 
all Germans in the community welcomed the organization’s insistence on a national 
presence in all aspects of German life. As will be further discussed in Chapter Eight, 
there were some among the Catholic clergy who were suspicious of the attempt to 
found life on a national basis, seeing in it a threat to the primacy of religion. 
Likewise, some ethnic Germans expressed skepticism or opposition to the new 
national movement for their own, personal reasons. 
Central to the Kulturbund as it would develop under Grassl was its promise of 
dual or simultaneous loyalty, summarized by its ubiquitous slogan “Loyal to the 
[Yugoslav] state and loyal to the [German] nation” (“staatstreu und volkstreu”). In 
this slogan the Swabian activists sought to emphasize that loyalty to Yugoslavia was 
in no way contradictory to devotion to the German Volk. Such a delicate balance 
might have dissatisfied the most ardent nationalist but it was based on the reality of 
the Swabians’ numerical inferiority and the obvious distance which prohibited 
annexation by Germany or Austria. Nevertheless, the Swabians’ insistence that they 
were both staatstreu and volkstreu was never fully persuasive to the kingdom’s 
population or government, which typically suspected the Germans of harboring 
irredentist dreams and frequently regarded them with intolerance. Only years later, 




Erneuerungsbewegung was named, would the Kulturbund veer significantly from this 
principle of dual loyalty.307 
Some respectable scholars (and more less respectable ones) have questioned 
whether the Germans ever felt true loyalty to the Yugoslav state.308 Certainly many 
(especially in Slovenia) did not and the shallowness of their Yugoslav patriotism 
became increasingly apparent following Hitler’s accession to power and his 
subsequent accomplishments in economics, diplomacy and war. During the 1920s and 
especially 1930s, one could certainly question whether the regular contacts between 
the Swabian activists and Volkstumarbeit in Germany bodies were fully consistent 
with proper loyalty to Yugoslavia. After all, the Kulturbund received assistance from 
such organization as the Deutsches Ausland-Institut (DAI), the Verein fuer das 
Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA), the Deutsche Akademie, and the Suedostdeutsches 
Insitut in Graz, as well as attention from the German Foreign Ministry and later the 
Nazis’ own Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, a sort of clearinghouse for auslandsdeutsche 
matters which was also a branch of the SS.309 Nevertheless, for the vast majority of its 
history the Kulturbund did remain within the bounds of its statutes and Yugoslav law. 
Indeed, especially at the dawn of the 1920s, there were powerful arguments for at 
least passive Swabian loyalty to the Yugoslavia, which ironically had made their 
national movement possible in the first place. The men behind the Kulturbund 
recalled the oppressive atmosphere of old Hungary and well understood that their 
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institution was only possible in the comparatively liberal political atmosphere of the 
Yugoslav Kingdom.  
On the occasion of the establishment of a Kulturbund chapter in Zemun in 
August 1920, Grassl elaborated on the development of the organization and its 
meaning for the Germans of Yugoslavia. At that time, the Kulturbund was slowly but 
surely growing both in membership and the number of local chapters.  Invoking the 
triumph of democracy as well as the other Wilsonian ideals of freedom, self-
determination, law and justice that had replaced the fallen idols of the past. Grassl 
reflected on the reality of the Swabian position in the new kingdom.  
We are nationally conscious Germans, proud of our belonging to the 
great German cultural community, that has given so much to civilized 
humanity, but we are no pan-Germans and no irredentists. Without 
historical and geographic connection with a mighty German 
hinterland, we are not only a national minority but moreover a national 
diaspora, a scattered Germandom that, through utopian dreaming, 
could only jeopardize everything: its very cultural and economic 
existence. 310 
 
Thus, the Swabian position in Yugoslavia during the national age was one that 
offered both possibilities and peril. The relative liberalism of the Yugoslav Kingdom 
contrasted positively with the oppressive conditions that had existed in old Hungary 
(at first at least). Such liberalism made the interwar German national movement 
possible. However, the national age also posed difficulties for the Swabians, who 
were outnumbered and isolated from the German heartland in the nation-state of a 
different national group.  
The history of the Kulturbund was marked with meaningful accomplishments 
occasionally tempered by official harassment or outright prohibition. The first life of 
                                                 




the Kulturbund before its banning in 1924 was marked by many successes and some 
controversies within the German community. The Kulturbund’s leadership 
encouraged German communities to set up their own local chapters, which many 
promptly did. Such local chapters were founded across Vojvodina but local 
authorities prevented the Kulturbund from operating on the territories of Slovenia and 
Slavonia. Thus, the Kulturbund was effectively restricted to Batschka and Banat 
during its early years. The Kulturbund also faced opposition from certain ethnic 
Germans, not unlike Deutsches Volksblatt.  
Many ethnic Germans who had either Croatized or Magyarized resented the 
German movement, which judged them harshly. Similarly, many ethnic Germans 
merely wanted to exist quietly in the Yugoslav Kingdom and worried that the 
Kulturbund would only draw undesired attention to them. Those who opposed the 
German national movement in the abstract naturally had no love for its principle 
association, and they occasionally made their displeasure known. The Kulturbund’s 
progress was frequently rocky and it was by no means always clear that the German 
movement in Yugoslavia would be successful. Did the Germans in Yugoslavia have 
the organizational capacity to run the Kulturbund successfully? Would local Germans 
take a standing interest in the national movement or would “the ‘dimwitted’ Swabians 
burn out like a straw fire” and allow their enemies to lead them by the nose in the 
future as willingly they had as in the past? In early 1921, Deutsches Volksblatt 
editorialized against the German movement’s opponents as “ethnic traitors” who, 
lacking the courage to openly oppose the movement, “make trouble in secret and 




newspaper provocatively concluded. “What have you against an honest, industrious 
Volk?”311 Ultimately, dissent of this sort from within the German community was 
only sporadic, but it plainly irritated the Swabian activists, who in turn derided their 
detractors as “ethnic traitors” and “renegades.” 
Though frequently hampered in its activities by government interference or 
local intransigence, the Kulturbund quickly proved popular and scored successes in 
many of its fields of endeavor. True, the state of German education in the country 
remained highly dissatisfying, but the organization achieved much in its efforts to 
impart and cultivate German national consciousness and form group identity from the 
many disparate German settlements. Thus, by April 1924, when it was first dissolved 
by the government, the Kulturbund could boast 125 local chapters with 50,000 
members and many more supporters.312 
 
Political Turbulence and a New Beginning for the Kulturbund 
In 1924, then-Education Minister Svetozar Pribićević pushed for the 
Kulturbund’s dissolution, essentially because the German politicians of the Partei der 
Deutschen had regularly dared to express criticism of the country’s nationalities 
policies.313 As we shall see in Chapter Four, however, the heart of the matter was that 
the German political party, the Partei der Deutschen, had ceased its support of the 
government.314 Thus the ban was an act of naked political revenge as well as an 
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expression of Pribićević’s conviction that the Germans had revealed their hostility to 
the state first by forming their own political party and then by not supporting the 
Pašić- Pribićević coalition at a key moment. The ban was also intended as a 
disciplining measure, demonstrating that the government could squeeze or smother 
the Kulturbund as a means of exuding pressure on the Partei der Deutschen.315  
The reasons for the ban of the Kulturbund being rather specious and 
transparently political, the succeeding government of Ljubomir Davidović approved 
the resumption of Kulturbund activities shortly before it itself fell in November 1924. 
In fact, some Kulturbund local chapters had never completely ceased their activities. 
Nevertheless, the organization could not immediately recover from the temporary 
setback of its dissolution and for years problems persisted in recovering property 
which had been confiscated by state and local authorities. Local officials sabotaged 
the efforts of Kulturbund chapters to resume activities in most cases, and it would not 
be until the government of Nikola Uzunović issued a directive on January 12, 1927 
conferring full freedom of development upon the Kulturbund that the organization 
could renew its activities in earnest.316 In the interim, Grassl had resigned, Ludwig 
Bauer had become General Secretary, and the Partei der Deutschen had vigorously 
lobbied Belgrade to remove obstacles to Kulturbund activity. During these years, the 
Kulturbund consisted of little more than its board and a few still active local chapters. 
It had been dealt a heavy blow.317 
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At the Kulturbund’s annual congress in June 1927 (the first such meeting 
since August 1923), Johann Keks was elected chairman, replacing Bauer as the man 
in charge.318  He would remain at the helm of the Kulturbund during most of its 
subsequent years of legal activity, resigning only after years of conflict with the 
young Nazi-oriented Erneuerer in 1939 as will see in Chapters Six and Seven. Owing 
to the difficulties that the Kulturbund had had in operating even after its nominal 
relegalization in 1924, its members regarded this 1927 return to form as a second 
phase of organization building. During this phase, the conservative Kulturbund 
leadership would be more careful to restrict its activities to the unambiguously 
cultural.319 Nevertheless, it continued its mission of organizing the German minority 
under its auspices. The consolidation of German national associations inside the 
Kulturbund was once again underway. 
The Kulturbund’s legal reprieve proved short lived, however, and in 1929 the 
organization would again be banned, along with the Partei der Deutschen and all 
other nationally based organizations and parties in the Yugoslav Kingdom. Though it 
was tentatively allowed to resume activity in August 1930, its statutes were not 
reapproved until 1931.320 This was another big setback for the German national 
movement but it had anyway been difficult after 1927 to reignite enthusiasm among 
the conservative, largely rural Swabians for an organization that had been banned by 
the authorities. At the time of its second suspension, the Kulturbund consisted of only 
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64 local chapters and far fewer members than its earlier incarnation. However, the 
Kulturbund was by then active on a wider territory, including Bosnia, Slavonia and 
Slovenia.321   
Although it had faced serious obstacles at both the local and national level, the 
(again relegalized) Kulturbund could look back upon its work with some pride and 
yet also easily identify areas of concern. On the one hand, it had successfully 
established a cultural organization that, at least theoretically, embraced Germans 
across the entire country. Moreover, it had been successful in making this a popular 
organization with a broad reach. True, nowhere near the entire German community 
could be counted among its ranks. However, its membership rolls were still 
impressive and it served to mobilize many individuals in a German-oriented way for 
the first time. It had been instrumental in starting the German economic cooperative 
movement in Yugoslavia and thus had contributed to German organization and 
prosperity. Perhaps most importantly, it had served as a framework within which to 
build a broad German cultural community, a nation-based group consciousness that 
transcended parish, confession, village, and region. Yugoslavia’s Germans might 
have been less nationally mobilized than their coethnics in some other successor 
states, but in the Kulturbund a “central organization of national mobilization” had 
definitely been forged by 1924.322 The Kulturbund had served a key role in 
mobilizing the community and establishing a sense of national as well as regional 
identity. As we shall see in Chapter Six, however, its moderate course would soon be 
challenged from within, when a more radical generation sought to seize control of the 
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organization and “renew” it in the spirit of the “new German worldview” emanating 
from the Third Reich. 
 
Ordinary Swabians and the German National Movement 
Although the Kulturbund and Deutsches Volksblatt trumpeted the new spirit 
of German nationhood, not all Swabians were attracted by their message, as we have 
seen. Nationhood was just one possible basis for identity and a rather abstract one at 
that, especially for a largely rural people. Moreover, national identity plainly was not 
so innate in everyone as the nationalists claimed. While the Swabian activists may 
have found liberation in the destruction of the old order, many others Swabians were 
horrified by the turn of events and instinctively clung to things Hungarian. Still others 
remained simply uninspired by the national idea and thus deaf to the Kulturbund’s 
appeals to organize as Germans. For such “Magyarones,” “renegades,” and 
Auchdeutsche, the architects of the new German movement reserved sharp words. 
The Swabian activists had consciously sought to imbue their movement with a sense 
of the inevitable and had little patience for those who would seek to reverse it or sap 
its momentum. Their impatience did not mean inattention to their opponents, 
however. As such, the remarks and publications of the Swabian activists also reveal a 
German populace that was often confused or offended by the activities carried out in 
its name. The German activists targeted several categories of such unenthusiastic 
Swabians as retrograde or problematic. In addition to the merely indifferent, these 




either abandoned German publicly or privately, and those who were outright 
opponents of the movement.  
There was also religious skepticism toward the German national movement in 
the Yugoslav Kingdom. We will deal with the Swabian Catholic clergy’s position on 
the Kulturbund and national identity in greater detail in Chapter Eight. However, it is 
useful at this point to observe that the Catholic Church restricted its Swabian clergy 
from actively supporting the German national movement after a short period in the 
1920s. Although some Swabian priests showed early enthusiasm for the German 
national movement in Yugoslavia, the Catholic Church remained broadly suspicious 
of the movement and was especially conflicted about the Kulturbund. In part this 
reflected the Croatian (or lingering Magyar) biases of the Catholic Church in the new 
Yugoslav Kingdom. As we shall see, the Church in the Swabians’ settlement area was 
largely dominated in the 1920s by a priesthood which had been trained in Hungarian 
or Croatian seminaries and was nationally biased accordingly. Thus the Church was 
only unevenly supportive of the Swabian activists during the 1920s and sometimes 
Swabian clergymen proved actively hostile toward the Kulturbund. Even when 
speaking positively of German national identity, the Swabian clergy usually lacked 
the unconflicted zeal of the Swabian activists. Indeed, some Swabian priests were 
quite vocal in their opposition to German national identity and considered it a 
positively blasphemous basis for social organization. Finally, even when Swabian 
clergymen endorsed national identity, a lingering nostalgia for the prewar era was 




In contrast to the cool Catholic Church, the German Protestants, with their 
Kaiserreich-trained clergy, were more familiar and comfortable with the concept of 
German national identity and were more open to the German national movement. The 
German Protestants’ sense of national identity was additionally reinforced by their 
distinct settlement history and the fact that, unlike Catholics, Protestants were usually 
separated by confession from their Magyar and Croatian neighbors.323 As we shall see 
in Chapters Five and Eight, the German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia grew ever 
more comfortable with German national identity and developed close connections to 
Germany and Austria during the interwar years. 
The Swabian activists sought to confer a sense of inevitability upon their 
movement. They asserted the nation to be a natural category of humanity, sometimes 
even calling it part of the natural order established by God Himself. In spite of the 
Swabian activists’ bluster, however, it is clear that years after the First World War a 
sizable portion of the Swabian population remained either indifferent or hostile to 
political Germandom. German national identity did not hold particular meaning for 
them, at least not as a principle upon which to politically organize. While in their 
“everyday ethnicity” the Swabians remained attached to their German traditions and 
may have considered themselves a cut above their South Slav neighbors, after nearly 
two centuries of cohabitation with South Slavs and Magyars in southern Hungary 
(where Catholic masses were often not held in their language), cultural lines had 
begun to blur, as we have seen. Many Swabians had embraced the styles and 
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traditions of the hegemonic Magyars or Croats in their aspiration to a higher social 
standing. For such people, the gravitational pull of political Schwabentum must have 
been weak indeed. Oftentimes, the Swabian doubters were not necessarily hostile to 
the German movement, but they regarded its success as unlikely. Alternatively, many 
worried that the German movement could draw negative attention to Swabians in 
general. Thus, while the ardent German activists believed the hour of national rebirth 
to have struck, other Swabians did not care or remained uninspired, having grown 
despondent by the tumultuous state of world affairs and the insecure place of the 
Germans in Yugoslavia. Such doubters irritated the German activists, but it was 
believed they could be won “back” to Germandom, and the activists made regular 
appeals to them at rallies and in print.324 Other points of resistance among the 
Swabians, however, would prove a greater challenge to the self-styled awakeners and, 
as Deutsches Volksblatt noted in 1921, there were those who persisted in preferring to 
identify themselves as Banater or anything except German, lest they be resented for it 
and suffer economic harm.325 
Even worse than the politically indifferent and the Auchdeutsche in the eyes of 
the German activists were those Swabians who actively resisted the German national 
movement and its leadership. In the vocabulary of the Swabian activists, they were 
regularly derided as “Renegaten”, renegades from their own people. Though many 
had opted to emigrate to Trianon Hungary after the war, many remained and served 
as obstacles to the German national movement.326 By renegades, the Swabian 
activists meant those Germans who had been deeply Magyarized or Croatized 
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through education and life. They might have outwardly appeared German and 
remained capable of speaking the language, but in terms of national consciousness it 
was understood that they had exchanged their German identity for a Magyar or Croat 
one. Able to exist in two cultural worlds, they had nevertheless decided upon a 
“foreign” cultural allegiance, speaking Magyar or Croatian with their children and 
otherwise endeavoring to present themselves in language, thought, and feeling as 
urmagyarisch as possible, according to Deutsches Volksblatt.327 The Swabian 
activists were not amused. 
Deutsches Volksblatt lamented that the degrees and types of Swabian 
renegades were too numerous to discuss in detail, but nevertheless devoted special 
concern to the Magyarones who, together with Croatized Swabians, formed the vast 
bulk of the German apostates. Magyarones, the newspaper warned, actually 
represented a pernicious violation of natural order for their German national identity 
for a Magyar national consciousness. They were nothing less than “the Janissaries of 
our time.” Indeed, “just as those stolen Christian children had no idea for what 
monstrous purpose they were being misused as bloodthirsty Janissaries, so are our 
renegades also not in the least bit aware of the ignoble role they are playing.” 
Furthermore, even after the destruction of old Hungary, they persisted in their 
obdurate indifference to Germandom and worked to smother the nascent “Swabian 
Volk” as it stirred from its passivity.328  
Such histrionics in Deutsches Volksblatt aside, it is clear that the embrace of 
German national identity was neither swift, nor total, nor uncontested among 
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Yugoslavia’s Swabians. For the Swabian activists, the lingering indifference of some 
of their co-ethnics to politics and assimilates’ outright hostility to their agenda was 
particularly intolerable. In a highly religious society where such words were not used 
lightly, Deutsches Volksblatt sneered that Swabians cool or hostile to the German 
national movement “deny their Germandom like Judas denied the Lord.”329  
As we have seen, Novi Sad soon emerged as the unofficial center of the 
country’s German movement and host to several of its main interwar institutions. Yet 
even there, a half decade after the proclamation of the Yugoslav Kingdom, attitudes 
toward Germandom varied among Swabians. On the occasion of a 1924 election rally 
in the city, Deutsches Volksblatt recalled that the Swabians who held back from 
participation in the German movement could be roughly divided into four groups, 
reflecting their state of national consciousness and the Magyarizing or Croatizing 
circumstances under which they began the interwar era: 
• Closet Germans (die geheimen Deutschen) - those who considered themselves to 
be good Germans and doubtless truly were, but only in the privacy of the home. 
• Nervous, fearful Germans (die aengstlichen Deutschen) – Germans who 
maintained their national identity and nurtured German customs in their family 
but nevertheless shied from joining with nationally conscious Germans, who were 
still derided as pan-Germans in certain quarters. Such Swabians publicly avoided 
participation in society, associations, elections, etc. as Germans because they did 
not want to expose themselves and endanger their business, profession or income. 
• Aggrieved Germans (die gekraenkten Deutschen) - people who affirmed their 
Germanness but nevertheless remained on the sidelines of the German movement, 
because they were offended by the rhetoric of Deutsches Volksblatt or the attitude 
of the Kulturbund. 
• Ashamed Germans (die geschaemigen Deutschen) - People who were of German 
origins but who described themselves as Magyars because they considered 
Magyars to be something better, more noble, and cleverer than a mere Swabian.330 
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In summary, one may say that the crystallization and institutionalization of 
German nationhood in the Yugoslav Kingdom of the 1920s was remarkable but also 
incomplete. Moreover, that crystallization was the result of several interacting forces. 
The interplaying nationalisms that Rogers Brubaker describes were in evidence, as 
the nationalizing nationalism of the increasingly restrictive Yugoslav state met 
German homeland nationalism and its many Volkstumarbeit organizations. In 
between there developed Swabian minority nationalism, which had been recently 
crystallized by war and the new political situation in the Yugoslav state. Thus, 
German nationhood crystallized among the Swabians in response to interacting 
domestic and international forces and was shaped according to the designs of the 
Swabian activists. These ethnic engineers labored to foist a national identity upon the 
rural Swabian population based on its own everyday ethnicity and colonist ancestry. 
Their timing was propitious owing to the radical transformations following the First 
World War and its calamitous aftermath. Thus, warfare and political mobilization 
were also important contributors to the crystallization of national identity and 
minority nationalism among the Swabians. We will discuss the specific content of 
that minority nationalism in greater detail in Chapter Five.  
In such an environment, a small cadre of German activists chose to become 
national “awakeners,” German activists, and professional ethnics. They established 
institutions and organizations to mobilize the Germans in a national way. They also 
used history, ceremony, and the press to shape German/Swabian identity and impart it 
among the everyday ethnic population as the foundation for political mobilization. 




policies provoked a backlash in the hitherto merely “everyday ethnic” Germans. 
Finally, Volkstumarbeit organizations and even German foreign policy encouraged 
the Swabians’ “revival” and provided activists with financial, material, and 
ideological assistance. It was a heady brew. 
Ultimately, the Swabian activists were highly successful in their ability to 
establish cultural and media institutions, which appealed to nascent national 
sentiment among the population. The existence of such institutions was by no means 
a guarantee of success, however. Instead, the Swabians had to refine and tailor their 
message so as to appeal to the broad spectrum of Germans in the country with their 
distinct histories, regions, and dialects. As we shall see in Chapter Five, they 
promoted not only German national consciousness but also a profoundly local one 
based on the common history of colonization in the region. In this the activists used 
German national sentiment and a regional consciousness to reinforce both identities. 
However, as we shall also see in the following chapter, the Swabian activists were not 
content to restrain their activities to the cultural or intellectual realms. On the 
contrary, they recognized that it would be necessary to organize politically in order to 
defend or expand the cultural rights and privileges which had been guaranteed them 
at the Paris peace conference but whose implementation Belgrade seemed only too 
happy to overlook. Their desire to participate in politics led to the founding of the 
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Chapter 4: Swabians in Yugoslav Politics: Restrictions and 
Unintended Consequences, 1918-1929 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Yugoslav government initially offered 
favorable cultural privileges to the German minority in the wake of Austria-
Hungary’s defeat. Generous allowances were made especially in education (with 
suggestions of more to come) in a bid to win local Swabian support in the new state’s 
contested northern regions.  However, when local plebiscites looked unlikely and the 
borders and terms of the peace treaties became clear, such generosity in politics 
faded. The Swabians increasingly discovered themselves to be a distrusted and 
unwanted minority in somebody else’s nation-state (or worse, nationalizing state, as 
we have discussed). Although the Germans had little history of political mobilization 
and were sometimes quite integrated with the South Slavs in their communities, the 
new Yugoslav government regarded them with suspicion. One of its first acts towards 
the German population was to deny it and certain other minorities basic political 
rights. 
 
Citizenship, Emigration, and Swabian Political Exclusion 
 
The Yugoslav authorities characterized their decision to deny the minorities 
political rights as a temporary measure, allegedly based on concerns about national 
security. In their view, it would have been ridiculous to award political rights to 
                                                                                                                                           




former enemies who as yet had no clear obligation to remain in the state.333 Ironically, 
the authorities based their denial of the Swabians’ political rights on precisely those 
aspects of the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon that were designed to protect 
individual and minority rights. The Trianon peace treaty’s Section VII, “Clauses 
Relating to Nationality”, was expressly intended to protect the rights and property of 
the individual.  Article 61 stated that no one could be denied citizenship in their home 
territory after the fall of the monarchy, though Article 62 excluded the automatic 
awarding of citizenship to minorities in Yugoslavia, who had to obtain official 
permission from the successor state to secure such citizenship. It was Article 64, 
however, which formed the foundation of Belgrade’s decision to exclude its 
minorities from the political process. “Persons possessing rights of citizenship in 
territory forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and differing in 
race and language from the majority of the population of such territory, shall within 
six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty severally be entitled to 
opt for Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, or 
the Czecho-Slovak State, if the majority of the population of the State selected is of 
the same race and language as the person exercising the right to opt.”334 Meanwhile, 
Article 63 established that those who opted to relocate were free to move both their 
families and property but stipulated that they must formally relocate within one year 
of the Trianon treaty’s coming into effect in their current state of residence.  
January 22, 1922 marked the last date upon which persons could opt for the 
citizenship of another state and thus the last date the Yugoslav government could 
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justify the denial of political rights to minority groups. By that time, however, much 
of the new state’s fundamental political framework had been established. The 
Germans (and other minorities) had been excluded from elections to the 
Constitutional Assembly and thus had been denied a voice in preparing Yugoslavia’s 
constitution. Even after the Constitutional Assembly adopted the centralizing (and 
thus offensive to Croats) “Vidovdan Constitution” on June 28, 1921, Germans 
remained barred from political participation or organization until January of the 
following year. By that time, however, they had carried out much of the preparatory 
work for what would become their principle political voice in the country, the Partei 
der Deutschen (PdD). Immediately after the expiration of the option for citizenship 
and emigration (known as the Optionsrecht in Swabian circles), the party was born. 
In fact, the exclusion of the minorities from political life led to massive 
complications and revealed the absurdity of attempting to legislate identity. To 
exclude minorities on the basis of their ethnicity might have seemed like a simple 
legislative act but in practice it raised the unwieldy prospect of categorizing people 
according to identities that may have been vague, mixed, or even incomprehensible to 
the person in question.  In his study of Djakovo and its surroundings, for example, 
Vladimir Geiger discusses how the determination of voter rolls based on the denial of 
political rights to the minorities led to much confusion in Djakovo and demonstrated 
the difficulty of defining just what constituted a German or Magyar.335 While 
assigning citizenship based on the location of a person’s birth may be simple enough, 
precisely determining the objective and subjective criteria of the ethnic identity of an 
individual or preexisting population is perhaps an impossible task.  This was 
                                                 




especially the case in the lands that constituted the new Yugoslav Kingdom. What 
criteria to use? Surnames? “Heritage?” Should all those with German or Hungarian 
surnames be denied the right to vote? By such logic, of course, even Croatian patriot 
and Yugoslav enthusiast Bishop Josip Strossmayer would have been ineligible for 
political rights. What to do in cases where people who identified as Slovene, Croatian 
or Serbian had foreign heritage or names? What to do about language? In many cases, 
bilingualism was common in the Yugoslav Kingdom. Some marriages were mixed 
between ethnicities. Many Germans had been forced to attend Magyar or Croatian 
schools and had thus become highly assimilated to those cultures. As we have seen, in 
nineteenth century Croatia, the German population of the cities had been particularly 
inclined toward assimilation after the 1850s or at least became highly acculturated. 
How should they be treated?  
As Holm Sundhausen has observed, there was never a generally applicable 
answer to the question of who or what constituted a German in interwar Yugoslavia, 
and one spoke often of an undetermined nationhood or even national opportunism and 
apostasy. Ethnic heritage, language, identity and religion did not always neatly 
coincide.336 In many cases, self-identified “Germans” had only the shakiest grasp of 
the language, especially in its written form. Years later, after the Third Reich’s 
invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, many more people suddenly identified 
themselves as German than had hitherto been the case, prompting grumblings about 
opportunistic “Aprildeutschen” who sought to benefit by association with the new 
                                                 




order. Clearly, isolating and defining the protean concept of identity was more 
complicated than the bureaucrats might have liked.337  
 The Swabian activists were extremely dissatisfied with their denial of political 
rights in the first interwar years and the lingering taint of suspicion cast upon them for 
their allegedly divided loyalty.338 This imperative of legally determining ethnicity 
contributed to the congealing of a German national identity and the German national 
movement. The treatment of the Germans as aliens or foreigners seemed especially 
offensive and provoked a heightened awareness among the Swabians of their own 
distinctiveness as well as a defiant pride in their colonist ancestors, who had settled 
the land centuries before. By interpreting the Trianon and St. Germain treaties’ right 
to emigrate in such an exclusive way, the Yugoslav government formally isolated the 
Germans from the nation of state and led them to wonder, in national terms, exactly 
why.  
 
The Establishment of the Partei der Deutschen 
On the second anniversary of the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes, Deutsches Volksblatt took stock of the German community’s 
political position in the country and reviewed its own accomplishments. The 
newspaper observed that December 1 should be a day of celebration for Germans as 
well as South Slavs because of the many opportunities the new order had brought 
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them. “December 1 is a day of unification for us Germans as well, a day of the 
joining together of all Volksgenossen, who before belonged to different lands of the 
state. All that is German in heritage and orientation in Vojvodina, Croatia, Bosnia, 
Dalmatia, Slovenia was forged into a single German national community, into a 
common fate by an act of state by the new [Karadjordjević] ruler.” Life was far from 
perfect for this German Volksgemeinschaft, however.339 Local governments had 
prohibited Kulturbund activity in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and the government 
in Belgrade, Deutsches Volksblatt charged, either lacked the will or the power to 
overrule them. And as we have seen, Belgrade had also hindered German political 
action through the denial of political rights until the expiration of the option to 
emigrate. Well, that option was about to expire and a new German political force 
would soon come to the fore, the newspaper promised.340 
 Actually, the wisdom of establishing a German political party had been 
debated in Deutsches Volksblatt during the early months of 1921. Contributors opined 
for and against such an organization while the newspaper officially claimed to 
withhold its own stated position. Opponents of a German party argued that the 
establishment of a political organization would be premature. The Kulturbund still 
needed to be consolidated and the Germans would continue to lack political rights 
until January 1922. Anyway, various local German political organizations predating 
the First World War already existed in various parts of their settlement area and could 
be tasked with representing the German community in Yugoslavia. Surely this would 
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be enough?341 The conspicuously more numerous advocates for a new party 
organization, on the other hand, asserted that a German party was necessary for the 
Germans’ needs to be taken seriously by the government. The German population 
was sizable enough that a German party would not even be the smallest in parliament, 
so long as it embraced all Germans, irrespective of class and confession.342 
Meanwhile, the entire German population was being shut out of the most important 
matters of state and, crucially, agrarian reform. 
 By the autumn of 1921, the main Swabian activists had taken the decision to 
establish a German political party and preparations were underway that would 
culminate in the party’s formal founding in time for the next elections.343 The depth 
of support in the Swabian electorate was of some concern to them, however, since “it 
is unfortunately a sad fact that perhaps no people has been raised so politically 
apathetic as precisely our Swabians.” Thus, the entry of Germans into the political 
arena meant a new area of endeavor for the newspaper, which would hence have to 
prepare the Swabians for political life. “In a word, we must educate our people 
politically,” Deutsches Volksblatt resolved.344 In February of the following year, the 
newspaper went further, announcing its intention to move beyond being effectively 
just an organ of the Kulturbund and enter more boldly into and matters of politics on 
behalf of the nascent German political party.345 True to its word, throughout the 
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1920s, Deutsches Volksblatt brimmed with articles explaining not only the 
importance of voting but also whom to vote for. 
 The formal announcement of the new Party of the Germans in the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes followed immediately upon the expiration of the 
Optionsrecht. On January 29, 1922 an appeal to join the new political party, 
frequently known by its German acronym “PdD”, streamed across the front page of 
Deutsches Volksblatt. Wrapping itself in the flag of Yugoslav patriotism and dynastic 
loyalty, the appeal recounted a long list of German grievances in the Yugoslav state 
and called upon Germans to join the new party. Charging that their constitutionally 
guaranteed rights were being violated, the appeal’s authors especially inveighed 
against their denial of political rights on the basis of the Optionsrecht. Likewise, they 
complained that agrarian reform had been legally improper, proceeded in a 
discriminatory manner, and was generally reprehensible. Furthermore, they protested 
the displacement of the German language from official or public communication as 
both unjust for Germans, as well as unwise for South Slavs, since such a precedent 
could imperil the linguistic rights of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes beyond the borders 
of their kingdom. German needs in education and culture required respect, as did 
German economic rights, especially in the area of trade and taxes. Furthermore, it was 
imperative to struggle against corruption and obtain German officials for German 
areas in the country. But despite this long list of grievances, the Germans’ appeal was 
hardly revolutionary and promised a party informed by the conviction that the 
political cooperation of all the country’s citizens was a prerequisite for national 




political life and called upon the German population to establish local party chapters.  
Among the appeal’s authors were Franz Moser (Ferdinand Riester’s 1911 successor 
in the Croatian Sabor) as well as future members of the Yugoslav parliament, Samuel 
Schumacher and Hans Moser.346 
The generic name of the Partei der Deutschen was indicative, demonstrating 
the party leadership’s desire to equate nationhood and politics. That is, the party 
construed itself as a nation-based party, for whom it was the duty of all the country’s 
Germans to vote. Throughout its electoral history, PdD officials and candidates (as 
well as the rest of the Swabian activists in the Kulturbund, at Deutsches Volksblatt 
and elsewhere) stressed that it was nothing short of a moral obligation of the ethnic 
Germans to vote for the party. For example, in 1925 the PdD exhorted in the pages of 
Deutsches Volksblatt that “no German voter may remain at home. Everyone without 
exception must vote for the German party list.”347  To do otherwise, would be 
betrayal of the Volk and denial of one’s nationhood. The party leadership expected the 
Germans to demonstrate loyalty to the Yugoslav Kingdom but never forgot its 
obligation to defend the interests of the kingdom’s German minority. 
 Many Germans greeted the Partei der Deutschen’s January 29 appeal with 
enthusiasm and promptly joined the party. A party board tasked with setting up a 
local party chapter was immediately formed in Ruma on January 29 and was followed 
by many others from Slovenia to Banat. In fact, the party already boasted 46 local 
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chapters in Batschka, Banat, and Syrmien by August 1922.348 From its inception, the 
PdD cast itself as an all-German party that straddled differences of class, occupation, 
origin and confession. The organizers even declared their hope to attract Germans 
who had been hostile to the Kulturbund. In this, the party revealed its aspiration to 
embrace all Germans and immediately began to speak in their name, casting those 
who resisted the party as renegades or strays to be won back to the fold.   
The PdD used the February 15, 1922 founding of its local party board in Novi 
Sad as an occasion to publicly elaborate on its tactics and explain the urgent necessity 
for a German party. The German activists had long complained that the South Slav 
parties effectively ignored them, thus excluding them from the new state’s 
Constitutional Assembly and denying them the chance to participate in the crucial 
business of agrarian reform.349 Speaking at the Novi Sad party board founding, Georg 
Mueller reminded listeners of both the surplus of political parties in Yugoslavia and 
the shortsightedness of their programs. Moreover, the many parties possessed a 
regrettable tendency to represent the interests of only a single South Slav ethnic group 
and, thus, contained no place for the Germans. While the Slavs and Germans 
definitely had interests in common, he asserted, there were many areas in which their 
priorities differed. These differences, such as the use of German language in school, 
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church, official correspondence, banks, post, telephones, etc. revealed the need for a 
specifically German political party. Germans must agitate for their linguistic priorities 
just as they must fulfill their obligations as loyal citizens, rejecting irredentism but 
also demanding their rights.350   
That same day in Novi Sad, Deutsches Volksblatt editor Franz Perz made his 
newspaper’s sympathy for the PdD abundantly clear when he acknowledged that the 
Novi Sad daily regarded the communication of the party’s program and its 
instructions to party supporters as among the newspaper’s principle tasks.351 During 
March and April of that year, Deutsches Volksblatt‘s masthead even briefly 
proclaimed it to be the “Daily newspaper of the Party of the Germans in the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” before prudently reverting to being merely the “Daily 
newspaper of the Germans in Yugoslavia (SHS)”. Regardless of the claims of its 
masthead, however, Deutsches Volksblatt should clearly be regarded as an unofficial 
organ of the Partei der Deutschen.  
By fall 1922, many more local chapters of the PdD had been founded but the 
party still had only its provisional, founding committee to direct it. With an increasing 
number of chapters in place, the party founders turned to the formation of a proper 
board of directors and the drafting of a comprehensive political program. These 
moves forward were given additional impetus by the looming possibility of an 
election in 1923, in which the party founders were determined the PdD should take 
part. By the time of its first party congress on December 17 in the Banat town of 
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Hatzfeld (Romanian - Jimbolia), the PdD counted 50 local chapters, of which more 
than 34 sent representatives.352  
In Hatzfeld,353 the PdD would work out the program that would guide it until 
the party’s dissolution in 1929 under the strictures of the new royal dictatorship. The 
Hatzfeld conference, therefore, served as the formal founding of a new party, but it 
also was a demonstration of continuity between the interwar German movement and 
its prewar antecedents. Ludwig Kremling, who had been the prewar chairman of the 
Ungarlaendische Deutsche Volkspartei, was elected chairman of the PdD, while the 
position of managing chairman went to former VDH student leader Stefan Kraft, who 
hailed from Indjija in Srijem. Hans Moser of Zemun (also in Srijem) and Michael 
Theiss (of Hatzfeld) were elected deputy chairmen. All in all, men from Srijem 
composed no less than 20 percent of the party’s steering committee. Thus, the pre-
1914 cradle of German activism in Croatia-Slavonia continued to be well represented 
in the broader German national movement during the interwar period.354  
 The Hatzfeld party congress held to several guiding principles, including the 
belief that the Partei der Deutschen could not remain on the outside of the country’s 
politics but rather must enter into alliances with the government and other parties. As 
such, in Hatzfeld the party resolved to take no stand on questions of constitutional 
law and instead asserted that it was for the “Slavic nation of state” to decide whether 
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the country would be centrally or federally administered.355 Delegates to the party 
congress passed two resolutions, which were then read aloud by Franz Perz and 
Johann Keks. The first of these made the perfunctory declaration of allegiance to the 
Yugoslav state and Karadjordjević dynasty. The second resolution awarded the PdDs’ 
leadership the freedom to negotiate alliances or agreements with the government and 
other political parties in Yugoslavia. Any deviation from loyalty to the state was 
declared intolerable and effectively meant expulsion from the party.356 Like the 
Kulturbund, the PdD meant to be simultaneously volkstreu and staatstreu. 
Unfortunately, it proved even more difficult to persuade South Slavs of the sincerity 
of this position in politics than in social and cultural affairs.  
Ultimately, the Hatzfeld party congress would be most remembered for the 
political program it adopted. The “Hatzfeld Program,” as the party platform came to 
be known, was extensive and remained the PdD’s guiding document until 1929. The 
document consisted of two sections of demands, the first listing the Germans’ 
“general” objectives and a second one outlining objectives more specific to the 
German population in Yugoslavia. The first, general section emphasized, among 
other things, the need for the state to observe certain fundamental liberal freedoms, 
including “personal freedom, inviolability of residential rights, religious freedom and 
freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and freedom of 
association, freedom to teach and freedom to learn, the inviolability of the mail, 
telegraph and telephone, and the right of petition and grievance.” The Hatzfeld 
Program additionally called for the implementation of constitutionally guaranteed 
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areas of equality, including for the country’s various churches. Furthermore, the 
program demanded the streamlining and rationalization of state administration; the 
expansion of certain welfare provisions and institutes; healthy finance policies and a 
just system of taxation; the reduction of certain trade barriers; improved transport and 
communications; the favorable stabilization of currency; welfare and just treatment 
for demobilized soldiers; the holding of a fair and accurate census; the forging of 
friendly international relations and trade agreements; and the harmonization and 
unification of laws across the kingdom.357 
In its second section, the Hatzfeld Program turned to the Germans’ more 
specific concerns. In large part, these specific concerns derived from the Germans’ 
treatment in the years since the collapse of Austro-Hungarian rule, during which they 
complained of South Slav chauvinism and insensitivity; denial of various rights; 
political exclusion; lawless or senseless administration by non-German and even non-
local officials appointed to run their areas; obstacles to German schooling and efforts 
at outright denationalization through education; linguistic discrimination; and the 
displacement of the German language from certain areas of public and civil life.358  
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Several areas of the “specific part” of the Hatzfeld Program are worth 
particular consideration. Article 1 emphasized the Germans’ aspiration to see the 
forging of a constitutional order that permanently and genuinely guaranteed them the 
right to freely organize their particular cultural, national and economic areas of 
activity as a unified people. Additionally, each citizen should be free to determine his 
or her own nationality. In Article 2, the Germans asserted their right (on a group, 
confessional, communal or private basis) to establish and maintain educational 
institutes and schools of all levels and types, with particular concern for the training 
of teachers. Article 3 also dealt with education. It revisited the Germans’ need for 
such German language teachers’ training institutes (especially invoking the relatively 
wealthy German tax base) and demanded the legal recognition of parents’ right to 
choose the school (and, thus, language) of their children’s education. Additionally, 
the Germans called for the right to attend schools abroad and have their diplomas 
recognized in Yugoslavia. Finally, Article 3 concluded with the demand for the 
material assistance for the Germans’ legally recognized churches in correspondence 
with their number of believers, as well as the provision of religious education in 
German by priests of German ethnicity. Article 4 expressed concern for the usage of 
the German language both in interaction with various state officials as well as in 
communications and signage. Similarly, Article 13 pled for the maintenance of 
German place and street names and the free use of German symbols. Further articles 
in the specific section of the Hatzfeld Program addressed important economic 
matters, including the perennial concern for the way agrarian reform was being 





handled, as well as the need for increased German representation in local 
administration.359  
Ultimately, it is clear from the Hatzfeld Program that the original German 
leadership in Yugoslavia retained high hopes for the liberal prospects of the state in 
1922 yet recognized that those liberal prospects should not be considered secure, no 
matter what the constitution said. The Partei der Deutschen was particularly anxious 
in the program’s “specific” section to iterate the Germans’ need for rights and respect 
in education, administration, elections, agrarian reform, language, and economics.360 
Despite this clear iteration, these would be areas that frustrated the Swabians 
throughout the interwar period. 
The Hatzfeld party congress was an event of real significance in the history of 
the Swabians. The party leadership, never one to overlook an opportunity for identity 
building and self-promotion, began celebrating the event’s significance almost 
immediately.  Stefan Kraft, who would lead the party during the 1920s, called it “a 
turning point in the development of our [German] political life” and emphasized the 
importance of constructing a common German consciousness from the disparate 
German regions in Yugoslavia. Johann Keks, future chairman of the Kulturbund and 
an energetic German activist observed that, “The world war brought new ideas for the 
coexistence of mankind to the surface.” The Wilsonian principles promising self-
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determination and protection of smaller peoples had been inspiring and “we Swabians 
have also succumbed to the magic of these words as well,” he intoned.361 
 As had become evident, German national consciousness remained an 
emerging and complex phenomenon, which sometimes eluded or defied its 
protagonists. The Swabian activists, however, were assisted mightily in their work by 
the nationalizing policies of the Yugoslav government, which rendered German 
national identity newly salient and gradually drove many otherwise disinterested 
Swabians into the German national camp.  
 
Germans in Yugoslav Politics, 1922-1929 
The German experience in Yugoslavia during the 1920s was characterized by 
the insistent construction of national institutions and activities designed to forge 
group consciousness, impart national identity and define that identity as both Swabian 
and German. In the cultural realm, as we have seen, this meant the development of 
the Kulturbund and its various local chapters. In politics, the German experience was 
characterized by the Partei der Deutschen’s campaign for German votes and German 
national priorities, a constant balancing act between the principal Serbian and 
Croatian parties, and a struggle against the efforts of those parties to attract German 
voters.  The PdD participated in three national elections and likewise worked to elect 
Germans in the regional elections after these were finally permitted in 1927. At the 
decade’s end, Germans could look with some pride upon their nascent political party, 
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but the actual accomplishments of the PdD were few and not immediately apparent. 
Meanwhile, in politics and daily life, the country’s Swabians were subject to constant 
discrimination and even nationalist violence at the hands of their South Slav 
neighbors. To be sure, daily relations between Germans and their Serbian, Croatian 
and Slovenian neighbors were often quite good. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav state, 
itself a locus of heated Serbian and Croatian national contention, pursued a 
nationalizing agenda that discriminated against the Germans, ironically contributing 
to the consolidation of German national identity in Yugoslavia.  
Much of what follows is a discussion of ethnic differentiation, which occurred 
across the 1920s as circumstances and national activists pushed ethnicity to assume a 
more salient, political meaning. In many cases, especially those which are recorded 
by journalists, police, diarists and historians, it is the exceptional clash in local 
politics, not the friendly exchange in the local marketplace that becomes an object of 
nationalism studies. Perversely perhaps, acts of violence leave a more indelible mark 
than acts of kindness, and the sensational eclipses the mundane in recorded memory. 
As such, the reader should bear in mind when reading the following that many 
contemporary authors and later historians have observed that relations between South 
Slavs and Germans during the interwar period were sometimes tense but were also 
often good and neighborly. Germans and South Slavs may have spoken different 
languages in the home but bilingualism was also common. Orthodox Serbs and 
Protestant Germans may have attended different churches than their Catholic 
neighbors, but in many cases they nevertheless lived in the same communities and 




often worshiped together, a fact that elicited concern among some nationalist 
Germans, who recognized the blurring of cultural lines between the two communities 
and warned against Croatization. Serbian and Croatian words penetrated local 
German dialects just as German words were adopted by Serbo-Croatian.  
In many cases, Germans did lead separate associational lives from Serbs and 
Croats during the prewar years. Nonetheless, as we have seen in Osijek, Germans also 
often participated in various associations (fire brigades, gymnastics associations, 
choral groups, etc.) with their Croatian or Serbian neighbors.  This began to change in 
the 1920s, a decade which was marked by a concerted and conscious effort by the 
Swabian activists to expand the national basis of German life and establish distinct 
German choral groups, gymnastics clubs, and the like. In this process of cultivating 
German national consciousness, the Swabian activists consistently pursued an agenda 
of ethnic differentiation. (Croatian and Serbian nationalisms were also strident during 
these years.) The Yugoslav state, on the other hand, sought to either assimilate or 
marginalize the Germans, hoping additionally that many would simply leave the 
country. 
 
Tensions in the Streets, Germans in the Skupština 
For the Swabians, the 1920s was a period of national construction and the 
building up of German national institutions. As we have seen, for the Kulturbund this 
meant the opening of new local chapters, the arranging of lectures, rallies, courses on 
German custom and identity; and the holding of ethnically and historically based 




sought to highlight German consciousness and belonging as well as Swabian 
tradition, history and custom. The Partei der Deutschen arguably was instrumental to 
all of the national goals of the Kulturbund. However, it also had the task of competing 
in elections and functioning in a parliament where German aspirations were not 
always looked upon kindly or as innocent. The Kulturbund and PdD thus had 
different spheres of activity but common concerns.362  
Before the imposition of royal dictatorship, as noted above, the PdD competed 
in three parliamentary elections, the first of which was actually announced during the 
party’s first congress at Hatzfeld.  The PdD was a small party operating in a country 
where South Slav parties and parliamentarians often regarded it with suspicion or 
outright hostility. Yet in interwar Yugoslavia, the importance of the few German 
parliamentarians could be disproportionate to their number, since every vote was 
precious in a parliament where decisions were often made by very narrow 
majorities.363 The PdD’s strategy varied according to circumstances, but generally the 
party sought to advance its own agenda by supporting or aligning itself with whatever 
powerful force would help it achieve its goals. In practice, this often meant support 
for the government, but the PdD did sometimes vote with opposition. (Neither 
strategy was particularly successful.) Its members could be vocal, and on numerous 
occasions, Kraft, Grassl, Moser and others loudly asserted German priorities and 
concerns in parliament. Throughout the 1920s, however, South Slav support for the 
PdD’s priorities and initiatives proved elusive. This frustrated the German activists 
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tremendously, especially since the Serb Radicals and Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) 
regularly made generous overtures to gullible German voters in the hopes of 
obtaining their votes for their own parties.364 The PdD also had the unenviable task of 
seeking not to offend Serbs or Croats in a parliamentary system that was very much 
nationally fragmented and where joining the government or opposition broadly meant 
defection from the camp of one ethnic party to that of its rival. As such, the story of 
the PdD in parliament is one of consistent advocacy for German priorities but only 
rare accomplishments of lasting significance.  
Scarcely had the Partei der Deutschen unveiled its Hatzfeld Program that the 
party had to launch its first political campaign. While the Germans gathered at the 
PdD congress in Hatzfeld, Nikola Pašić had King Alexander dissolve the Constituent 
Assembly and schedule elections for early in 1923. This was not unexpected, and the 
PdD quickly resolved to mount party lists in those districts where they saw possibility 
of electoral success. In their campaign, the German activists urged the Swabian 
population to “be strong and unified!” and resist the tempting promises of the “Slavic 
parties.”365 Meanwhile, the party’s South Slav competitors hoped to poach German 
voters from Slovenia to Banat. The PdD held many electoral rallies across 
Yugoslavia’s German regions. However, the party lacked the time and resources to 
campaign in all areas with German inhabitants and therefore had to concede some 
places to its opponents until future elections. This was especially true in Slavonia, 
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where the PdD remained unorganized and the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) hoped for 
many Swabian votes.366  
 Joseph Rothschild has characterized the 1923 balloting itself as “free and 
peaceful”, but observes that the rhetoric on the campaign trail was spiked with 
vitriol.367  Throughout the campaign, Deutsches Volksblatt loudly complained of what 
it considered disenfranchisement and harassment, as well as misinformation and 
slander in the Slav press. In the German press, the PdD charged the South Slav parties 
with alternately intimidating German voters or making false promises to score votes. 
The Radical campaigners, it claimed, threatened that German votes for any party but 
their own would be viewed as an expression of disloyalty to the Yugoslav 
Kingdom.368 PdD campaign events were sometimes interrupted by nationalist 
violence, and several small bombs were allegedly even detonated at the offices of 
DVAG.369 Meanwhile, Deutsches Volksblatt steadily beat the drum of campaign 
support for the PdD, regularly appealing to the German electorate to vote, instructing 
them exactly whom to vote for, explaining the value of having German members of 
parliament, and warning that any splintering of the German vote would be disastrous.  
 Despite its complaints about the campaign, the Partei der Deutschen did 
respectably well in the 1923 parliamentary election, securing a total of eight mandates 
across a number of electoral districts. (There were 313 mandates at stake overall.) 
Although they were disappointed by the unfortunate split of the German electorate in 
Ruma between the PdD and the active and well funded Croatian Peasant Party, the 
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men of the PdD generally viewed the election as a success. 43,415 votes were cast for 
the PdD which secured mandates in Slovenia, Batschka and Banat.370 This number 
was sufficient for the German deputies to form a parliamentary Klub, which they 
promptly did. Its members were Stefan Kraft, Samuel Schumacher, Simon 
Barthmann, Josef Taeubl, Hans Moser, Wilhelm Neuner, Franz Schauer, and Peter 
Heinrich. 
In accordance with its program, the PdD sought to avoid the Serb-Croat 
conflict and constitutional questions as much as possible. It worked according to the 
principle that it would offer its support to whatever party could deliver on the issues 
of importance to the German population. In practice, this usually meant siding with 
the strongest political parties and the government, though there were occasions when 
the party broke from this practice. The Radical Party of Nikola Pašić had won 108 of 
the 313 seats in parliament but fell short of having enough to form a majority 
government. Nevertheless, Pašić was entrusted with forming an all-Radical 
government, which would count on the support of the 14 Džemijet Albanians and the 
8 deputies of the PdD. The PdD, thus, found itself in a position of almost surprising 
importance and agreed to conditionally support the Pašić government, while always 
pushing for its own goals.  
The PdD’s strategy would soon be put to the test by the turbulent nature of 
Yugoslav politics during the 1920s. The parliament elected in 1923 endured for less 
than two years and struggled with constantly shifting coalitions, divisions in the 
South Slav parties, nationalist frustration, and a temporary boycott by parliamentary 
deputies of the Croatian Peasant Party. Serb-Croat tension continued unabated 
                                                 




throughout this parliament. Meanwhile, tensions among the Serbs themselves led to 
the secession of a bloc of Serbs from the Democratic Party. These secessionist Serb 
MPs promptly formed the Independent Democratic Party and accepted four ministries 
in the government of Nikola Pašić. The intransigent Stjepan Radić campaigned for 
the Croatian cause from London to Moscow, while his HSS deputies edged closer to 
assuming the parliamentary seats they left vacant for some time after the election. 
Several governments were formed from several constellations of parties and featured 
either Nikola Pašić or Democratic Party leader Ljubomir Davidović as prime 
minister. It was the alliance between Pašić and Pribićević that spelled particular 
trouble for the Germans, however, for the latter made no secret of his hostility toward 
the Germans and their political party. As Rothschild points out, “the 1923 elections 
thus sharpened the differences among the ethnic communities on the one hand and 
accelerated the internal political consolidation of each of them on the other. Within 
each ethnic community, the strongest, most cohesive and reputedly most nativist 
party gained at the expense of smaller, looser and more ecumenical ones.”371 This did 
not necessarily bode well for the Germans. 
 According to Valentin Oberkersch, PdD representatives had reached an 
agreement with Pašić on matters of great concern to them (including lifting the 
“temporary” system of appointed administration in Vojvodina by which they were 
frequently governed by-local Serbs already) by September 1923. In exchange for their 
support after the upcoming elections, the Swabians believed they could count on 
Radical support for their own educational, linguistic priorities, economic and 
especially administrative priorities. The Germans would retain the right to express 
                                                 




criticism of prevailing circumstances but agreed to not serve as opposition to the 
government. It quickly became apparent, however, that Pašić was unwilling or unable 
to honor his promises to the Germans and the German deputies would be forced to 
defend their interests on such crucial matters as taxation, education, and agrarian 
reform.372  
In early 1924, when the HSS sought to assume many of the mandates the 
party had won but not yet filled in the boycotted Belgrade parliament, the PdD gave a 
sharp indication of its frustration with its Radical partners. By this time, the Bosnian 
Muslims, the Slovenian Popular Party and the HSS had formed an opposition bloc, 
but this strategy required the parliamentary certification of the vacant HSS mandates 
in order to become effective. The parliamentary accreditation committee had 
originally consisted of 11 Radicals and 10 members of the opposition. After the 
departure of one Radical from the committee, however, PdD MP Hans Moser found 
himself on the committee as the Radical’s substitute. Moser, thus, was suddenly in the 
position of casting the deciding vote on whether or not to certify to the HSS 
mandates. Exasperated by the behavior of the Radicals, Moser voted in support of the 
HSS. 
Shortly after Moser voted to certify the mandates in mid-March 1924, the 
Radical government resigned, no longer possessing a coalition majority. However, 
Pašić and the Radicals quickly returned to power, this time with the support of 
Svetozar Pribićević and his Independent Democrats. The dissolution of the 
Kulturbund quickly followed, as we saw in the previous chapter, prompting the PdD 
leadership to hold an emergency meeting in Novi Vrbas on April 27. The 
                                                 




contemporary press noted that the PdD event was not without incident, being 
interrupted by nationalist youths allegedly screaming “Long live great Serbia!” and 
brandishing sticks, daggers and revolvers.373 Two Germans were allegedly stabbed at 
the event, which was then dispersed by Serbian authorities before its conclusion.374 
The police allegedly beat German attendees as well while protecting the disruptors,375 
which prompted MPs Ludwig Kremling and Stefan Kraft to dispatch a letter of 
complaint to the Interior Minister.376  Before the authorities dissolved the Novi Vrbas 
meeting, however, delegates passed several resolutions, the most important of which 
were a Declaration to the German Electorate, and a formal protest against the 
dissolution of the Kulturbund.377 No longer, the PdD declared, was it possible for the 
Germans to support a regime that neglected the cultural, national and economic 
necessities of its minorities and practically disowned the principles of 
parliamentarism and rule of law.378 The Partei der Deutschen, therefore, would 
henceforth pursue its politics in the opposition. Its hopes were briefly awakened in 
1924 by the Davidović government, which nominally relegalized the Kulturbund, but 
the party would soon have to face elections (after yet another brief Pašić government) 
on February 8 of the following year.  
The parliamentary campaign in 1925 was anything but uneventful. The 
opposition parties faced greater intimidation than in 1923, and the pages of Deutsches 
Volksblatt were filled with outraged articles and quotations by PdD officials about 
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interrupted campaign rallies, intimidation, and several violent incidents. Ultimately, 
the PdD emerged from the election having earned more votes but with fewer MPs to 
show for its efforts. Also during this election, the PdD first ran a list of candidates in 
upper Slavonia in the Virovitica electoral district with Hans Moser heading the party 
list. Though the PdD did not prevail in Virovitica, its electoral efforts there were 
significant for they represented the organization’s expansion deeper into the 
Slavonian territory of the Croatian Peasant Party. The parliament elected in 1925 was 
still divided and dominated by the Radicals. However, the parliament also briefly 
featured a coalition of the Radicals and their erstwhile Croatian opponent, the HSS, 
which on March 27 announced its acceptance of the Vidovdan Constitution. Also 
under this parliament, long-promised regional elections were finally held on 
November 16th and future local elections were announced on September 7, 1927. 
Despite earning slightly more votes (45,172) overall than in 1923, the PdD 
secured only five parliamentary mandates in the 1925, three fewer than they had won 
in the previous election.379 The party attributed this to widespread voter intimidation, 
official manipulation of voter rolls and other such official chicanery. In fact, 
intimidation of the Germans was hardly new in 1925, though the German experience 
of official or “private” acts of violence and intimidation never approached the 
severity of similar acts in Kosovo or Macedonia, for example. Mostly the Swabians 
were frustrated by official foot dragging, selective implementation of measures 
connected with their supposedly equal rights, and especially the issues of language 
and schooling. Their hoped for solution to all of this was the long promised holding 
of regional and local elections and the obtainment of such cultural autonomy as Serbs 
                                                 




and their Orthodox Church had enjoyed in prewar Austria-Hungary. Through local 
elections, the Swabians hoped to finally replace the “temporary’ Serbian 
administrators imposed after the world war with local Swabians, who would not 
block whatever minority-friendly measures came out of Belgrade. Through cultural 
autonomy, the Swabians hoped to finally be able to develop an established system of 
German education. It is worthwhile here to recall Anthony Smith’s definition of 
nationalism, by which the Swabian activists can legitimately be called “nationalists” 
in interwar Yugoslavia. Smith neutrally identifies nationalism as “an ideological 
movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a 
population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 
“nation.” The Swabian activists in the PdD and other institutions were clearly 
pursuing precisely such goals. In their efforts, however, the Swabians suffered 
obstructionism, unsympathetic local officials who were often outsiders appointed by 
Belgrade, denial of treaty-guaranteed minority rights, and occasional incidents of 
intimidation and violence on the campaign trail. These aspiring minority nationalists 
consistently confronted a Yugoslav nationalizing nationalism that frequently regarded 
their efforts with impatience or even treated them as insurrectionary. 
The open violence and intimidation (other than Pribićević’s banning of the 
Kulturbund) came most often from local Serb youths, officials or police. Such acts 
were usually tolerated by the Belgrade government, which plainly regarded the 
Germans as an irritant and rarely prosecuted wrongdoers.380 Most often, the incidents 
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were scuffles or tension between individuals. However, on several occasions during 
the 1920s, individual Swabian leaders were actually assaulted and they all had to 
suffer hecklers on the campaign trail. In February 1922, Johann Keks, then-editor in 
chief of Deutsches Volksblatt’s sister publication Neue Zeit, and several others were 
arrested on insubstantial charges and held for several weeks in Pančevo.381 This was 
nothing less than a test of the constitution, Deutsches Volksblatt charged, which 
would show whether constitutional protections, as far as they concerned Germans, 
represented the law in practice or merely existed on paper.382  Was the Yugoslav 
Kingdom a state governed by laws, as was promised, or a police state, as the political 
opposition often charged? Shortly after Keks’ release, Georg Grassl, the former 
editor-in-chief of Deutsches Volksblatt and current Kulturbund head, was himself 
arrested and held in Topola for three days by local authorities, who he claimed had 
sought to prove a “non-existent” connection between the Kulturbund and Partei der 
Deutschen. Grassl was likewise released unbowed and unharmed, but hardly 
optimistic about the fate of constitutional law in the country.383 
The Swabians also faced intimidation by nationalist thugs and more organized 
nationalist youth groups in the 1920s. Such groups as ORJUNA, the Organization of 
Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija jugoslavenskih nacionalista), and SRNAO,  
Serbian National Youth (Srpska nacionalna omladina),  frequently interrupted 
campaign rallies, scuffled with Swabians at PdD or Kulturbund functions, and even 
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see Bešlin. 
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attacked the offices of the German publishing house in Novi Sad.384 On several 
occasions, these scuffles became quite serious and leading PdD politicians were 
seriously wounded. In August 1922, Deutsches Volksblatt reported that its offices 
were raided by several young men from ORJUNA, who also threatened the staff 
working there.385 According to the newspaper, the intruders seized books, documents, 
and letters before heading to the neighboring offices of the Kulturbund and similarly 
seizing documents and correspondence.386 The following year, Deutsches Volksblatt 
complained of a bomb attack on the offices of the Germans’s publishing house, which 
fortunately did little damage. By far the most serious scuffle with South Slav 
nationalist youths in 1923, however, occurred in the Slovenian town of Ptuj. There, 
German MP Franz Schauer was wounded, having been hit in the head by a large stone 
hurled from an ORJUNA mob after a German concert, which ORJUNA suspected of 
being a political rally.387 Schauer recovered, but the relative insecurity of the German 
politicians was self-evident. 
Virtually every year seemed to yield new clashes between South Slavs and 
Germans. In May 1924, for example, Swabians and some recent South Slav 
immigrants to Vojvodina clashed over land in the village of Lazarfeld.388 In the 
aforementioned repressive atmosphere of the 1925 elections, PdD campaigners were 
on several occasions prevented from holding campaign rallies or even entering towns. 
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The most notable incident of violence during the entire 1920s, however, occurred in 
the village of Novi Sivac, where a Serb nationalist gang attacked Stefan Kraft and 
Georg Grassl, wounding both and hospitalizing the former. After his recovery, Kraft 
took the state to task in the Skupština for the failings that made possible harassment 
and attacks such as had happened at Novi Sivac and elsewhere. Kraft charged that the 
German minority lived under circumstances that “contradicted the demands of the 
constitution and international law.” Germans were not in fact citizens of equal rights 
in Yugoslavia, he claimed. Indeed, the minority did not enjoy the protection of the 
law, especially in matters connected with the Partei der Deutschen, that is, political 
matters. Such a situation, Kraft explained, was intolerable.389 The Yugoslavs, it 
seemed, were not going to show the Germans the protections they had themselves 
demanded under the vanquished Habsburg Monarchy.  
 The position of the PdD throughout the 1925 parliament remained precarious. 
The conflict between Serb parties, the defiant attitude of the Croats, and the general 
fracturing of political life along ethnic lines dominated by charismatic leadership 
produced a parliament that was riven by division and never truly stable. Under such 
conditions, the PdD cautiously entered talks for cooperation with the governments led 
by Velimir Vukićević, to whom Kraft submitted a memorandum outlining the 
concerns of the PdD in August 1927. It included the following demands:  
1. The return of the confiscated property of German associations, 
especially in Slovenia; 2. the return of certain confiscated church 
lands; 3. a fundamental understanding about the return of nationalized 
private schools and the granting of cultural autonomy; 4. compensation 
for damages caused by Yugoslavia’s agrarian reform; 5. the holding of 
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municipal elections in Vojvodina; 6. complete equal rights and actual 
equality in economic and social life; 7. political representation 
corresponding to the number of the German population in the country, 
that is, ten to eleven members of parliament; 8. the gradual hiring of 
aspiring German civil servants into state employment.390 
 
As before, the issues that continued to preoccupy the Germans were not only cultural 
ones, such as education, but also reached deep into the economic, legal, and material 
realms. After years of parliamentarism, Germans’ needs and aspirations remained 
unfilled.  
 The parliament produced by the elections on September 11, 1927 was even 
more turbulent than its two predecessors, culminating in the shooting of Stjepan 
Radić on the floor of the Skupština on June 20, 1928 and the King’s introduction of 
royal dictatorship on January 6 of the following year. The 1927 parliament was also 
defined by the remarkable and unusual reconciliation of Stjepan Radić and Svetozar 
Pribićević, who after years of personal enmity and political denunciation, allied 
against the principal Serbian Radicals and thereby managed to obstruct much of the 
business of the Yugoslav parliament. In the chaos following the shooting of Radić, 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes also received its first and only prime 
minister who was not a Serb, Msgr. Anton Korošec of the clerical Slovene People’s 
Party. In 1927, the PdD again received more votes than ever but won only six 
mandates. That is, two less than in 1923. As usual, the German parliamentary club 
was led by the ubiquitous Stefan Kraft. Kraft also headed the party list in upper 
Slavonia, where the party had again failed to win but nevertheless earned more votes 
than in the previous election.  
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As the situation deteriorated in the second half of 1928, the PdD held a major 
meeting of its leadership in Novi Sad on November 18, which was attended by all six 
German MPs and 1000 representatives from 110 communities, some as far away as 
Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The tone of the meeting and the resolution it 
produced was one of bitterness and disappointment, reflecting deep disillusionment 
with the state and parliament. “Experience has shown us,” the party’s mouthpiece 
declared, “that we can expect nothing or not much in this respect from the state, 
whose loyal citizens we are and wish to remain. The time of hopes and illusions is 
over for us.” The only hope on the road ahead lay in “self-help” and the sort of 
cultural autonomy enjoyed by the Transylvanian Saxons, Deutsches Volksblatt 
declared.391 This Novi Sad meeting yielded a resolution which gave formal form to 
the Germans’ sense of bitter disappointment. Stefan Kraft expressed his own great 
frustration at the meeting, observing that the Germans were in their tenth year of 
denial of rights and emphasizing that all their complaints, strategies and tactics had 
been in vain.392 
 
Croatian and Serbian Parties Court the Swabians 
The South Slav parties did not regard the German voters as an automatic 
constituency for the PdD and actively courted them. Swabians in ethnically mixed 
areas endured a particularly difficult situation. On the one hand Yugoslav (Serbian) 
authorities regarded the cultural and political aspirations of the Germans with great 
suspicion, since the Germans in these regions mostly voted for the HSS. On the other 
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hand, the Croats suspected the PdD of “sailing in Great Serbian waters,” that is being 
inclined out of opportunism to support the Serbian agenda.393 Thus, the Swabians 
were simultaneously desired and distrusted from all sides. 
The matter of South Slav political parties was also of concern to the PdD and 
the German activists. As we have seen, some Germans had long believed that a 
German political party could only be superfluous or so small and powerless that it 
made more sense to participate in the South Slav political parties. Naturally, the 
South Slav parties agreed and courted this potential electorate, often making generous 
promises, which usually went unfulfilled. In Vojvodina, the Swabian leaders were 
particularly concerned about the attraction of the Radicals and Independent 
Democrats. In Croatia and Slavonia, where the PdD long lacked much party 
infrastructure, Radić’s HSS was the greater concern. As we have seen, many 
Swabians in Croatia-Slavonia had largely assimilated or were only vaguely nationally 
conscious. (It did not help that Croatian authorities long denied the Kulturbund the 
right to operate on its territory, thus permitting German national consciousness to 
further erode.) Naturally, such people were inclined to vote as their Croatian 
neighbors did, especially in lieu of a realistic German alternative.394 
As for the Swabian leadership and the PdD, on one hand they welcomed the 
occasional kind utterance about Yugoslavia’s Germans by Stjepan Radić. On the 
other hand, they clearly recognized the HSS as a natural and able competitor. The 
HSS hoped to lure Swabians into its groups and associations so as to cultivate them as 
voters. For several years, the HSS even produced a German language newspaper 
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called Freies Heim, which was widely circulated and aimed at the Swabian peasantry 
and self-described as the “German Organ of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party.”  
Suzana Leček cites Slovenian historian Dušan Biber’s study to assert that Freies 
Heim was among the most widely distributed newspapers among Germans in 
Croatia.395 The newspaper’s formal publisher was Vladko Maček, a leading HSS 
politician, and the managing editor was Rudolf Herceg, then-editor of the party’s 
principle organ Slobodan Dom. The newspaper boasted a long list of contributors, but 
the majority of articles were penned by the indefatigable Stjepan (later “Stefan”) 
Radić and included such titles as “”The German People in the Battle for its 
Existence” (“Das deutsche Volk im Kampf ums Dasein”), “Why is Stefan Radic 
Considered Teacher and Leader of the Croatian People?” (“Wonach gilt Stefan Radic 
als Lehrer und Fuehrer des kroatischen Volkes?”), “The Peasant Party and the Non-
Slavic Nationalities” (“Die Bauern Partei und die nichtslawischen Nationalitaeten”), 
and “Peasant State and Peasant Government as the Savior of the Balkans and the 
Danube Region” (“Bauernstaat u. Bauernregierung als Rettung des Balkans und des 
Donaugebietes”). A great deal of content was additionally devoted to explaining the 
ideology of the HSS. In many ways, Freies Heim resembled its sister publication 
Slobodan Dom, but it did find German collaborators (usually anonymous), whose 
contributions tended to highlight issues of importance to the Germans. Gradually 
Freies Heim took on its own identity. That is, it was not merely a German translation 
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of Slobodan Dom, but rather was consciously adapted to appeal to Germans.396 In any 
event, by stressing the marginalization of non-Serbs under the chauvinistic, unitary 
Serbian regime, the HSS could appeal to the Swabians as a fellow beleaguered 
people. As a peasant party, the HSS could additionally appeal to the mostly rural 
Swabians on the basis of class. 
 
 
 When the PdD sought to become active in Croatia, it faced many difficult 
obstacles. As we have seen, the first local chapter of the PdD was actually founded on 
January 29, 1922 in Ruma. The party struggled in Srijem, however, facing not only 
competition from local Serbs but also from the HSS, which cleverly included a 
handful of Germans on its own party lists. Lacking resources, the PdD did not run a 
list of candidates in Croatia-Slavonia until 1925, as we have seen, and it was not until 
1927 that the party finally would establish a local chapter in Slavonia’s principal city, 
Osijek. 
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 As previously discussed, the national identity of Osijek had long been a bone 
of contention between the nascent German movement and the Croatian national 
movement, with the latter plainly ascendant in Osijek. Although much of the 
population of Osijek was of German origin, the Croatian national movement 
dominated political life there and many Germans had shown themselves inclined 
toward assimilation. The region’s German national activists declared their intention to 
reverse this trend before the First World War and their hopes were no different in 
1927 when the party competed in that year’s municipal elections.  
Despite facing extreme competition from the HSS, the PdD founded its local 
chapter in Osijek in 1927 with high hopes. The challenges ahead for the organization 
were evident, however. At its first PdD meeting, the local chapter chairman lamented 
that he had nearly lost hope for future of Germandom in the city when he read in the 
newspaper of the plans for the PdD. The PdD held an early rally in Osijek in 
September 1927 which drew approximately 400 attendees. Speakers bemoaned the 
decline of Germandom in Croatia and Vojvodina and emphasized the need for a 
German party to defend German interests. Grassl expressed his shock to have recently 
received a German letter written partly in Cyrillic397 and Stefan Kraft expressed his 
feelings on assimilation in the highly Croatized city by invoking the Serbo-Croatian 
saying “Gori je poturica od Turcina” (“The [Turkified] apostate is worse than the 
Turk”) and “Spolje ljubi I dudje postuj” (“Love one’s own and beware things 
                                                 




foreign”).398 The irony that the Croatian language sayings were the most suitable 
vehicle to stress the importance of German identity apparently went unnoticed. 
 Osijek lay in the Virovitica electoral district, so the Osijek visit was very 
much a campaign rally for Stefan Kraft, who headed the party list there in 1927. The 
PdD’s local voice in Osijek, Der Volksbote, instructed readers specifically how to 
vote.399 Der Volksbote urgently explained that it was the eleventh hour for Germans 
in Slavonia qua Germans and that the end was drawing near. Did the Germans not 
want to halt their calamitous decline once and for all? Did they not want to live on as 
Germans who, despite insufficient regard for their mother tongue in the past 
centuries, nevertheless retained a connection to the great currents of German cultural 
life and progress? “Do we want to disappear without a trace into the Volksgemische of 
our country due only to our own dilatoriness?” Imagine the disappointment of the 
colonist ancestors to discover that their grandchildren had so neglected their language 
and customs that they no could longer understand them! To avoid such a future, the 
newspaper urged, it was time for Germans to get off their hands, stand up and take 
part in the German movement themselves.400 
The PdD did earn considerably more votes in the September 11, 1927 election 
than it had in the previous parliamentary round in the Virovitica electoral district, but 
its 1601 votes were nevertheless insufficient to carry the day.401 The party also ran a 
candidate list headed by Ferdinand Gasteiger in the November 6, 1927 municipal 
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elections but this similarly did poorly.402 Thus, although the activists had planted an 
institutional seed, the German movement in Osijek remained in its infancy relative to 
other parts of the Germans’ settlement area at the end of the Yugoslav Kingdom’s 
first decade. As we shall see in the following chapters, however, other figures would 
emerge in the 1930s and give new impetus to the German movement in Croatia-
Slavonia.   
 
The Unintended Consequences of Nationalizing Nationalism in the Yugoslav 
Kingdom 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Kulturbund was effectively banned 
from meaningful activity from 1924 until 1927. Although the PdD scored many 
successes during the 1920s, it was banned with all other nationally based political 
parties in 1929. Throughout the decade, German politicians and activists were 
menaced by bands of nationalist Serbs, whose transgressions were broadcast 
throughout the Swabian community in the German press. From a variety of local 
identities in Srijem, Batschka, Baranja, and Banat, the men behind DVAG 
endeavored to forge an imagined community of Yugoslav Germans based upon the 
German ethnicity, language, and culture as well as the historic memories of Swabian 
colonization. The PdD sought to mobilize that community and represent it in the 
Skupština but were frequently ignored and even attacked on occasion for their efforts. 
All in all, these incidents of nationalizing nationalism contributed mightily to the 
construction of a common German consciousness, assisted by the soft oppression and 
                                                 




hard discrimination to which Germans were all to often subjected in Yugoslavia. In 
short, the pressures of the South Slav state were crystallizing a Swabian variety of 
minority nationalism. 
Following yet another disappointing setback in the PdD’s campaign for 
German schooling in Slovenia and the main area of German settlement, Grassl 
remarked that “the gravity of the anti-German schooling decision brought the German 
leadership together and revealed a deep solidarity among Yugoslavia’s Germans from 
Slovenia to Banat.403 Grassl’s estimation of the degree to which a common German 
identity or consciousness across the entire German settlement area had indeed 
crystallized was surely an exaggeration. Many ethnic Germans remained nationally 
unconscious or were simply uninterested in 1928. Nevertheless, his general thesis that 
the political restriction and exclusion of the German community in the 1920s at the 
hands of Yugoslav authorities had heightened national consciousness and increased 
German susceptibility to a nation-based viewpoint is surely correct. Ironically, the 
very Yugoslav attempts to smother German national identity and assimilate German 
children in the schools had had the opposite effect, offending German sensibilities. 
Such an atmosphere created an open market for the Swabian activists’ appealing 
political message. 
One might liken the above process to a vicious circle whose every 
contradictory turn only served to undermine the intent of the Yugoslav authorities. 
Elites in the interwar successor states did all they could to homogenize their 
populations, that is, to nationalize and assimilate ethnic minorities. As elsewhere in 
postwar eastern Europe, the authorities, invoking the right of self-determination for 
                                                 




the majority peoples, regarded the isolated minorities in their nation-states as a 
potential threat to their new sovereignty. This led to a vicious circle whereby the 
majority peoples sought to assimilate or marginalize the minorities, often through 
denial of cultural or political rights. Their efforts achieved only the opposite of their 
intent, however, for the provoked minorities consolidated themselves and sought, 
wherever possible, support from the Germans in Germany and Austria.404 This 
consolidation and search for assistance from Germany proper in turn confirmed the 
worst fears of the majority peoples and “‘justified’ not only their mistrust but also 
further sanctions against ‘disloyal’ minorities.”405 Moreover, the emergence of the 
national principle had transformed the nature of conflicts between larger and smaller 
peoples or even between entire civilizations. Such conflicts now took on a new 
quality, with ethnic origin and native tongue assuming a novel and ideological 
significance. Commenting on this process, German historian Holm Sundhausen 
observes that the result, was a “Sprachen- und Kulturkampf”, a new battle of 
language and culture.406 
The Swabians’ embrace of Germandom was a gradual process that proceeded 
in fits and starts, often hindered by apathy and meeting hostility from among South 
Slavs, Magyars, and even the Swabian populace itself. The German movement would 
suffer many setbacks, but ultimately the determination of the Swabian activists, the 
inspiration of other nationalisms, and the shock of the First World War set the 
Swabians on a historically unprecedented course toward embracing modern German 
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national identity. The government’s provocative challenges to Swabian efforts, the 
hostility of Yugoslav nationalists, and increasing assistance from Volkstumarbeit 
organizations in Germany also contributed to the forging of a self-sustaining German 
national movement, which was both cooperative with the state yet also 
unapologetically assertive.  
Easter was a particularly potent symbol for all nationally conscious Swabians 
throughout the interwar period. As a symbol of rebirth, renewal, and new life, it was 
frequently employed both by the early Swabian activists and their later challengers in 
the Erneuerungsbewegung after 1933.407 Easter, and the often used associated 
concept of “resurrection” seemed a tailor-made symbol for a Swabian leadership that 
cast itself as reviving a national community, which had allegedly lapsed into a deep 
slumber. Easter celebrations added a conveniently festive dimension to this happy 
symbiosis of the nation’s revival and Jesus’ resurrection, which also offered the 
symbolism of purity, hope and the celebration of youth.408 Naturally, the Swabian 
activists were quick to draw attention to the special connection between Easter and 
their national movement in their mouthpiece Deutsches Volksblatt already in 1921. 
The Easter celebration has a very special meaning for us Swabians. 
For the third time since the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy it is Easter and we may, indeed we must, lay certain 
questions of conscience before us: whether we have proven worthy of 
the hopes of resurrection, which filled the hearts of our best men in the 
fateful hours of the [Habsburg] collapse. We were granted the chance 
to awaken ourselves to [national] consciousness after a two hundred 
year sleep. Such a historical hour as would not reoccur for hundreds of 
years [the First World War and its denouement], called a powerful 
warning to us and we can gladly say that our Swabian Volk did not fail 
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to hear the voice of fate . . . . We have risen, we have rubbed the deep 
sleep out of our eyes.409 
 
By the late 1920s, the Swabian activists had truly achieved a great deal and 
their claims of a “national resurrection” grew increasingly credible. Based upon the 
lessons learned and experience gained learned in Austria-Hungary, the nascent 
Swabian leadership had established a nationalist press in DVAG, an active German 
cultural association in the Kulturbund, and finally a political party the Partei der 
Deutschen. Yet much of the boasting about the “reawakened” Volk reflected wishful 
thinking, and a sizable proportion of Swabians (especially in Croatia-Slavonia) would 
remain indifferent to Germandom into the 1930s and beyond. Still, by capitalizing on 
the revolutionary events of the First World War and the disintegration of Austria-
Hungary, the small group of tireless Swabian activists had established the institutions 
that would contribute mightily to crystallizing German nationhood and forging a 
broad national movement where there had been virtually none before. In the next 
chapter, we turn to the content of that nationhood, noting that the identity that 







                                                 




Chapter 5:  Minority Nationalism and Swabian Cultural and 
Protestant Identity 
 
As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, the ethnic German leadership that 
emerged in the Yugoslav Kingdom faced not only the task of building institutions and 
providing political leadership, they also had to forge and shape the very German 
community that those institutions were meant to represent. That is, the Swabian 
activists faced the formidable challenge of forging group identity where there was 
none before and doing so on the basis of German national consciousness, which many 
Swabians still found remote or even bewildering. This chapter will examine in greater 
detail the content of that Swabian identity and the various vehicles that the German 
activists used to highlight or impart it to the Swabian millieu, which frequently 
consisted of peasants in isolated settlements. In the process, we will explore how the 
Swabian activists located their enterprise in the nineteenth century tradition of 
“national awakening” and directed their principle cultural institutions toward its ends. 
We will furthermore examine the role of history, language, song, dress, and public 
commemoration in the overall enterprise of shaping and imparting a common identiy 
as national. Such public commemorations were particularly important, for they served 
as intersections between the German national movement’s institutions and the 
individual lives and regions whose history and future they claimed to represent. 
Ultimately, it was this nationally German and locally Swabian identity that formed 
the foundation upon which the Swabians’ interwar minority nationalism, their 
minority nationalist stance viz. the Yugoslav nationalizing state, would be based. 




Church as the sort of national incubator which Anthony Smith discusses in his 
treatment of the importance of organized religion for ethnic group coalescence and 
endurance. 
German Activists as “National Awakeners” 
For purposes of clarity, this work has refered to the Yugoslav Germans’ 
postwar leadership as “activists”, but this is not the term that they applied to 
themselves. Rather, these men called themselves “awakeners” and viewed themselves 
as engaged in the classic nineteenth century European project of “national 
awakening.” In fact, theirs was a kind of missionary work that understood itself as 
rousing the vast body of Swabians from a deep slumber. In certain cases (such as 
Slavonia) the Swabian activists saw themselves as working to “win back” wayward 
Germans who had partly or mostly defected to the ways of Magyardom or Croatdom. 
Theirs was also an educational mission and the Swabian activists devoted hours of 
labor and pages of print to constructing and imparting a comprehensive identity that 
was German national but also proudly Swabian.  
The activists’ methods in the struggle to impart German consciousness to their 
co-ethnics in Yugoslavia would appear remarkably innocuous in a non-national age. 
Through the new institutions discussed in the previous chapters, they sought to craft 
and impart a new national and cultural identity based on history and tradition. Having 
asserted the basis of collective identity and action to be the nation, not confession, the 
activists then proceeded not to somehow nationally “revive” the Swabian populace 
but rather “teach Germany to the Germans” and construct for them an identity based 




would be proudly Swabian and nationally German. To do this, they would use a 
plethora of German publications, rallies and festivals, cultural, youth, and gymnastics 
organizations, and Swabian literature and history. They additionally cooperated with 
such Germany-based Volkstumarbeit organizations as the Deutsches Ausland-Institut 
and the Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland. In their work, new and deeper 
connections were forged with Weimar Germany and its Volkstumarbeit organizations 
than had ever existed before. 
The Swabian activists were hardly reticent about the nature of their work, nor 
did they shy from openly lamenting the weak national consciousness of Germandom 
in the Yugoslav Kingdom. Despite the fact that their rhetoric thoughout the 1920s 
was marked by confidence, the German activists regularly commented on the 
deplorable condition of the country’s Swabians, as we have seen. This manifested 
itself in attention to the Croatian and Magyar assimilation that had occurred under the 
old regime, but also in frustration with German indifference in the country. As usual, 
the principle forum for their outrage was Deutsches Volskblatt, which regularly 
observed that German consciousness in some quarters was very weak indeed but also 
took solace in “the root of our Germandom, our upright, industrious, and stalwart 
peasantry,” which had  “remained German at its core, as German as only a German 
could ever be.”410 Here Deutsches Volksblatt revealed a central aspect of the the 
German/Swabian identity the activists sought to cultivate: the idea of a pure, 
industrious, virtuous and simple German peasantry, which despite two turbulent 
centuries of cultural oppression and corruption through assimilation, nevertheless 
remained the healthy seed from which the unblemished German Volk might again 
                                                 




blossom in the Yugoslav Kingdom. The peasantry, being by far the most numerous 
element among the Swabians, was also the basis upon which the Swabian activists 
would build their fabled Volksgemeinschaft.  
The vocabulary the Swabian activists used reflected the revolutionary 
transformations being experienced by the German populace. It was a time of 
“national rebirth,”411 or “the national rebirth of our Swabian Volk.”412 The Germans 
were experiencing a reawakening that was nothing less than a kind of “resurrection” 
and, as we have seen, was frequently linked with Easter in the activists’ public 
discourse and publications.413 The awakening - actually the “becoming a people of 
Swabiandom” or “Volkswerdung des Schwabentums” - would not be easy, however, 
and was an ongoing process.414  
Just as the Swabian activists viewed themselves as “awakeners” so did their 
institutions understand their own missions. Deutsches Volksblatt proudly 
acknowledged that it engaged in nationally-oriented educational work 
(“Aufklaerungs- und Erziehungsarbeit.”) The newspaper considered itself “the first 
attempt [in two centuries] to bring together all the living strengths of our 
[Swabian/German] nationhood and put them strictly at the service of the good of the 
community.”415 Indeed, it called itself “one of the most important factors in our 
national movement [which had] worked and struggled since its founding as the 
awakener of German self-awareness and as proclaimer of the [German] feeling of 
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national belonging” in Yugoslavia.416 Likewise, the Kulturbund regarded its mission 
as not merely preserving German culture but positively developing and spreading it. 
In their common national endeavor, these and other Swabian institutions purposely 
reinforced one another. On the occasion of the 1928 opening of a new, purpose-built 
building to house Deutsches Volksblatt, Franz Perz claimed bluntly that it would not 
be an exaggeration to say that the founders of the German publishing house D.V.A.G. 
and the newspaper were the inspirers and awakeners of the German 
Volksgemeinschaft in the country.417 
 
“National Awakening” in Action 
The Swabians’ national activism consisted of several parallel currents. Most 
fundamentally, the Swabian activists were creating a cultural archetype based upon 
idealized notions of Germandom spiked with history and traditions peculiar to the 
Swabian settlements in the Danube region. This meant, as will be discussed, the 
celebration of the virtues, accomplishments, and memory of the settler ancestors, and 
would reach its apogee in the 1930s, when many Swabian towns celebrated important 
settlement anniversaries. The Swabian activists additionally sought to create their 
“imagined community,” to invoke Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase, by spreading 
the printed German word. As we have seen, DVAG promptly opened a bookstore and 
published Deutsches Volksblatt, which regularly offered book reviews and 
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recommended particular books to its readers. The Kulturbund opened German 
libraries and reading rooms through its many local chapters and also encouraged the 
expansion of nationally-based, German associational life.418  
The Swabians activists feared their people had grown distant from their 
national roots. To correct this, the activists, promoted works of history, literature, 
painting and even sculpture. In addition to the widely circulated works of the revered 
Banat author Adam Mueller-Guttenbrunn, the Swabian activists also promoted 
historical works such as Leo Hoffmann’s Schwaebische Heimatbildermappe, which 
depicted key scenes in Swabian history, from the liberation of the Danubian Heimat 
from the Ottomans to the early national activism of Swabian Vorkaempfer Reinhold 
Heegn in Banat.419 Similarly, Swabians were encouraged to read Raimund Friedrich 
Kaindl’s history of the Karpathendeutsche, and the Kulturbund promoted Die 
Donauschwaben in Suedslawien und Rumaenien, a history of Swabian settlement by 
Stuttgart professor Herman Ruediger.420 There were calls to build a Swabian 
museum, which was simultaneously intended to be educational and also serve as a 
Volksdenkmal, a monument to the settler ancestors and their descendants.421  Many 
local museums were established in towns and villages to celebrate local or regional 
history. Additionally, trade and art exhibitions were organized, showcasing Swabian 
industry as well as the artwork of local Swabian painters such as Oskar Sommerfeld, 
Stefan Jaeger and others. Despite their relatively limited resources, the handful of 
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Swabian activists was able to find collaborators and produce a comprehensive 
program of historical commemoration, linguistic celebration, and cultural 
inspiration.422 In the campaign to shape and impart identity, however, no organization 
was so central as the Kulturbund. 
 
The Kulturbund as an Agent of “National Awakening” 
“The national reawakening of our local German population began in a 
meaningful and promising manner with the establishment of the Kultubund,” intoned 
Deutsches Volksblatt in 1921.423 As we saw in Chapter Three, the Kulturbund 
regarded itself as far more than a mere cultural organization. On the contrary, the 
organization consciously viewed itself as having a mission to “awaken” the Swabians 
from their “national slumber” and create a nation-based group consciousness that 
transcended the bounds of village, region, and confession. The Kulturbund was 
Yugoslavia’s first statewide German organization and, in spite of its name, aspired to 
include the Germans of Slovenia as well as the Swabians in Slavonia and Vojvodina. 
As such, the very existence of the Kulturbund was significant for German 
community-building in the Yugoslav kingdom and the organization worked hard over 
the course of the interwar period to expand both its network of local chapters and its 
membership rolls to the maximum extent. As the sponsor of festivals, concerts, 
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exhibitions, and much more, the Kulturbund would be the driving force behind the 
Swabians’ national “awakening” as well as its principle arena.  
 The Kulturbund produced an annual Kulturbund Kalender. Thoughtful, 
colorful and widely distributed, the Kulturbund Kalender combined the functions of a 
farmer’s almanac with the organization’s mission of identity building and group 
coalescence.. Similar almanacs from Germany and Austria had previously been 
available in the region, but the Kulturbund Kalender would be the first such 
publication specifically by and for the Germans of the Yugoslav Kingdom. It spoke 
directly to the Swabians and thus represented an important milestone by itself. Its 
pages contained lists of religious and state holidays, information on the royal family, 
Swabian poetry and literature, and articles on Swabian history. It also sought to keep 
readers up to date on the state of the Kulturbund, including the number of local 
chapters and where to find them. Johann Keks, who would be the Kulturbund’s 
chairman after 1927, edited the Kulturbund Kalender for many years. Other leading 
Swabians contributed articles to the almanac.  Judging by its annual circulation of 
40,000, this Swabian almanac was a smashing success.424  
 The Kulturbund Kalender promptly addressed the daunting task of forging 
group consciousness in its first issue in 1920.425  In its introductory article, the 
almanac acknowledged the great changes at the end of the First World War and 
addressed the new German community the denouement had abruptly created. The 
almanac stressed the common fate of the Germans in the new country and asserted the 
importance of national unity. Invoking the motto of the Kulturbund, it observed that 
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“We must be faithful to our nation, if we want to do justice to our historical mission, 
if we want to claim our mother tongue and the inheritance of our ancestors. We want 
to be loyal to the state, without coercion and of our own accord, because the 
flourishing and advancement of the state also means the prospering and advancement 
of our German nationality (Volkstum).”  
First, however, there was much group identity construction to be done. As the 
Kultubund Kalender observed, “the almost 750,000 Germans of Yugoslavia426 were 
not only distributed in different regions in the [Habsburg] Monarchy, they were not 
only of different German regional and cultural strains (Stammeszugehoerigkeit), they 
had also experienced different cultural development and had not taken the same path 
of historical development.” Before the hard work of securing German rights in 
Yugoslav Kingdom could begin, the almanac continued, the Germans of the 
kingdom’s disparate parts had to form a proper community.427  
The Kulturbund Kalender’s covers were powerful and symbolic, being 
intended to communicate the Kulturbund’s message of national identity even to the 
illiterate. Their artwork from 1922 to 1924 was particularly evocative, depicting an 
idyllic scene whose message was unmistakable. Framed by arching oak trees from 
whose branches dangle acorns, a grandfatherly figure sits in a field with a young boy. 
Clad in Swabian national costume (Volkstracht) and holding the child in his left arm, 
the man points skyward with his right. The boy’s gaze follows the man’s outstretched 
hand upward to where the sun shines brilliantly, its illuminating rays emanating from 
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the words “Muttersprache, Heimat, Vaeterglaube.” This simple Kulturbund slogan 
embodied the organization’s hopes and values: love of the German language, 
devotion to Heimat (in Yugoslavia but also broadly understood to include Germany, 
the Urheimat), and faith in the settler ancestors, whose virtues and struggle were to 
serve as guiding inspiration for their German descendents in the interwar Yugoslav 
Kingdom.  
Following the 1924 dissolution of the Kulturbund, the Kulturbund Kalender 
was repackaged as the Deutscher Volkskalender, which hardly sought to hide the 
connection.428 In essence, the “new” almanac remained largely unchanged, devoting 
attention to German cultural icons such as Schiller and Goethe, encouraging 
Swabians to treasure their Swabian dialect, and reminding them to preserve their 
German folk costume. In one 1926 article, then-Kulturbund leader Ludwig Bauer 
even urged Swabians to prefer Gothic script to Latin letters, both for traditional 
purposes and because, in his estimation, the German script was more easily readable 
than Latin script and was therefore “easier on the eyes.”429 Deutscher Volkskalender 
also devoted many pages to local historical themes as well as German national ones, 
such as “the Old German City”, which educated readers about architecture and the 
urban landscape in Germany.430 The almanac was also not shy about its close 
association with the Partei der Deutschen and the Kulturbund, even including an 
article in 1928 announcing the Kulturbund’s relaunch and authored by its new leader 
Johann Keks.  
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Also like the Kulturbund Kalender, Deutscher Volkskalender left little room 
as to its purpose in its evocative cover art. The 1925 almanac’s cover depicts a scene 
dominated by a massive oak tree, whose roots are firmly anchored around the name 
of the almanac’s publisher, the Deutsche Druckerei- und Verlags-A.G. In the 
landscape behind this, a Swabian farmer ploughs the fertile earth and the church 
tower of a German village peeks over a gentle hill. Later almanacs would continue 
this theme of history, labor, and cultivation. Their cover art frequently depicted a 
German peasant dressed in Swabian folk costume and sowing seeds in a field, again 
with a German village in the background. Deutscher Volkskalender, thus, iconified 
the noble Swabian peasantry, which it depicted as sowing the seeds of the nation and 
prosperity in the new Heimat. The message was unmistakable: pious and industrious, 
the colonist ancestors had forged the blooming Heimat from the pestilent swamps and 
pitch forests they had found. Now this same peasantry would form the basis of the 
revived German nation in Yugoslavia. For the Swabian peasantry, such imagery must 















One cornerstone of the Kulturbund’s program to form an imagined 
community of German speakers in Yugoslavia was its effort to create a local, German 
intelligentsia of the sort that had been impossible under the conditions of prewar 
Hungary. To this end, the Kulturbund worked to increase Swabian appreciation of the 
uncorrupted German language as well as access to the printed German word. 
Kulturbund General Secretary Grassl proudly announced in the Kulturbund’s 1923 
almanac that the organization had already set up 42 German libraries containing 
approximately 7000 volumes and had distributed over 12,000 copies of national 
literature, particularly targeting youth.431  
Increased access to German literature was accompanied by the regular 
celebration of German literary luminaries in the press and daily life. Adam Mueller-
Guttenbrunn, the Swabian author from Banat, was the object of particular attention 
throughout the interwar period. His birthday was celebrated and he was mourned on 
the date of his death. The Kulturbund even made an honorary member of the author 
of the Swabian colonization saga, Der Grosse Schwabenzug, and promoted his work 
heavily. Later, when a version of that book was produced especially for children, 
Deutsches Volksblatt urged Swabian parents to purchase a copy for their family, 
observing that Mueller-Guttenbrunn had been called “the Homer of the 
Suedostschwaben” on the occasion of his 70th birthday, and that his work contained 
valuable lessons for German youth.432  
Promoting German education formed another key element in the Kulturbund’s 
strategy of nation-building. The promotion of education also meant encouraging 
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current teachers to embrace the German national consciousness and training future 
educators to do the same. Most Swabian teachers had of course been trained in 
prewar Hungary, where they had developed an affinity for Magyar culture which was 
frequently reflected in their methodology. In the pages of Deutsches Volksblatt, the 
activists complained that most Swabian teachers in Yugoslavia viewed the cultural 
and educational efforts of the Kulturbund uncomprehendingly or even hostilely owing 
to their own training in Magyar teacher training institutes.433 “German teachers,” the 
newspaper pleaded in 1920, “raise our children to be Germans!” and “awake from 
your slumber!”434 Indeed, it was a perennial concern of the Swabian activists that the 
country lacked sufficient German teachers. Another Swabian worry was that the 
“German” instructors appointed by the state to teach in German schools and classes 
later in the decade often were actually Serbs and Croats whose desire and ability to 
use the German language was frequently limited. Likewise, the Swabian activists 
were anxious to see a German Priesterseminar founded, so as to secure Catholic 
priests who were both German speaking and nationally German-oriented.435 
Even during the initial, relatively liberal postwar years, German educators 
faced the problem of the Swabian students’ frequently poor command of written 
German. Most such students had hitherto studied in Magyar or Croatian schools, of 
course. In fact, Georg Grassl observed in 1921 that the majority of the Swabians 
struggled to even to write a letter in proper German.436 To remedy this, the 
Kulturbund hoped to run remedial winter courses and continuing education courses 
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through its various local chapters, but the organization was forbidden to do so by 
Yugoslav authorities. Similarly, the government forbade the Kulturbund to open 
private kindergartens, as envisioned in the organization’s statutes.437 As previously 
noted, the Kulturbund quickly produced a comprehensive German education program 
and submitted it to the Yugoslav Ministry of Education with the ultimate goal of 
achieving German autonomy in education.438 The government took little notice of 
this, however, leaving Germans forever anxious about the precarious state of German 
education in the country. After a brief renaissance in 1919-1920, German schools had 
been nationalized, stripped of their administrative autonomy, and made “parallel 
departments” of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian state schools. Even then, German 
education remained subject to the arbitrary decisions of local authorities until proper 
educational guidelines were established by the state years later.  
Finally, after many years of pleading with the government to fund proper 
German education, the Swabian activists turned to other solutions in the spirit of self-
help. In 1929, the Kulturbund was a principle cofounder of the School Foundation of 
the Germans of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Schulstiftung der Deutschen des 
Koenigreiches Jugoslawien),439 whose goal was the advancement of German 
education in the country and which had the right to run private German schools and 
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other educational institutes in the kingdom.440 Additionally, the Swabians directed 
considerable energy and resources toward the establishment of a private German 
teacher training institute. This Private Deutsche Lehrbildungsanstalt was finally 
approved by authorities in 1930 and opened in October 1931 in Zrenjanin.441 
 
Tearing Down History, Constructing Identity 
As previously noted, the German population largely consisted of peasants 
living in isolated settlements, some of which were quite small. Though national 
consciousness was wanting, Swabians’ lives were characterized by what Rogers 
Brubaker has called “everyday ethnicity,” German patterns which shaped, dress, 
language, ritual, dance, marriage patterns, and even architecture. Moreover, the 
disparate Swabian settlements shared collective memories of their ancestors’ 
colonization experience. Thus, though they faced a challenge in creating and 
imparting national identity to their co-ethnics, the Swabian activists had considerable 
linguistic, cultural and historic reserves upon which to draw. 
Ultimately, history and language lay at the root of the identity forged by the 
Swabian activists. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the history they promoted was only 
selectively and often negatively the story of the seemingly eternal Habsburg 
Monarchy. The experience of Hungarian oppression was a regular theme in this 
version of history and there was little room in the narrative for the glory of the 
supranational House of Habsburg. The reconquest and cultivation of the lands of 
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southern Hungary, on the other hand, were sources of deep Swabian pride. The 
Swabian activists celebrated their colonist ancestors, German folk traditions, songs, 
national costume, dance and above all language and literature. As such, they sought to 
cultivate a local identity as well as an awareness of belonging to the great German 
Volk and its Kulturgemeinschaft. All Swabians, they stressed, shared common 
experiences and historical memories irrespective of their region or origins and had 
similar priorities in education, politics, and culture (language). Moreover, all 
Swabians similarly felt the heavy hand of South Slavs’ suspicion, hostility or 
indifference in the Yugoslav Kingdom. Finally, the Swabian activists (including 
Georg Grassl and Johann Keks, the two principle Kulturbund leaders) also 
emphasized the fundamentally Christian nature of Germandom.442 In this, however, 
they carefully avoided the confessional divide between Protestant and Catholic, 
insisting instead that nationhood should unite the community. 
 For a group that ordinarily so tailored its message to suit its audience, the 
Swabian activists displayed little nostalgia for the old order. In a sense, this was 
surprising, since there had been a general preference among much of the Swabian 
population to remain part of Hungary.443 Hungary had seemed eternal and enduring, a 
sentiment which had long been encouraged by the Magyars themselves. The original 
Swabian colonists had embraced Hungary as their home and most of their 
descendants regarded Hungray as their fatherland.  To be sure, many Germans did 
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remain largely ungarnfreundlich, or open to Hungary,444 but the German activists’ 
public stance toward Hungary and the Habsburgs was hostile. They chose to 
remember the Hungarian past in grim terms, publicly opposing Habsburg restoration, 
and urging Germany’s swift annexation of truncated Austria, which they dismissed as 
unviable.445 
 The Swabian activists recalled the Hungarian past in their speeches and 
writing as a time of oppression and denationalization. Absent in their rhetoric was any 
nostalgia for Habsburg or Hungarian glory. On the contrary, the Swabian activists 
focused on the Magyarization measures of that state, which had been so burdensome 
as to make a German national movement there nearly impossible. “The admittedly 
rather few volkstreu men in the Magyar times had inifinitely much to endure and 
suffer,” Deutsches Volksblatt lamented in 1920.  “They were tormented and 
brutalized, locked up or expelled for the sole reason that they openly asserted 
themselves as Germans as their natural self-awareness commanded, and dared to 
warn their coethnics about Magyarization.”446 Far from something to be missed, 
Hungary was recalled by the Swabian activists as a place of persecution. As for 
Hungarian glory, the Swabian activists made their position toward  the Kingdom of 
Saint Stephen clear on the occasion of its 925th anniversary, when their flagship 
newspaper printed an article questioning the actual age of Stephen’s crown and asked 
provocatively, “Is Hungarian national sainthood a sham?”447 
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 Deutsches Volksblatt recalled Austria-Hungary very poorly indeed. Austria-
Hungary was the “last leftover” of the state model of the middle ages, held together 
only through its “dynsasty and the power of the bayonette.”448 It was an archaic and 
outmoded state form, they sneered. Similarly, the activists expressed no love in their 
mouthpiece for the House of Habsburg, whose cosmopolitanism had been offensive 
to many nationalists. The activists clearly opposed a Habsburg restoration and 
described Karl von Habsburg’s efforts to this end in Hungary as a “comedy” 
provocative to all the successor states.449 Upon Karl’s death, the newspaper wrote, 
It was disastrous folly to believe that the Habsburg Monarchy could 
ever be resurrected, since that state, composed as it was out of so many 
different national elements, no longer suited our age. Austria-Hungary 
remained alive until its collapse through external methods of force but 
internally it was sick, even deathly ill, and had to dissolve into its 
national components sooner or later. The revolution of 1918 merely 
brought an end to the existence of a dying man. The Monarchy had 
fulfilled its historical and cultural mission and had to make room for 
new state forms, which rose from its collapsing body. 450 
 
The Swabian activists thus rejected the Habsburgs’ multinational dynastic 
state as an anachronism, which had become outmoded in the national age. So deep 
was Deutsches Volksblatt’s conviction that the old order had become unsuitably 
archaic that the newspaper even found positive implications in the 1914 assassination 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. On the tenth anniversary in 1924, Ferdinand’s death 
was recalled as leading to the longed for ideal of the “nation-state, in which every 
nation has the right to develop its national, cultural and economic life, as best 
correspond its customs and needs.”451 The fall of Austria-Hungary had been 
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inevitable and was not to be regretted for it had liberated even the Swabians to pursue 
their own national development. The Swabians also noted, however, that the 
prohibition of Austrian unification with Germany was an outrage and flagrant 
violation of self-determination, which urgently needed to be corrected.452  
 Despite the above, the Swabian activists’ attitude toward the past was hardly 
negative. On the contrary, they viewed the past as hugely important and filled the 
interwar years with numerous anniversaries and public commemorations. Ultimately, 
as we have argued, the Swabian activists were trying to create an identity that was 
both local and national. As discussed, two concepts lay at the center of the identity 
and national/group consciousness the Swabian activists sought to create: the sacrifices 
of the colonist ancestors and the virtues of the German peasantry. Deutsches 
Volksblatt acknowledged the central role of the German farming peasantry in its first 
anniversary issue:  
[The strengths of our nationhood] lie primarily in our peasantry, and 
the peasantry must therefore become filled with the warming and 
invigorating glow of the German idea, if the national and also the 
economic and social rebirth of our local Germandom is to be achieved. 
Self-aware Germandom can be born unto us only from below, for in 
the peasantry slumber not only our unbroken physical and economic 
strengths but also our best moral ones, upon which ultimately all future 
questions depend.453  
 
The peasantry constituted not only the majority of the Swabian population in the 
interwar period, but it also formed the lion’s share of the Germans who had floated 
down the Danube in previous centuries as colonists. In this romantic view, they were 
honest and hardworking, diligent and pure. They were men and women of the earth, 
virtuous and uncorrupted. They were the essence of Germandom. 
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 The Swabians understood themselves as pioneers and colonists. As such, their 
defining group myths were steeped in the memories of men and women who had 
come to a distant and empty land which they tamed and made fruitful. To American 
ears, such myths are highly reminiscent of tales of “how the West was won.” Just as 
American lore is rife with stories and images of iconic pioneers, so did the Swabians 
revere their colonist ancestors, whom they thanked for literally building their thriving 
Heimat from the depopulated and uncultivated lands abandoned by the Ottomans. 
Where Americans recall U.S. westward expansion with mental images of wagon 
trains, Swabians’ recollection of their eastward colonization inspired similar images 
of boats on the Danube and carts on dusty Pannonian roads. The Swabians understood 
their history to begin with the conquering Habsburg armies under Prince Eugen of 
Savoy, who assumed a central position in their self-image and mythology.  
In one of its many historical pieces, Deutsches Volksblatt reminded readers 
that it was Austria which originally liberated what would become northern 
Yugoslavia. Even Belgrade had been “an Austrian province” from 1717 until 1739, 
when it was ceded back to the Ottomans.454 Such memories of conquest were 
important for the Swabian activists and formed one of their primary argments against 
the sentiment among Slavs that the Germans had come to Vojvodina empty-handed 
and had stolen their land. Swabians countered that, far from being beggars or 
exploiters, the Germans had come as liberators who had vanquished the Turks, and 
liberated Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina, and even Belgrade. This history of conquest 
and liberation, then, formed a major piece of their argument that their presence in the 
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region was justified. The Swabians argued that Slavs, far from being resentful, should 
gratefully recall that it was Germans who had liberated them from the Turkish yoke in 
the first place. Another aspect of the Swabians’ argument for the legitimacy of their 
presence concerned culture. The Swabian activists noted that the Germans did not 
come merely as liberators but also as bearers of culture. Culture, thus, was another 
area in which the German had directly benefited the Slavs, whose own primitive 
cultural level, they claimed, had been very much elevated by the German presence.455 
Likewise, the German movment regarded those “lost” Swabians who had Magyarized 
or Croatized as having raised the cultural level of those nations through their innate 
talents and contributions in politics, science, economics and the arts. 
 Finally, the Swabians argued that their ancestors’ labor to render the Danube 
region suitable for farming legitimized their presence. The Swabian colonist 
experience was recalled as one of toil and struggle. Though they had been promised 
assistance and prosperity in the original imperial appeals for colonists, the pioneers 
discovered life in the new Heimat to be difficult indeed and many returned to their 
homelands. Many others died from starvation and disease and the rest faced a daily 
struggle to survive. The Swabians felled forests, drained swamps, and built homes 
and villages. They introduced new crops, agricultural techniques, and even 
architecture to their adopted regions, transforming the landscape.456 Thus, the 
Germans asserted that they were not aliens or foreigners, as proved by their two 
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centuries of hard work in the region.457 In a 1921 paean to King Alexander, Deutsches 
Volksblatt succinctly summarized the important place of history both in the 
Swabians’ understanding of themselves and their place in their Danubian Heimat.  
We Swabians are a people of colonists and settled among neighbors of 
other tongues and of different bloods. Nevertheless, we feel ourselves 
not as foreigners in this land . . . since the ground upon which we 
stand, the landscape through which we pull our ploughs, was wrung 
from swamps and bogs by our forefathers. And this little spot of land . 
. . is everything to us, it is our German fatherland. . . . We seek to 
remain loyal to this tiny piece of earth, upon which the sweat clings to 
our brow, so long as we breathe, and likewise to the ruler, who holds 
his hand protectively over our Heimat. 458 
 
In addition to promoting the regional German histories discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the Swabians produced many local histories detailing the German 
founding or settlement of many regions and towns to further support the legitimacy of 
their tenure in the country. The activists also promoted artwork, such as that of 
Hatzfeld painter Stefan Jaeger. Reproductions of Jaeger’s “Immigration of the 
Germans into Banat” (Einwanderung der Deutschen ins Banat) could even be 
purchased through the German bookstore in Novi Sad, according to an advertisement 
which called the work “the indispensable, favorite painting of German families in our 
region.”459  
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Die Einwanderung der Schwaben in das Banat [The Immigration of the Swabians into Banat] by 
Stephan Jaeger, 1906-1910.460 
 
Jaeger’s painting depicts the culmination of the arduous trek by weary but determined 
colonist families, who arrive with their few possessions in the new Heimat and find 
preceeding colonists already working to contruct a new village in an empty 
landscape. It was artwork with a very clear historical message that spoke even to the 
illiterate: our German colonist ancestors built a prosperious region from nothing. 
In summary, though long dead, the colonist ancestors were not to be 
consigned to the past in the Swabian activists’ project of national “revival.” On the 
contrary, the Swabian activists looked to the ancestors and their supposedly German 
virtues of piety, industry and determination to guide their descendents in the 
Yugoslav state. In their colonization history, they provided a myth of common origins 
which is so essential to forging a common national identity (in this case as Swabians). 
As Jaeger’s prewar painting shows, the Swabian activists did not invent the colonist 
ancestry or Swabian pride in their ancestors. However, they did successfully deploy 
that history and pride in new and innovative ways that sought to craft a common 
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group consciousness upon the population as Swabians and Germans. It was the 
success of their enterprise that was perhaps most notable. 
 
Kulturgemeinschaft and Ties to the German Motherland 
Swabians’ history of colonization served well to build group cohesion and a 
local identity, but two centuries in Hungary had made establishing connections to the 
distant German heartland more complicated. Separated as they were from not only 
Germany but even Austria proper, the national identity that the Swabian activists 
were promoting had to be linguistic and cultural. In this, the Swabian identity project 
was perhaps not unlike others across Europe, where national movements had seized 
upon language as a common denominator of identity.  (No German national identity 
was possible on the basis of German statehood, of course.) As such, the Swabian 
activists endeavored to educate the Swabians about the German Kulturgemeinschaft 
and convince them of their place in it. They did this by educating the Swabians about 
the greatness of German literature and music and by celebrating German folk songs, 
which were given prominent place at official commemorations, folk costume balls, 
and the annual congresses of the Kulturbund. The centrality of the German language 
was constantly stressed, as was the high level of German culture to which it served as 
a bridge. The Swabian activists produced informational articles and held lectures on 
the various luminaries of German culture. Additionally, they produced information 
about Germany, which they refered to as their Mutterland, in distinction to the 
Yugoslav Vaterland.  Finally, the Swabians devoted considerable attention to the 




It may seem interesting or surprising at first that Germany, not Austria 
emerged as the country to which Swabians looked as their national homeland. After 
all, no living Swabian could personally recall life in Germany while all had 
recollections of living under the Habsburgs who were, after all, ethnic Germans. As 
such, ethnically German Austria might seem like a more suitable candidate to be the 
Swabians’ national homeland. Austria had the additional virtue of bordering the 
Yugoslav Kingdom. Yet  Austria was poorly suited for this task for several reasons. 
First, many in Austria itself basically looked to Germany as the German homeland.461 
Austrian German deputies had voted for unification with Germany in 1918, but this 
Anschluss was forbidden by the victorious western powers. Moreover, before the First 
World War, most Swabians had had little to do with Austria, which was then broken, 
weak, and divided during the interwar era. By contrast, Germany retained a certain 
wealth and dynamism as well as  the potential to return to Great Power status. Austria 
most plainly could not. Germany was, moreover, a nation-state in an age defined by 
nationalism.  
Germany’s organizations involved in Volkstumarbeit also formed part of the 
bonds that made the country so suitable and accessible as a national homeland for the 
Swabians. After the war, these Volkstumarbeit organizations expanded and 
multiplied, being especially concerned with those Reichdeutsche who found 
themselves living in Poland after Versailles. If as a cultural phenomenon Weimar 
homeland nationalism meant the articulation of identification with and concern for 
transborder Germans, as Rogers Brubaker asserts, then as an organizational 
phenomenon it meant the development of a network of individuals and formally 
                                                 




private but often state-controlled or state-influenced Volkstumarbeit organzations 
working in Germany and across its borders. As a social-relational phenomenon, it 
meant the organized cultivation of a dense network of cross border relations and the 
organized provision of a steady cross-border flow of resources.” Moreover, “these 
relations and resource flows [were] funded for the most part, by a few state agencies 
but organized in a decentralized fashion through the network of organizations and 
associations” such as the Deutsche Ausland-Institut and the Verein fuer das 
Deutschtum im Ausland. They “not only linked Auslandsdeutsche to Weimar 
Germany but, perhaps more importantly, contributed to detaching them from the 
states in which they lived,” Brubaker observes. In the case of the Yugoslav Kingdom, 
this meant that social networks and relations were restructured in a new way toward 
Germany and not the Habsburg lands for the first time.462 
One way of linking the Swabians to Germany was through the emphasis of a 
common language and culture. German language education having been so limited in 
Habsburg Hungary for so many years, the Swabians in Hungary’s successor states 
were frequently not proficient in high German. The effort to restore the place and 
quality of the German language among Swabians would be conducted on many 
fronts. Chief among these would be schooling, as we have noted. However, German 
had also suffered locally in terms of status. The Swabian activists, therefore, had to 
restore pride in their local dialect as well as highlight its connection with the German 
Kulturgemeinschaft. It was necessary to treasure local Swabian dialects as a 
                                                 




nationales Gut to be passed on to the next generation while simultaneously 
recognizing the importance of written German as a unifying agent for the Volk.463  
 As noted above, the Swabian activists constantly celebrated the work and 
memory of the Swabian nationalist Banat author Adam Mueller-Guttenbrunn in 
articles and commemorations too numerous to list here. As time went on, they 
promoted the work of other Swabian writers, even excerpting or serializing their 
stories and novels. They additionally strove to inform their coethnics about German 
cultural luminaries such as Albrecht Duerer, Friedrich Schiller, Franz Schubert, and 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, whose work and lives were extolled in the press.464 
They considered the return of German-language theater an urgent matter and heavily 
promoted performances by traveling theater companies from Austria and Germany. 
They promoted knowledge of modern Germany, and produced materials replete with 
statistics on the country’s geography, demographics and politics. Similarly, Germanic 
history and customs were frequently discussed and linked with the modern era.  
 Perhaps no area of German culture received greater attention from the 
Swabian activists than German song. German music was recognized as having an 
important community-building function on a number of levels. We have seen already 
how Ruma, cradle of the German movement in Croatia-Slavonia, had a German 
choral society even before the First World War. As noted, such choral societies were 
places for Swabians to meet as Germans and discuss the issues of the day in an 
ethnic-cum-national framework. However, there was a certain mystical significance 
attached to German music.  Swabian music might serve as a common touchstone or 
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an anthem, such as the Song of the Swabians (Schwabenlied) or the Song of Prinz 
Eugen (Prinz Eugen-Lied), the latter of which told the tale of Prince Eugen’s forces in 
battle against the Turks. These pieces and other favorites assumed particular symbolic 
importance in the interwar period and were sung before Swabian meetings and public 
events.  But German song also long had an important place in the churches of 
southern Hungary, whose Swabians were not always nationally conscious but were 
usually religious.  
It is useful here to recall Anthony Smith’s observation about the importance of 
organized religion in the maintenance of ethnic identity. Smith argues that organized 
religion can play both a spiritual and social role. “The liturgy and rites of the Church 
or community of the faithful supply the texts, prayers, chants, feasts, ceremonies and 
customs, sometimes even the scripts, of distinctive ethnic communities, setting them 
apart from their neighbors.” 465 Many of these prayers, chants and especially hymns 
would have been in German and particularly beloved. The activists asserted that 
German song formed a living bridge between contemporary Swabians and their 
colonist ancestors and thus represented a valuable cultural bequest. German song 
additionally was understood to form a connection between the German nation and 
God in the churches, where German songs were often sung (though not often enough 
for the Swabian activists). “German songs awaken in us German thinking, German 
industriousness, German love and German loyalty, German joy and German pain – in 
a word, German spirit,” Deutsches Volksblatt intoned, additionally pleading that 
Swabians, “Save German song!”466 German songs also formed a living bridge to 
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Germany itself. To ensure that German song was indeed preserved and promoted, 
Johann Keks even announced in 1928 that the Kulturbund was in the process of 
producing a Volksliederbuch or songbook.467 Additionally, the German activists 
encouraged the formation of German choral groups across the land and held singing 
competitions at their events and gatherings. Such German choral groups occupied a 
prominent and honored place in the various settlement anniversary celebrations and 
particularly at the annual congresses of the Kulturbund.   
 
Public Celebrations 
The Swabian activists’ fascination with language, history, Kultur, and the 
colonist ancestors all came together in the many public celebrations and gatherings 
they held during the interwar period. Of these, the most common but hardly least 
remarkable were surely the many Swabian folk costume balls. The annual congresses 
of the Kulturbund were also grand occasions designed as much for nation- and 
identity-building as for handling Kulturbund administrative tasks. Similarly, the many 
settlement anniversary festivals held during the interwar period were occasions for 
celebration, venues of historical commemoration, and stages for national education. 
For such events, the activists produced folkloric programs rich with national 
symbolism and which were designed to shape the future by commemorating the past. 
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Trachtenfeste, National Festivals in Swabian Folk Costume 
We begin with Trachtenfeste or Trachtenbaelle. Tracht is simply “national 
costume” or “folk costume” of the sort that was venerated by many national 
movements across Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Swabians’ 
folk costume was colorful and varied, being peculiar to individual German 
settlements in Yugoslavia and frequently reflecting the communities from which the 
Swabian colonists had originated in the German “Urheimat.” As we shall see, a 
standardized version of the Swabians’ Tracht would later emerge as a kind of 
Kulturbund “uniform” at the initiative of the Nazi-oriented Erneuerungsbewegung 
during the 1930s. In the 1920s, however, Tracht merely symbolized a celebration of 
Swabian heritage and German culture. It was a visible, celebrational bond with the 
colonist ancestors. At Trachtenbaelle, German songs were sung, folk dances were 
danced, and competitions were held for the most elaborate folk costumes.   
The Trachtenbaelle were also political affairs, drawing attendees which 
included PdD parliamentiarians, Kulturbund leaders, and even delegations from 
Germany itself. They not infrequently included speeches venerating the colonist 
ancestors and extolling the German Volk. They also provoked the ire of the German 
movement’s opponents. The events sought to integrate the past and the present as 
well as the urban Swabians and their rural coethnics on the basis of their common 
colonist ancestry. Additionally, Trachtenbaelle had the function of binding urban and 
rural Germans on the basis of the tradtional peasant garb, which in the nationalist 
concept was elevated to a common, national good.468 Finally, they were explicitly 
                                                 




national affairs, being organized on the basis of a common ethnic identity and 
national consciousness that superceded confessional differences.  
 Usually held during the winter months, Trachtenbaelle were a welcome break 
from the monotony of village life during the year’s darkest coldest months. Typically, 
they lasted only one night but they might draw attendees from neighboring villages or 
even across the region or country. By contrast, the Kulturbund annual congresses 
were much larger celebrations and were usually held during the summer months so as 
to coincide with a historical anniversary of some sort. There, Kulturbund business 
was attended to and integrated into a festive, Swabian national commemoration. Two 
such dual-festivals in Bela Crkva and Indjija merit closer attention for the manner in 
which they mobilized the Swabian past in the service of the national consciousness 
for which the German activists strove. 
 
The 1923 Kulturbund Annual Congress in Bela Crkva 
In late August 1923, the Kulturbund held its annual congress in the Banat 
town of Bela Crkva, timed so as to coincide with the 200th anniversary of German 
settlement in the Danube region of then-southern Hungary. The timing demonstrated 
the Kulturbund’s custom of seeking to link its annual congresses with local events of 
cultural or historical significance, which were then represented as celebrations of 
universal importance for all Swabians and highlighted the idea of the Kulturbund as 
being synonymous with Germandom in the country. More than mere revelry, the 
celebration would be defined by nation-building choreography that was plainly 




traditions of the past. It would also have the effect of cementing the recently 
established Kulturbund in two centuries of Swabian settlement. 
 In the weeks before the Bela Crkva dual-festival, Kulturbund General 
Secretary Georg Grassl published a series of articles promoting the event and urging 
Swabians to find self-confidence and national identity in their rich history. The 
festival marked the 200th anniversary of the immigration of Swabians to Banat and 
the impetus behind it came from the “self-aware, indigenous, Germandom” of Bela 
Crkva itself, he insisted. “We Danube Swabians have our own history as well,” he 
observed, “the impressive history of a people struggling in hard work for its daily-
bread.” The Swabians were a loyal people but there had historically been little 
appreciation of that loyalty, he noted in frustration. Indeed, the nations around the 
Swabians had long sought to assimilate them, a task made easier by the Swabians’ 
ignorance of their own history. But history would come alive at the bicentennial 
celebration, Grassl promised. The colonist ancestors would speak and urge their 
descendents to remain true to their German spirit.469 
 Much of the first day of the Bela Crkva dual-festival was devoted to 
Kulturbund business. Highlights included the presentation of the general secretary’s 
and treasurer’s annual reports as well as new elections for the Kulturbund’s board.  
An exhibition of Banat viticulture also opened that day, followed by a presentation by 
the Bela Crkva volunteer fire department. The evening was then given over to culture, 
including performances by German choral groups, dancing, and even an operetta at 
the town’s Theatersaale. The second day of the dual-festival opened with services by 
both the Catholic and Evangelical Protestant churches. Simultaneously, the Catholic 
                                                 




Church also held its own commemoration to mark the 200th anniversary of the 
founding of the town’s Catholic parish. The rest of the day was dominated by an 
impressive parade to commemorate the 200th anniversary of German immigration to 
Banat,470 a singing competition by choral societies from across Banat, and 
presentations by various gymnastics groups from Srijem. The day’s activities again 
culminated in music and theater. Finally, on August 27, the third day of festivities, the 
Kulturbund held its important meetings and the exhibitions closed. As usual, the 
Kulturbund leaders emphasized that this was a transparent event open to members, 
German non-members, and all other friends of the Kulturbund.471  
Much of the Bela Crkva dual-festival was devoted to German song, whose 
nation-forming power Grassl pronounced “one of the firmest guarantees of our 
national life,”472 However, the organizers’ nation-building agenda was perhaps best 
displayed in the festival’s impressive parade. Steeped in symbolism, the parade itself 
consisted of three parts, the first being historical and featuring the colorful folk 
costumes of the colonist ancestors; the second consisting of German delegations from 
across Banat; and the third showcasing contemporary Swabian life in and around Bela 
Crkva.473 Its route included a three minute pause in front of the town’s Catholic 
Church to honor the Swabians’ colonist ancestors.  
The parade’s historical section was headed by horsemen in Swabian folk 
costume and accompanied by a local choral group and another group wearing 
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Volkstracht typical of Germany’s Black Forest. Close behind followed several 
“floats” made to resemble the wagons upon which the original colonists had made the 
arduous trek into Banat. These featured examples of old-fashioned household effects 
and the primitive agricultural tools that the settlers had brought with them from the 
German Urheimat. Finally, one of the parade’s concluding floats featured the town’s 
coat of arms and the years of its settlement, 1723-1923.474  
Lest anyone miss the deep cultural connection the event hoped to forge 
between the original colonists and their descendants, Deutsches Volksblatt very 
clearly drew the linkage for readers: 
Two hundred years lie between then and now, seven generations. 
These are indeed not so many generations, but goodness! What an 
enormous difference separates the way of life and cultural 
circumstances of the past from the present! There poverty, simplicity, 
and clinging to the past; here wealth, luxury and striving for the future. 
But these poles are bound together though a natural, progressive, 
industrious, progressive development; they are bound together through 
the same Volk which itself managed this upswing based on its own 
strength; they are bound together through German nature and being, 
which despite all external changes, have not transformed their essence. 
475 
 
 Besides simple commemoration and identity-building, the dual-festival at 
Bela Crkva also had the clear intention of refuting Slavs’ accusations that the 
Swabians were somehow exploiters or “foreigners”. (This was, as we have seen, a 
source of perennial Swabian anxiety and resentment.) Far from being aliens in the 
Danubian landscape, the Swabians again emphasized how their ancestors had actually 
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made its soil productive with their own blood and sweat.476 In the words of one 
observer, 
It has been two hundred years since our ancesters came here and from 
a desert forged a breadbasket, a paradise; it has been two hundred 
years since the ground cleared and cultivated by the fathers was given 
over to the sons, who in tenacious work continued what their ancestors 
had begun; for two hundred years we Swabians have invested our 
blood and treasure into this land where we found a second home; and 
we are still supposed to be “foreigners?” No, never, and nevermore!477 
 
The message was clear: nobody had earned the right to be in the Danube region more 
than the Germans, who had made it fruitful through their own hard work. The task of 




The 1927 Kulturbund Annual Congress in Indjija 
In 1927, the Kulturbund held its annual congress in Indjija in Srijem. In the 
meantime, the Swabians’ nation-building project had been dealt a heavy blow by the 
ban on the Kulturbund in 1924. The Kulturbund was nominally relegalized later that 
year, of course, but the organization proved unable to renew its activities in earnest 
until 1926 and even then faced lingering obstruction from local authorities. Thus, 
more than three years would pass between the Bela Crkva and Indjija meetings. These 
intervening years were difficult ones for the organization, as the reader will recall 
from Chapter Three.479 In 1927, however, activist Johann Keks formally assumed the 
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helm of the Kulturbund, a change which truly launched a new era for the 
organization. Having secured renewed government sanction for the Kulturbund’s 
activity, Keks would henceforth drive the organization to surpass its former 
achievements, backed as usual by Deutsches Volksblatt. In one of the more colorful 
metaphors of the interwar era, the newspaper rejoiced at the relaunch of the 
Kulturbund, which would finally be awoken from its long and forced “sleeping 
beauty sleep” or Dornroeschenschlummer.480 
The Kulturbund’s 1927 annual congress was again timed to coincide with a 
historical anniversary, in this case the 100th anniversary of German settlement in the 
town of Indjija in Srijem. This multi-ethnic community was actually considerably 
older than 100 years, but like many German settlements in Srijem, its German 
population had been later immigrants, who had altered the town’s physical, economic 
and demographic structure by their presence. Now with a vastly German majority, 
Indjija nevertheless contained a considerable number of Serbs.481 The event was 
meant to simultaneously pay homage to the ancestral settlers of one of the younger 
parts of the settlement area as well as confirm the Kulturbund’s relaunch. The 
deliberate choice of Indjija in Srijem was also meant to draw Swabian attention from 
Batscka and Banat and acquaint Swabians there with this less familiar region. In Bela 
Crkva in 1923, Stefan Kraft had declared that that event was a celebration of all 
Germandom in Yugoslavia and that virtually nothing separated the Swabians in its 
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disparate regions.482  Likewise, the Indjija meeting was meant to show that, “no 
matter how far from one another we may live, we are all sons of the same German 
brothers and must leave to our heirs the German heritage and language which we 
inherited from them.”483 The message was universal and clear: Indjija’s history was 
Swabian history, and Swabian history was German history. 
As in Bela Crkva, the Indjija dual-festival included both areas of historical-
cultural concern as well as purely Kulturbund matters. The first day was given to the 
reception for guests, including the representative of Croatian Catholic Bishop 
Aksamović, Msg. Andreas Spiletka. This was followed by the opening of an 
exhibition of the work of Swabian painter Oskar Sommerfeld and an exhibition of 
crafts by students from Indjija’s elementary and vocational schools. A torchlight 
parade in the early evening was followed by a welcome reception for guests and 
participants.   
Whitsun (Pfingstsonntag), the festival’s second day, was a celebration of 
German settlement. PdD leader Stefan Kraft (himself from Indjija) gave the 
centennial celebration’s keynote speech, which was followed by a high mass, 
consecration of the flag, a sermon by Msg. Spiletka, and several other speeches 
before the midday banquet. Musical performances dominated the afternoon and 
evening.  
The actual annual congress of the Kulturbund was held the next day and 
featured a report on the Kulturbund’s activities by its new leader Johann Keks. 
Deutsches Volksblatt estimated the number of participants, who came from all 
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German parts of Yugoslavia, at over 6000.484 Guests of honor included many of the 
leaders of the PdD and numerous South Slav politicians and authorities. Indicative of 
the growing connections between the Swabians and Germany proper, the German and 
Austrian ambassadors sent representatives, as did two Berlin newspapers.  Even 
representatives from the Deutsche Buchhandlung in Novi Sad came to promote a 
selection of German books and magazines at this celebration of German life in 
Yugoslavia and its links to Germandom abroad. 
 The Indjija dual-festival had three principle tasks: to further establish the link 
between the past and the present; to announce the relaunch of the Kulturbund under 
Keks and to talk up the German community as an evolving Volksgemeinschaft. 
Speaking at the event, Stefan Kraft observed the relationship not only between the 
modern Swabians and their colonist ancestors but also of the Yugoslav Germans and 
the Urheimat their forefathers had left two centuries before.  
Let us also think in the deepest piety and gratitude of the the old 
German Heimat of the German motherland from which derive our 
origins and plea for God’s protection and blessing upon it. What is 
good and noble, what enables us to be useful members of every state 
community and to contribute to order, growth and progress in every 
country, has its roots in the German mother earth, with which we feel 
bound both in unbreakable adhesion to the German community of 
language and culture and in faithful care of German customs and 
traditions.485 
 
Johann Keks, the new Kulturbund general secretary and longtime Swabian 
activist, gave two speeches at the dual-festival and presented the Kulturbund’s annual 
report. Keks decried the continuing opposition to the German national movement in 
some Swabian quarters and appealed to the “deaf, dumb, and blind” to end their 
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resistance or indifference. The blind must see, he proclaimed, they must recognize 
that the world had moved forward in the interwar era, and that the general Swabian 
body had as well. Likewise, the deaf must hear the call of the Swabians’ moderate 
and tolerant nationhood, rich as it was in its history and culture. Swabians must hear 
the call of the Kulturbund and ignore the appeal of socialism, whose internationalism 
clearly troubled the Swabian leadership. Finally, Keks called on the “dumb” to end 
their silence and spread the good news of Swabian national identity in cooperation 
with the Kulturbund. “Eyes, open! Ears open! Mouths open!,” he cried. “On your 
feet! Friends, to work!”486   
 
The Evolution and Role of the German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia 
Also attending the 1927 dual festival at Indjija was the President of the 
Germans’ Evangelical Church, Dr. Philip Popp, who conducted a Protestant service 
there, having come for the occasion from his home in Zagreb.  Formally known as the 
Deutsche evangelische-christliche Kirche Augsburgischen Bekenntisses im 
Koenigreiche Jugoslawien (after 1930), the (Lutheran) German Evangelical Church 
was not an intital focal point for our familiar Swabian activists but nevertheless came 
to play a major part in the Swabians’ emerging national identiy under the leadership 
of Popp.487 As we have seen, the German population in Yugoslavia was already 
divided by confession in 1918. The country’s Protestant component would further 
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subdivide during the interwar years as its Evangelicals organized separate churches 
along national and denominational lines. More than 75 percent of the German 
population in Yugoslavia was Catholic, of course, but the number of Protestants in 
the country was not inconsiderable. In fact, the influence of the Protestants in the 
story of the Swabians’ embrace of nationhood was disproportionate to their numbers, 
since the German Protestants typically had stronger ties to Germany itself and were 
thus more disposed to a nationally-oriented worldview.  
In many respects, German Protestants in Yugoslavia confronted even more 
profound challenges than their Catholic neighbors in the wake of the Habsburg 
defeat. True, the Catholics faced the demotion of their Church’s position in the new 
Yugoslav state, with its Orthodox monarch and majority. Additionally, the Church’s 
dioceses were divided by the borders of the Habsburg successor states, resulting in 
necessary administrative changes. Yet the Papal center of the Catholic faith remained 
undisturbed and its institutions endured, as seemingly eternal and universal as they 
ever had been. The Protestants’ situation, by contrast, was more complicated. Where 
the Catholics merely had to adjust the local administration of their single, existing 
Church, and could furthermore count on the support of the Vatican, Yugoslavia’s 
Protestants had to forge a new church (or churches, as it turned out) from the 
scattered Protestant inheritance that fell to Yugoslavia after Trianon and St. Germain. 
Thus, Yugoslavia’s German, Slovak, Magyar, and Wend Protestants literally had to 
construct a new church life from the remnants of several others, and the construction 




acquiesence of the Yugoslav authorities, who were sometimes well-disposed toward 
the Protestants but could also be inattentive to their priorities.  
The Protestant churches in prewar Hungary had been multiethnic, not 
formally the property of a certain national group. As such, nationally conscious or 
not, the German Protestants were naturally unsettled by the Hungarian collapse as 
well. The future of Protestantism in Yugoslavia was very uncertain after the First 
World War. That a Lutheran church would emerge which was almost wholly German 
and oriented toward Germany was anything but clear for some years after 1918. Even 
the basic institutions of the Lutheran German Evangelical Church would not assume 
their final form until the 1930s. Thus, in the development of the Germans’ Protestant 
church in Yugoslavia we can also trace the consolidation of German national identity 
and its emergence as a salient, organizing agent, at least by the 1930s. In the 
immediate term, however, the Protestant leadership had to take stock of its reduced 
resources, construct a new church, negotiate its place with the Yugoslav authorities, 
and establish new and nurturing bonds with the Evangelical community abroad and 
especially in Germany. As we shall later see in Chapter Eight, this process would be 
complicated but not interrupted by the rise of National Socialism and the ascension of 
the Third Reich.  
 
Constructing a New Evangelical Church after the Habsburg Collapse 
The 1931 Yugoslav census found slightly more than 100,000 German 
Protestants in the country, of whom 85,369 belonged to the German-dominated 




15,437 belonged to the Magyar-dominated (Calvinist) Reformed Church of the 
Helvetic Confession (H.B.).488 Lutherans, thus, comprised 17.1 percent of 
Yugoslavia’s German population and Calvinists 3.1 percent, according to the official 
statistics. Hitherto, these Protestants had been scattered across the different halves of 
the Monarchy in different churches and church districts, all of which (except the 
Bosnian Synode) were divided at Trianon and St. Germain.489 Like the Germans 
themselves, the Protestant population was scattered across the northern part of the 
country. The greatest concentration was to be found in Batschka and Banat, but 
important communities also existed in Slovenia and even Zagreb. The Protestants in 
Slovenia had had little contact with those of distant Batschka and Banat and thus had 
had different histories and experiences.  
Institutionally, the Lutheran Church consisted of its many local communities 
or Gemeinden, which were gathered into larger administrative units called Seniorate. 
These Seniorate then formed the whole church or Landeskirche. Although its final 
form was not immediately clear after the First World War, the German Lutheran 
Church in Yugoslavia would ultimately consist of eight Seniorate. Six were to be 
found in Batschka, Banat, Belgrade, Bosnia, Syrmien, and the “Savabanat,” with a 
separate Seniorat for Yugoslavia’s Wends and another for the Germans in Slovenia. 
Each Seniorat was headed by a Senior, who handled spiritual and many 
administrative affairs, as well as a Senioratsinspektor. The highest representative and 
administrative body of the church was the Landeskirchentag or national assembly, 
which was only irregularly summoned during the interwar years. At the highest level, 
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church affairs were governed by a church constitution, written by a special 
constitutional synod. A Bishop (elected for life) and an Earthly Church President 
(with a limited term) were the church’s highest officers. The German Lutheran 
Church, thus, reflected many strong democratic as well as juridical traditions. It was a 
spiritual organization, but the spirit of equality between layman and priest was firmly 
embedded in the church and penetrated its very institutions.490 
For years after the Habsburg denouement, the future of Protestantism in 
Yugoslavia remained highly uncertain. The most pressing questions the country’s 
Protestants confronted were whether to form one church or several, who should lead, 
and how to proceed until matters fully resolved themselves. By 1921, the 50,000 
Slovak Lutherans had decided to form their own church. Therefore, Batschka Senior 
Gustav Adolf Wagner, whose Seniorat counted the largest number of German 
Protestants, called representatives from the German Seniorate to a meeting in Novi 
Sad on July 2, 1923 in order to form an independent Lutheran district in 
Yugoslavia.491 (Non-Germans were also invited.) There Wagner, who quickly 
emerged as the German Lutherans’ prevailing force, announced that the Slovaks’ 
secession now compelled the German Seniorate to form their own church 
organization. Chairing the meeting, Wagner announced that the German Seniorate 
(and any others who wished to join them) were compelled to form their own Lutheran 
Church District or Evangelische Kirchendistrikt A.B. in Yugoslavia.  
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This congress in Novi Sad is generally considered the founding meeting of the 
German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia, for it was here that the basics of the 
Germans’ provisional church district were determined and its officers elected 
(including Jakob Jahn and Samuel Schumacher, the latter of whom would served as a 
PdD parliamentarian from 1923 to 1928). In this provisional state, the emerging 
church would be known as the “Evangelischer Kirchendistrikt A.B. in S.H.S.” Until a 
synod could convene to write a church constitution and thus the basis for a proper 
church, this provisional Evangelical Church District would be run by a dual 
presidency consisting of an elected priest and a layman.492 All in all, the church 
district included 117,384 members in 1925.493 Of its 66 pastors, 51 were ethnic 
Germans and 6 Wends, with 5 Magyars, 3 Slovaks and a Croat forming the rest.494 
The nascent Evangelical Church District could not formally emerge as a 
church until a Lutheran synod had drafted a church constitution and the Yugoslav 
state had approved it. Until such a time, the various Lutheran church constitutions, 
rules and laws inherited from the Habsburg era would remain in effect. The synod, 
which convened five times between 1926 and 1930, first met on April 15 in Novi 
Vrbas with the task of adapting the old church laws to the currently prevailing 
circumstances. There, the synod presidium was elected, including Gustav Adolf 
Wagner and Wilhelm Roth as presidents, and L. Schaefer, Philipp Popp, J Steinmetz 
and M. Wolf as vice presidents. Philipp Popp, the young Senior of the Croatian 
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Seniorat, also played a prominent role at this first synod, where he gave the event’s 
opening sermon. This first synod meeting was especially concerned with 
constitutional matters and determined, among other things, that the Lutheran Church 
would ultimately be headed by a single bishop, elected by the Seniorate.  
 Batschka Senior Gustav Adolf Wagner remained dominant in the German 
Evangelical Church District until 1926. As we have seen, he effectively founded the 
church district and was promptly elected to its highest spiritual office with the 
expectation that he would later become the church’s first bishop. His unexpected 
death on May 28, 1926 thus came as a major shock to the Yugoslav Kingdom’s 
German Protestants. Born in 1868, Wagner had been educated in southern Hungary, 
Pressburg and finally Germany itself, whereupon he returned to southern Hungary 
and was ordained in 1894. In 1911, Wagner was elected Senior of the Batschka 
Seniorat, the position he held until 1923 when he was elected spiritual President of 
the nascent Evangelical Church District.495 As the spiritual president of the synod, he 
had been the guiding force in crafting the church’s draft constitution and regulations, 
and his death was regarded as devastating. “He made the preparations and indeed 
made them well,” Pastor Franz Klein observed in the Novi Vrbas Evangelical weekly 
Gruess Gott. “How will we complete the work [without him]?”496 
Shortly after Wagner’s burial, the Synod’s Spiritual Vice President Philipp 
Popp was entrusted with leading Synod matters in the future by its Earthly President, 
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Wilhelm Roth.497 Popp’s ascension was important for many reasons. On one hand, it 
meant the literal shift of the institutional center of the German Lutherans from Novi 
Vrbas in eastern Batschka to Zagreb in western Croatia. Furthermore, Popp had been 
born in 1893, 25 years after Gustav Adolf Wagner’s birth and only one year before 
Wagner’s ordination. Thus Popp’s ascension in the German Evangelical Church also 
represented a generational shift which had its own profound implications. Being 
younger than his predecessor, the agile Popp was better suited to adapt to the collapse 
of the Dual Monarchy and felt more at home in the Yugoslav Kingdom. Moreover, 
his German national consciousness was of a more modern variety than Wagner’s had 
been.498 Lastly, he had recently studied abroad, including a time in Berlin, and thus 
was familiar with modern Germany itself. 
In 1917, Popp became vicar of the Lutheran community in Zagreb before 
quickly being elected pastor the following year. Immediately, following the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s collapse, he organized the Lutheran Gemeinden in upper Croatia into a 
Seniorat, which elected him Senior in 1921. Popp also quickly assumed a position of 
importance in the broader German Lutheran community in Yugoslavia, being first 
elected Synod Vice President and then Spiritual Synod President in 1926 in the wake 
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of Gustav Adolf Wagner’s unexpected death.499 In 1927, at the tender age of 34, he 
was formally elected Spiritual District President,500 a title which changed to Bishop 
Administrator at the German Lutherans’ June 1928 District Convention.501 Popp 
would lead the church Synod over the next several years, completing work on the 
church constitution, determining church rules and procedures, and working with 
officials in Belgrade to establish the German Lutheran Church’s legal position in 
Yugoslavia.  
Once King Alexander signed the Protestant Law in April 1930 and it was 
published in the kingdom’s official gazette, Službene novine, the road ahead for the 
Evangelical Church District at last became clear and the church was free to take its 
final form. As such, the Synod promptly reconvened and approved a church 
constitution in Novi Vrbas on Martin Luther’s birthday in November 1930. Following 
royal approval in November and the constitution’s official publication in Službene 
novine that December, the Constitution of the German Evangelical-Christian Church 
A.B. in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia formally entered into effect. The first 
Landeskirchentag, convened in 1931, unanimously electing Popp Bishop and also 
electing Wilhelm Roth Earthly Church President.502 That September, both men  
formally assumed their posts at a ceremony in Zagreb. Despite Wagner’s untimely 
death, things seemed to be going well for the German church. Indeed, the Wends had 
even decided to form a common church with the Germans.  
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With the adoption of the church constitution and the election of its bishop, the 
Deutsche evangelische-christliche Kirche Augburgischen Bekenntnisses im 
Koenigreiche Jugoslawien had properly come into being. The Yugoslav state also had 
an important role in shaping this German Lutheran Church and even determining its 
very name. Initially, Yugoslav authorities had recognized many other matters as more 
pressing than the internal affairs of the fractured Protestant community (or 
communities) after the Habsburg defeat. With so much of its own state construction 
to do, Belgrade could not devote much attention to the Protestants and, when it did, it 
often viewed them in terms of the national question. The Protestant Law stated clearly 
that “the Evangelicals of the Augsburg Confession [Lutherans] in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia form two Evangelical-Christian Churches A.C. which would be 
independent of one another: the German and the Slovak.” The law further stipulated 
that “the members of the reformed confession [Calvinists] in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia form a separate, Reformed-Christian Church.” Thus, the government 
made permanent the division of the respectively German- and Slovak-dominated 
Lutheran churches and recognized a third, Reformed church of Calvinists.503 The 
ethnic separation of the Germans and Slovaks, therefore, was permanent.504 
The Protestant Law was also fundamental to the future of the German 
Evangelical Church for it enabled the Church District to finally proceed with 
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confidence on its constitutional draft. Knowing now that there would be distinct 
German and Slovak churches, Lutherans of both nationalities could finally plan for 
the future with certainty. As one German Evangelical organ observed, “We are, thank 
God, finally emerging from our provisional state.”505 
The awkward appellation assigned by the Protestant Law, “the German 
Evangelical-Christian Church of the Augsburg Confession in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia” actually reflected several government priorities. The inclusion of the 
descriptive “christlich” reflected the government’s concern that the Evangelicals’ 
church would not otherwise be recognizable as Christian to many Yugoslavs 
unfamiliar with Protestantism. Likewise, the idea to specifically label the church as 
“German” originated from government quarters and not among the Germans 
themselves, who actually resisted it. In this, Belgrade again revealed its desire that the 
Slavic Lutherans form their own church. The government plainly hoped to alienate 
the Wends from the now “German” Evangelical Church and drive them into 
association with the Slovaks. The Wends chose to remain with their German co-
religionists, however, even as the church assumed a decidedly German orientation 
under Philipp Popp. 
 Following the establishment of legal status in 1930, a second major turning 
point in the Church’s brief history occurred in 1931. That year, Popp became the 
German Evangelical Church’s first bishop, as we have seen. His personal and national 
orientation differed markedly from that of his predecessor, Wagner, and would have 
important implications for the future of the emerging German Kirchendistrikt. The 
place of Popp’s birth, Bežanija, was perhaps fortuitous. Located near Zemun, it lay in 
                                                 




Srijem on the border between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Serbian Kingdom, 
whose capital would become the capital of Yugoslavia, of course. Popp was thus not 
a product of Hungary proper, having lived most of his young life in Croatia-Slavonia 
and Germany. On the contrary, having attended Gymnasium in Zemun, he had life-
long contacts with Serbs. Far from feeling deep connection to Ungarntum, he felt 
sympathy for the Serbs who had struggled under Budapest. Having done his doctorate 
in Zagreb, Popp was additionally was well acquainted with Croatian national identity 
and the intellectual tradition of Yugoslavism.506 When the Habsburg Monarchy fell, 
he was only 25.  
 In short, Popp’s ascension had promising but also revolutionary implications 
for the still emerging Kirchendistrikt. Unlike Gustav Adolf Wagner, Popp was 
genuinely comfortable with the Yugoslav state, and demonstrated enough loyalty that 
he was decorated by King Alexander himself.507  Under Popp’s leadership, the church 
would distance itself from nostalgia for Hungary and move toward embracing 
Germany. In his history of the Lutheran Church, Georg Wild observes, that 
“unburdened by Magyarophilia and consequently loyal to Yugoslavia, Popp 
possessed the internal freedom and power to now seize upon the idea of national 
determination” in addition to purely church matters. Thus, in his simultaneous 
                                                 
506 Wild. 131. 
507  In 1927, King Alexander awarded Popp the Order of St. Sava Third Class in recognition for his 
extensive work with the Evangelical soldiers of the Zagreb army garrison. "Auszeichnung unseres 
Kirchenpraesidenten Dr. Popp," Neues Leben 7, no. 10-11 (1927). 84. According to the University of 
Glasgow’s Archive Services, “The Serbian Order of St Sava was instituted on 23rd January 1883. It 
was awarded to Serbian citizens and foreign nationals, for merit in the field of culture, public 
instruction, science, civil service and divinity, as well as for service to the King, State and Nation, by 
civilians or the military. There are five classes of the order.” "University of Glasgow Archive Services: 




embrace of both confession and nation, Popp introduced a new vocabulary to 
discussions on the nature and tasks of the church.508 
 Popp’s comfort with matters of both the Lutheran church and German 
nationhood became manifest on several occasions in 1928. Popp set the new tone at 
an important June meeting of leading German Lutherans when he explicitly linked 
care for the Lutheran Church with that for the Germandom of the entire German 
minority and expressed criticism of the conditions under which Germans lived in 
Yugoslavia. Such comments were markedly different from the words of his 
predecessor.509 Of course, the conception of the German Evangelical Church as 
“German” was facilitated by the Yugoslav government’s insistence on including that 
national identifier in the church’s full, formal name in its effort alienate the Wends 
into a fusion with the Slovaks in a church of all Slavic Lutherans. In May 1928, Popp 
brought the church’s national identity to center stage in Novi Vrbas at its “First Great 
German Evangelical Festival of Song”, which Popp promised would be a “mighty 
rally of Protestantism and Germandom.” He continued, “the purpose of this festival of 
song and this impressive Lutheran rally is to foster and nurture understanding and 
love of the songs of the Evangelical Church and the German Volk, and to advance, 
deepen, and strengthen the feeling and spirit of evangelical and German solidarity in 
our communities and in our whole people.”510  
At year’s end Popp and Wilhelm Roth again signaled the Lutherans’ new 
direction when they called upon the German Evangelical Church Gemeinden to 
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protest the government’s draft school law, which they considered offensive and even 
threatening to their the German Lutherans’ “church-religious and even national life.” 
Popp and Roth demanded that state authorities show more understanding for the 
German mother tongue and distinct culture in the schools, something that would only 
be possible through the return of the Lutheran and German schools, which had been 
taken by the state. They demanded that Lutheran clergy be permitted to conduct 
religious education, not only elementary school teachers as the draft school law 
envisioned, and they expressed concern about how the lack of suitable German 
Lutheran religious teachers was apparently to be handled. Ultimately, however, their 
protest called for the government to respect and nurture Germans’ “religious-moral 
life as national-cultural life.”511 
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Bishop Philipp Popp 
The Evangelical District Presidium formalized their outrage in a 
memorandum to the education minister on December 15, 1928. Religious education, 
it stressed, needed always be in parent’s mother tongue. Meanwhile, Popp’s and 
Roth’s outrage apparently found resonance in the German Lutheran communities, 
with one speaker in the western part of the Germans’ settlement area declaring that 
“We do not hesitate to solemnly declare before God’s countenance, that we would 
rather that our children die than they lose their faith and their nationhood! But we also 
have the right to live as Evangelicals and Germans before God and Man.” Though the 




Yugoslavia, he also evinced his determination to defend his church and Volk. And the 
Lutheran communities were plainly ready to follow his example.   
Popp was hardly alone in his inclination toward specifically German national 
consciousness and he had many Lutheran collaborators in Yugosalvia and abroad. 
The rise to prominence of Pastor Gerhard May of Celje in Slovenia should also be 
seen as indicative of the national and even institutional shift in the German 
Evangelical Church away from old Hungarian Batschka and toward the German 
heartland. As the formal spiritual head of the church, Popp was nominally its lead 
authority on spiritual matters. Nevertheless, May emerged as the Church’s actual lead 
theologian and likewise discussed national matters and the relationship of the church 
and the Volk. In 1934, May published Die volksdeutsche Sendung der Kirche (“The 
Volksdeutsche Mission of the Church”) in Germany, an influential book which 
brought new attention to the German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia. That year he 
explained the nature of the German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia and the 
function of the church among Auslanddeutschtum generally in the premier issue of 
the church’s new monthly journal Kirche und Volk. “What forges a people,” he 
explained, “is a common faith. A people are those who are overcome by belief in a 
common calling, which exceeds the life of the individual and the individual’s life-
time achievements.” Recalling the colonist history of the Yugoslav Germans, he 
observed that their settlers only first became a community (Gemeinschaft) when they 
had a church. The church had an essential role in the formation of the nation, May 
continued, for it was through its faith and services that the settlers became a village, a 




abroad, so would it continue to nurture them, for such was God’s will. “Our church is 
not only popular (volkstuemlich), it is also nationally conscious. It serves the Volk in 
its German manner and is its strongest spiritual defense. It avows that God has made 
us as Germans. He wants what is German to remain German.” May even recognized a 
suitable role for the Lutheran church far beyond the confines of traditional pastoral 
care and extending into even economics. “Our church stands consciously in the Volk”, 
he explained, “and that’s why our Volk stands in the church.”512   
Part of the reason for the German Evangelical Church’s new German 
orientation was simply practical and predated the death of Gustav Adolf Wagner. 
Following the Habsburg defeat in 1918, the Lutherans in Yugoslavia were adrift, cut 
off from their mother churches and uncertain of the road ahead. Just as the German 
Lutherans were forced to contend with the national strivings of their Slovak 
coreligionists, so were they compelled to recognize certain practical needs as they 
established their own church. That church quickly looked abroad for both financial 
assistance and moral support. Recognition by other Lutheran churches and 
organizations would help their position with the Yugoslav authorities, they reasoned. 
The German Lutherans in Yugoslavia therefore quickly forged good relations with 
other Protestant churches and associations in Europe and even the Americas. They 
worked closely with the Gustav Adolf Association (Gustav Adolf Verein), an 
association of German Lutherans devoted to charitable work among co-confessionals 
abroad and which also provided extra support for “threatened” Lutheran 
communities. Indeed, as Rogers Brubaker himself suggests, the intense concern of the 
Gustav Adolf Association for their German co-confessionals may be seen as part of 
                                                 




the broad pattern of homeland nationalism and is illustrative of the new or deepened 
ties with Germany by which it was that the Swabians came to view that country, not 
prostate Austria or Hungary, as their national homeland.513  
There was considerable exchange of German Evangelical visitors from 
Yugoslavia and abroad. Popp and Gerhard May often traveled abroad, meeting 
foreign dignitaries and important church notables. Guests from Germany were 
common at important Lutheran celebrations in Yugoslavia. In fact, so many Yugoslav 
Germans studied at the Viennese Theological Faculty that in 1928 Popp even called it 
“our faculty” for the number of students it trained and its close relationship to the 
German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia.514 The fact of a young Lutheran 
priesthood being trained in Germany and Austria was especially significant for the 
church’s national orientation, since it meant that future Lutheran clergy would no 
longer be raised “in the ‘academies’ of Hungary in the Magyar spirit” as they 
formerly had been.515 Reich and Austrian visitors were common at the Theological 
and Pedagogical Weeks, which Popp initiated in 1928 in order to better train his 
clergy and forge Lutheran bonds across borders. As the German Evangelicals built up 
their church, so did they deepen their relations German with Lutheran organizations 
abroad. Thus, at the January 31, 1928 meeting of the District Convention, Popp could 
boast that his church district was working with not only the Gustav Adolf Society, but 
also the Lutheran World Convention (Lutherischen Weltkonvent), the European 
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Central Office for Church Assistance (Europaeischen Zentralstelle fuer kirchliche 
Hilfsaktionen), the Evangelical League (Evangelischen Bund), the International 
Federation for the Defense of Protestantism (Internationalen Vereinigung zur 
Verteidigung des Protestanismus ) and others.516 Such international connections 
would only grow more extensive over time.  
 In conclusion, by the early 1930s the German Evangelical Church may be 
described as a largely consolidated organization that was nationally oriented with 
many contacts abroad, but whose leadership was loyal to the Yugoslav state. The 
church had spent years in a state of confusion followed by one characterized by 
uncertainty and provisional arrangements before finally winning formal sanction by 
the Yugoslav government. Gustav Adolf Wagner had reluctantly led the Germans to 
form their own separate Lutheran  Church and his successor Philipp Popp had 
completed Wagner’s work. German Lutherans had supported the original Swabian 
activists in the German movement after the Habsburg defeat and remained active in 
the affairs of the German community in Yugoslavia. Deutsches Volksblatt paid 
regular and positive attention to Lutheran affairs. As we have seen, Samuel 
Schumacher, a Lutheran pastor in Bosnia, had even served as a member of parliament 
for the Partei der Deutschen from 1923-1928. The German Lutherans had also done 
much to promote the urgent matter of German language education. As head of the 
German Evangelical Church, Popp was particularly active, advocating for German 
language education, promoting the German School Foundation, and working with the 
Kulturbund. So significant was Popp’s own involvement that the VDA, the 
Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland, that the organization awarded him its 
                                                 




badge of honor (Ehrenplakette) during the summer of 1933.517  Additionally, the 
German Lutherans in Yugoslavia had much contact with their coreligionists in 
Germany. Such contacts would continue but also become altered following the Nazis’ 
seizure of power and the subsequent transformation of German Protestant life there. 
We conclude with the observation that Swabian minority nationalism and 
identity had many sources in local history, regional culture, language, and even 
confession. As an institution, the German Evangelical Church became a center for 
German self-identification and the cultivation of a German national identity under the 
young Philip Popp. The other leading Swabian activists at this time were older but 
had studied abroad like Popp. However, they had been active in the German national 
movement as students in Vienna during the prewar era and eagerly engaged in the 
project of national “awakening” following the 1918 denouement. They were 
conscious of their role as activists and, though they spoke of “national awakening,” 
they were actually well aware that their work was a process of identity building, 
national instruction, and the popular mobilization of a sometimes resistant or 
uncomprehending German peasantry. This peasantry may have been aware of its 
“everyday ethnicity” but frequently had little understanding of how that ethnicity 
connected with a national project or even surmounted the bounds of parish, village or 
region. The German activists devoted themselves to overcoming this disconnect, and 
sought to infuse their coethnics with a sense of national consciousness and common 
purpose. In this they relied not only upon German culture but also drew from the 
Swabian experience of colonization and celebrated the virtues of the noble peasantry 
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as an iron repository of German power and spirit. As we have seen, however, they 
were neither immediately not completely successful in their endeavor, and many of 
their coethnics remained indifferent or hostile to their project. The activists pleaded 
for these Auchdeutsche and assimilates to embrace their movement but frequently met 
resistance or disinterest. As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, the Kulturbund 
operated under the constant threat of dissolution (when it was allowed to operate at 
all) and the Swabians were also frequently stymied in parliament. On one hand, this 
official Yugoslav coolness toward the Swabians actually helped expand and 
consolidate the movement. However, it also led to the appearance of new fractures in 
the German minority, particularly among those youths who had no memory of life 
under pre-Trianon Hungary.  
As the Swabians moved from the 1920s into the 1930s, there were rumblings 
among the young and dissatisfied intelligentsia about the need for radical new tactics 
and a comprehensive “renewal”of the German community. Such rumblings were 
initially slow to crystallize. Thereafer, they developed into an insurrection which 
would threaten the original Swabian leadership and drive the German community 
toward the tenets of National Socialism. Ironically, it was original activists’ very 
success which made possible the impending conflict between themselves and the next 
generation of radical young nationalists, who had rather different ideas about how the 
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Chapter 6:  The Erneuerungsbewegung Insurgency, 1933-1935 
 
As we have seen, the 1920s was a productive decade of Aufbauarbeit during 
which the Swabian activists had gained valuable experience and organizational skills. 
However, the prohibition of nationally- or confessionally-based political parties under 
the royal dictatorship in 1929 was a huge blow for the Swabians. Unlike the Serbs, 
Croats or even Slovenes, who might expect articulation of their ethnic priorities even 
without their flagship national parties, the Swabians lost their only political voice 
with the dissolution of the Partei der Deutschen. Moreover, the concurrent banning of 
the Kulturbund meant the elimination of the single organization which served both as 
the secular conveyor of German culture and the glue of the Swabian community. To 
continue to advance its views, the German movement would henceforth have to rely 
upon persistence, compromise, and thoughtful innovation. The Swabians also 
benefited from homeland nationalism in Germany, which manifested itself through 
the moral and financial support of official state bodies and unofficial Volkstumarbeit 
organizations. As we shall later see, such support increasingly came with strings 
attached. 
In addition to the challenges arising from the imposition of royal dictatorship, 
the German leadership would also face a new threat during the 1930s from within the 
minority itself. As we have seen, one success of the German movement had been its 
raising the next generation to be increasingly nationally conscious. Although 
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Swabians’ endeavors to obtain German schools met with only partial success, 
Swabian youth were nevertheless more connected to Germany proper than ever. An 
increasingly number of Swabian students studied abroad in Austria or the Weimar 
Republic, where they became familiar with new political ideas and social trends. The 
German youth movement proved particularly infectious and spawned Swabian 
imitators in Yugoslavia. Increasingly, Swabian youths were drawn to a movement 
among their German peers which embraced the voelkisch “neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung,” especially as promoted by the Nazi Party. In Yugoslavia during the 
1930s, these young men (and some women) challenged the Swabian leadership in a 
bid to capture the Kulturbund and “renew” Yugoslavia’s German community along 
lines which were very much inspired by Hitler’s National Socialism. This was 
nothing less than a split in the minority nationalism of the Swabians. Their 
Erneuerungsbewegung was also a local manifestation of the broader German youth 
movement and therefore was deeply voelkisch and rebellious at heart. Thus it was that 
the original Swabian activists, who were moderate in their methods and measured in 
their demands, soon came under siege by their disciples and children, who spoke a 
language of radicalism. That aspects of the movement to “renew” German life in 
Yugoslavia, the Erneuerungsbewegung, may have been familiar to the original 
leadership made the insurrection no less threatening.  
The churches were also affected by the Erneuerungsbewegung insurgency. 
This relationship between the churches and the Erneuerer is dealt with separately in 
Chapter Eight, but it is worthwhile to note here that the Kulturbund was not the only 




as a bastion of Magyarones and ethnic traitors. This in turn prompted leading 
Swabian Catholics to launch a fiery counterinsurgency in 1934. Their 
counterinsurgency articulated a third vision of German nationhood for the Swabians 
that rejected the “new heathenism” being exported by Berlin but also sometimes 
displayed skepticism toward the Kulturbund.   
In sum, the German community in Yugoslavia was characterized by a 
complex dynamic of two separate but related conflicts in the 1930s. On one hand, the 
Erneuerungsbewegung challenged the original leadership for control of the 
Kulturbund, which became the premier German organization after its relegalization in 
the 1931. On the other hand, as we shall see in Chapter Eight, the Swabian Catholic 
clergy led a simultaneous campaign against the Erneuerer, who retaliated with 
venom. The Erneuerungsbewegung’s complex clash with the original leadership was 
fundamentally a power struggle, but the Erneuerers’ ultimate goal was the 
ideologically driven transformation of the Kulturbund, its methods, and even the 
German Volksgruppe itself. The claim to Swabian leadership resting on nationalist 
legitimacy, their challenge to the original leadership was centered largely on issues of 
German “authenticity” and even the definition of Germandom.  
The clash between the Erneuerer and the Catholics was somewhat different, 
though no less heated. The Catholics sought to expose the Erneuerer as anti-
Christians, who propagated a heretical world view which offered only strife in this 
world and damnation in the afterlife. But the idiom of national identity had become 
sufficiently hegemonic by the 1930s, such that even this Catholic German resistance 




terms. Naturally, the Church asserted a German identity which fundamentally rejected 
National Socialism. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia’s German community, which all 
antagonists agreed must stand united, was developing significant fractures.  
This chapter examines the new conflicts and fractures in the Swabian 
minority. We begin with a survey of the Yugoslav political context during the 1930s, 
which continued to be turbulent, despite the promises of King Alexander’s 
dictatorship. We then consider some of the institutional responses of the Swabian 
leadership to the dissolution of their political party, the rise of new political parties, 
and increasing international attention to the circumstances of Europe’s 
Auslandsdeutsche. We continue with a discussion of the expanded activities of the 
relegalized Kulturbund before stepping beyond the realm of Yugoslavia and 
organizational life to examine the German youth movement and the key intellectual 
tradition of voelkisch thought. This intellectual tradition underlay the ideology of 
National Socialism, guided the beliefs of the Erneuerer and shaped their criticisms of 
the Kulturbund’s leadership. Thus, we consider the Erneuerer not only as a political 
phenomenon but also seek to understand the nature of their insurgency. Finally, we 
review some major events in that insurgency as well as the original leadership’s 
countermeasures. Throughout the chapter, we remain attuned to the various 
manifestations and interaction of Rogers Brubaker’s triad of homeland, nationalizing 






German Minority Nationalism in a New Political Context 
The Yugoslav political environment in which the Germans lived in the 1930s 
differed drastically from that of the 1920s. In the wake of Sjepan Radić’s murder, 
King Alexander determined that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in its 
current, parliamentary form was unworkable and boldly took matters into his own 
hands. On January 6, 1929 the King announced the suspension of the Vidovdan 
Constitution, the dissolution of all political parties and political organizations, and the 
introduction of royal dictatorship. General Petar Živković was appointed Prime 
Minister by the King, whose directives were to be enforced as law. Though the 
dissolution of parliament and the suspension of the constitution originally enjoyed 
some popular support (especially among Croats), it soon emerged that the dictatorship 
was based on intolerance of any opposition and the arrests and trials of important 
opposition leaders commenced in April of that year. During the dictatorship, Vladko 
Maček, Anton Korošec, and Svetozar Pribićević (respectively key Croatian, 
Slovenian and Serbian politicians) were all arrested. The regime consistently failed to 
reach an accord with the Croats. To consolidate his kingdom, which he formally 
renamed “Yugoslavia” in 1929, King Alexander enacted many centralizing reforms 
while simultaneously introducing radical new territorial and administrative divisions. 
On October 3, 1929, the country was divided into nine banovinas, each named after a 
river, in the hope of undermining the conflicting national claims and visions of the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The banovina system also affected the Germans, 




banovina contained the lion’s share of Swabians, who comprised 15% of its 
population and were the most active Swabians in the country.520 Nevertheless, the 
German population in the Sava banovina was not insignificant and would become 
more nationally conscious over the course of the 1930s. 
Despite such heavy-handed measures as political arrests and severe media 
censorship, it soon emerged that a pure dictatorship would be unworkable, and certain 
concessions would have to be made to Yugoslavia’s peoples and parties.  In 
September 1931. King Alexander issued a new constitution and permitted the 
November election of a national assembly. Neither institution brought calm to 
political affairs, however, which remained contentious and infused with national 
tensions. Despite their formal banning, many of Yugoslavia’s political parties 
continued to operate in an illegal or semi-legal status under the royal dictatorship.521 
Nevertheless, every party but the government’s slate boycotted the election to protest 
Yugoslavia’s new political circumstances.  
Many of the liberal sounding aspects of the constitution were revealed to have 
no substance in practice and the National Assembly likewise proved to be of limited 
potency. To execute its political program, the regime created the Yugoslav Radical 
Peasant Democracy, precursor to the later Yugoslav National Party (JNS – 
Jugoslovenska narodna stranka). On March 24, 1933 voting laws were somewhat 
relaxed, enabling the formal participation of opposition parties in the parliamentary 
elections of May 5, 1935. Meanwhile, a series of prime ministers and cabinets ensued 
after 1931 among the national turmoil. 
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As Sabrina Ramet has observed, the next election in 1935 was a watershed 
event.522 The SDK coalition consisting of the (Croatian) HSS, and the (Serbian) 
Independent Democrat Party united with other Serbian opposition parties behind a 
common list headed by Vladko Maček. This Opposition Bloc opposed the regime’s 
list which was headed by Bogoljub Jevtić and featured Radical support. Jevtić 
narrowly won the election in what was a statistical victory but a moral defeat.523 
When the election proved to be characterized by widespread fraud and abuse, the 
Croatian and Serbian opposition parties resolved to boycott the resulting assembly. 
Such a boycott made plain the illegitimacy of any government under Jevtić, whom the 
Royal Regent Prince Paul asked to resign. (King Alexander had meanwhile been 
assassinated in 1934 while on a state visit to France.) Jevtić’s replacement was the 
finance minister and former Serbian Radical Milan Stojadinović. He would remain in 
office until early 1939. 
The Stojadinović years were important for Yugoslavia. As finance minister 
and later premier, Stojadinović had orchestrated a shift away from France as 
Yugoslavia’s main trading partner and toward Germany. Under him, relations 
between Yugoslavia and Germany improved, as the “political opportunist” 
Stojadinović wagered that the Third Reich and Hitler were a the best bet for securing 
economic stability and territorial integrity.524 Meanwhile, however, Yugoslav 
domestic rivalries were heating up and manifesting themselves in potentially alarming 
ways. In December 1934 three Serbian imitators of Fascism merged to form Zbor 
under Dimitrije Ljotić. Zbor was a vocal but minor political force, however, failing to 
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attract even 1% of voters in the 1935 election. Meanwhile, the HSS was forming 
paramilitary units, known as Croatian Peasant Defense (HSZ) to defend members 
against Četnik harassment. (Critics suspected darker, secessionist intentions.) Another 
marginal group which would exercise influence greater than its formal membership 
was Ante Pavelić’s Croatian-ultranationalist Ustaša. The Ustaša would leave its 
greatest mark in the 1934 assassination of King Alexander, which it co-authored with 
the Macedonian rebel group IMRO. Meanwhile, the Ustaša was also increasingly 
becoming a source of concern to the HSS, from which it sought to poach young and 
old adherents.525 
Stojadinović formed a coalition with Korošec and Bosnian Muslim leader 
Mehmed Spaho on June 25, 1935. More importantly, perhaps, he also founded a 
political party, Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ – Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica), 
in August of that year. The next election was held on December 11, 1938. Following 
Stojadinović’s withdrawal of Yugoslavia’s controversial concordat with the Vatican, 
Maček’s HSS and the Independent Democrats again joined forces with several Serb 
opposition parties in a Bloc of National Agreement to oppose the JRZ in the 1938 
election. Again, they did not prevail in this 1938 election, but the JRZ had only been 
able to win approximately 54.1 percent of the vote against the Bloc of National 
Agreement’s 44.9 percent. Dmitrije Ljotić’s Zbor showed the breadth of its support 
by winning 1 percent of the vote and earning exactly no seats in the Skupština. 
Ultimately, the Bloc of National Agreement’s electoral success revealed a significant 
decline in the Stojadinović government’s popularity since the previous election. In the 
Croatian areas in Vojvodina, the Maček list won more than twice the number of votes 
                                                 




as the JRZ.526  Following Korošec’s withdrawal and the resignation of five cabinet 
ministers, Stojadinović was himself compelled to resign in February 1939, thus 
ending his tenure as interwar Yugoslavia’s longest serving prime minister. 
After Stojadinović’s resignation, Prince Paul entrusted Dragiša Cvetković 
with forming a government. Cvetković brought urgent attention and new flexibility to 
resolving the lingering dispute between Belgrade and the Croats over their place in 
the Yugoslav state. In less than eight months, Cvetković and Maček worked out the 
Sporazum, an arrangement by which a large, Croatian banovina was formed with far 
reaching competencies and prerogatives in August 1939. Croat Ivan Šubašić would be 
the first ban. Shortly thereafter, Cvetković formed a new government, which included 
Maček as deputy prime minister and featured five HSS ministers in prominent cabinet 
posts. The Sporazum revived the Croatian Sabor and created a single ban for the 
united Croatian territory. Yet in the end, the Sporazum left many dissatisfied in 
Yugoslavia. Many Croats, felt that the new arrangements did not go far enough to 
address their demands of autonomy and respect. Meanwhile, many Serbs believed 
that too much autonomy had been conceded to the Croats or that Serbia should be 
granted similar prerogatives at the very least. Thus on the eve of the outbreak of the 





                                                 




The Danube Swabians Under Royal Dictatorship, 1929-1934 
The Swabian leadership received the announcement of dictatorship in 1929 
with definite apprehension but also cautious hope. In the wake of the King’s 
proclamation, their immediate concern was the Partei der Deutschen, which they 
hoped would escape any ban or disciplining action. Such was not an unreasonable 
hope, for the main conflict in the state existed between the major Slav parties, not the 
minorities’ political organizations.527 The PdD was banned, however, as was the 
Kulturbund, compelling the Germans to embrace alternative strategies. On the one 
hand, they sought repeal of the ban on the Kulturbund, which they achieved in late 
August 1930. Simultaneously, they participated in the authoritarian parliament 
established by the dictatorship. Additionally, they established an organization to 
advocate for them on the international stage at the League of Nations. Finally, they 
took educational matters into their own hands and established institutions to deal with 
teacher training, school and student funding, and the like. In sum, the established 
German leadership did not deviate from the moderate tactics and goals it had 
embraced in the 1920s. True, the new circumstances of the 1930s required some 
strategic innovation. In essence, however, the original leadership’s program remained 
the same. Wherever possible, the original leadership remained at its posts or created 
new ones. It was always persistent but never revolutionary in its demands.  
 The banning of the Partei der Deutschen had been a heavy blow to the 
Germans, who thereby lost their only political voice in Yugoslavia. Although the 
Kulturbund continued to operate on a very limited and semi-illegal basis, it would 
                                                 




never carry the weight that the Germans’ parliamentary Klub did during the 1920s 
and was anyway supposed to be a non-political organization. Nevertheless, the 
German leadership considered it necessary to have an organization through which to 
represent the Volksgruppe and therefore in May 1929 established the League of the 
Germans in Yugoslavia for the League of Nations and International Understanding. 
Known in German as the Liga der Deutschen in Jugoslawien fuer Voelkerbund und 
Voelkrverstaendigung (henceforth as the “Liga,” for simplicity’s sake), the Liga 
formally eschewed politics in its statutes.528 In fact, however, the organization was 
quite active in minority matters and sent delegations to Geneva to inform the 
international community about the status of Germans’ minority rights in 
Yugoslavia.529 The Liga should be understood as yet another manifestation of the 
Swabians’ minority nationalism as it effectively existed to air Swabian grievances 
about Yugoslavia on the international stage and thereby obtain concessions at home. 
It was particularly concerned with highlighting the discrepancies between the 
Swabian’s existing cultural prerogatives and Yugoslavia’s obligations to its 
minorities under the aforementioned minorities treaties, which it concluded with the 
League of Nations at the outset of the interwar era. Moreover, Swabian minority 
nationalism and German homeland nationalism interacted most visibly through the 
Liga. In September 1929, Stefan Kraft traveled to Geneva, where he even met with 
German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and discussed the Germans’ situation in 
                                                 
528  The Liga’s statutes were printed in full in Deutsches Volksblatt. Obviously, after King Alexander 
renamed his kingdom Yugoslavia, the organization changed its name to reflect that change. "Satzungen 
der Liga der Deutschen des Koenigreiches der Serben, Kroaten und Slovenen fuer Voelkerbund und 
Voelkerverstaendigung," Deutsches Volksblatt, June 28 1929. 
529 The ubiquitous Kraft served as President of the Liga, whose leadership also included such familiar 
notables as Georg Grassl, Evangelical Bishop Philipp Popp, PdD parliamentarian Hans Moser, and 




Yugoslavia. A pioneer of German homeland nationalism, Stresemann advocated for 
the German minorities in Geneva and increased (frequently covert) state financial 
support for Germandom organizations in Germany and abroad.530 This support was 
most welcome at the time, but it also created avenues and connections to the 
Auslandsdeutsche which would later be exploited by the Third Reich. 
The Liga actually had actually held its founding meeting in Belgrade in 
January 1928. Thus, the idea of an organization to involve Swabians in the League of 
Nations actually predated the dictatorship. Kraft had himself been active in 
international circles for years and had forged connections with Auslandsdeutsche 
from many important countries. Kraft had long believed that Swabian interests in 
Yugoslavia would best be served by sticking to domestic politics. However, by the 
late 1920s, he had concluded that this original strategy was misguided and Kraft 
resolved to get involved with the League of Nations in Geneva. He was still an 
advocate of German involvement in Yugoslav politics, but Geneva offered a new way 
to squeeze cultural concessions out of the Yugoslavs and confront them with the 
undeniable international dimension of their minority problem. After all, the League of 
Nations, was supposedly the guarantor of the minority treaties. Moreover, the 
international visibility would provide the Swabians greater freedom of action even 
under the dictatorship. As the significance of the League of Nations waned over the 
1930s, so did the Liga curtail its activities. However, for a time the Liga was quite 
active and served as a useful platform from which to work on behalf of domestic 
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German interests and advocate on behalf of Auslanddeutshtum generally on an 
international stage.  
Stresemann died shortly after meeting Kraft in 1929. Nevertheless, the 
Swabians persisted in their work with the League of Nations, motivated by their 
concerns over education legislation and the excesses of King Alexander’s 
dictatorship. Faced with the prospect of international criticism, the Yugoslav 
government could be moved to hint at or vaguely promise great concessions to the 
Germans, but real resolution of the Germans’ key complaints (especially in 
education) proved elusive. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia’s desire to improve its 
reputation in Geneva contributed to the government’s granting permission for the 
Kulturbund to resume activities as well as permission to establish a Private German 
Teacher Training Institute or Private deutsche Lehrbildungsanstalt in November 
1930.531 
The Germans did gradually obtain state concessions in education policy 
during the 1930s and were furthermore permitted to found their own organizations to 
promote private German schooling and training. (The fact that they felt compelled to 
form such private educational institutions, however, is indicative of the degree to 
which they had given up on adequate state support of German education.)  Winning 
government approval of a Private German Teacher Training Institute in November 
1930 was a milestone for the Germans, who would henceforth be able to address one 
of their most pressing concerns: the shortage of suitable German teachers. Likewise, 
the Germans were pleased with the government’s 1931 decree which expanded 
                                                 




German education and seemed to provide for more parental decision-making in 
choosing children’s language of instruction than had hitherto been the case.532  
The 1931 educational decree truly was a welcome development, but there was 
still room for improvement, Georg Grassl and other Swabain notables observed.533 
Despite the new decree, the controversial method of name analysis sometimes 
continued to be used to determine school language choice.534 Moreover, simple 
official sanction was not enough to guarantee the future of German education. Even 
the most liberal school plan, Kraft observed, was only of practical value to minorities 
in so far as school authorities were inclined and the teachers were able to implement 
it. Adequate resources were also an issue, so to ensure that the Germans’ Private 
Teacher Training Institute would be adequately funded the Swabians established the 
German School Foundation, or Deutsche Schulstiftung in 1931. 
Kraft chaired the German School Foundation’s founding meeting in June 1931 
in which Grassl, Keks, and both Evangelical Bishop Popp and Catholic Abbott Jakob 
Eggerth also participated. As part of the broad trend of Volkstumarbeit and an aspect 
of homeland nationalism, the School Foundation regularly received funding from the 
German government.535 The teacher training institute opened that October in 
Zrenjanin and moved to Novi Vrbas two years later. Over the course of the 1930s, the 
Swabians would receive permission to open yet more schools, ranging from 
kindergartens to Gymnasien. The process was slow, however, and the Germans’ were 
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always eager for greater cultural autonomy and educational capacity. State 
concessions did not come easily and the Germans were never satisfied with their 
situation. Nevertheless, they achieved important educational reforms in the 
authoritarian kingdom of the 1930s which they had been unable to in the democracy 
of the 1920s.536 This process was in no small way helped by the fact of an 
increasingly powerful and assertive Germany, with whom Yugoslavia was eager to do 
business. 
The Germans’ most important achievement in the early years of the 
dictatorship was obtaining permission for the Kulturbund to renew its activities. 
Though it served as a German voice in public affairs, the Belgrade government 
specifically forbade the Liga from establishing local chapters as the Kulturbund had. 
The Liga, thus, could not approximate the Kulturbund’s functions of group formation 
and cultural transmittal. Nor could it institutionally involve a large number of 
Germans as the Kulturbund had. The Swabian leadership realized, therefore, that 
renewing government approval of the Kulturbund’s statutes was both urgent and 
essential. After January 6, 1929, the Kulturbund and other organizations which 
wished to operate under the dictatorship were compelled to submit their statutes to the 
Interior Ministry for reapproval. The Kulturbund’s 1931 statutes confirmed its 
mission as “the care and honoring of the spiritual, aesthetic, customary, and social 
culture of the German national minority of the Yugoslav Kingdom and the raising of 
its material and social welfare.” 537 They furthermore specified that “all political 
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activity in the context of the Schwaebisch-Deutsch Kulturbund remains excluded.”538 
Ultimately, then, the Kulturbund remained basically unchanged according to the 1931 
statutes. As before, Johann Keks was elected Chairman and Grassl Honorary 
Chairman of the organization. Internal developments in the coming years, however, 
would transform the Kulturbund.  
The prohibition of the Partei der Deutschen had effectively made the 
Kulturbund the leading all-German organization in the Yugoslav kingdom, and its 
leaders increasingly comported themselves as if they were in fact formal heads of the 
German minority. Though the Kulturbund hardly included all of the country’s 
Germans in its membership rolls at this time, the informal claim to Yugoslav German 
leadership was not specious or inaccurate, since no other organization existed to unite 
Germans or speak in their name. And indeed, the Yugoslav government came to 
implicitly recognize the Kulturbund as the de facto, if not de jure collective 
leadership of the German minority.539  
Meanwhile, the ban on the PdD also transformed the nature of the Kulturbund. 
In the 1920s, the Germans had taken pains to separate politics and culture, and the 
Kulturbund had truly been a cultural body (though its German national agenda was 
implicitly political during this age of nationalism and, as we have seen its connections 
with various Germany-based Volkstumarbeit organizations did make it an agency of 
minority nationalism). Following the ban on the PdD, this separation became less 
clear and the Kulturbund gradually became an indirect vehicle for the expression of 
German political aspirations. Under the circumstances of the 1930s, only an 
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established figure had even a remote chance of securing a mandate in parliament or in 
the senate. As such, after 1929, young Swabians aspiring to leadership naturally 
turned to the leading posts of the Kulturbund. Work during this third Aufbau phase 
was difficult, but by 1932 the Kulturbund boasted 82 local chapters. Two years later, 
the organization consisted of 129 local chapters, allowing its leadership to announce 
at the Kulturbund’s 1934 annual congress that it had surpassed its previous record 
size from 1924, when the authorities had first banned the organization.540 
 
 
Graphic from the 1933/1934 Arbeit des Kulturbundes showing the growth in the number of local 
Kulturbund chapters during the organization’s three periods of activity.541 
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The new constitution introduced by the Yugoslav government in September 
1931 made no mention of the country’s minorities and confronted the Germans with 
some hard choices as to how to proceed. Ethnic parties such as the Partei der 
Deutschen remained formally illegal and the new electoral law ultimately left the 
Germans little choice but to join Prime Minister Živković’s list as candidates 
themselves if they wished to have any influence in parliament. By this point, the 
cautiously receptive standpoint from which the Germans had received the 
proclamation of dictatorship had become more pessimistic. Yet German leaders felt 
they had little alternative but to support the Živković list, since failure to do so might 
suggest disloyalty and invite scapegoating or otherwise endanger whatever cultural 
concessions could be wrung from Belgrade. They justified their participation, thus, as 
neither approval of the current political structure of the country nor as a rejection of 
its opposition but rather as an expression of loyalty to the state and king. It would be a 
tricky line to walk. 
According to Swabian German Valentin Oberkersch, the government in 
Belgrade gave the Germans few options but cooperation and well informed them that 
failing to cooperate would carry unfortunate consequences. To be certain, the regime 
wanted Swabian support for its policies but electoral circumstances were not 
favorable for the Germans. They were basically forbidden from fielding candidates in 
Srijem, Slavonia and Slovenia. Moreover, the new electoral districts’ schema was 
such that no German was elected in the three Banat electoral districts, despite a rise in 
the already significant number of German voters. Ultimately, only Kraft was elected 




Alexander appointed Georg Grassl to the senate. Finally, Kraft was joined in 
parliament in October 1931 by Hans Moser as the replacement for another MP who 
had resigned.542 The Germans thus retained a voice in politics, but it was a weak and 
marginal one. 
As we have seen, the royal dictatorship was unsuccessful in subduing 
Yugoslavia’s various political currents. Consequently, it erected a quasi-party, the 
Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy, which would have only a brief existence but 
be notable for the differences it revealed among the Germans’ leaders. While Grassl 
and Moser endorsed the call for this party, Kraft’s immediate endorsement was 
conspicuously absent. Meanwhile, since the Liga’s advocacy at the League of Nations 
had clearly moved an embarrassed Belgrade to make concessions on the School 
Foundation, Teacher Training Institute, Kulturbund and such, Kraft directed 
Deutsches Volksblatt to focus increased attention on Belgrade’s poor treatment of its 
German minority.543 This and some German opposition to various measures 
contributed to steadily poorer relations between the Germans and the government. 
Simultaneously, new problems for the German leadership were arising among the 
Swabians themselves.  
 
New Challenges to the Swabians Original Leadership after 1933 
The 1930s witnessed considerable confrontation and dissent within the 
German minority. In the German leaders’ initially varied reaction to the establishment 
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of the Yugoslav National Party, one sees early evidence of internal German conflicts 
and dissatisfaction that had been simmering as of late in the minority. During the 
early 1930s, a quiet dissatisfaction with the German leadership was growing among 
parts of the German population. Simultaneously, differences within that leadership 
itself were beginning to fester and would explode later in the decade. In mid-1933, a 
young doctor named Nikolaus Hasslinger launched a newspaper and a movement in 
Zrenjanin, which briefly seemed a real challenge to the established German 
leadership. Ultimately, however, the most enduring crisis in the German minority 
emerged from the Banat city of Pančevo, where a young doctor named Jakob 
Awender was planting the seeds of the Kulturbund’s original leadership’s most 
serious challenge: the Erneuerungsbewegung. 
We begin with Nikolaus Hasslinger. Hasslinger’s Deutsche Volkszeitung was 
highly critical of the Swabians’ leadership and institutions, and it served as the 
platform from which he hoped to rally German youth behind him in a Young German 
Movement or Jungdeutsche Bewegung. The Young German Movement was 
decidedly pro-Yugoslav and even operated under the motto “Everything for the King, 
nation and fatherland”544 Hasslinger’s movement nevertheless indulged in devotion to 
Germandom, which its leaders argued could be best served through close cooperation 
with Belgrade and the Germans’ entry into the Yugoslav National Party (JNS). 
Hasslinger himself was an enthusiastic member of the JNS and complained that the 
established German leaders futilely practiced methods of confrontation with the 
government. Furthermore, he and his colleagues expressed heated resentment for the 
                                                 





leadership of the Kulturbund, which he described as old and out of touch with 
common Germans, especially young Germans. “We are not against the Kulturbund,” 
he insisted, but rather against its leadership and methods, its inactivity and its 
fecklessness.”545 As the name of his movement suggests, youth was a powerful motif 
among Hasslinger and his supporters. They denigrated the Kulturbund’s leadership as 
“old fat cats”, whom they blamed for creating artificial confrontations between 
Germans and unnecessarily dividing the minority.546 The old men had lost touch with 
the times, they charged. Moreover, they were excessively inclined toward Berlin and 
insufficiently patriotic. Hasslinger insisted throughout his speeches and articles that 
he only proposed his new direction (straight into the arms of Belgrade) in response to 
mounting dissatisfaction among Yugoslav Germans with their leadership and in 
answer to popular desire for new leadership.547 
 Naturally Hasslinger’s efforts earned him the ire of the Kulturbund leaders 
and their mouthpiece Deutsches Volksblatt, through which they responded to his 
criticism. The original leadership dismissed Hasslinger as a nobody with no right to 
speak for the country’s Germans. His movement merely repackaged such Kulturbund 
standbys as “staatstreu und volkstreu”, they claimed, which it sought to purvey as 
new.548 Mocking his extreme pro-Yugoslav stance, one Deutsches Volksblatt 
contributor even suggested that Hasslinger should claim leadership of a new nation, 
the “Jugoschwaben.”549 By 1934 the German leadership plainly decided that it had 
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had enough and permanently expelled Hasslinger from the Kulturbund for allegedly 
printing falsehoods about a recent Kulturbund annual congress.550 Later that year, 
Kraft sued Hasslinger and a colleague for slander, among other things, winning 
convictions on both counts.551  
Ultimately, the commotion Hasslinger caused and the support he earned 
proved ephemeral. This was especially the case when it emerged that he was heavily 
financially backed by Belgrade, which at the time was aiming to weaken Kraft. 
Hasslinger’s movement, which was anyway limited and always seemed most 
impressive in the press, gradually dissipated. The “movement”, such as it were, had 
never been big. Nevertheless, for a time Deutsche Volkszeitung was one of the 
country’s most widely-read German newspapers,552 which suggests that the popular 
German dissatisfaction Hasslinger trumpeted had some actual basis in fact. In the end, 
Hasslinger’s movement was eclipsed by something far more ominous for the original 
leadership: Jakob Awender’s Erneuerungsbewegung. Hasslinger himself was never a 
member of the Erneuerungsbewegung and faded from importance after 1935. The 
Erneuerungsbewegung did not. 
Hasslinger’s Young German Movement and the Erneuerungsbewegung shared 
an idiom and both capitalized on simmering discontent in the German minority. The 
Erneuerungsbewegung also emphasized youth, the ineptitude of the “big wigs”, and 
devotion to such methods as the Fuehrerprinzip. Hasslinger reprinted several articles 
from Awender’s Pančevoer Post and clearly valued the latter’s criticism of the 
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Kulturbund leadership. However, the two movements were quite different, given the 
Erneuerer’s deep fascination with National Socialism and the Third Reich. In fact, on 
many points the nascent Erneuerungsbewegung and Hasslinger’s Young German 
Movement were antithetical. If the Kulturbund leaders were guilty of excessive 
orientation toward Berlin in Hasslinger’s eyes, the Erneuerer plainly were doubly so.  
In 1932, the relegalized Kulturbund held its annual congress in Pančevo, a 
largely German town in Banat, just across the Danube from Belgrade. In preparation 
for this congress, several likeminded Kulturbund members founded the Pančevoer 
Post, a weekly newspaper which surveyed the work of the Kulturbund and other 
Swabian organizations from a decidedly voelkisch perspective. Under managing 
editor Ludwig Kapri during its first year, the Pančevoer Post hinted at dissatisfaction 
with the leadership of the Kulturbund but was a relatively benign, albeit 
uncompromisingly German national newspaper. Jakob Awender assumed the post of 
managing editor in January 1933, however, and transformed the newspaper into a 
platform from which to first sharply criticize the Swabian leaders and subsequently 
organize a movement to challenge them. Under Awender, moreover, the newspaper 
closely observed Third Reich politics and did not seek to hide its enthusiasm for 
Adolf Hitler or the leadership principle he embodied.553 
It was in the pages of Awender’s Pančevoer Post that simmering German 
discontent with the original Kulturbund leadership first turned into a boil. Thus we 
may date the German minority’s internal divisions from at least 1933. According to 
the Erneuerer themselves, 1933 was merely the breakthrough year. They looked to the 
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years between 1927 - 1930/31 as the years of their movement’s incubation. From then 
until 1933, the “hitherto totally neglected” young generation became involved in 
voelkisch matters on their own and cast about for a “guiding, compelling idea.” 
Finally, the Erneueer claimed, the period since 1933 was defined by the “rise and the 
renewal of Gesamtdeutschtum,” all Germans everywhere. Indeed, “the postwar 
generation was especially gripped by new voelkisch thoughts.” The youth had brought 
their energy and enthusiasm to the work of the Kulturbund such that “youth group 
after youth group is formed and with them local Kulturbund chapters. Already by 
1934 the German Youth Association (Deutsche Jugendverband) could be founded not 
as the result of the Kulturbund leadership’s efforts, but rather as result of the work of 
such key Erneuerer as Kameraden Fuerst, Halwax, Lichtenberger, Schenk, etc.,” the 
Erneuerer claimed.554 Since then, the spirit and activity of the youth had made their 
mark on the Kulturbund, the Erneuerer claimed.  Both in the local chapters and in the 
Kulturbund headquarters, Jugendarbeit or “youth work” and the spirited Swabian 
youth had become an essential part of the Kulturbund. Indeed, “in all things great and 
small, the young generation is everywhere: in sports- and cultural events, rallies, 
courses, training events, Heimabende, etc.” Thus did the Erneuerer present their 
“breakthrough,” which they carefully located in the context of Hitler’s coming to 
power in Germany.555 In conclusion, the Erneuerer emphasized the local roots of their 
malaise but also cast themselves as part of a greater, modern German movement that 
transcended statehood and even space itself. The intellectual roots of their discontent 
may be located in the German voelkisch intellectual tradition. 
                                                 
554 We shall learn more about Jakob Lichtenberger and Gustav Halwax shortly.  






The Voelkisch Tradition and the Interwar Swabians 
This dissertation is the history of a national movement and the story of 
intellectual and political competition among Yugoslavia’s German minorities. It is 
thus a tale of the marketing of an idea and the battle to define that idea. It has no 
pretensions to be a proper intellectual history, a task anyway made impossible by its 
broad scope and limited pages. That said, it is useful at this stage to briefly discuss the 
voelkisch tradition and consider how it informed German political currents during the 
interwar period. Neither the original Swabian activists nor their rivals in the 
Erneuerungsbewegung existed in an intellectual or social vacuum, of course. On the 
contrary, their ideas and the institutions through which they sought to execute them 
were very much part of a lively German intellectual tradition. This tradition as it 
manifested itself in southeastern Europe reflected local circumstances. The historical 
experience under Hungary and the Habsburgs, the paucity of intellectuals, the 
comparative lack of German education facilities, and the region’s remoteness from 
Germany and Austria all informed the ways in which Germans in southeast Europe 
experienced intellectual and social currents from Austria and Germany. Those 
intellectual and social currents unquestionably impacted and shaped the country’s 
educated Germans, who in turn adapted them to local circumstances and sought to 
diffuse them among their coethnics. Such was the case with the original Swabian 
activists before and immediately after the First World War, when they sought to 
instill German national consciousness in the local ethnic German population. 




popular in the radicalized environment of Weimar Republic, where parliamentary 
dysfunction, financial collapse and the sting of military defeat were driving Germans 
toward ever more radical ideas as solutions to German woes. 
Most Swabian leaders discussed in these pages had studied beyond their 
immediate surroundings in Germany or Austria, where they were exposed to the 
prevailing intellectual currents of the day at a young and impressionable age. One 
such intellectual current, whose foundations were well established by the turn of the 
century, was voelkisch thought, an intellectual tradition with a firm foundation in 
irrationalism and hostility toward liberalism. The speeches, articles and other writings 
of the Erneuerer were permeated with the ideas and vocabulary of this voelkisch 
tradition, which grew even more radical and ascendant during the interwar period. 
Nature and the natural occupied a central place in the voelkisch ideology, 
which was mystical and concerned with the essence of man. In many ways it was 
transcendental and escapist, and sought comfort beyond the banalities of the real 
world. Subscribers to voelkisch ideas felt alienated, deeply dissatisfied with mundane 
reality and found escape in nostalgia for an imagined German past. They pined for the 
romantic and pastoral amid industrialized modernity’s turbulent grayness. Voelkisch 
thinkers variously rejected parliamentarism, party politics and materialism as false 
solutions to Germans’ malaise or even as part of the problem. Political parties were 
held to be artificial and the compromises of parliamentarism deficient for plainly 
defying the principle of bold leadership.  Indeed, voelkisch thinkers dismissed 




mystical concepts of nature and man.”556 Voelkisch thought was an ideology of crisis 
that offered dramatic and radical solutions. Its rejection of materialism and longing 
for a higher, more spiritual society rooted in the essence of the Volk gave it a 
transcendent power but also left it aggrieved and feeling wounded. Voelkisch thinkers 
sought social transformation and “attempted to heal the rupture in the national fabric 
by appealing to the organic Volksstaat, to the common roots of all Germans.”557 They 
aspired to something higher than nineteenth and twentieth century society, an organic, 
nationally conscious Volksgemeinschaft.  
The voelkisch intellectual tradition provided much of the background and 
ideological context of the Erneuerungsbewegung. However, the youth movement in 
Germany was also of key importance in shaping the Erneuerer’s revolt. The 
organizational roots of the German youth movement date from only 1901, when the 
first Wandervoegel chapter was organized as a boys’ hiking club in the Berlin suburb 
of Steglitz. Its “intellectual” or perhaps “cultural” tradition extended far backwards 
into the previous century, however. The Wandervoegel quickly spread and inspired a 
host of imitators and splinter groups.  
Although its principal activities consisted of hiking and singing folk songs, the 
youth movement was radical and viewed itself as such. However, it was also 
conservative in its attitude and represented an embrace of the right. It shared much 
with voelkisch ideology and represented a further turn to the right for youth. The 
youth movement, in which youths sought to organize themselves independent of adult 
supervision, effectively was a movement of rebellion against adulthood and the banal 
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existence of the staid bourgeoisie. The youth groups’ many hikes and excursions out 
from from the cities and into the countryside certainly seemed benign enough and in 
many ways they were. Nevertheless, such excursions also represented a rebellious 
flight from modernity toward nature and a kind of German mysticism. The movement 
celebrated the cult of heroism and the true Germanic man, who felt an instinctive link 
between his soul and nature and the Volk.558  Naturally, the German youth movement 
also worshiped at the altar of the cult of youth, which they saw as vital, potent, 
innovative, and uncorrupted. Where they viewed their parents as bourgeois and 
artificial, members of the youth movement insisted upon their own deeper 
authenticity. Moreover, they insisted upon that authenticity not as individuals but 
rather as members of the collective Volk. There was diversity in the movement, but 
ultimately all agreed that the movement should seek “the renewal of German life and 
culture through the spirit of youth.”559 They would oppose the coldness and 
artificiality of Zivilisation through the embrace of the more genuine Kultur.  
This already radical prewar youth movement in Germany and the potent 
voelkisch ideology of conservative revolution became even more radicalized during 
interwar period, when young men – especially those who had fought in the First 
World War – had to confront military defeat, political chaos, financial collapse, 
economic dislocation, and national dishonor. Rump Austria additionally had to 
contend with the fact of Habsburg deposition, neighboring Slav triumphalism, and the 
humiliating prohibition of its desired Anschluss with Germany. Jobs were scarce 
everywhere. 
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Though they grew up far away in southeastern Europe, the older Swabian 
intellectuals and their younger rivals may be located in the context of this voelkisch 
ideology and the German youth associational life, where many would learn their 
values, gain leadership experience, and become imbued with an ideology that was 
highly anti-liberal. The Erneuerer especially were well acquainted with voelkisch 
ideology and the works of Moeller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler, and Ernst 
Juenger. Likewise, they were seized by the crisis of German civilization after the war. 
Many of the leading Erneuerer had studied abroad, fought as young men in the First 
World War, or both. The Erneuerungsbewegung’s leader, Jakob Awender, for 
example, was born in 1897 and fought in the war as a 17-year-old before studying 
medicine in Graz. Awender had a long history of involvement with the Kulturbund. 
He addressed its 1922 annual congress as a representative of the German academic 
youth and was elected to the Kulturbund’s board in the late 1920s. He and other 
young Swabians were influenced by the political developments in Germany and 
Austria and became disillusioned with the comparatively anemic posture of the 
German leaders in Yugoslavia. Their frustration was exacerbated by the exigencies of 
the Depression and the few career opportunities they encountered in Yugoslavia, 
where a Swabian’s professional options were indeed limited.560 (In Yugoslavia, both 
state and local authorities generally hired only Slavs, business opportunities were 
limited and the original Swabian leaders had no intention of vacating their jobs for the 
next generation.) In fact, many of the above youth trends and intellectual currents 
were imported from Germany proper and locally reinterpreted in Yugoslavia so as to 
suit local dissatisfaction within the German minority there. Thus, the voelkisch 
                                                 




intellectual tradition and current German and Austrian political and social context 
would weigh heavily on the distant Swabian community. 
 
The Pančevoer Post: The Erneuerungsbewegung Finds its Voice 
Alongside the rebelliousness of the incipient youth movement in Yugoslavia, 
frustration with Stefan Kraft and others in the original leadership began to develop 
during the early 1930s and received early expression in the Pančevoer Post. The 
Pančevoer Post began publication in 1932 in preparation for the Kulturbund’s 
upcoming annual congress, which would be held that year in Pančevo. As we have 
seen, only when Jakob Awender took control of the newspaper in January 1933 did 
Pančevoer Post assume its acutely confrontational stance and directly targeted the 
original leadership and their policies. In 1934, the newspaper would rename and 
remake itself as Volksruf, a call to arms for likeminded Swabian dissidents in the 
Kulturbund. The newspaper was widely read, soon becoming second in circulation 
only to Deutsches Volksblatt. 561 The Pančevoer Post quickly made its revolutionary 
agenda clear during its first year and a half under Awender, however, never hesitating 
to challenge the old leadership. Indeed, the Pančevoer Post spoke with a voelkisch 
and radical vocabulary that suggested the German minority’s problems extended 
beyond a few tired old men and that comprehensive reform and even a kind of 
spiritual regeneration were necessary. More than just new leaders,  the Germans of 
Yugoslavia were in need of Erneuerung, comprehensive renewal. 
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 In the Pančevoer Post, Awender and his collaborators gave voice to their 
disagreement with the original leadership, introduced a voelkisch agenda and ideas, 
advocated for the country’s allegedly frustrated German youth, and assured readers 
that the Erneuerungsbewegung was the only path toward achieving a proper 
Volksgemeinschaft, a transcendent form of national community. Drawing from the 
reservoir of voelkisch ideology, these Swabian dissidents claimed the German 
minority was deeply troubled. Its troubles extended beyond the Germans’ leadership, 
they claimed, although that leadership was certainly problematic. Rather, the 
Pančevoer Post complained of a growing malaise among the Germans, a poisonous 
apathy which was enervating Germans as a society and weakening their local 
institutions. The original spirit which had driven the German movement in 
Yugoslavia after the war had expired, they claimed, and had been replaced by 
something pale and bloodless. The voelkisch spirit of the people had atrophied and the 
Swabians had lost their readiness to struggle and sacrifice for their own 
institutions.562 In the original leadership, these Kulturbund dissenters saw not bold 
national activists but stubborn holdovers from a bygone era.  
The Erneuerungsbewegung began as an opposition movement inside the 
Kulturbund. Its criticisms, as we shall see, concerned individuals, ideology, and 
methods but also extended to symbolism and even commemorations. An early article 
in the Pančevoer Post seized upon the 1934 Kulturbund Trachtenfest in Novi Sad as 
representative of their grievances. These once boisterous Kulturbund Trachtenfeste 
had withered in recent years, the Erneuerer complained. Attendance at the 1934 event 
was low and some regions were represented especially poorly. These galas, which 
                                                 




had once served as powerful and popular celebrations of German nationhood and 
traditions, had recently lost their power to inspire and forfeited their capacity to forge 
community. Indeed, “the Novi Sad Trachtenfest, which once inspired hopes that it 
would become a true Volksfest, a festival of the people, has become a purely fancy 
party at which the country folk are hardly represented and could hardly feel 
comfortable. If this development proceeds in the same manner, this “greatest festival 
of the community” will soon become just a ‘costume party’” of Swabian society’s 
upper class. Such criticism was biting on a number of levels. On the one hand, the 
author cast the original leadership as city dwellers who were out of touch with the 
mostly rural Swabians. Such a remark at a time when modernity and especially the 
modern city were considered broadly suspect to many German thinkers and social 
critics was plainly not innocent. Here the Erneuerer’s mouthpiece was openly 
questioning the authenticity of the original leadership’s German national identity and 
implying that that leadership was alien to the eternal, voelkisch virtues of the German 
peasant and his pastoral environment. Trachtenfeste, celebratory vehicles for 
instilling national consciousness and creating true community, were en route to 
becoming decadent costume parties for the Swabian urban elite, the dissidents 
charged. As a remedy, the Pančevoer Post suggested returning more of these 
Volksfeste to the Volk itself. It would really be a blessing, he concluded, if Swabians 
would gradually come to the conviction that a proper Volksfest, which a Trachtenfest 
was supposed to be after all, could only be held in Swabian villages or small towns, 
such that the peasants, who comprised the majority of the Swabian population, could 
really participate.563 
                                                 




 In its criticism of the 1934 Kulturbund Trachtenfest, the Pančevoer Post 
revealed its voelkisch outlook. The modern and corrupt city had stifled expression of 
the authentic German spirit as represented by the Swabian peasant, village and 
landscape. The Trachtenfest article additionally suggested the newspaper’s highly 
topical concern with the quality, nature, and cult of leadership and the mystical 
connection between true leaders and the true Volk. The peculiar genius that was 
German nationhood had been allowed to fade under men more concerned with their 
personal fortunes than the good fortune of the Volk. Swabians, the newspaper 
bemoaned, had an “oligarchic-dictatorial leadership” which had lost contact with the 
people.564 Jakob Awender himself wrote of this alienation and even antagonism 
between the leadership and people in early 1933. The Kulturbund leaders sat in 
splendid isolation in their offices, never venturing out among ordinary Swabians to 
hear their concerns, he snorted.  Theirs was a “bureaucratic dictatorship”, unjustified 
because of its lacking connection to the people. As mass politics were capturing 
whole societies in Europe, Awender sneered that the original leadership’s isolation 
and anemic leadership had rendered it incapable of organizing more than 10 percent 
of the German minority in the Kulturbund.565  
 To be sure, Awender was hardly against dictatorship and was an open admirer 
of Hitler and the Third Reich. He also stated that dictatorship selflessly executed for 
the true good of the Volk first and individuals second could be justified.566 Under his 
editorship, the Pančevoer Post avidly followed German and Nazi Party politics and 
celebrated the qualities of bold leadership. “Fuehrerprinzip,” one such front page 
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article from early 1934, discussed the essence of leadership (Fuehrertum), finding it 
to be absolute faith in ideals, elimination of private desire, responsibility for the fate 
of the Volksgemeinschaft, and indifference toward popularity. “Genius is not 
comprehensible to the masses,” the newspaper warned, noting that in the end it was 
men who made history.567  
One such man, of course, was Adolf Hitler, whose NSDAP assumed power in 
January 1933 and seemed to fulfill the voelkisch yearnings of the most radical 
elements. In Hitler’s revolution, Awender recognized not the mere assumption of 
power by a political party but rather ideological triumph in a clash of world views. “A 
young, committed, corporative unity-idea struggles against a bloodless, self-absorbed, 
thoughtless system of self-interest,” he wrote. In Germany, the Nazi regime had 
demonstrated the triumph of Jungdeutschland and would soon banish the last traces 
of impurity, dishonor, and self-interest from the country. Similar struggles were at 
hand in Austria and Romania, Awender noted, and even Yugoslavia was touched by 
the movement.568 Indeed, the Erneuerer observed throughout their speeches and 
writings that theirs was not just an isolated challenge to a tired old leadership that 
refused to afford the younger generation influence or responsibility. Rather, they were 
part of a broad movement among Europe’s (especially young) Germans to banish an 
outdated system and ideology and usher in a new, purer age of the authentic Volk.  
The liberalism of Weimar and, the Erneuerer implied, of the original 
leadership, was anathema to the purer order for which the voelkisch worldview 
yearned. Liberalism fundamentally privileged the individual over the community, and 
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self-interest over the good of the Volk. It promoted a crass materialist worldview, 
which sprang from a fountain of individualism and egoism. Against such a world 
view, the Erneuerer offered one driven toward the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft, a 
nationally-based community where community interests triumphed over those of the 
selfish individual. Meanwhile, they saw liberal poison as spreading throughout 
Swabian society, blaming it for enervating the Genossenschaften and other German 
associations in Yugoslavia. By encouraging the atomized mentality of the individual, 
liberalism had originally been responsible for the Swabians’ lack of national 
consciousness and later undermined the German national movement in Yugoslavia. 
“Precisely because of its individual-egocentric attitude toward all of life’s problems 
and its disjointedness, because of its atomization of the people, liberalism was and 
remains the greatest danger for our Volk and must be eliminated from our ranks,” they 
asserted. “Therefore, the voelkisch-awoken Swabian people stands in conscious 
opposition to liberalism, possessed by its idealistic community spirit.”569 Ultimately, 
the liberal worldview and the men who held it represented nothing less than betrayal 
of the Volk, the Erneuerer believed.570 “Common-interest before self-interest” 
(Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz) would become a signature slogan of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung, with the clear intention of smearing the original leadership as 
not merely socially irresponsible but positively self-serving and even exploitative. 
Indeed, there was an element of class conflict in the Erneuerungsbewegung-original 
leadership split, since the original leadership tended to be materially well off. They 
were thus vulnerable to criticism before the less wealthy Swabians at a time when 
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everybody in Yugoslavia was still feeling the effects of the world economic crisis. 
The established German leadership, the Erneuerer charged, regularly put themselves 
and their own material well being ahead of the common Swabian good.  
 In addition to revealing their contempt for liberalism and the current 
leadership, which they accused of betraying the German Gemeinschaft, the men at the 
Pančevoer Post openly engaged in the cult of youth, both for youth’s self-evident 
energy but also for the same progressive yet conservative-revolutionary qualities 
ascribed to it by Moeller van den Bruck in The Third Reich and elsewhere.  Owing to 
the popularity and influence of the youth movement in Germany, many voelkisch 
thinkers had fixed upon the power and strength of youth, of course. Under the Nazis, 
virility, youth and the cult of Germanic, young manhood (especially as embodied in 
the heroic, young, male form) would be celebrated in song, word, and even stone. As 
for the Erneuerer, the power of their movement rested upon the Swabian youth, 
whose youth groups were essentially a local manifestation of the overall German 
youth movement and likewise indulged in its rebelliousness against the world of their 
elders. It was their idealism that inspired the Swabian youths’ belief in the 
Fuehrerprinzip and indeed the purity of their own ideas and capacity to lead. Their 
rebellious energy lent their message power and perplexed their elders across every 
section of German society, all of whom noticed there was something different about 
this younger generation and sought either to contain or harness its energy.  
 The men at the Pančevoer Post identified themselves with the Nazis’ 
successes in Germany and thus the victory of the young over the old. In Hitler’s 




“Erneuerung”. Hitler’s appointment, they claimed, had been a victory for himself and 
his party but also for the likeminded men and women of the young generation over 
their opponents, whom they cast as old.571 It also meant more than a change in mere 
administration and herein lay the substance of Erneuerung: the Yugoslav Erneuerer 
were calling not merely for changes in the leadership of Yugoslavia’s Kulturbund and 
economic cooperatives and other organizations. To be sure, the current leadership 
would have to go. However, the essence of the issue was not the replacement of the 
old leadership with new men. Rather, the introduction of a whole new system would 
be unavoidable, they claimed, though they were vague on its details. The rotten must 
be removed, the impure must disappear. “All new methods in the management 
corresponding to the contemporary spirit must find entry into our organization [the 
Kulturbund].” Fortunately, the young were uniquely qualified to lead. “It is already 
about more than the right to collaboration and consultation by the young and naturally 
temperamental generation in the decisive issues of our Volk,” they claimed. “Today it 
is about leadership itself.” Indeed, “the young generation has a more impressive 
national education behind it than can be imagined, to which one should add a decade 
of consistently driven grass roots efforts, which sharpens their outlook.” Furthermore, 
the young leadership cadre looks with consternation on the vacuum, on the airless 
space, which surrounds the old leadership, which appears to have totally lost any 
living contact with the great mass of our Volk.” They continued that “even then, the 
worst bit lies not so much in the innumerable mistakes of the leading personalities of 
our Volk organizations, nor expressly in the almost morbid unification of different 
and internally contradictory offices in a single hand, but rather in the spiritual closing 
                                                 




off of the old leadership against every new idea, against every renewal, against every 
revitalization from the outside.”572 
The leaders of the budding Erneuerungsbewegung were thus calling not 
merely for new leaders (themselves, preferably) but also for new ideas and new 
tactics. The sullied men and methods of the past would be replaced by youth and 
dynamism, both free from liberalism and firmly rooted in voelkisch national 
consciousness. Their struggle was best understood as an intellectually charged 
generational clash, the Pančevoer Post advised, since the conflict derived from 
differences of opinion between the old and the young. The conflict was quite 
obviously more than that, however. “The ‘older generation,’ to which the ‘leaders’ 
with their narrow following belong, have built up organizations that they lead 
according to their ideas and their system and now close off against renewal – from 
wherever it may come – even at the risk of the good of the people; they attempt, 
therefore, to block this eternal cycle of things by every means available to them.” 
Meanwhile, “the younger generation – by which should be understood not people of a 
particular age but rather those who are interested with youthful enthusiasm in the 
good of the nationality/people (Volkstum)" had been shut out of German affairs. As 
outsiders, they saw “many transgressions [by the original leadership] and therefore 
declared war on this ‘older generation.’” Finally, this struggle would lead to a true, 
organized Volksgemeinschaft, they promised, which must be tirelessly implemented 
according to the principle that the “common interest goes before personal interest.”573 
The Pančevoer Post aimed at nothing less than a revolution within Yugoslavia’s 
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German minority. The clash of generations would continue to divide the German 
minority for several contentious years.   
 
The Nature of the Erneuerungsbewegung in Southesastern Europe 
The Erneuerungsbewegung in Yugoslavia did not occur in a vacuum. As we 
have seen, it was predicated upon the voelkisch ideology and German interwar 
indignation. It was further inspired and energized by Hitler’s success in Germany and 
the ongoing National Socialist struggle in Austria. Awender and his colleagues 
consciously viewed themselves as local agents of a broader struggle for Germandom, 
the vanguard of a voelkisch insurgency against staid liberalism, and advocates for the 
future against the past. However, the Erneuerungsbewegung in Yugoslavia also 
received impetus from events in neighboring Romania, with whose German 
population the Yugoslav Swabians shared ties of history, culture, religion and 
kinship.  
Romania’s German population was even more diverse than Yugoslavia’s. In 
addition to hundreds of thousands of Swabians in Banat, it included the ancient 
Transylvanian Saxons as well as a smattering of Germans in Sathmar, Dobrudja, 
Bukovina, and Bessarabia. These Germans in Romania had extensive contacts with 
Germany during the interwar period, and the cities of Transylvania as well as 
Timişoara included a relatively large class of intellectuals, businessmen, and the like. 
Some Romanians such as Richard Csaki, Secretary General of the Stuttgart-based 
Deutsches Ausland-Institut, played important roles in Reich Volkstumarbeit 




come as immigrants during the years of Habsburg settlement, of course, and were 
only recently divided by the political borders reached at Trianon. Even afterward, 
there was considerable exchange between the Swabians in Romania and Yugoslavia, 
the latter of whom would long recall proud Timişoara as a major center of 
Schwabentum in southeastern Europe.  
Like Hungary and Yugoslavia, Romania had begun the interwar period with a 
German leadership that was essentially moderate and pragmatist. The Transylvanian 
Saxon Rudolf Brandsch founded the Association of Germans in Romania (Verband 
der Deutschen in Rumaenien) in 1921 to manage German affairs there, and this 
organization enjoyed reasonably good relations with the government for some time. 
Indeed, Romania’s Germans probably had the best relationship with their government 
of all the German minorities in southeastern Europe. However, the interwar period 
was characterized by extremism in Romania just as it was everywhere else and the 
success of National Socialism created local admirers and imitators there. A Nazi-
inclined body first appeared in the 1920s in the form of Fritz Fabritius’ “self-help” 
movement. As Hitler consolidated power in Germany, Fabritus’ self-help movement 
drifted toward Nazi sympathy and even self-identification, finally renaming itself the 
National Socialist Renewal Movement of the Germans in Romania 
(Nazionalsozialistische Erneuerungsbewegung der Deutschen in Rumaenien) in 1934. 
This Romanian German Erneuerungsbewegung then began its own insurgency, 
seeking control of the Association of Germans in Romania and its highest office for 
Fabritius.  Despite considerable resistance in conservative (mostly Swabian Catholic) 




that Fabritus succeeded in taking over its presidency. The German minority in 
Romania would remain riven by internal divisions and subject to Reich interference 
in the coming years. Nevertheless, the Romanian Germans’ Erneuerungsbewegung 
provided clear inspiration for their coethnics in Yugoslavia, who took notice of its 
struggles and successes. Awender and other Erneuerer at the Pančevoer Post regarded 
Fabritius’ movement as a model and recognized a dynamic at work in Romania which 
they plainly believed applicable in Yugoslavia.574  
Ultimately, the Yugoslav Erneuerer’s insurgency was a clash of generations 
and the Erneuerer consciously framed their insurrection in terms of the young and 
old, the new and outmoded. It became an external assault on the Kulturbund but the 
movement began as internal opposition within that organization. Awender’s harsh 
criticism of Kraft and his colleagues had additional roots in economic affairs, 
specifically in the Genossenschaften, which many believed were being mismanaged 
under Kraft’s leadership. The insurrection was furthermore about jobs, since many 
leading Erneuerer felt locked out of leadership and, thus, jobs by their elders. 
Although Awender and his colleagues at the Pančevoer Post and later Volksruf 
claimed to speak for all Erneuerer, and though Awender was commonly recognized 
as the movement’s leader, the Erneuerungsbewegung was not a typical organization 
with statutes, rules, procedures, etc. like the Kulturbund. The Erneuerungsbeweung, 
thus, became more than a typical opposition movement but less than a formal (or 
legal) organization or party. To the degree that it had local chapters, these often began 
as Kulturbund youth groups which young Erneuerer simply infiltrated and 
“converted.” In fact, it quickly became the Erneuerungsbewegung’s goal to convince 
                                                 




Kulturbund youth groups and even whole Kulturbund chapters, to publicly embrace 
their Kameradschaft der Erneuerungsbewegung. In point of fact, the Erneuerer had 
been responsible for founding some of these Kulturbund youth groups or local 
chapters to begin with.  
Despite its open enthusiasm for Hitler and National Socialism, the Yugoslav 
Erneuerungsbewegung was not created or installed by the Nazis. Indeed, many in the 
NSDAP and especially such official Reich bodies as the Foreign Ministry long 
regarded the Erneuerer as a nuisance whose insurrection in Yugoslavia threatened to 
complicate relations between that country and Germany.  Despite its obvious 
admiration for German National Socialism, the Erneuerungsbewegung had 
indigenous roots and reflected local concerns, such as hostility to Magyars. 
Nevertheless, the movement plainly embraced National Socialism and should be 
viewed as a local manifestation of deep Nazi sympathy, if not exactly an openly Nazi 
party. Although its leaders sought to portray the movement as monolithic, differences 
existed within its ranks and in time a more “moderate” wing emerged alongside the 
“radicals” behind Awender, as we shall see.575 The Erneuererungsbewegung, thus, 
was an extreme expression of voelkisch as well as homeland German nationalism, and 
its adherents became infamous for their preference for confrontational methods and 
impatience with “decadent” liberalism, democracy, and the like.  
The Erneuerungsbewegung was also paradoxical. It was a simple expression of 
rebellion against authority at the same time that it championed “German” discipline 
and spoke in a militaristic idiom of struggle and Kameradschaft. The latter clearly 
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reflected the influence of the experience of the First World War on the 
Erneuerungsbewegung’s members who had been soldiers during the conflict. Indeed, 
the Erneuerer proudly referred to one another as “Kameraden.” Thus, the 
Erneuerungsbewegung must also be seen in many ways as a local expression or 
outgrowth of the broader German youth movement, which became popular in 
Germany before the First World War and somewhat later in southeastern Europe 
(especially in Romania). Youth groups assumed various forms among Yugoslavia’s 
Germans, including Catholic and Protestant varieties as well as those youth groups 
within the Kulturbund itself. However, the loose Kameradschaft der 
Erneuerungsbewegung gradually proved to be the most formidable strain of the youth 
movement in Yugoslavia, attracting defectors from the religious youth groups and so 
infiltrating the youth groups of many Kulturbund chapters that the original leadership 
ultimately would have to disband them. In sum, then, these youth movements in 
Yugoslavia were indigenous affairs, but they also had important connections to 
German youth abroad, especially in Germany, Austria and Romania.  
Finally, the Erneuerer’s insurgency and the original leadership’s resistance to it. was 
also a dispute over methods. The original leadership argued for more moderate tactics 
and cooperation with the Yugoslav authorities. The Erneuerer, however, embraced 
more disruptive methods, displays of numerical strength, manifestations of defiance, 
provocative confrontations, and a proud renunciation of parliamentarism, which they 
believed had achieved nothing for the German minority. The Erneuerungsbewegung 
was a generational clash but also a clash of world views (though, as will be further 




themselves). It was an assault on liberalism and tolerance. It was a revolt by young 
intellectuals against older intellectuals. It was a bid for power. It was also highly 
personal. 
 
The Expansion of Youth Groups in the 1930s 
As we have seen, many Swabians who studied in Austria and Germany later 
became influential leaders in the German national movement both before and 
especially after 1918. Men such as Stefan Kraft had been members of the Association 
of German University Students from the Lands of the Hungarian Crown in Vienna, in 
which they had been particularly influenced by that organization’s guiding spirit, the 
Swabian nationalist author Adam Mueller-Gutenbrunn. It was largely through these 
Swabian students, thus, that German nationalism and voelkisch thought made their 
way to Yugoslavia. During their studies abroad these men naturally would also have 
become aware of the German youth movement and especially the Wandervoegel. 
Upon their return home, however, they did not seek to recreate that movement which, 
with a few partial exceptions, did not develop in Yugoslavia until the 1930s. In sum, 
the Swabian boys who studied before the First World War had imbibed a diet of 
nationalism and had at least learned the idiom of the voelkisch ideology. The 
generation of students which succeeded them in the radicalized environment of the 
1920s and 1930s would return home as bearers of National Socialism’s neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung and seek out other youths receptive to their message.576 
                                                 




Despite the existence of a handful of Wandervoegel-inspired groups, the 
German youth movement in Yugoslavia would not really take off until the 1930s.577 
Swabians who had studied abroad were the true drivers of the movement, inspired as 
they were by the dynamic and radical youth movement they had seen in Germany and 
Austria.  After 1931, the relegalized Kulturbund also turned to the matter of German 
youth, which it urgently wished to organize under its auspices. As we have seen, the 
Kulturbund already contained a number of youth groups.578 Besides some gymnastics 
and sports clubs, a number of youth groups, (girls’ sections, boys’ sections, and 
young sport groups) had formed in or merged into the Kulturbund.  At the 1933 
annual congress, however, the Kulturbund resolved to address youth matters more 
intently and adopted the slogan “Youth forward!”579 In May of the following year, the 
Kulturbund’s various youth organizations were gathered into the Association of 
German Youth in the Swabian-German Kulturbund (Verband der Deutschen Jugend 
im Schwaebisch-Deutschen Kulturbund or VDJ). The leader of the Kulturbund’s 
Sport Association (Verband der Sportvereine), Thomas Menrath, was appointed the 
VDJ’s head or “Youth Leader” (Jugendleiter). Altogether, there were 102 youth 
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groups of some type in the Kulturbund by the 1934 annual congress, showing that the 
Kulturbund well recognized the importance of organizing contemporary youth.  
Graphic from the 1933/34 Arbeit des Kulturbundes showing the increasing number of Kulturbund 





Frauenarbeit: Women in the Kulturbund 
Like youth, women became increasingly visible in the Kulturbund during the 
1930s. True, women had not featured prominently in either the original leadership of 
the Kulturbund or that of its subsequent challengers, the Erneuerer. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that women and girls were involved in the German national 
movement from its early years and ultimately came to form a significant portion of 
the Kulturbund’s membership and the Erneuererungsbewegung’s adherents. To be 
                                                 




sure, the Kulturbund, KWVD and Erneuerungsbewegung were dominated by and 
primarily oriented to males. Nevertheless, the original Swabian activists and later 
Erneuerer sought to integrate women into their movements and mobilize them for 
their causes. During the Kulturbund’s first decade, women were especially involved 
in the Kulturbund’s charity work and were essential participants at every Trachtenfest 
and annual congress. Women also participated in other Kulturbund gatherings, albeit 
usually in a secondary capacity. At all such events, women would have been exposed 
to the same speeches and relentless appeal for Swabians to embrace their German 
national identity and recognize the boundaries of their natural community as national. 
Moreover, since the German community was largely based on the German language 
and the collective memory of Swabians’ colonist ancestry, women were assigned 
special roles as mothers and the preservers of tradition and language in the home. 
 Early women’s sections in the Kulturbund, known as Frauenabteilungen, 
were founded in Zrenjanin in 1923 and in Bela Crkva and Novi Sad shortly thereafter. 
In the 1930s, the Kulturbund increased its appeal to women and girls and encouraged 
the development of yet more sections specifically for them. Such sections were 
initially few in number, however, and were furthermore slow to develop. Surveying 
the state of Frauenarbeit in 1934, the Kulturbund’s annual report observed that the 
German movement had had only a marginal appeal for the country’s German women 
during the first interwar decade. The German national idea had only started to appeal 
to the Swabian male population during the war and initial postwar years, the report 
noted, and was slower to develop among Yugoslavia’s Swabian women, who had not 




situation was abetted by the general lack of nationally conscious women leaders. 
Moreover, women did not immediately recognize the exceptional nature of the 
Kulturbund as a specifically nationally-based organization in the initial interwar 
years. Women were especially skeptical of the Kulturbund in the cities, where they 
had long belonged women’s voluntary associations involved in charity work.581 Such 
preexisting associations had frequently been confessionally-based and therefore 
contained many non-Germans. Thus, it was necessary to instill in women the idea 
that, in addition to normal social work, the auslandsdeutsche Frau had other, 
specifically national duties, which could only be successfully carried out within the 
Kulturbund.582   
Following the reapproval of the Kulturbund’s statutes in 1931, several more 
women’s sections were established across Yugoslavia’s German-settled regions, 
including in Torža, Velimirovac, Sombor, Belgrade, and the Slovene cities of 
Maribor and Celje. By 1934, the Kulturbund also boasted seventeen 
Maedchenabteilungen, sections specifically devoted to girls and parallel to the far 
larger number of Sportabteilungen and Jugendgruppen. As the idea of a special role 
for women developed in the Kulturbund, the number of both women’s and girls’ 
sections grew accordingly, and the organization began training young women to lead 
them. The Kulturbund’s annual report noted in 1934 that Swabian women had 
increasingly come to recognize “their mission as an auslandsdeutsche woman and 
mother.” Indeed, working with the Kulturbund was nothing less than a “national 
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duty” for Swabian women.583 Still, women were always slower than men to become 
institutionally involved in Kulturbund affairs.  
 The Kulturbund’s women’s sections were typically involved in charitable 
work, especially the Kulturbund’s annual Winterhilfswerk campaign “Brueder in not” 
(“Brothers in Distress”) during the 1930s. Likewise, they cooperated with the 
Belgrade “Kinder aufs Land” program (“Children to the Countryside”), which was 
designed to enable Belgrade’s Swabian children to spend summers in the Vojvodinian 
countryside.584 They additionally engaged in charitable activities at Christmastime, 
taking up collections and distributing presents to needy Swabian children. In some 
cases women’s groups organized folk dance groups and groups in which to sing 
German Volkslieder. They helped organize mothers’ day celebrations and festivals for 
children, which frequently were major public events. Moreover, they organized 
informational events, such as lectures on public health and the family.  
In doing such charity work, Yugoslavia’s Swabian women continued their 
labors in a familiar field but did so in a slightly changed way. Where before they 
might have participated in multi-ethnic but mono-confessional associations, Swabian 
Catholic and Protestant women in the Kulturbund now mixed based expressly on the 
basis of their common ethnicity. Moreover, the boundaries of their community and 
the beneficiaries of their charitable work henceforth also would be specifically 
defined by German ethnicity. Indeed, the Kulturbund insisted on the German national 
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orientation of women’s groups and meetings under its auspices, stipulating that there 
should “never be a gathering without a short lecture, never a meeting without a 
serious discussion among all members about the great questions of our German 
life.”585 
The above notwithstanding, the Kulturbund’s new Frauenarbeit reflected a 
very traditional understanding of women’s place and role in society, the family, and 
the German community.  All Swabian activists were principally concerned with 
preserving German traditions and increasing Swabian numbers. Thus, though there 
was a public, political aspect to their national movement, that movement also had to 
be carried out in an intimate and intensely personal space as well. During an era when 
German language schooling or religious services were frequently unavailable, the 
primary venue for the instillation of the German spirit and language in Swabian 
children was necessarily the home. Thus, motherhood and the domestic sphere 
assumed great importance for the German national movement in Yugoslavia. Women, 
understood as mothers, were of essential importance in the literal reproduction of 
Swabians and the transmission of German customs, language and values across 
generations. They were encouraged to have large families, and the mothers of 
particularly kinderreich families, that is families with many children, were extolled in 
print, in sermons, and at the Kulturbund’s annual congresses.  
By the mid-1930s, the Kulturbund’s leaders had come to consider 
Frauenarbeit essential to their movement’s overall success. But as much as the 
Kulturbund’s leadership encouraged women to join its new women’s sections, it 
clearly had traditional ideas about the nature of their work. According to the 
                                                 




Kulturbund’s 1937 annual report, Frauenarbeit should remain limited to those 
specific areas “predestined” for women in society and should not seek to compete 
with men’s activities.586  Women were important for their supposedly innate, 
nurturing qualities and their unique capacity for charity and support. For all the talk 
of the vital role of women in the work of the Kulturbund, organized Frauenarbeit, it 
was clear, would remain women’s work.  
 
 
The Erneuerungsbewegung Bids for Control of the Kulturbund 
Everyone knew there was going to be trouble at the Kulturbund’s annual 
congress in 1934. The Erneuerer had continued their agitation throughout the year 
and had become even more strident with the transformation of the Pančevoer Post 
into Volksruf in August 1934, as we shall see below. Young Swabians were 
particularly receptive to the Erneuerer’s message, and the movement, such as it were, 
steadily gathered Swabian adherents in schools and youth groups. Although the 
Kulturbund had no doubt sought to bring the country’s German youth groups under 
its wings partly as a means to control them and harness their energy, the fact is that 
the youth were very susceptible to the Erneuerer’s rebellious message, and the many 
Kulturbund youth groups frequently served as avenues of infiltration for the 
Erneuerungsbewegung. As such, 1934 would witness the first year of several 
showdowns between the Erneuerer and the original leadership. However, where in 
past years the Erneuerer had limited themselves to loud demands and blistering 
criticism, in 1934 they would make an organized bid for control of the organization.  
                                                 




 In August, the editors of the Pančevoer Post launched Volksruf, a more 
substantial newspaper which would loudly proclaim the Erneuerer’s message from 
Banat to Slovenia and become the second most widely read German newspapers in 
the country.587 In one sense, Volksruf was merely a renamed and expanded Pančevoer 
Post. However, its launch signaled that the Erneuerer would intensify their message 
and seek to expand their voice to all parts of the German settlement area. The 
Pančevoer Post’s key staff remained, especially founder and Pančevo Kulturbund 
chairman Simon Bartman and editor Jakob Awender. Its new masthead now 
describing Volksruf as the “organ for voelkisch renewal”, the new newspaper proudly 
declared that it stood above differences of class and confession and asserted it would 
defend the usual litany of national concerns such as language, Heimat, and the like.588 
To this Volksruf added intense anti-liberalism, hysterical opposition toward 
Magyarization, anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, intolerance of Auchdeutsche, and 
several eponymous essays on “Race, Volk and Nation.” Volksruf intensified the 
editorial line of its titular predecessor and revealed itself as even more voelkisch. In 
1934 the newspaper also introduced several of the principle Erneuerer, such as 
Gustav Halwax and Fritz Metzger, who would later so antagonize the original 
leadership and soon became regular contributors of ideological essays and 
Kulturbund criticism to its pages. In its premier issue, for example, Hans Thurn 
championed “Peasant (Bauerliches) Thought and Life” and asserted that the two 
“most elementary goods of every Volk [were] blood and soil.” Thurn called for an 
Erneuerungsfront and inveighed against liberalism and the “German-blooded” 
                                                 
587  Bešlin. 7. 




(meaning ethnically German but not politically so – a sneer) intelligentsia who had 
long imparted a sense of inferiority among the Swabians of Yugoslavia and otherwise 
facilitated Magyarizaion and German decline.589 As we shall see in Chapter Eight, 
Volksruf also voiced severe criticism of Catholicism during 1934 and was particularly 
critical of the Swabian Catholic clergy.  
The Pančevoer Post’s attention to the affairs of other ethnic Germans abroad 
persisted in Volksruf, which included coverage of Konrad Henlein, leader of the 
Sudeten Heimatsfront in Czechoslovakia already in 1934. (Deutsches Volksblatt also 
followed the Henlein movement with great interest.) Likewise, Volksruf remained 
attuned to German affairs in neighboring Romania where it breathlessly followed the 
progress of the Romanian Germans’ Erneuerungsbewegung. The newspaper’s 
criticisms of the principal Swabian body there, the Volksrat, were clearly intended to 
suggest parallels to the original leadership in Yugoslavia while also locating the 
Yugoslav Erneuerungsbewegung in the context of a transborder German revolution. 
In Romania, Volksruf claimed, the old German leadership (of the Volksrat) had “gone 
to sleep.” Why? Because the “representatives of the old system” believed themselves 
more capable of leadership than the younger generation of Erneuerer and had 
consequently excluded them from decision-making. Here Volksruf basically accused 
the older German leaders in Romania of being ineffective, out of touch, indifferent, 
and enjoying the creature comforts of power without much thought for defending 
common German interests. The “old leadership’s” defense of the “System” there 
consisted of slander and denunciation and was nothing short of open treason, which 
                                                 




ultimately undermined the Volk, Volksruf charged.  The parallels to Yugoslavia which 
Volksruf hoped to draw were obvious.  
In the months leading up to the Kulturbund’s 1934 annual congress, there was 
plenty to suggest that the event would not be the sort of self-congratulatory affair it 
had been in the past. The Convention of University Students (Akademikertagung) in 
September, for example, revealed the simmering discontent among the young, 
educated, and ambitious Swabians in the country. This meeting was actually the 
annual gathering of the Kulturbund’s National Association of German University 
Students in Yugoslavia. (Landesverbandes der Deutschen Akademiker in 
Suedslawien). Looking back on the event, Deutsches Volksblatt quietly noted this 
discontent and provided a remarkable snapshot of the young generation in the eyes of 
the establishment. “They act as if they are different by disposition and temperament,” 
the newspaper observed. “One group seeks to realize the ambitions of the past and 
build up what is at hand. Others seek to invigorate what has already been achieved 
though a new impetus, a new thrust of power. Finally, there is a third group which 
rejects the old as failed in many ways and is determined to pursue fundamentally new 
paths.”590 Ultimately, the dissatisfaction the students expressed with the original 
leadership at the university student convention was all the more important since the 
National Association of German University Students was actually a Kulturbund body. 
As such, their discontent represented another expression of dissatisfaction with the 
organization’s leadership from within. 
 
                                                 




Scenes from the 1936 Annual Congress of the Kulturbund in Novi Sad’s Habag Haus. Bottom center 
and right, Keks congratulates particularly large German families.591  
 
Although Awender and likeminded men on the Kulturbund’s board had 
expressed criticism of the men and methods of the original leadership at the 
Kulturbund annual congresses in the past, 1934 marked the year when he and his 
allies would first make an organized bid to gain control of the organization. They 
hoped to gain control of the Kulturbund’s board and thus the helm of the 
organization. At the same time, they hoped to install their Kamerad Jakob 
Lichtenberger as Youth Leader (Jungendleiter). The current leadership of the 
organization, on the other hand, naturally sought to prevent their young rivals from 
achieving either objective. Their victory would be both partial and impermanent. 
To read coverage of the 1934 Kulturbund annual congress in Deutsches 
Volksblatt, little out of the ordinary seems to have occurred at this meeting of the 
Kulturbund and its sub-associations, the Association of German Youth (VDJ), the 
German Choral Union (Deutscher Saengerbund), the Association of German 
Libraries (Verband deutscher Volksbuecherein), the Doctors’ Section (Aerztesektion), 
and German Women (Deutsche Frauen). The meeting of the VDJ was particularly 
                                                 




well attended, featuring around 250 youths from 50 youth groups. At this meeting, 
according to Deutsches Volksblatt, Thomas Menrath orderly resigned his post as 
Jugendleiter, which he claimed he had always considered a temporary position. 
(Menrath’s residency in Novi Vrbas, the Kulturbund’s unofficial mouthpiece 
explained, made his compliance impossible with the organization’s statutory 
requirement that the Jugendleiter have his headquarters in Novi Sad.) The meeting 
then elected Jakob Lichtenberger as his replacement. Later at several important 
meetings of the Kulturbund leadership there was much discussion about whom to 
select as new board members. According to the Kulturbund’s statutes, one half of the 
board members were required to resign and be replaced. A great debate erupted over 
the list of board candidates proposed by the Kulturbund leadership, when some local 
chapters requested that some proposed candidates be replaced by others. After much 
consideration, the leadership settled upon its own, original list, which then won 
majority approval.  
Although Deutsches Volksblatt did not report it directly, one of the men to 
lose his seat on the board at this annual Kulturbund congress was Jakob Awender. 
Indeed, from the newspaper’s coverage it would seem the only thing notable about 
the annual congress was that it featured heavy attendance and especially heavy 
participation by German youth. Deutsches Volksblatt positively cited the presence of 
so many young people as proof “that the seed, which the older fighters sowed for our 
nationality has not fallen on infertile ground.” However, not all was well with the 
youth at this annual congress, Deutsches Volksblatt observed. “The brashness and 




than was absolutely necessary. But one found oneself over and over in the most 
serious concern and work for our Volkstum, which young and old, experienced 
pioneers and young, enthusiastic fighters, each in his way, shared in the same devoted 
readiness for duty.”592 
The Erneuerer, by contrast, covered the 1934 Kulturbund annual congress in 
Volksruf as if two armies had clashed there. As we have seen, the Erneuerer spoke a 
hyperbolic idiom of confrontation and rebellion. In their speeches and writings, they 
attached a sense of inevitability to their movement, finding nobility in struggle and 
asserting that their perseverance made victory unavoidable. In the weeks before the 
annual congress, they noted much alleged popular distrust of the original leadership 
and called for a “total turn away from the hitherto liberal, capitalistic-Marxist way of 
thinking represented by our leaders.”593 On the eve of the event, Awender intoned 
that important tasks would be faced at the Kulturbund’s annual meeting, “upon whose 
resolution depended the Volkstuemlichkeit of the Kulturbund and the deepening of the 
voelkisch sentiment inside the Volksgruppe.” Proponents of a voelksiche Erneurerung 
would push their agenda and fully expected confrontation with the recalcitrant 
original leadership.594 
 Volksruf described the youth convention, that is the meeting of the VDJ, in 
very different terms than Deutsches Volksblatt. The Erneuerer called it a kind of 
insurrection where impatient youths demanded an end to hollow procedure and false 
debate, as well as Lichtenberger’s immediate election as Jugendleiter. In this, 
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Volksruf claimed, Lichtenberger allegedly commanded unanimous support save for a 
few misguided Herren, leading to inevitable conflict. After some shouting, 
Lichtenberger eventually was elected Jugendleiter, of course, but the scene hardly 
resembled its banal presentation in Deutsches Volksblatt. Although that newspaper 
had promised that Menrath would retain a role in Jugendarbeit, Lichtenberger’s 
comments at the event as reproduced in Volksruf suggested a dramatically new 
course. He promised the most far-reaching independence for Jugendarbeit in the 
future, ominously noting that the Kulturbund leadership well knew him and his 
views.595 
 As well as offering a long-shot at leadership, the 1934 Kulturbund annual 
congress provided the Erneuerer a platform from which to announce their principles 
and demands. As such, Erneuer Fritz Metzger rose at the Kulturbund board meeting 
and called for a new and primary emphasis on “social and biological 
Volkstumarbeit”, provoking heated controversy. Along with accusations of 
inexperience, board members also reproached Metzger and his Kameraden of 
copying “foreign” ideas and brash methods, which did not correspond to the 
circumstance of Germans in Yugoslavia. Naturally, the Erneuerer rejected such 
criticism, but the accusations were nevertheless significant for they revealed the 
original leadership to retain a local sensibility even as they championed German 
national identity and even endorsed Adolf Hitler’s Germany. (As we shall see, the 
original Swabian activists may not have been National Socialists, but neither were 
they immune to admiration for the Third Reich.) The Erneuerer, for their part,  
announced that the ideas and methods in question were not foreign at all but rather 
                                                 




were German, and that they need not “copy” them since they already held them as 
Germans themselves. The Erneuerer dismissed Kulturbund leadership’s list of 
proposed board members as inconsistent with the will of the Volk. As for their own 
list, they acknowledged that it had “stood in a most bitter battle,” which was 
generously to say that it had had little chance of victory.  
Unbowed, Awender rejected accusations that he and his colleagues were 
causing divisions in the German minority even as they insistently rejected 
compromise. “For us its about the idea and totality, about our principles and their 
comprehensiveness,” they screamed. In the end, the Erneuerer had to acknowledge 
the decisive defeat of their candidate list by that of the Kulturbund leadership, 271 
votes to 165.596 The Erneuerer’s insurgency was thus halted at the Kulturbund’s 
annual congress in late 1934. Nevertheless, that the Erneuerer secured so many votes 
plainly demonstrated that their movement was gaining adherents.  
The 1934 annual congress would have a lasting impact, the Erneuerer 
promised, and the event did mark a deepening and hardening of the divisions in the 
Volksgruppe. Indeed, 1934 was a kind of breakout year for the internal crisis that 
would dominate the German minority for so much of the 1930s. Though defeated at 
the annual Kulturbund congress, the Erneuerer resolved to continue striving for a 
“deepening of the voelkisch thought according to volksbiologisch, nation-specific, 
social and earthbound views.” Meanwhile, the Erneuerer’s opponents both within and 
without the Kulturbund were forced to take notice of their growing influence.  
 Obviously, the original leadership was disappointed (and probably quite 
perplexed) by the ire being directed their way by the Erneuerer’s leaders and their 
                                                 




many young sympathizers. During the 1920s they had encountered resistance to their 
German movement by Magyarones, Serbs, and Croats for being too nationalist, but 
the appearance of the Erneuerer marked the first time that they were challenged for 
not being nationalist enough. It was an unexpected and unwelcome change of affairs 
to say the least.  
The original leadership at first used the courts to repulse Awender’s early 
challenges, which were economic. As we have seen, German life in the 1930s was 
also characterized by a sophisticated system of economic cooperatives or 
Genossenschaften, the largest of which was the agricultural cooperative Agraria. As 
one might expect, the original Swabian activists and their associates, above all Stefan 
Kraft, held leading positions in these cooperatives, which faced difficult times as the 
world economic crisis lingered on in Yugoslavia. Indeed, the economic depression 
highlighted the gap between well to do Swabians such as Kraft and their poorer or 
younger co-ethnics in Yugoslavia. It is in part for this reason that the Erneuerer so 
often derided the original leadership as “big wigs” or “fat cats” who allegedly put 
their own self-interest (Eigennutz) before the Swabians collective interest 
(Gemeinnutz). The wealthier and more established Swabians tended during these 
tough times to remain committed to the original leadership. However, the younger 
and less well to do elements of society, whose circumstances visibly deteriorated with 
the Depression, became more susceptible to radical solutions to the Swabians’ social 
and economic circumstances.597 Recognizing this, Awender and his associates did not 
shy from personal or professional criticism of the original leadership in 
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Genossenschaften matters, prompting Kraft, Grassl Moser and Keks to drag him 
before a court of honor (Ehrengericht) in 1933, where he was convicted of slander 
and his accusations formally dismissed.598 As in the case of Nikolas Hasslinger, then, 
the original leadership was quick to resort to the courts to defend itself against 
unsubstantiated criticism of their leadership. Not all the criticism was specious, 
however. Leadership was controlled by few enough men that accusations of oligarchy 
did not always seem far fetched. And the German cooperatives, like society in 
general, endured difficult times during these years, prompting some popular 
resentment and suspicions of mismanagement. 
Besides legal remedies, the original leadership fought back against the 
Erneuerer in the press they controlled. At first they sought to ignore their young 
challengers in the press, but shortly after the debut of the Pančevoer Post they 
denounced the young “well-poisoners” as imperiling the national unity necessitated 
by the Germans’ minority status in Yugoslavia.599  The original leadership’s principle 
resistance strategy during the Ereneuerungbewegung’s early years consisted of 
charging its critics with being negative, naïve, inexperienced, and endangering 
German unity. The veteran national activists juxtaposed their own experience against 
the mere zeal of youth, warning that the latter would likely bring harm to the 
minority.600 Thomas Menrath, the future Kulturbund Jugendleiter, recognized the 
unfortunate irony of the situation when he observed that Swabians had formerly 
lamented the lack of educated Germans in Yugoslavia and dreamt of what the 
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minority could accomplish if only it had a broader intelligentsia. Now such a 
generation of university students had indeed emerged, but its energies were being 
squandered on its own pretensions to leadership as well as the creation of distrust 
between the Kulturbund leadership and the people. Dismissing calls by these “self-
selected leaders of an uncertain future,” Menrath recalled the important innovations 
and accomplishments of the original leadership, noting that despite some failures, 
much had been achieved. “Who,” he asked “empowered [the Erneuerer] out of the 
almost 500 university students of our country to be the torchbearers and sole 
enlightened leaders to a better future?”601  
The Kulturbund leaders also reminded Swabians of their many 
accomplishments and sacrifices for the Swabian Volk, which was one reason for the 
production of such an impressive annual report at the 1934 annual congress. Not 
insignificantly, this lavishly produced report included a historical overview of the 
Kulturbund’s costly achievements under the steady hand of Grassl, Keks and others. 
Meanwhile, Deutsches Volksblatt warned that “in its zeal, the Swabian youth looks 
only forward and is all too easily inclined to undervalue or at best accept the 
achievements of its forbearers as a given.”602 Worse, the Erneuerer’s brashness and 
bellicosity drew unwanted, even hostile attention to the German minority. 
 Matters came to a head several times during 1935. In the wake of the 1934 
annual congress, the Erneuerer claimed that their defeat there, which they considered 
a temporary setback, would only strengthen their movement. Likewise, the original 
leadership recognized that the challenge of the Erneuerungsbewegung was far from 
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neutralized and planned measures to exclude its influence from the Kulturbund as 
much as possible in the future. As we shall see, these efforts crystallized in January, 
July and October of 1935, revealing both the lasting authority of the original 
leadership as well as the momentum of the forces arrayed against them. 
Simultaneously, the original leadership complained to the increasingly complex array 
of Reich and NSDAP bodies about the Erneuerungsbewegung, whose activities were 
proving to be quite disruptive. That year, Grassl wrote to the German Foreign 
Ministry demanding that the Reich recognize the Kulturbund’s leading role in 
Swabian affairs and appealing to Rudolf Hess to restrain further meddling in Swabian 
affairs by the Reich-based groups and organizations.603  
As we shall develop in the following chapter, the organizations and nature of 
Volkstumarbeit altered considerably following the Nazis’ accession to power and the 
general Gleichschaltung of German society and organizational life. Although the 
sympathy of the German Foreign Ministry still was with the Kulturbund’s original 
leadership, their brash challengers in the Erneuerungsbewegung also had admirers 
and even supporters in various official state or party bodies and nominally unofficial 
Volkstumarbeit organizations. Indeed, the Erneuerer had had supporters in the Reich 
from the very beginning, support which gradually increased. The Erneuerer 
conducted talks with the VDA during the spring of 1935 and found understanding and 
support there. The VDA had had some Nazi connections even in the years before 
Hitler’s accession in 1933. Nevertheless, the VDA recommended that the Erneuerer 
handle its disagreements with the original leadership in a restrained fashion.604 Thus 
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though they might have found intellectual allies, the Erneuerer were encouraged to 
tread softly so as to not rock to the boat and disturb relations between Germany and 
Yugoslavia. Although it is ostensibly a force for co-ethnics abroad, homeland 
nationalism frequently prioritizes the interests of the homeland itself, as Rogers 
Brubaker has observed. Under the Nazis, German homeland nationalism served the 
interests of the Reich itself, which desired placid foreign relations. The wishes of the 
ideologically related Germans in Yugoslavia were secondary. As such the official and 
unofficial German organs of Volkstumarbeit would continue to back the original 
leadership, for the time being at least. 
 
The First Countermeasures against the Erneuerer, 1935 
The original leadership did not wait long after the December 1934 annual 
congress to take countermeasures against the Erneuerungsbewegung. Meeting on 
January 13 of the following year, the Kulturbund leadership resolved to expel the 
movement’s principle leaders from the organization. Although the expulsion was 
supposedly temporary, the reasons given for it eliminated the likelihood of a prompt 
return.  Jakob Awender, Gustav Halwax, Georg Henlein, and Hans Thurn were to be 
expelled in accordance with the Kulturbund’s statutes for activities damaging to the 
goals of the organization. In announcing its decision, the Kulturbund leadership 
explained that Awender’s newspaper, Volksruf, had long pursued such broad, 
unfounded and slanderous attacks on the leadership of Yugoslavia’s German 
organizations that it had cast aspersions upon the whole Kulturbund itself. They 




innocent and his opposition not loyal, as Volksruf had plainly showed as of late. His 
statements and behavior at the 1934 annual congress had been the final straw. “Dr. 
Jakob Awender raises the comprehensive claim to the leadership of the Kulturbund 
without . . . possessing a clear vision of how the work should be directed,” Deutsches 
Volksblatt charged. He knows only “that the development of the Kulturbund and 
thereby the good of our entire Volksgruppe shall not be ensured through peaceful and 
harmonious cooperation with all Volksgenossen, but rather should be aspired to 
through reckless struggle on an uncompromising path toward totality.” To this end, 
Awender had even recklessly raised doubts about the Kulturbund’s Yugoslav-loyalty 
and reputation, the Kulturbund board complained. In order to prevent him from 
damaging or even destroying the Kulturbund as the kernel of Yugoslavia’s German 
community, he had to go.605 Through the expulsions, the Kulturbund leadership 
hoped that the Erneuerer’s illegitimacy would resound throughout the organization’s 
many local chapters and the generally conservative Swabian population at large. The 
move also had the added benefit of making the Erneuerungsbewegung technically 
illegal. 
 Shortly after the Kulturbund leadership’s announcement banishing the 
Erneuerer, Chairman Keks submitted a lengthy essay on Erneuerung to Deutsches 
Volksblatt, in which he effectively sought to seize the mantel of national renewal for 
himself and his colleagues. They were the original “Erneuerer” who had led the 
country’s ethnic Germans back to national consciousness, he argued. “The hour of 
birth of the voelkische renewal of the German minority in Yugoslavia lies in the year 
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1918.” Indeed, “in the horrible experiences of the great global bloodbath, everything 
unnatural and artificial which had been forced upon [the Swabian Volk] fell off. The 
blinders which had prevented it from clearly perceiving its badly threatened situation 
also fell from its eyes and [the Volk] found its way back to its own nature.” Through 
its suffering during the war, “the voice of blood spoke and led back to the path 
already abandoned by many Volksgenossen. It gave them back their national honor, 
which all too many had surrendered with the denial of their blood.” Under the 
guidance of the original leadership, the Kulturbund had been the vehicle of its 
national awakening, this national renewal, this “voelkische Erneuerung.”606 
 In Volksruf, the Erneuerer called their exclusion from the Kulturbund a “base 
act of revenge” for their challenge at the Kulturbund’s 1934 annual congress.607 
Dismissing the original leadership as “weaklings” who were drowning but spoke 
confidently, it promised that the Kulturubund’s current leadership would be “washed 
away” from Habag Haus, the newly constructed building in Novi Sad that housed the 
Kulturbund’s headquarters and several other German institutions. In a letter to 
Deutsches Volksblatt, Awender denied having ever attacked the Kulturbund itself but 
admits to having opposed its leadership.608 Meanwhile, one of the leading Erneuerer 
intellectuals, Jakob Roedler, called in Volksruf for the resignation all the 
Kulturbund’s board officers for allegedly violating the organization’s statutes. The 
collapse of the “system” was underway, he claimed, and its replacement by a true 
Volksgemeinschaft was only a matter of time. A week later, Gustav Halwax took 
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Keks to task for his article on Erneuerung with the usual charge that this old man just 
did not “get it”. Where Keks had celebrated language and Vaeterglaube in his article 
as the borders of Volksgemeinschaft, Halwax dismissed such words as simultaneously 
too broad and too narrow. Keks would admit a German-speaking “Neger” into the 
Volksgemeinschaft but not heavily assimilated Germans, such as the German 
Volksgenossen in Slavonia, who might say “mi nijemci” instead of “wir 
Deutschen.”609 Where is the consciousness of blood, he demanded? According to 
Halwax, Keks’ thinking was not really “erneuert” at all. It did not reflect  the bold 
new spirit of the Erneuerungsbewegung. Rather, he sneered, the chairman remained 
intellectually stuck in the last century.610 
 
In Exile, a Program for the Erneuererungsbewegung 
During the spring, the Erneuerer continued to hold lectures and meetings 
across the Germans’ settlement area, even in distant Slovenia. Additionally, the 
Erneuerungsbewegung published its program in the Easter issue of Volksruf, no doubt 
seeking to benefit from association with “rebirth” just as the Swabian activists had 
during the 1920s. The Erneuer’s program consisted of a list of guiding principles and 
a separate set of demands.611 The principles included the perfunctory declarations of 
loyalty to Yugoslavia, while at the same time calling for the maintenance of “blood-
determined nature,” at least as far as the Germans were concerned. Likewise, the 
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principles embraced the German Volksgemeinschaft and its “historic mission” to 
serve as a bridge between the Yugoslav people and the German “motherland.” 
Trumpeting its voelkisch heritage, the Erneuerungsbewegung claimed to embrace “the 
German community of blood, the faith in its God-willed law of German Volkstum, 
which is rooted in the three elementary powers of honor, blood and soil.” Finally, the 
movement professed to embrace Christianity, but called for a “separation of its 
church and national tasks.” As we shall see in Chapter Eight, the Erneuerer’s stance 
on Christianity would lead to conflict with the Catholic and, to a much lesser extent, 
the Protestant churches.  
 The Erneuerer’s formal demands were both broad and specific. Chief among 
them were vague calls for the establishment of a German people’s court of honor; the 
development of all institutions devoted to the “public health, blood purity and the 
forging of more favorable conditions for the facilitation of reproduction;” the 
development of social welfare institutions according to the principle that the common 
interest must come before personal interest (“Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz”); the 
shaping and guiding of the Swabians’ independent existence in accordance with the 
German “voelkisch-socialist worldview”; the overcoming of class differences through 
the construction of a Volksgemeinschaft according to natural, social classifications; 
political relief through a separation in the leadership of the areas of national work in 
the interest of maintaining and developing our cultural and economic assets and all 
institutions; and finally the establishment of a national council or Volksrat, “which 




would have the right and duty to supervise Swabians’ national life, the upshot being 
that the leadership would decide all the internal matters of the Volk.  
The Erneuerungbewegung’s program concluded by iterating the movement’s 
determination to force the Volk from its current indifference and lack of purpose 
toward “self-reflection, goal setting, and crystallization based on its own strength.” 
Ultimately, the Erneuerer explained, their movement claimed nothing less than “the 
formation and leadership of our individual national life” The Erneuerungsbewegung’s 
ambitions, thus, were voelkisch, absolute, and nearly revolutionary. Moreover, their 
program asserted, such demands were unalterable.612  
In publishing its program, the Erneuerungsbewegung announced its 
coalescence as a loose but increasingly well defined movement. Its final demand, the 
call to create a Volksrat to supervise the minority, was essentially a demand for a 
wide degree of institutionalized German autonomy in Yugoslavia, though the actual 
program avoided that word. The Erneuerer turned their energies not outward on the 
government but rather inward, toward their fellow Swabians. Far from storming the 
bastions of Belgrade and demanding proper autonomy, the Erneuerer continued to 
focus their efforts and attention on seizing the Kulturbund by deposing its current 
leadership, apparently with the intention of executing its reforms from within that 
body. Indeed, the Erneuerer seem to have played little role as minority advocates in 
Belgrade, if any. Meanwhile, the original leadership looked upon the 
Erneurungsbewegung’s program, consolidation, and increasing penetration of the 
Kulturbund’s own Jugendgruppen darkly and took further steps to counter it, as we 
shall see in the following chapter.  
                                                 







Chapter 7:  Tactical Shifts and Reconciliation in the Kulturbund, 
1935-1938 
 
The Nazi rise to power meant fundamental changes in Germany and Europe. 
As we have seen, the neue deutsche Weltanschauung, of which the Nazis were 
tireless exponents, found receptive ears and willing champions among the Swabian 
youths in Yugoslavia. Mobilized as the Erneuerungsbewegung, their drive to seize 
control of the Kulturbund met stubborn resistance by that organization’s leadership, 
which sought to put a definitive end to their challenge in 1935 and thereafter. In this 
chapter we will examine the New Order the original leadership implemented in the 
Kulturbund to this end and consider its implications for the obstreperous Erneuerer. 
Having been effectively cast out of the Kulturbund, the Erneuerer were compelled to 
seek out new strategies and even legal frameworks in which to conduct their 
activities. In this chapter, we consider those new strategies with particular attention to 
Slavonia, where the German national movement gained new traction during the 
1930s. There, a former Austro-Hungarian army officer launched an organization 
which was essentially a legal, institutionalized manifestation of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung as well as a direct competitor for the Kulturbund. We begin, 
however, by examining the fundamental transformation which occurred in the field of 
Volkstumarbeit after 1933. These changes and yet further Swabian divisions would 
undermine the original leadership, contributing to an uncomfortable reintegration of 
the Erneuerer into the Kulturbund. Indeed, the Erneuerer would eventually secure the 
coveted position of Kulturbund chairman itself. Yet their victory, though momentous, 





Volkstumarbeit, a Changed Landscape after 1933 
As we saw in Chapters Three through Five, at first both the Weimar German 
government and the Germans abroad sought to rely on the League of Nation’s 
minority protection system to see that their rights were respected in the interwar era. 
Indeed, that system remained the cornerstone of the ethnic Germans’ claim to rights 
in Yugoslavia into the 1930s. However, by the end of the first interwar decade the 
limitations of the minority protection system were already apparent. Yugoslavia, for 
one, had long ago given up its strategy of trying to win over the Swabians through 
generous cultural concessions. Meanwhile, frustration with Weimar policy on ethnic 
Germans abroad grew both at home in Germany and among the ethnic Germans 
themselves. As Volkstumarbeit historian Valdis Lumans observes, “from the critics’ 
perspective, the government’s efforts alleviated some difficulties and solved some 
incidental problems but did little to alter the status of the minorities.”613 Meanwhile, 
“Volksdeutsche” (the increasingly preferred term in the 1930s and thereafter) leaders 
increasingly turned to Germany for resources for support614 and their plight provoked 
ever louder public calls in Gemany itself for a more activist foreign policy on behalf 
of co-nationals abroad.615  
 National Socialism had won supporters in the Reich but also admirers outside 
Germany. After taking power, calls for a more activist foreign policy viz. the 
                                                 
613 Lumans, Himmler’s Auxilliaries. 27 In my discussion on Volkstumarbeit organizations during the 
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614  This was the case even during the 1920s, when Weimar Germany and its various Volkstumarbeit 
organizations provided extensive overt and covert funding and support for Germans in eastern Europe. 




Germans abroad grew ever louder. “The minority issue,” Lumans observed, “forced 
itself on Hitler.” Inspired by the methods and tenor of National Socialism, disruptive 
German communities or groups such as the Erneuerer could represent a liability for 
Hitler’s foreign policy plans by creating disturbances or making demands that seemed 
to implicate Germany or which Reich Germans might feel their country obligated to 
address.  In some cases, such communities would be recognized as an opportunity for 
Germany’s expansive foreign policy. But in the case of Yugoslavia, the uppity 
Germans were mostly regarded as a nuisance, especially by the Reich Foreign 
Ministry. In the immediate term, it was necessary to bring the German communities 
abroad under control. To this end, the Nazis streamlined and coordinated the 
cacophony of Volkstumarbeit organizations in Germany and regulated their 
interaction with the German minorities abroad. Thus, in the years before the Second 
World War “it was political expediency, not voelkisch concerns, that guided Hitler’s 
actions regarding the minorities.”616 
While some Volkstumarbeit leaders welcomed the arrival of the Nazis in 
power, the field was largely dominated by non-Nazi traditionalists who were 
conservative and voelkisch-oriented but not necessarily members of the NSDAP. 
Thus it was necessary for the Nazis to coopt many of the existing Volkstumarbeit 
institutions before redirecting their efforts toward Nazi objectives. As we have seen, 
contacts between Reich and non-Reich Germans preceded 1933 and were sometimes 
even implicitly political. However “with the coming of the Nazi stewardship, a 
‘scientific’ frame was given to the handling of the German folk groups outside the 
                                                 




Reich.”617 Henceforth, Volkstumarbeit would come to increasingly reflect the Nazis’ 
own peculiar priorities and German foreign policy objectives, not necessarily the 
good of the various German communities abroad. 
Most of the men running the Volkstumarbeit organizations in 1933 were 
traditionalist, voelkisch-inclined conservatives who were not themselves Nazis, 
though perhaps the most important Volkstumarbeit organization, the Verein fuer das 
Deutschtum im Ausland (DAI), was known to have some Nazi ties even before 
1933.618 When it became clear that the Hitler regime intended to “coordinate” the 
Volkstumarbeit organizations, the VDA, for its part, sought to reinvent its image and 
thereby escape deep Gleichschaltung. It even adopted a more voelkisch name, the 
“Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland,” so as to ingratiate itself with the new 
regime. Furthermore, it scrapped its democratic procedures and elevated to leadership 
Hans Steinacher, a conservative non-Nazi, and long time Volkstumarbeit activist.619 
Lumans writes that Steinacher and his supporters saw little difference between their 
own goals and those of the Nazis. Both groups hoped to promote the German Volk, so 
Steinacher expected that compromise was possible and any disagreements would be 
more about style than substance. Volkstumarbeit had a long tradition, after all, and 
the Nazis were but a young regime. In any event, the VDA seemed to have escaped a 
deep Gleichschaltung and maintained meaningful independence for a while. This 
would change, however.620  
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Hitler anointed Rudolf Hess the leading Reich authority in Volksdeutsche 
matters in 1933, although Heinrich Himmler would work energetically to secure his 
control and influence over the field. Shortly after his appointment, Hess launched a 
new Volkstumarbeit coordination effort in the form of the abortive Volksdeutscher 
Rat, or Volksdeutsche Council, which was intended to guide and coordinate the 
various organizations in the Volkstumarbeit field. This body, which featured 
delegates from various Volkstumarbeit organizations, again consisted of mostly non-
Nazi conservatives who were leaders in the field. However, its authority was 
ultimately undermined by the intrusion of several bureaucracy-collecting Nazi 
entrepreneurs. After several years of machinations, hierarchical confusion and 
intrigue, Hess created a new NSDAP liaison post under SS member Otto von Kursell 
for matters concerning Volksdeutsche. Established in October 1935, this Buero 
Kursell, so-named after its chief, became known as VoMi or the Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle (Ethnic German Liaison Office), in 1936.621 
VoMi was a Nazi Party office and was tasked with the coordination of all 
matters affecting the Volksdeutsche. Thus the VDA was formally subordinated to it. 
Though Kursell sought to avoid direct party meddling in VDA affairs, “there could be 
no doubt that he regarded Nazi interests as supreme and those of the Volkstum 
organizations or even the Volksdeutsche, as incidental.” Moreover, he made 
Volksdeutsche funding abroad increasingly contingent on enthusiasm for National 
Socialism. At the same time, however, the VDA and other Volkstumarbeit 
organizations retained their nominal independence, and VoMi sought to avoid the 
                                                 





appearance of Reich meddling in the sovereign affairs of others states.622 That said, it 
was under Kursell’s leadership that the Nazification of Germans abroad may be said 
to have begun.  
After this appointment of SS subordinate Kursell to the leading Nazi 
coordinating body on Volksdeutsche affairs, SS Chief Heinrich Himmler sought to 
become a player in the field himself and effectively commandeered the 
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. VoMi officially answered to Hess, but Kursell was an SS 
man and therefore Himmler expected him to be compliant with Himmler’s own 
directives. When Kursell unexpectedly resisted, Himmler expelled him from the SS 
and had him removed from his position at VoMi. Shortly thereafter, Himmler 
persuaded Hess to install another, more cooperative SS man, Obergruppenfuehrer 
Werner Lorenz, as his replacement in January 1937.  
More substantive changes followed. Less than a month after the installation of 
Lorenz at the top of VoMi, delegates from the leading Volkstumarbeit organizations 
were assembled and told that henceforth VoMi would take the leading role in 
Volksdeutsche affairs with the task of forging voelkisch unity and promoting National 
Socialism. All Volkstumarbeit organizations would henceforth work with the various 
Volksgruppen abroad only through the primary intermediary of the Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle.623 Thus did Himmler and the SS become deeply involved in the business 
of Volkstumarbeit. Finally, under Lorenz, VoMi would curtail the VDA’s 
independence. The latter would remain a formally separate organization but it was 
necessary to control this most important Volkstumarbeit organization in order for the 
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SS to consolidate its grip on the Volkstumarbeit field. As such, VDA President Hans 
Steinacher, who had sought to retain precisely the autonomy for his organization that 
VoMi now wanted to restrict, was ousted in October 1937.  
Over time, the scope of VoMi’s activities and the breadth of its authority 
expanded. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle began life as a strictly NSDAP office. 
However, in July 1938 Hitler formally transformed the nature of VoMi and vastly 
expanded its authority. In a decree in July of that year, Hitler extended state authority 
in Volksdeutsche affairs to the organization and charged it with numerous tasks 
which had hitherto been the purview of the state. Not least among these was the 
distribution of all monies earmarked for Germans abroad. That is, the decree 
explicitly awarded control over the financing of Volkstumarbeit to VoMi, a 
responsibility that made the organization powerful indeed.624 Its control over finances 
gave the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle tremendous influence over Europe’s German 
minorities, many of whom had become ever more dependent on Reich subsidies for 
their expanding activities during the 1930s. Unsurprisingly, those subsidies 
increasingly came with certain requirements of a political nature. The various German 
minority leaderships were expected to adopt and expound a pro-Nazi attitude and 
follow directives from Berlin, including recognition of Hitler as their Fueherer.  
In addition to financial control, Hitler’s 1938 decree also awarded VoMi new 
power and responsibility. Specifically, Hitler also awarded VoMi authority over all 
state, NSDAP and private organizations working in the field of Volkstumarbeit.  In so 
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Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 




doing, Hitler elevated VoMi to a position equal (though not superior to) Reich 
ministries.625 This was both an expansion of authority as well as a blurring of the 
source of that authority since now the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle could be understood 
to speak for the state or the Nazi Party. Finally, and of great relevance for Yugoslavia, 
Hitler’s 1938 decree awarded VoMi the right to determine the German minorities’ 
leadership. Thus, VoMi became the ultimate arbiter of power among Europe’s 
German minorities. Indeed, Hitler’s decree even conferred upon VoMi the authority 
to regulate contacts and cooperation between Volkstumarbeit organizations, state 
institutions, and party offices on the one hand, and the recognized groups among the 
Volksdeutsche on the other. In other words, VoMi henceforth would determine the 
individuals, groups, and factions with which a Reich-based Volkstumarbeit body 
might have dealings and do business.626 This was hugely important, since by that 
point in time it was clear to the Swabians that no one could expect to maintain 
leadership in the minority or achieve the desired concessions from Belgrade (such as 
in education) without Reich backing.627 VoMi additionally would serve as an 
advisory body to the various Volksdeutsche leaders including the Swabians’ original 
leadership.  Finally, in 1939, Hess issued a decree stipulating that all Nazi and non-
party bodies in Germany align themselves with either the VDA or League of the 
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German East (the Bund Deutscher Osten – BDO). Henceforth, “all cultural 
Volkstumarbeit would come under the aegis of the VDA, whereas political matters, or 
Volkstumpolitik , would be the concern of the BDO.”628  Circumventing VoMi was 
henceforth out of the question. Indeed, VoMi’s new authority after July 1938 would 
allow it to play the decisive role in the dispute between the Kulturbund’s old 
leadership and their challengers in the Erneuerungsbewegung. 
Clash at Habag Haus, 1935 
The Kulturbund’s own youth groups were clearly becoming centers for the 
ideas and activities of Erneuerungsbewegung, which was ever more assuming the 
posture of an insurgency. In fact, a considerable number of these youth groups, if not 
an actual majority, openly embraced the Erneuerungsbewegung. Others were 
sympathetic to the movement, even if they did not totally approve of its methods or 
the Erneuerer’s drive to depose the Kulturbund leadership.629 The Kulturbund 
leadership launched a movement to take back these youth groups by circumventing 
and ultimately deposing Lichtenberger, who had been only recently elected 
Jugendleiter himself at the 1934 Kulturbund annual congress. The original 
leadership’s move against Lichtenberger came as part of a new effort to purge the 
Kulturbund of prominent Erneurerer and their sympathizers. It would not go as 
planned. 
 Upon his controversial election as Jugendleiter at the 1934 Kulturbund annual 
congress, Lichtenberger had ominously announced that his principles were already 
well known to the original leadership, and it was plain that under him there would be 
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changes in future Kulturbund youth work (Jugendarbeit). Indeed Lichtenberger was 
closely associated with the leading Erneuerer and his election marked a major victory 
for their movement. In his interaction with the Kulturbund leadership, he was so 
insistent on his principles and methods, that the original leadership finally resolved 
that it could not work with him. Lichtenberger clashed especially with Chairman 
Keks, who finally decided to replace him through an extraordinary “youth 
convention” or Jugendtagung at Habag Haus in Novi Sad on July 28, 1935. Officially 
Lichtenberger was to be deposed for insubordination and intransigence for he had 
basically refused to work with Chairman Keks, whom he did not believe shared a real 
commitment to the neue deutsche Weltanschauung. Moreover, Lichtenberger was 
provocative, permitting the expelled Erneuerer to give officially prohibited lectures to 
Kulturbund youth groups and even whole Kulturbund chapters.630 In short, 
Lichtenberger was openly spurning the Kulturbund board’s directive to shut out the 
Erneuerer leadership.  
 Planners of the extraordinary youth convention circumvented Lichtenberger, 
who nonetheless learned the details of the event. Struggle being one of the 
Erneuerer’s guiding principles, he resolved to resist his removal and dispatched a 
“strictly confidential” letter to his Kameraden in the Kulturbund youth groups 
regarding the upcoming “Putsch” against himself and the Erneuerer’s outposts in the 
Kulturbund. Lichtenberger called upon his followers to descend upon Novi Sad in 
protest. His plan called for his supporters to march under the Kulturbund’s own youth 
                                                 




banner631 and in coordinated outfits-qua-uniforms.632 Paramilitary-like formations and 
matching clothing were sometimes typical at Kulturbund events by this time 
(especially with youth groups), but it was plain that Lichtenberger intended his march 
to be more aggressive than celebratory. “Sieg Heil!,” he wrote.  
Lichtenberger received much support from Slavonia’s regional Jugendleiter 
and Chairman of the Osijek Kulturbund chapter, Branimir Altgayer, about whom we 
will hear more later in this chapter. Altgayer promised to encourage young supporters 
and sympathizers from Slavonia to crash the extraordinary youth convention as 
Lichtenberger had instructed.633 In his own appeal to Slavonian youth, Altgayer 
questioned the legality of both Lichtenberger’s suspension as Jugendleiter and the 
upcoming youth convention itself. The meeting’s sole purpose of the youth 
convention, Altgayer declared, was to depose the Jugendleiter in a manner which 
would be a most “undeutsch” suppression of the people’s will.634 Meanwhile, 
Lichtenberger issued a call to arms in his July 25 memo to the Jugendleitung, in 
which he predicted a successful show of youth’s strength and unity at the upcoming 
extraordinary youth meeting.635 The scene that unfolded at Habag Haus on July 28, 
1935, was nothing less than a showdown and marked an early use of the unruly 
tactics which would become the Erneuerer’s trademark. The language that all sides 
used to describe the clash was martial, and included talk of “marching”, struggle”, 
and the “storming” of Habag Haus itself. 
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Well before the event the youth sections which had answered Lichtenberger’s 
call gathered outside of Habag Haus. After some time, they forced their way into the 
hall where the meeting was being held and effectively occupied the place. Keks 
declared that the meeting could not be opened until the intruders abandoned the 
chamber, which they were plainly unwilling to do. Finally, amid considerable 
commotion, the police declared the gathering dissolved and ordered the meeting hall 
vacated.636 
 In its coverage of the youth convention, Volksruf heaped accusations upon 
Keks. Asserting that they did not recognize the “illegal” attempt to depose 
Lichtenberger as “Jugendfueherer,” the Erneuerer declared the meeting had ended up 
as a protest rally against Keks, whom they accused of reprising his former role as a 
Austro-Hungarian military officer and practicing “Austro-Hungarian methods” of 
brutality.637 They insisted, moreover, that the “Jugendfuehrer”, as they called 
Jugendleiter Lichtenberger, was responsible to the youth alone, not Keks.  “The 
System,” they declared, had unmasked itself and the youth convention, which should 
therefore be considered a milestone in the development of the minority. Indeed, the 
Erneuerer charged Keks with ethnic treason in Volksruf, adding that even calling the 
youth convention was a violation of the Kulturbund’s statutes.638 For its own part, the 
original leadership looked upon the youth with incomprehension and concluded that 
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Lichtenberger’s leadership had lead to demoralization, chaos, dissolution, and 
revolt.639 
 In the end, the extraordinary youth convention was significant for it 
demonstrated the determination of the original leadership to oppose the Erneuerer as 
well as the limits of their ability to do so. Moreover, the disruptive tactics Lichtenberg 
and his followers employed in Novi Sad were typical of the methods that the original 
leadership found both so threatening to themselves and perilous for the precarious 
German minority as a whole. Defiant and evidently popular, Lichtenberger would 
keep his job as Kulturbund Jugendleiter for the time being. Although Keks wished 
him gone, Lichtenberger’s successful disruption of the youth convention meant that 
no successor had been elected in his place.640 The setback at the youth convention did 
not break the original leadership’s determination to resist the Erneuerer, however, and 
at a meeting in late October, the Kulturbund board took its next, dramatic measure 
against the insurgency. The time for drastic action, they believed, had come. 
 
The Original Leadership’s Counterattack in the Kulturbund 
After the July 28 confrontation, the original leadership determined that the 
Erneuerungsbewegung had gotten out of hand and drastic measures would be 
necessary to purge the movement entirely from the Kulturbund. By this point, many 
Kulturbund youth groups operated in indifference or even open hostility to the local 
chapter to which they formally belonged. Despite their expulsions, the Erneuerer 
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were welcomed at their meetings and regularly gave lectures on the neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung. Some youths, including Lichtenberger, even called for Keks to 
resign as Kulturbund chairman. Clearly such insubordination could not be allowed to 
continue. The Kulturbund board gathered on October 27 to take action since they 
plainly felt they were losing control of the situation. In the resolution adopted at that 
October 27 meeting, the Kulturbund board observed that many Kulturbund 
departments, especially the youth groups had been characterized by excessive 
pretensions to extreme independence. These groups not only refused obedience to 
their local chapter leadership, they ignored or even openly opposed the dictates of the 
Kulturbund itself. Furthermore, they frequently held “Kulturbund” events without 
informing the Kulturbund leadership. Worse, individuals outside of the Kulturbund 
(that is, the expelled Erneuerer) had been organizing activities in some Kulturbund 
chapters without consulting the Kulturbund leadership. In order to end such 
unstatutory activities, the Kulturbund leadership took drastic steps implementing what 
came to be known as the organization’s “New Order” or Neuordnung. 
 The Kulturbund leadership’s response to the Erneuerer’s challenge consisted 
in formally banning the movement from the Kulturbund, on the one hand, and rooting 
out individuals and bodies who would not adhere to the Kulturbund leadership’s line 
on the other. “The so-called Erneuerungsbewegung was never a movement of the 
Kulturbund,” the Kulturbund leadership avowed. Since the Erneuerer’s activities 
exceeded the Kulturbund’s statutory limits, the Kulturbund leadership formally 
declared their movement outside the organization. Moreover, the Kulturbund 




Kulturbund. Many associations and departments inside the Kulturbund were 
temporarily suspended or dissolved. Predictably, the bulk of the Kulturbund 
leadership’s measures were directed at youths and the Kulturbund’s youth groups, for 
these had proven most susceptible to the overtures of the Erneuerungsbewegung. 
Nevertheless, whole local chapters came under intense scrutiny and some were 
disbanded. The obstreperous Lichtenberger was formally dismissed, of course, as 
were the officers he had installed and any other associates belonging to his circle. All 
youth groups were ordered to cease their activities, pending evaluation by the 
Kulturbund leadership on a case-by-case basis. The Kulturbund leadership announced 
that only those associations and youth groups would be permitted whose leaders 
provided guarantees that they were a Kameradschaft of constructive work, 
characterized by self-discipline and self-command, fulfillment of duty and a readiness 
to be responsible. They should, moreover, be penetrated by the awareness that 
Swabians were all part of the entire German Volk not only in flesh and blood, but also 
in spirit.641 The Kulturbund leadership’s New Order, then, consisted of a purge of the 
Erneuerer, dissolution of their groups in the Kulturbund, and the confirmation that 
surviving Kulturbund bodies would hold true to the line of the original leadership. 
Honorary Kulturbund Chairman Grassl explained that the Kulturbund leadership had 
only taken these drastic decisions out of concern that Kulturbund activities remain 
possible in the future and he appealed for peace.642  
 Naturally, the Erneuerer had little interest in such peace and even less 
intention to be silenced by their rivals. Nevertheless, the disbanding of the 
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Association of German Youth (VDJ) was a significant blow, for the Kulturbund’s 
youth groups had served as the organizational framework and the institutional cover 
for the Erneuerungsbewegung’s activities. So long as the Erneuerer could claim to be 
Kulturbund members, their meetings, rallies, and such were legally sanctioned within 
the context of that organization. Outside the Kulturbund, however, the 
Erneuerungsbewegung had no legal status as an independent organization. As such, 
the clear expulsion of the movement technically placed the Erneuerer in legal 
jeopardy and forced them to search for new tactics.  
Comprehensive though it was, the New Order left Volksruf unaffected. 
Volksruf was independent of both the Kulturbund and the associated German 
publishing house, DVAG, after all, and was therefore able to continue its activities 
unhindered. Now more directly dependent on their mouthpiece than ever, the 
Erneuerer repeated their claims to the moral high ground in their conflict with the 
Kulturbund. They charged that the original leadership’s brazen dissolution of the 
Kulturbund’s youth organizations had exposed it as lacking the moral authority to 
lead the organization.643 Awender decried the behavior of the Kulturbund board’s 
“thirty three men, which call themselves representatives of the German Volksgruppe 
in the Kulturbund.” He rejected their accusations against the Erneuerer, whom he 
described as “the bearers of the idea of national renewal in the spirit of the German 
worldview.” They would not be deterred from shaping the Volksgruppe according to 
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voelkisch-socialist principles, he claimed, and the Kameradschaft (of the Erneuerung) 
would persevere.644  
“Volksgemeinschaft means a community of struggle,” Volksruf reminded 
readers in the wake of the October 27 Kulturbund board meeting where the New 
Order had been resolved upon.645 Mindful of this, the original leadership instituted 
various new security measures at the 1935 annual congress on December 22, 
including hiring a security team. The Erneuerer announced that they would march on 
the annual congress, just as they had disrupted the extraordinary youth convention in 
July. In the end, the new security measures appear to have been sufficient to keep 
most Eneuerer out of the annual congress, entry to which was strictly controlled. 
Erneuerungsbewegung sympathizers did cause some disruption, but the meeting was 
able to carry out its work and the attending representatives of those loyal chapters 
formally approved the Kulturbund leadership’s October 27 measures instituting the 
New Order. The Kulturbund members did so, however, not without some misgivings, 
which suggested both a degree of sympathy for the banished Erneuerer as well as 
some concern for the new methods at work.  
The Kulturbund leadership’s decree effectively suspended all local chapters, 
which were then required to submit written declarations of fealty to the Kulturbund 
leadership in order to resume activity. Most did assure the Kulturbund leadership of 
their loyalty and soon renewed their work. Support for the Erneuerungsbewegung was 
strong in some parts of the country, however, and several local chapters responded to 
the Kulturbund leadership’s New Order decree negatively. By mid December 1935, 
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eleven such Kulturbund chapters had been dissolved with more to come.646 Naturally, 
the Kulturbund chapter in Pančevo, home of the Erneuerungsbewegung, was targeted 
and not reestablished until years later. Meanwhile, the Erneuerer and the original 
leadership followed the imposition of the New Order in the Kulturbund with great 
interest but opposite perspectives. The Kulturbund celebrated the many local chapters 
who, as requested, clearly expressed their loyalty to the original leadership in writing. 
By contrast, the Erneuerer highlighted the many local chapters which were suspended 
or dissolved from Slovenia to Banat and their members thus expelled from the 
Kulturbund. By late 1937, more than twenty Kulturbund chapters had been 
dissolved,647 though 92 percent were not, according to Keks.648 Thus, the original 
leadership had struck back against the Erneuerer effectively but the German 
minority’s internal strife was far from over.  
 
The New Order in Slavonia: Branimir Altgayer’s KWVD 
At this point we shift our gaze to Slavonia, a region that had hitherto seen 
little Kulturbund activity but would soon become a battleground between the original 
leadership and the Erneuerer. Organized German life in this area, as we shall see, was 
inseparable from the name of Branimir Altgayer. Altgayer would initially be a voice 
of moderate caution, though not one of cautious moderation. An active member of the 
Kulturbund since 1931, Altgayer was elected to the organization’s board in 1934. His 
interest in the Kulturbund was significant because it coincided with Slavonia’s 
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emergence as a new field of activity for the organization. Owing to practical and legal 
limitations, the Kulturbund did not found a local chapter in Slavonia’s largest city, 
Osijek, until March 1934. Hitherto neglected Slavonia, however, whose Germans 
were often largely assimilated into their Croatian milieu, would become an area of 
intense German activity and even competition in coming years. There the Kulturbund 
would be forced to square off against a rival German organization, sharing similar 
goals but infused with the ideals of the Erneuerungsbewegung. Branimir Altgayer 
was at the center of this competition.  
 
Branimir Altgayer in Swabian Tracht.649 
 
 Altgayer’s activity in German matters predated his formal association with the 
Kulturbund. Born in Galicia in 1897 but raised in Slavonia, he had studied in Croatian 
schools before attending Austro-Hungary’s mounted cadet school in Moravia. From 
1915 until the end of the First World War he served as an officer in the Austro-
Hungarian military on the Russian, Romanian, and Italian fronts, where he was twice 
wounded and decorated. After the Habsburg defeat, Altgayer remained in the now-
Yugoslav military as an officer for four years before briefly withdrawing to civilian 
                                                 




life. He then returned to the Yugoslav military from 1924 until 1927.650 Altgayer was 
deeply involved in Osijek’s new German Choral and Musical Association (Deutscher 
Gesang- und Musikverein), of which he served as chairman and which was for a time 
the only German association in the city.  As with so many such groups, this choral 
society had both a musical and a national purpose, and after 1931 Altgayer formally 
became involved with the Kulturbund. Until that year, the Kulturbund had been 
legally unable to operate in Slavonia, an area that was either overlooked by most 
Volkstumarbeiter or whose Germans were regarded as so assimilated as to be “lost.” 
In 1934, Altgayer became founder and chairman of the Kulturbund’s local chapter in 
Osijek. As Osijek Kulturbund chairman, Altgayer worked hard to spread German 
national consciousness in Slavonia and start new Kulturbund chapters wherever 
possible. Having joined the Kulturbund’s board in 1934, he was soon named 
Slavonia’s regional Jugendleiter by then-Kulturbund Jugendleiter Jakob 
Lichtenberger in June 1935. 
The Kulturbund leadership’s New Order and its deliberate expulsion of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung provoked a unique response in Slavonia. Kulturbund activity 
there was of a relatively recent vintage, of course, since the Kulturbund effectively 
had been prohibited from operating on the territory of Croatia-Slavonia throughout 
the 1920s. True, neighboring Srijem had hosted several very important Kulturbund 
chapters during that decade and German national consciousness had been particularly 
strong in eastern Srijem even during the Habsburg era, as we have seen. Nevertheless, 
Slavonia proper saw its first Kulturbund chapters founded only after the 1931 
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approval of the Kulturbund’s statutes, whose fifth article specifically enabled the 
organization to begin activity in all parts of the Germans’ settlement area.651 The 
Kulturbund promptly directed new attention to Croatia-Slavonia and established local 
chapters in Zagreb as well as in Velimirovac, Čačinci and elsewhere in 1932. Several 
more chapters were founded during 1933, including one in Vukovar, and in March 
1934 the Kulturbund established a chapter in Osijek under the chairmanship of 
Branimir Altgayer. This chapter was in large part based on the German Music- and 
Choral Society, which had attracted a surprising number of young German men in the 
nine year since its founding in 1925. It is true that many of these were fledgling 
groups featuring few members and infrequent activities, for German national 
consciousness was still weak and uneven in Croatia and Slavonia, as we have seen. 
Nevertheless, by the Kulturbund’s 1934 annual congress, Croatia-Slavonia (including 
Srijem) boasted no less than 40 of the Kulturbund’s 129 chapters.652 As an indicator 
of the new prominence of Slavonia in Kulturbund affairs, Altgayer was elected to the 
Kulturbund’s board at the 1934 annual congress. 
The Kulturbund in Slavonia pursued the same agenda of nurturing German 
custom, language, and sentiment that it had elsewhere in Batschka, Baranya and 
Banat. Kulturbund members described this as “awakening” but, as we have seen, their 
actions were actually aimed at crafting and imparting an identity, which 
simultaneously was nationally German and locally Swabian. Altgayer and his 
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supporters would later go so far as to cultivate a distinct identity for the region’s 
Germans as Slavoniendeutschtum, though they rejected any allegations of separatism. 
In the short run, however, national consciousness was remarkably weak in Slavonia, 
where ethnic Germans lived interspersed with their Catholic Croat neighbors and had 
often become quite assimilated into their Croatian communities. As we saw in 
Chapter Two, Croatization of Germans especially in Croatia-Slavonia’s cities was 
well under way before the First World War. Naturally, efforts at Croatization only 
accelerated in the interwar period. Spoken German in the region was colloquial and 
written German was usually poor. Such regional dialects as Essekerisch typically 
were dominant where German was still spoken at all. German literacy was often poor. 
The German consul in Zagreb observed in 1928 that at 60,000 the number of 
Germans in Slavonia remained considerable. However, they were in constant peril of 
“de-Germanization,” he claimed. Meanwhile, only the German Protestant pastors 
approached local Swabians in a national way, while the Catholic clergy served as 
energetic and successful agents of Croatization.653 Altgayer and his fellow German 
activists, therefore, had their work cut out for them.  
Despite the recentness of his involvement in the high affairs of the 
Kulturbund, Altgayer quickly found himself swept up in the Erneuerungsbewegung 
controversy. As we saw from his 1935 correspondence with Jakob Lichtenberger, 
Altgayer had already taken a position that was at odds with the Kulturbund leadership 
and especially Keks as regards youth work by mid-1935. His stance demonstrated 
more than just a personal affinity for the Jugendleiter Lichtenberger and was rather 
indicative of support for the principles and methods of the Erneuerungsbewegung. He 
                                                 




made this support clear in a public letter even before the clash at the extraordinary 
youth convention, in which he wrote that the Kulturbund leadership merely wished to 
“halt the ever growing Erneuerungsbewegung in its path to victory.”654  
In the wake of that youth convention clash in Novi Sad, Altgayer continued to 
oppose the original leadership’s appeals to Kulturbund youth groups655 and 
complained in his correspondence about traveling emissaries from Habag Haus who 
were stirring up opposition to himself and Lichtenberger.656 Altgayer’s resistance was 
not always appreciated, however, least of all by the Kulturbund leadership. At the 
Kulturbund’s 1935 annual congress, Altgayer was taken to task by a Kulturbund 
board member from Našička Breznica (Slavonia) who according to Deutsches 
Volksblatt, warned that “the exaggerations, which have been seen recently in 
Jugendarbeit, can only lead to the Germans in Slavonia being scared off rather than 
won over to the German Volksgemeinschaft.” The Kulturbund board member 
demanded, therefore that the youth and above all the Chairman Altgayer of the Osijek 
local chapter show more restraint.”657 
In sum, Altgayer’s support for the Erneuerungsbewegung and his enthusiasm 
for Lichtenberger’s style of Jugendarbeit was well known to the Kulturbund’s 
leadership by late 1935. Consequently, Slavonia, where Altgayer was effectively the 
local German leader, would not be spared the Kulturbund’s New Order. As the Osijek 
local chapter’s chairman, Altgayer had disagreed with the original leadership’s 
decision to exclude Awender and his compatriots from the Kulturbund in 1935.  In 
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the wake of the Kulturbund leadership’s formal expulsion of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung from the Kulturbund in October of that year, the Osijek 
chapter’s board wrote to the Kulturbund leadership, and complained that the 
expulsion violated the Kulturbund’s statutes, ignored the wishes of its membership, 
and actually endangered the organization.658 After the 1935 annual congress, when 
Altgayer proved disinclined as a man and as a Kulturbund leader to disassociate 
himself from the Erneuerungsbewegung, the Kulturbund leadership resolved to 
disband his Kulturbund chapter. Accordingly, the Kulturbund chapter in Osijek was 
formally dissolved on December 12, 1935, a move which would have unexpected 
consequences for the Kulturbund. 
 Although Altgayer was more conservative in his methods than Awender and 
smoother in his interaction with Croatian and Serbian authorities, he was nevertheless 
a devoted Erneuerer and eagerly subscribed to the principles of the neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung. Had he or any of the leading Erneuerer lived in Germany, they 
would have been eager Nazis. Unperturbed by the Kulturbund’s New Order, he 
resolved to found his own, rival organization after the dissolution of the Kulturbund’s 
chapter in Osijek. Thus, in March 1936, Altgayer formally established the Culture 
and Welfare Union of the Germans in Osijek, known in German as the Kultur- und 
Wohlfahrtsvereinigung der Deutschen or the KWVD.  
The KWVD was intended as a direct competitor to the Kulturbund, a rivalry 
which Yugoslav authorities may have hoped would undermine both organizations.659 
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Its activity was limited by its statutes to the eastern part of the Sava banovina, which 
effectively made it an organization of the Germans of Slavonia. According to these 
statutes, the organization’s tasks and competencies differed little from the 
Kulturbund’s, though it would pursue its activities in a different key.660 However, the 
KWVD promised to place special emphasis on youth, and in the coming years it 
worked not only to “awaken” Germans in Slavonia but also to craft for them a distinct 
Slavonian identity within Danube Swabiandom and Germandom. Its leaders were 
open devotees of the Erneuerungsbewegung, whose activities achieved legal cover in 
Slavonia through the KWVD.  
Despite the anemic state of German national consciousness in Slavonia, 
Altgayer was able to secure talented collaborators locally and from elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia. The popular Jakob Lichtenberger accepted Altgayer’s invitation to join 
the KWVD as its Jugendfueherer and eagerly went to work organizing youth groups 
in the spirit of the Erneuerungsbewegung in the Sava banovina.661 Similarly, the 
Association of German University Students (Verein Deutscher Hochschueler or 
VDH) in Zagreb became a loyal supporter of the KWVD, having already confirmed 
its defiant support of the Erneuerungsbewegung in a letter to the Kulturbund board in 
October 1935.662 Such support was important, but the creation of a second Yugoslav 
Germandom organization faced several significant obstacles, not least of which were 
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the hostility of Croatian organizations and determined competition from the 
Kulturbund itself. Nevertheless, Altgayer and his collaborators managed to gather 
large numbers of hitherto passive and nationally indifferent Swabians into the KWVD 
in a short time.  
The KWVD pursued a dual strategy of founding local chapters as quickly as 
possible while simultaneously persuading existing Kulturbund chapters to effectively 
break with their mother organization and join the KWVD. Altgayers’ group 
particularly sought to found chapters in areas hitherto unexposed to Volkstumarbeit, 
places they considered “new country” for the German national movement.663 After its 
founding, three of the five extant Kulturbund districts (Kreisen) in Slavonia joined the 
KWVD outright and there was much sympathy for the organization in the remaining 
two.664 By its first annual congress in March 1937, the KWVD boasted 74 local 
chapters which it divided into eleven districts.665 A year later, the 85th local chapter 
was established, and so many Germans had joined the organization in Osijek that 
there was talk about forming further chapters there. The KWVD’s growth was not 
smooth or uncontested, however. Organizers had to contend with intense competition 
from the Kulturbund as well as enduring Swabian indifference in Slavonia. 
Oftentimes the local chapters were inactive and their membership characterized by 
significant Croatization. Nevertheless, the KWVD’s growth was impressive and 
earned the new organization respect in Yugoslavia and abroad. 
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While there were men such as Altgayer and Osijek City Councilman 
Ferdinand Gasteiger who were devoted to the German national movement, most of 
the Swabians in Slavonia, however, were poorly educated and only dimly nationally 
conscious as Germans. Often, even the most nationally conscious had only a basic 
command of written German. Letters from local Germans to Altgayer often included 
gross phonetic or Slavicized misspellings, such that “Liederbücher” (songbooks) 
might be written “lider bicher,” or “Vorstellungen” (introductions) as 
“vorštellungen.”666 Phonetic writing of German with Croatian spelling was very 
common in Slavonia and often produced ironic results, such as discussions of the 
“Kameradšaft” (Kameradschaft) of the German nationalist Erneuerungsbewegung.667 
Ambitious Slavonian Germans sometimes concluded their correspondence with 
Altgayer or Lichtbenberger with “Sig hail!” (Sieg Heil!)668 Other times, Slavonian 
Germans interested in the KWVD simply avoided German in their correspondence 
with Altgayer. One such man was Joseph Stumpf, of Velika Pisanica (near Bjelovar). 
Having heard that Stumpf was a “nationally conscious German man, who has already 
taken on the gathering and organizing of the Volksgenossen in [his] village,” Altgayer 
invited him to the 1935 founding meeting of the KWVD.669 Stumpf would soon 
become a member of the KWVD’s main board and leader of its west district, but his 
written response and future correspondence must have been something of a 
disappointment to Altgayer, for Stumpf consistently wrote in Croatian. In an early 
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letter to Altgayer, he apologetically noted that his inability to write in German was 
“sad but true” as well as indicative of the decline of German identity in his area.670 
Although the KWVD would eventually found more local chapters in Slavonia 
than the Kulturbund, the Kulturbund nevertheless remained a potent and determined 
rival in the region. Moreover, the Kulturbund possessed considerable resources with 
which to combat Altgayer’s KWVD. Members of the Kulturbund leadership, such as 
Keks, traveled to Slavonia, upon which increasing energy and attention was lavished. 
Roving teachers (the so called-Wanderlehrer) canvassed the region’s villages to 
stimulate German consciousness and Kulturbund allegiance. Often this rivalry was 
polite but there were also numerous allegations of personal confrontation and even 
physical violence between the two sides. The KWVD’s mouthpiece, Slawonischer 
Volksbote complained of knife fights, such as one in Čačinci, where a KWVD man 
was allegedly stabbed three times.671 Indeed, the Kulturbund’s and KWVD’s 
mouthpieces were full of mutual reproach. Velimirovac, home of a Kulturbund local 
chapter as well as an active KWVD chapter, seems to have been a particular flash 
point. Here, Deutsches Volksblatt reported, Lichtenberger and twenty KWVD youths 
disrupted a Kulturbund meeting. After shouting down the Kulturbund’s speakers, they 
allegedly launched into violent songs about the Kulturbund leadership, singing 
“Shoot them dead, the ethnic traitors!” (“Shiesst sie tot, die Volksverraeter!”) 
Elsewhere, the newspaper reported, KWVD youths were known to sing “Beat him to 
death, that Keks. Throw [Kulturbund Secretary] Giljum up against the wall.” (“Schlag 
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ihn tot den Keks. Stellt Giljum an die Wand!”)672 Lichtenberger denied this public 
allegation against him, of course. Nevertheless, later internal KWVD correspondence 
did complain of clashes between KWVD and the Kulturbund youths, allegedly 
involving knives, insults and cudgels on one occasion in 1937.673  
As Lichtenberger himself observed in 1938, in just a few years Slavonia went 
from being a backwater in the German national movement to a proper battleground 
between the Kulturbund and the KWVD in their local power struggle. Where before 
there had never been a single German organization, now two groups dispatched 
representatives to canvass the region’s villages, spreading the gospel of German 
national consciousness and encouraging new local chapters. Meanwhile, the 
Kulturbund leadership regularly charged the KWVD with separatism and blamed it 
for the divisions that could only lead to the weakening of the Volksgruppe. The 
Kulturbund men were especially perturbed because in addition to raiding the 
Kulturbund’s membership, the KWVD began to obtain certain Volkstumarbeit funds 
normally awarded to the Kulturbund. 
Croatian organizations also variously exerted significant attraction or coercive 
pressure upon the many scattered German settlements in Slavonia. Many Croats 
regarded the nascent German movement there with hostility, seeing it as a kind of 
betrayal. Since the bulk of Yugoslavia’s Germans lived in Serbian-dominated lands 
and typically supported the (Serbian) governing party at the ballot box or in 
parliament, Germans in Slavonia often seemed suspect to their Croatian neighbors. 
Many Swabians blithely voted for the HSS, but many Slavonian Germans were torn 
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during the interwar period about whether to join their co-ethnics in Vojvodina and 
support the “Serbian” government, or vote as their Croatian neighbors, who naturally 
endorsed the HSS. For some highly assimilated Germans, this was not a dilemma at 
all and they voted for the HSS out of pragmatism or genuine belief. Others were more 
conflicted. In any event, assertions of German independence were unwelcome in 
Croat circles during the tense political climate of the 1930s. Altgayer regularly 
bemoaned the increasing competition of the HSS and Seljačka Sloga, its cultural 
affiliate.  “Here and there,” he wrote, “one can detect a pronounced intolerance, 
which occasionally degenerates into terror.”674 In a 1936 letter to the KWVD chapter 
leadership in Babina Gora, Altgayer again observed that Germans in several 
communities had been attacked by Croats for their German national consciousness 
and political engagement. This seemed to baffle Altgayer, who insisted that the 
KWVD was a non-political organization, as its statutes insisted it must be. On the 
other hand, he was also surprised that the Croats believed a German could do 
otherwise than support the government party, which currently allowed Germans 
considerable freedom of development, while the government’s Croatian opponents 
actually fought the Germans in Slavonia.675 In 1937, Altgayer noted other attacks and 
measures against those professing Germanness in several places, especially the 
Slavonska Požega district. Such measures, he claimed were intended to pressure 
Swabians to abandon their German national consciousness and join Croatian cultural 
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organizations.676 Frequently, however, they had the opposite effect of heightening 
German minority nationalism in Slavonia. 
In sum, the situation was difficult and contentious in Slavonia in the years 
after 1935, compounding German division and rivalry. The dimensions of the 
challenge faced by the KWVD were succinctly summarized by Altgayer himself in a 
letter to fellow Erneuerer Adam Maurus in July 1936, shortly before the latter’s 
dismissal from the Kulturbund. “The struggle grows sharper daily and our situation 
ever more difficult. We must decide this two-front-struggle with entirely insufficient 
means and almost without suitable strength. On the one hand the Croatian peasant 
movement is developing an admirable activity through its economic organization 
‘Gospodarska sloga’ and its cultural organization ‘Seljačka sloga’, which also has a 
foot in most Swabian settlements. On the other hand, the Kulturbund leadership has 
thrown almost its entire administrative staff and cadre of roving teachers 
[Wanderlehrer] into our region. That these people are not particularly considerate in 
their choice of weapons you can imagine.” It appeared to him that “their entire 
endeavor is directed to do damage to us and undermine us, even if Germandom 
suffers the greatest losses in the process. They are of the viewpoint that it is better to 
have absolutely no German organization [in a place] than to have a KWVD local 
chapter, and they therefore stir up Maček’s [HSS] supporters against us.” Lacking 
resources, Altgayer concluded, the KWVD was basically was forced to be on the 
defensive even as it grew.677  
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As we earlier observed, the KWVD effectively pursued the same mission as 
the Kulturbund in Croatia but did so in a new key. The men of the KWVD were 
unabashed Erneuerer and proponents of the neue deutsche Weltanschauung. In 
practice, the organization’s methods differed little from those of the Kulturbund 
elsewhere. It established local chapters which held lectures, courses, festivals, 
anniversary celebrations, and Trachtenfeste. German national consciousness being 
weak, Altgayer and his colleagues knew that much work would be necessary to 
impart and stimulate German identity among the region’s Swabians. As such, they 
publicly reached out to even very small German settlements with enthusiasm, while 
simultaneously bemoaning the poor state of national consciousness to which 
Slavonia’s Germans had “sunk” in private correspondence. In their campaign, they 
cast the Kulturbund as having first willfully ignored Slavonia’s Germans for many 
years and then as having falsely boasted about “rescuing” them. Nonsense, replied 
Altgayer and his colleagues, who rejected such claims of “rescue.” Slavonia’s 
Germans had awoken themselves from their so-called national slumber, they argued. 
Indeed, the KWVD (headed by Altgayer, a Slavonian from Osijek, of course) was the 
organizational vehicle of that self-awakening. The KWVD also advanced the notion 
of a distinct Slavonian sentiment (if not full fledged identity), though it denied 
allegations of separatism. The organization chose the 150th anniversary of the towns 
Kula and Poreč to showplace its regional legitimacy and to assert a historical 
Slavonian presence as proud as those elsewhere in Batschka or Banat.  
Just as the Kulturbund had used settlement anniversaries as platforms from 




150th settlement anniversary of the villages Kula and Poreč as a means by which to 
forge a sense of national consciousness and belonging among Slavonia’s Germans in 
1936. The task was especially pressing given the poor state of German national 
identity and the nature of German settlement in Slavonia, where they were often 
intermixed and assimilated with their Catholic, Croatian neighbors. On the eve of the 
event, the KWVD’s unofficial mouthpiece Slawonischer Volksbote observed the “still 
in places poorly developed sense of mutual belonging and feeling of community. 
Without this natural feeling, Slavonian Germandom will never be able to pull itself 
out of its present insignificance and fragmentation. The occasionally present 
insecurity, the narrow self-awareness and the lacking faith in the future are only the 
consequences of the [Germans’] far too loose internal solidarity and of mutual 
ignorance.”678 Such disunity would be overcome in part precisely through such 
nationally oriented festivals and settlement anniversaries, whose meaning extended 
far beyond the settlements in question, organizers promised.  
The anniversary celebration for Kula and Poreč was an important event. 
Attendance was estimated at between 3000 and 3500 people, and included guests 
from across Slavonia and even from Germany itself.679 The celebrations began with 
religious services in both towns and featured significant youth participation, including 
the performance of many German folk dances and songs. Marching below the banner 
of the old-Germanic Odal rune and in Einheitstracht (effectively a uniform), youths 
took part in nearly all parts of the festivities. Finally, a monument marking the 
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occasion and the original settlement of the villages was unveiled in the local 
cemetery, where youths lay a wreath brought by guests from the Reich. Writing on 
the occasion in the KWVD annual report, one KWVD leader observed a special 
purpose for the event. “The task of today’s youth should not be reflecting on the past 
but rather transforming itself into a new man from which the new generation and the 
longed for Volksgemeinschaft can be forged,” she claimed. “And this new type of 
man is the decisive fighter for his Volk!”680 Though a celebration of the past, the 150th 
anniversary of Kula and Poreč was intended as a confident celebration of the future.  
Ultimately, Altgayer invented little new with his German movement in 
Croatia. In effect, he merely called the original leadership’s bluff and established his 
own organization when they would no longer allow him to run theirs in the manner he 
saw fit. Just as the original Swabian activists had established the Kulturbund, so 
would he found the KWVD. Just as the early activists had used language, symbols, 
song, and history, so would he promote a particular celebration of “Slavonian 
Germandom.” Like the Kulturbund, the KWVD (as its name implies) was heavily 
involved in charity work and organized a major winter relief campaign 
(Winterhilfswerk) during the colder months. Likewise, it promoted German culture, 
language, and mutual national belonging, as we have seen. 
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Above, a postcard advertising the KWVD’s 1937 Winterhilfswerk campaign.681 The caption reads 
“Through sacrifice to the Volksgemeinschaft.” The symbol above the shaking hands is the “Odal 
rune.”682 The stamp bears the image of the young King Petar Karadjordjević.” Photo by the author. 
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Prinz Eugen, which operated on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia. Writing on the 
wartime period, Croatian historian Mario Jareb notes that the Odal rune signified kinship and family, 
especially bonds to people of the same blood. For more, see Mario Jareb, "Promidžba Njemačke 






Above left, the emblem of the KWVD’s 1937 annual congress in Osijek combines that city’s seal with 
the Odal rune. Note how the KWVD sought to anchor itself in Slavonian history by asserting that its 
first annual congress, which was held in Osijek, coincided with the 250th anniversary of the city’s 
liberation from the Turks and thus the 250th anniversary of the German presence there.683 Above 
center, the Odal rune is integrated into the emblem of the Second Slavonian Trachtenfest in Osijek in 
1938.684 Above right, a Swabian boy in Einheitstracht hoists the Slavonia district flag bearing the Odal 
rune in propaganda material for the Second Slavonian District Youth Festival in 1939.685  
 
Just as the early Swabian activists had founded a newspaper with which to 
transmit German culture and the values of their movement, so in 1936 did Altgayer 
and his collaborators start Slawonischer Volksbote, an Osijek-based weekly which 
promoted the KWVD, was unabashedly voelkisch, embraced the 
Erneuerungsbewgung and served as a central vehicle for “national awakening” in the 
region. Written in high German, its very grammatical and orthographical accuracy 
served as a corrective to the poor linguistic level which characterized Slavonia’s 
Germans. It was hardly the first or only German newspaper in Slavonia, of course, 
where such titles as Die Drau, Christliche Volkszeitung, Slawonische Presse, and 
others had enjoyed many years of publication.686 However, Slawonischer Volksbote 
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differed from its predecessors by being unabashedly voelkisch and German-national 
in its orientation. Its mission was to convey a sense of German and Slavonian identity 
to the disparate German communities and thus forge a shared sense of belonging and 
common destiny. It warned that “only with the return to the original sources of life 
and being - to honor, blood and soil as well as a corresponding way of life - will our 
[Slavonian-German] settlement group be able to fulfill the tasks and duties expected 
of us as a part of the population of the Yugoslav State but also as a part of the 
transborder German cultural community and Volksgemeinschaft.”687 And though it 
asserted from its opening issue that it was not a Kampfblatt, it nevertheless did 
engage in the struggle with the Kulturbund’s original leadership, though perhaps not 
as viciously as Volksruf. Like the KWVD, Slawonischer Volksbote also enjoyed 
connections with the Reich and Volksruf, from which it obtained material and 
exchanged articles for publication. Its principle concerns were promoting German 
culture and identity, promoting the KWVD, and calling for Swabian reconciliation on 
the Erneuerer’s terms. Although anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism were not central 
to Slawonischer Volksbote’s reporting, the newspaper was hardly immune to those 
pathologies and could write spiritedly against communists and Jews.688 
Simultaneously, however, Slawonischer Volksbote regularly appealed for Croatian 
understanding and tolerance of the German national movement in Slavonia. 
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Frauenarbeit and Maedearbeit: Women in the KWVD 
Frauenarbeit was another area in which the Kultur- und 
Wohlfahrtsvereinigung der Deutschen continued the activities of the Kulturbund but 
with an important shift in emphasis. The early Erneuerer had recognized the 
importance of females in their insurgency and regularly appealed to Swabian 
Kameradinnen to join their male Kameraden in the movement’s infiltration of the 
Kulturbund’s Jugendgruppen and Maedchenabteilungen. The Kulturbund had 
launched much of its initial Jugendarbeit under the guidance of the young Helli 
Schenk, who was probably the most prominent of the female Erneuerer and later 
joined the KWVD in 1936. In the KWVD, Schenk served as Maedelleiterin before 
getting married and moving to Berlin in 1938. Her work with the KWVD revealed 
that organization’s Frauenarbeit and Maedelarbeit to have much in common with the 
Kulturbund’s own. Nevertheless, women’s work in the KWVD displayed an extra 
stress on racial purity typical of the Erneuererungsbewegung and National Socialism. 
  Like other Erneuerer, Schenk started out as a Kulturbund member and was 
closely involved with the Kulturbund’s initial organizational outreach to girls and 
young women. However, being a younger woman herself, she became inspired by the 
neue deutsche Weltanschauung and soon found herself sympathizing with the 
Erneuerungusbewegung. When Branimir Altgayer established his rival KWVD in 
Slavonia, she (like Lichtenberger) resolved to join him and continue her work with 
women and especially girls. As the KWVD’s Maedelleiter, Schenk sought to 
organize Slavonia’s girls and educate them on matters of public health, German 




Swabian culture to its original, uncorrupted essence. “Everything should be again free 
from foreign intrusions and brought back to its own unique nature, to what was 
inherited from our ancestors,” Schenk wrote.689 The girls went on hikes and danced 
and sang together. Maedelarbeit was not limited to cultural or outdoors matters, 
however, and in the KWVD’s first annual report Schenk explained that her work 
included education about “fundamental (weltanschaulich) questions.” That is, 
questions “on Volk, Heimat and the duties that derive from them.” Girls were 
instructed in volkshygenischen und volksbiologisch questions as well, Schenk 
explained.690 
Schenk’s views in the KWVD on the duty and role of women echoed those 
sentiments we have already seen in the Kulturbund, but with a more overt embrace of 
the neue deutsche Weltanschauung. Women were not considered incidental citizens 
of German extraction but rather had essential if proscribed roles as protectors and 
transmitters of the Swabians’ most precious German cultural goods to its most 
precious children. As for a German woman’s duty, Schenk wrote that “the 
preservation of the nationality for which they themselves are repositories lies in the 
hands of mothers. The German settler woman has a great task precisely in her 
capacity as a mother. The raising of children rests in her hands. She alone teaches 
them the German mother tongue and instructs them in all that which concerns a 
German child. She raises them to faithfulness, obedience, honesty, industriousness, 
and the fulfillment of duty.” Indeed, Schenk asserted, the preservation of German 
ways and customs had been as important for the original colonist women as the 
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struggle for one’s daily survival, for one’s daily bread.691  Women, thus had a very 
special role to play in the German movement and were nothing less than the 
guardians of the future.  
Ultimately, women never played a leading role in Swabian affairs except in 
their limited capacity as leaders of the various women’s groups in the Kulturbund, in 
the KWVD, and (less formally) in the Erneuerungsbewegung. Nevertheless, they 
actively participated in Kulturbund events and did so in increasing numbers over the 
interwar era. One aspect of the heightened activity of contemporary youth we have 
observed was the increased activity of ever more girls. Meanwhile, women were also 
called to fill an important role in the German national project. They were venerated as 
the vessels through which the German nation and its culture were literally reproduced 
across generations. And women’s nationally-based activities especially increased 
during the 1930s when the Kulturbund, the KWVD (Erneuerer) and, as we shall see 
in Chapter Eight, the Swabian Catholic clergy established young women’s groups 
designed to inculcate their respective values in Swabian society’s females and bind 
them to their movements.  
 
 
German Homeland Nationalism and the KWVD 
In a 1937 appeal to the Reich-based Archive of German Folksongs (Archiv 
deutscher Volkslieder), Lichtenberger lamented that too little Volkstumarbeit had 
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been carried out in Slavonia in the past. “The Germans are in many cases already 
nationally-alienated and have lapsed into Croatdom,” he wrote.  But the KWVD was 
making progress, he insisted, asking that more Volkstumarbeit materials be 
dispatched to the region from the Reich.692 Such support was increasingly 
forthcoming and the increasing backing that the KWVD enjoyed from Reich-based 
Volkstumarbeit organizations was indicative of the steady erosion of the original 
leadership’s position in the Kulturbund. In Slavonia, the VDA and German Foreign 
Ministry had initially been supporters of the Kulturbund in its activities there. 
However, this withered somewhat after the founding of the KWVD and Slawonischer 
Volksbote. As we have seen, the Erneuerer found ideological sympathizers in the 
powerful and wealthy VDA, one of the largest and most significant Volkstumarbeit 
organizations. The VDA had been a central provider of materials for the Kulturbund, 
but after the Kulturbund’s 1936 dismissal of Adam Maurus, leader of the Association 
of German Libraries in Yugoslavia (Verband der Deutschen Volksbuechereien) and 
proud Erneuerungsbewegung sympathizer, the VDA sharply cut back the delivery of 
such materials. Offended by Maurus’ dismissal, the VDA directed new resources and 
support to the KWVD, with whom Maurus retained close contact.693 In fact, a survey 
of the KWVD’s files reveals Altgayer to have had relations with a whole host of 
Volkstumarbeit organizations, periodicals, and other associations in Germany, 
Austria, Romania and even Czechoslovakia. Most prominent among these were VDA 
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and the DAI, but there were others.694 Similarly, even after his dismissal from the 
Kulturbund, the KWVD continued to work closely with Maurus, who had many 
literary connections in Germany and to whom the organization looked for books by 
Adolf Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, Walter Darre, Houston Stewart Chamberlain and the 
like for its libraries. The KWVD’s German cultural mission, therefore, plainly had a 
political bias that served the voelkisch ideals and priorities of National Socialism.695  
 
696 
1937 letterhead from the Deutsches Ausland-Institut indicaticating the extent of the organization’s 
Gleichschaltung.  
  
Although they had themselves dissolved the Kulturbund chapter in Osijek, the 
original leadership regarded Altgayer and his supporters as separatists and regularly 
warned that the KWVD’s existence undermined German strength and unity in 
Yugoslavia. Their stance was arguably correct, but Altgayer and his colleagues 
naturally refuted all accusations of “separatism.” On the contrary, they argued, they 
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were awakeners and unifiers who were ministering to exactly those Germans whom 
the Kulturbund had so long ignored in Slavonia. In fact, Altgayer was so recognized 
for his efforts in Reich circles that he was invited to partake in the NSDAP rally at 
Nuremberg in 1938 and even briefly met Hitler himself. While in Germany, he 
frequented the offices of the VDA and VoMi, where he held a series of meetings. As 
a result of this, the KWVD received library resources, books, student stipends, and 
the like from Germany’s official and unofficial Volkstumarbeit bodies. After the 
Second World War, Altgayer admitted during his interrogation by the victorious 
Communists that that “in the offices of the VDA and even more at the Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle, I got instructions and advice on how to direct the work and activities of 
the Kulturbund, that is, the KWVD, in the political interests of the Third Reich in 
important questions in such areas as, for example, politics, education, and 
economics.” Altgayer then explained that he carried out these and other directives on 
the territory of Yugoslavia.697 In other words, Altgayer worked closely with certain 
Reich organizations, accepted their resources and even communicated their directives 
to the Swabians in Slavonia. 
 
The German National Movement’s New Appeal in Slavonia 
As the 1930s drew to a close in Slavonia, the Kulturbund and KWVD, could 
legitimately claim much success in stimulating national consciousness and mobilizing 
them into the two (later one) Germandom organizations. This begs the question of 
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why one of Yugoslavia’s most apparently assimilated and least nationally conscious 
German communities (if the scattered Slavonian settlements with their disparate 
histories, origins, confessions and dialects could be said to constitute a single 
“community”) should suddenly decide to embrace German national identity. The 
answer derived from Brubaker’s triadic interplay of homeland, minority, and 
nationalizing nationalisms, punctuated by the local activism of Slavonia’s two 
competing Germandom organizations. 
 Even at the height of German membership in the Second World War’s 
Deutsche Volksgruppe in Kroatien, German national identity in Croatia and Slavonia 
remained complicated. The simple truth is that many Swabians in Slavonia still did 
not embrace German national identity in the 1930s. German national consciousness 
was often particularly weak in the cities. Especially in Osijek, some ethnic Germans 
remained positively hostile to the German national movement and self-identified as 
Croats, even if they spoke German at home. Sava banovina authorities reported in 
1937 that the KWVD was gaining little traction in most of Osijek and therefore was 
concentrating its efforts on villages, especially purely German villages, where the 
peasants were more receptive to German activism. Even in places where Kulturbund 
or KWVD local chapters were established, however, activity was sometimes lacking, 
a reality which provoked much frustration among Swabian leadership in Slavonia.  
Where there was success in stimulating German national consciousness, that 
success was in large part due to the talented German activists’ energies and skills, 
which were sharpened by the competition between the Kulturbund and the KWVD. 




Volkstumarbeit and often found a willing audience. The Swabian activists in Slavonia 
skillfully tailored their message to their Slavonian peasant audience, among whom the 
cult of the peasant as well as notions of  blood and soil might be expected to find 
particular resonance, rooted as they were in the romantic notion of the peasants’ 
supposedly authentic and organic connection to the land. Meanwhile, the Kulturbund 
expended a great deal of energy and resources in combating the KWVD, sending 
Kulturbund representatives, resources, and Wanderlehrer to all corners of Slavonia. 
Swabian youths were particularly attracted to the new national idea, especially as 
embodied by the neue deutsche Weltanschauung and the inspirational example of 
Hitler’s resurgent Reich. Whereas Germanness in previous decades might have been 
understood as a point of embarrassment or liability in Slavonia, it assumed an aura of 
glory and strength after 1933. Germany was again one of Europe’s great nations and 
many people wanted to be associated with it. This phenomenon only accelerated with 
Hitler’s steady triumphs in economics, diplomacy and, later, war. National 
consciousness gave the Slavonian peasants something to which to aspire, an ideal 
higher than themselves and arguably greater than Croatia, which after all was a place 
of only regional significance whose leaders seemed locked in perpetual struggle with 
Belgrade.  
National conflict also sharpened Slavonian national consciousness. Once the 
idea was out there that Germans too might have national rights, as institutionalized in 
the minority treaties at the end of the First World War, the excesses of Croatization 
became increasingly conspicuous. Let us not forget that the German national 




railed against Croatization (and the “apostate” Strossmayer) even before the collapse 
of the Habsburg Monarchy, as we saw in Chapter Two. In the contentious Yugoslav 
successor state, where Serbs and Croats struggled against one another even inside 
Croatia-Slavonia, many Swabians decided they identified with neither group and thus 
were susceptible to new identities. The overarching Hungarian identity and Habsburg 
cosmopolitanism were simply no longer available, but ethnicity endured. 
The vicious circle of national identification that manifested itself elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia was at least as evident in Slavonia in the 1930s. Banovina and local 
authorities exerted nationalizing pressure on their unwanted minorities. Paradoxically, 
however, their efforts frequently heightened the ethnic identity of those minorities 
who, in the Swabian case, were encouraged from Germany itself by increasingly 
active, Reich-based Volkstumarbeit organizations. Thus, nationalizing nationalism 
was in effect in Serbian, Croatian and Yugoslav variants. Meanwhile, German 
homeland nationalism directed new energies and attention at the Danube Swabians 
from the Third Reich. Lastly, the Swabians own minority nationalism was skillful, 
energetic, and articulate. The German activists were well prepared to capitalize on the 
crystallization of German national consciousness and channel it into a minority 
stance, that is minority nationalism, both domestically and abroad. 
As we have seen, the DAI, VDA and not least VoMi had regular contacts with 
the Germans in Yugoslavia, funded their organizations, provided them with literature, 
and encouraged and facilitated personal exchanges with the Reich.698 Meanwhile, 
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Croats had long exerted pressure for the Swabians to assimilate through such 
institutions as the Church and schools, as well as everyday social expectations. In 
this, the Swabians might demonstrate their loyalty to Croatia and join its proud 
society. As the Serb-Croat conflict wound on during the 1920s and 1930s, however, 
the Slavonian Germans grew increasingly suspect to the Croats for the political 
leanings of their coethnics in Vojvodina, whom we have seen tended to support the 
(Serbian) governing parties. This highlighted the Swabians’ sense of being distinct. 
German support for parties other than the HSS seemed especially treacherous to 
Croats and again stimulated tension and confrontation, which in many cases only 
sharpened German national sensibilities and reinforced this sense of being distinct. 
This situation only worsened in the tense political climate of the 1930s, when 
Croatian politicians were routinely arrested and their main party repressed. Also 
provocative was the fact that German national consciousness was plainly becoming 
political, and the Kulturbund was increasingly recognized as such by Yugoslav 
authorities. These authorities were nevertheless constrained by domestic and 
international considerations to tolerate it, at least to some degree. Finally, the rise of 
the Third Reich rendered German nationalism positively menacing to many, just 
when the German national movement in Yugoslavia and its increasingly active youth 
was becoming ever more strident. Ultimately, the Swabians’ ties to the German 
“motherland” were a concern which their regular assertion of loyalty to the Yugoslav 
“fatherland” did little to assuage.  
In conclusion, then, we may say that the German national movement achieved 




the ethnic German population remained indifferent to the appeal of German national 
consciousness. Many ethnic Germans had become highly assimilated to their Croatian 
environment. Nevertheless, the nascent German movement in Slavonia had begun to 
reverse this process and stimulate unprecedented national consciousness among 
Swabians during the 1930s. The Serb-Croat rivalry, Croatian nationalism, the 
Swabians’ own internal divisions, and the Reich’s increasingly active Volkstumarbeit 
organizations only increased Swabian identification with things German. Meanwhile, 
the Kulturbund’s New Order may be said to have plainly backfired in Slavonia, where 
the Erneuerer were now organized, legal and ascendant. 
 
The New Order in Vojvodina: The Erneuerungsbewegung Joins Zbor 
Like any movement, the Erneuerungsbewegung contained diverse currents 
and varying degrees of intensity. At its core, it was youth-obsessed, anti-liberal, anti-
Semitic, German national, National Socialist, racist, and as chauvinist as it could be 
within the confines of a foreign nation-state, which was often divided against itself. 
The movement was always insistent and impatient but it could also be impetuous and 
intemperate. As discussed, the Erneuerungsbewegung’s formal expulsion from the 
Kulturbund had had awkward consequences for the movement, which lost its 
institutional context and whose activities therefore became legally questionable. As 
we have seen, Branimir Altgayer resolved this situation of legal uncertainty by 
establishing the KWVD in the Sava banovina. However, the KWVD was constrained 
territorially by its statutes and was therefore barred from working with the 




another solution in an alliance with Serbian fascist Dimitrije Ljotić. On February 12, 
1937, the cover of Volksruf screamed that “The Erneuerungsbewegung has Joined the 
Ljotić-Movement ‘Zbor’!”699 
Yugoslav authorities typically regarded Zbor with suspicion. Ljotić himself 
claimed to object to calling his movement “fascist”, rejecting as too close the implied 
association with Mussolini’s National Fascist Party in Italy.700 Such details aside, his 
movement was plainly a right-wing nationalist group, whose traits, forms, and 
pretensions allowed contemporaries and permit the modern historian to describe it as 
a broadly fascist movement. Besides forming its own paramilitary branch, the 
Ljotićevci, Zbor was also racist, anti-liberal, and aggressively anti-Semitic. It openly 
admired the Third Reich. It disdained parliamentarism, political parties, and the 
niceties of debate. Unsurprisingly, it was also controversial in Yugoslavia’s 
establishment circles as well as marginal in political life, where it never won the 
support of more than the tiniest sliver of the Serbian electorate. 
If Branimir Altgayer’s decision to found the KWVD might be described as a 
determined and well-planned act of defiance, Jakob Awender’s decision to lead his 
followers into Zbor was a move of brash and ill-considered rebellion. The decision to 
join forces was not taken without reason, however. Official approval for a KWVD-
like organization in Vojvodina was never likely, but the Zbor alliance was 
immediately available and offered the Erneuerungsbewegung the legal cover to 
continue its agitation while also extending it the freedom to be overtly political. As 
we have observed, the Erneuerer had a history of concealing their unsanctioned 
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organizations and activities behind other, legitimate German associations such as the 
economic cooperatives and the Kulturbund, of course. Such concealment had 
basically been the only option for the Erneuerungesbewegung after its expulsion from 
the Kulturbund, before which the movement had operated within youth groups and 
local chapters.701 After February 1937, however, the Erneuerer would elect to form 
chapters in and conduct its business as Zbor.  
Awender described the fusion with Zbor as a step forward for the 
Erneuerungsbewegung, a pooling of German strengths toward the development and 
expression of their political will.702 Gustav Halwax, another leading Erneuerer, 
announced that the Erneurerungsbewegung’s decision to join Zbor was a political 
one. That is, it was a move intended to put their movement on a political footing and 
allow it to pursue its claim to “the total leadership and shaping of our national 
independent existence.” The alliance with Zbor, the self-described “Yugoslav 
national movement,” would allow for the “political deployment of the German 
worldview,” he explained.703 To be sure, the Erneuerungsbewegung would not be 
subsumed or disappear, but rather would merely join Ljotić’s “front” while 
maintaining its distinctness. And of course, there was also a peculiar but undeniable 
ideological affinity between Ljotić’s right-wing nationalist movement and the 
National Socialism-inclined Erneuerer. As Erneuerer ideologue Gustav Halwax 
explained, the Erneuerer appreciated Zbor because “there is no Yugoslav political 
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movement, which emphasizes the unity, inviolability, greatness and strength of our 
fatherland more than Zbor. One can heave every possible reproach at Zbor, but one 
thing remains, it fights for a state, which is the expression of the creative value and 
strength of the Yugoslav nation.”704  
In summary, Zbor offered the Erneuerer the opportunity to continue their 
agitation and do so in a more overtly political way. (A Zbor chapter was promptly 
founded in Pančevo, the ideological center of the Erneuerungsbewegung.) In their 
loose alliance with Ljotić, Awender and his supporters believed that they had 
themselves found a way to engage in Yugoslav politics in a new key, that is, in a way 
that was dramatically different from the staid, tired methods of the PdD or a 
“minority” organization such as the Kulturbund. Similarly, it had not been necessary 
to establish a new organization like the KWVD, the approval of which seemed 
unlikely in Vojvodina.  
Zbor had actually begun its appeal to Yugoslavia’s German radicals much 
earlier, not long after its 1935 founding. In July 1936, Zbor even launched Erwache, a 
German language weekly which appealed to Swabians to join Dimitrije Ljotić’s 
movement. A self-described “national-soziales Kampfblatt,” Erwache argued that no 
small minority such as the Germans could expect a prosperous future as an 
independent party or in alliance with either Prime Minister Stojadinović’s party, the 
Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ), or Maček’s opposition.705 Thus, Zbor presented itself 
to the Swabians as a political organization that was practical and staatstreu yet 
revolutionary. “Yugoslav” nationalism was a Zbor trait, but when the Awender and 
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his Erneuerer followers finally joined the movement’s ranks, Erwache offered them a 
front page welcome. The Erneuerer, it said, would help the Ljotić movement in its 
struggle against Jews and the various political parties, cliques, and coteries whose 
politics went under the name “democracy.” “Sieg Heil!,” Zbor’s German mouthpiece 
concluded, “Heil Ljotić!”706 
That the Erneuerer in Vojvodina had joined Zbor as a kind of political cover 
for its activities was not lost upon the authorities even in the Sava banovina, where 
Altgayer’s KWVD was active but where Awender had fewer direct connections.707  
In order to avoid being tarnished by Awender’s decision to join Zbor, Altgayer took 
steps to formally distance himself and his organization from the Ljotićevci. In a front 
page article in Slawonischer Volksbote, he publicly announced that the KWVD had 
nothing to do with those circles of the Erneuerungsbewegung which had decided to 
join Zbor.  On the contrary, he insisted, the KWVD remained a “totally unpolitical 
nationality organization” and would continue to operate as such within the limits of 
its statutes.708 Likewise, he claimed that none of the KWVD’s members belonged to 
the Ljotić movement.709 In fact, Altgayer himself was probably not so hostile to Zbor. 
As a supporter of Awender, one may assume that Altgayer would have likewise 
recognized commonalities with the Ljotić movement and appreciated the potential 
benefits of alliance. Though he could be diplomatic and calculating, he was certainly 
no moderate. Altgayer was just less of a hothead than Awender, and recognized that 
the Erneuerungsbewegung’s fusion with Zbor was politically un-savvy since it put the 
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Erneuerungsbewegung at odds with the Yugoslav government. Indeed, many 
Erneuerer (including Sepp Janko, who would soon attain great prominence) were 
unhappy with the Erneuerer’s fusion with Zbor.710 Altgayer, for his part, just seems to 
have revealed his pragmatic streak, a quality he would again demonstrate after the 
creation of a separate Croatian banovina in 1939. 
Although the fusion with Zbor might have brought the Erneuerer satisfaction 
in the short term, it would also have important negative consequences. Zbor stood in 
opposition to the Stojadinović government and many government bodies in Berlin 
considered the organization reckless. No one in Berlin at this time wished Germany’s 
good and prosperous relations with Yugoslavia to be upset by a bunch of brash 
German nationalists in Vojvodina, even if they did subscribe to the ideology of the 
Third Reich. As such, the Zbor alliance is indicative of the paradoxical relationship 
between homeland and minority nationalism. Although the gleichgeschaltet 
Volkstumarbeit organizations and even government or party bodies of Nazi Germany 
might have been expected to encourage their German ideological allies in Yugoslavia, 
the fact was that they looked down upon Awender’s fusion with Zbor because it 
ultimately endangered the interests of the Third Reich. To this, the interests of the 
Swabian minority were ultimately secondary. 
 
Turbulence, Change and Challenge, 1937-1938 
1937 was a turbulent year for the German minority. The divisions in the 
German minority persisted throughout the year but the price of conflict was becoming 
ever more apparent to the antagonists. State and local authorities continued the low 
                                                 




level harassment which had characterized the German experience in Yugoslavia in 
recent years. German youth in particular was targeted and subjected to fines, 
detention, beatings, and other such illegal measures and annoyances. It was such 
harassment which prompted an exasperated Kraft to ask parliament in March 1937, 
“do they not wonder why the German population increasingly loses its composure 
and hope in the genuineness and goodwill of government policies, and begins to 
become radicalized and seek new political paths and alliances via a socially insecure 
youth?”711 Kraft’s concern was more than just altruistic, of course, for he and the 
original leadership were not usually the beneficiaries of such “new political paths and 
alliances.”  
As we have seen, one such “new path” for Swabians was the KWVD, which 
became quite successful quite quickly in Slavonia. Altgayer’s supporters founded 
many local chapters in short order and the KWVD arguably emerged as the dominant 
German association in the Sava banovina within its brief lifetime. By contrast, 
Awender’s fusion with Zbor was less successful but nevertheless discomforted the 
established German leadership, who feared the Zbor alliance would have negative 
repercussions for the minority as a whole. In any event, the Erneuerer were plainly 
surviving their exclusion from the Kulturbund, which increasingly found itself 
isolated by the spread of the Erneuerer’s ideas. Yet neither the Erneuerer nor the 
original leadership reveled in the German minority’s division, which plainly made the 
creation of the fabled Volksgemeinschaft impossible. Division, all agreed, only left 
the already tiny German minority weak. 
                                                 




There were also important shifts in the dynamics of the German minority 
during 1937 and 1938. As we have seen, Berlin’s backing was essential in order to 
successfully lead German community, achieve cultural concessions on its behalf, and 
have the appearance of legitimacy. The German Foreign Ministry and important 
Volkstumarbeit organizations had traditionally endorsed the original leadership and 
had even helped finance the Kulturbund for many years under their stewardship. 
However, the ascension of the Nazis in 1933 and the subsequent Gleichschaltung of 
Reich-based Germandom organization meant important changes in the activities of 
those associations and their political orientation. (The German Foreign Ministry 
retained its support for the original leadership until quite late, however.) Increasingly, 
the VDA began providing resources and materials to the KWVD and Slawonischer 
Volksbote, as did the Deutsches Ausland-Institut and many other such associations. 
During these years the original leadership defended its right to be the sole 
representatives of the German minority to the Reich Foreign Ministry, but gradually it 
was losing its monopoly on representation. The German Foreign Ministry desired 
placid relations between Germany and Yugoslavia, so it was naturally inclined to 
support the original leadership over the brash Erneuerer. By contrast, relations 
between the VDA and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle on the one hand and the original 
leadership on the other were steadily deteriorating. As we saw earlier, the VDA was 
particularly offended by the expulsion of Adam Maurus in 1936 and redirected some 
resources from the Kulturbund to the KWVD accordingly.712 SS Obergruppenfuehrer 
Lorenz’s Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, for its part, recognized its obvious ideological 
                                                 




kinship with the Erneuerer. Still, meaningful financial support for the 
Erneuerungsbewegung would only come later. 
 Surprisingly, a deep and very public split simultaneously emerged after 1937 
between Stefan Kraft and the Kulturbund leadership, especially Hans Moser, Johann 
Keks, and Georg Grassl.713 As we have noted, discontent with the omnipresent Kraft 
had been simmering for some time among the Swabians. Despite his undeniable 
service to the German community, frustration had been growing with his political 
priorities, style, and his leadership of the German system of cooperatives, which were 
sometimes said to be mismanaged. In fact, much of Jakob Awender’s original 
criticism of Kraft had been concerned with these commercial enterprises, and in 1937 
Kraft’s colleagues in the German leadership decided it was time for him to retire from 
public life. This movement against Kraft first saw public light in a March 1937 
Deutsches Volksblatt article which called for Kraft to resign from his responsibilities 
in the cooperatives, especially the presidency of the Agricultural Central Loan Office 
(Landwirtschaftlichen Zentral-Darlehenskasse or LZDK).714 The conflict exploded 
again the following year when Hans Moser published a public letter in which he 
                                                 
713  It is useful here to review the career of a man who was one of the Swabians’ most important 
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entered public life as a political activist on behalf of a German Sabor candidate from Ruma in 1913. 
Convinced after 1918 that the Germans required their own political party in Yugoslavia, he was an 
early promoter of the Partei der Deutschen and collaborated on the party’s Hatzfeld Program. After 
helping establish several local chapters of the PdD, he was then elected to parliament himself, where 
he was a leading member of the Germans’ Klub during the 1920s. Following the implementation of 
dictatorship, Moser remained active in Swabian affairs and was either a founder or participant in many 
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Foundation and the League of Germans in Yugoslavia for the League of Nations and International 
Understanding. Moser returned to the Yugoslav parliament in 1931. As the 1930s wore on, Moser 
emerged as a premier target of the Erneuerer for being one of the leading “Systemler”, or men of the 
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appealed for Kraft, among other things, to resign from the presidency of the School 
Foundation.715 This letter was supported in the following days by supporting appeals 
by Grassl716 as well as Keks, Oskar Plautz, Franz Seemayer, and Hans Moser 
again.717 When he felt that Deutsches Volksblatt refused to provide sufficient space in 
which to defend himself, Kraft launched his own rival weekly in 1938, the Deutsche 
Volksbote fuer Jugoslawien, in which criticism of the established Kulturbund 
leadership found a new voice.  
The actual nature of the conflict between Kraft and his erstwhile colleagues 
(led by Moser) was opaque at the time and remains unclear today.718 There had been 
some discontent during the 1930s with Kraft’s general political line and leadership 
style. There were also questions about the management of the economic cooperatives 
in which he played a leading role.719 The Kulturbund leadership may have resented a 
suggestion by Kraft, who worried about his parliamentary seat in places where the 
Erneuerungsbewegung was strong, to readmit the Erneuerer to the organization.720 Of 
greater relevance was the fissure that it opened up among the Swabian activists, a 
fissure which the Erneuerer would exploit as part of their strategy to return to the 
Kulturbund as leaders. Ultimately, the conflict between Kraft and his opponents 
proved damaging for the original leadership as a whole. The established leadership 
suffered a loss of prestige and the conflict opened up new avenues of attack by the 
Erneuerer. It raised questions about the reliability of the original leadership among 
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some Volkstumarbeit organizations abroad and allowed the Erneuerer to trumpet their 
own solidarity. Moser actually appealed to the KWVD to endorse his stand against 
Kraft but was met with refusal by Altgayer, who claimed he wanted nothing to do 
with a further splintering of the German minority. Slawonischer Volksbote called the 
whole conflict despicable, irrespective of whether the allegations against Kraft had 
merit. “How happy is the greater part of our Slavonian Germandom, which is 
gathered together in the KWVD and has nothing to do with this hateful strife,” it 
wrote.721 Of course, this was disingenuous, for the Kraft controversy represented a rift 
in the original leadership and, therefore, opportunity for the Erneuerer. Still primarily 
focused on seizing control of the Kulturbund, the Erneuerer at Slawonischer 
Volksbote and Volksruf actually sided in the dispute with their erstwhile target Kraft.  
Ultimately, both the German Foreign Ministry and the Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle tired of the quarrel between Kraft and Moser, which seemed to them a 
distracting personal disagreement even if there might have been some legitimate 
reasons behind it. Reich Ambassador Viktor von Heeren finally recommended that 
the two sides submit their grievances to a court of arbitration composed of various 
prominent Auslandsdeutsche in Europe, which they did in May 1938. Ultimately, the 
dispute between Kraft and his former colleagues was not settled until the following 
spring, but the slow court process at least brought the original leadership a measure of 
cold peace in 1938.722   
 Just as 1937 had been tumultuous, so was 1938 a particularly dramatic year in 
European politics. Events of that year resonated among the Swabians and their South 
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Slav neighbors in Yugoslavia. Over the years, the Swabians had watched the 
consolidation of Hitler’s Germany and its gradual undoing of the Versailles Treaty 
with satisfaction. To nationally conscious Swabians of all persuasions, Germany at 
last seemed to be reclaiming its place as a great power in Europe and the world. In 
part, this meant improving the disadvantageous circumstances of German minorities 
abroad as well as revising the international borders that separated Germans in the 
Reich and neighboring states. But if the initial rise of Hitler’s Germany had filled 
Swabians with admiration, the events of 1938 would inspire deep new pride in their 
ethnicity and association with the Third Reich.  
As we have seen, the Swabians had long been attuned to auslandsdeutsche 
affairs in neighboring Hungary and Romania, of course, for they shared many 
familial, cultural and commercial ties with Swabians in those states. During the 
1930s, Swabian interest in Konrad Henlein’s Sudetdendeutsche Partei (SdP) had 
likewise grown with the Henlein party’s success in Czechoslovakia. Henlein’s SdP 
seemed to provide Swabians with an obvious example of the potential power a 
unified German minority could wield and also offered a powerful argument for 
overcoming the personal and ideological squabbles that had recently so dominated 
Swabian public and organizational life. Meanwhile, virtually all Yugoslavia’s 
Germans (except the German Catholic clergy) greeted the March 1938 Anschluss of 
Austria with unrestrained joy, and there were reports of particularly zealous 




Third Reich.723 Germany’s triumph at the international Munich Conference in 
September 1938 unleashed yet further enthusiasm for Hitler’s Reich and inspired 
many more Swabians to newly identify with Germandom, which was increasingly 
understood as synonymous with National Socialism by both Slavs and Swabians.  
 All the antagonists in the mid-1930s clash within the German minority 
bemoaned the divisions it produced, as we have seen. Each called for German unity in 
Yugoslavia, albeit according to his own principles. The Erneuerer around Awender in 
Zbor were the most bellicose, while Altgayer strove to sound reasonable even as he 
created his competing German organization in Slavonia. The original leadership 
appealed for order in the Kulturbund and worried about Altgayer’s Slavonian 
separatism. In fact, the original leadership and the Erneuerer conducted informal 
discussions and occasional negotiations throughout this period, with the aim of 
ultimately reaching common ground and ending the split. For its part, the original 
leadership remained well-established but was plainly on the defensive, losing both 
Swabian followers and Reich support for its efforts. The clash between Kraft and 
Moser and his supporters was likewise exhausting and self-defeating, ultimately 
producing only exasperation in Germany and new avenues of attack for the 
Erneuerungsbewegung. Meanwhile, the bulk of the Erneuerer were in the legal and 
organizational wilderness. Thus, though both the Erneuerer and the original 
leadership sincerely desired reconciliation, each group did so on the basis of its own 
values. As the division persisted, however, the need for such reconciliation became 
increasingly apparent to all sides. 
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 Ultimately, “reconciliation” in the German minority came in 1938 and 1939 
and led to the eventual triumph of the Erneuerungsbewegung inside the Kulturbund. 
Nevertheless, neither the process of reconciliation nor the ascension of the 
reintegrated Erneuerer was direct or uncontested, and important surprises occurred 
along the way. Nor did either process occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, both the 
original leadership and the Erneuerer were constantly aware of domestic and 
international circumstances and made their calculations accordingly. The three events 
which dominated German public life during 1938 were the proclamation of the 
Volksdeutsche Einheitsfront or “Volksdeutsche Unity Front” in spring, the formal 
reintegration of the Erneuerer into the Kulturbund after negotiations throughout the 
fall, and the campaign for the Germans to vote as a bloc for Stojadinovic’s JRZ in 
parliamentary elections in December.  
 Immediately after Wehrmacht troops crossed into Austria in March 1938, 
Altgayer called for the creation of a common German front in Slawonischer 
Volksbote to prevent any further disintegration of the minority’s institutions.724 Two 
weeks later, Altgayer again repeated this call, this time locating it in the context of 
Konrad Henlein’s own “Erneuerungsbewegung” (by which he meant the SdP) and the 
Anschluss of Austria, which, he noted, had filled Slawoniendeutschen, like all 
Germans, with joy.725 
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 The first formal steps toward reconciliation between the original leadership 
and the Erneuerer occurred on April 10, 1938, when the country’s more radical 
German leaders met in Belgrade to work out the creation of a common front. The 
groups behind the resulting Volksdeutsche Einheitsfront, thus, were essentially the 
Erneuerer but also included their former quarry Stefan Kraft and his supporters.726  
The Einheitsfront proclamation foresaw the creation of a number of institutions, 
including a “National Committee of the Volksdeutsche Einheitsfront,” whose task 
would be to represent the minority and assert its fundamental rights.727 Ultimately, the 
Volksdeutsche Einheitsfront’s program consisted of the following five demands: 
1. The establishment and recognition of our national individuality and our right to 
exist in the constitution and in law.  
2. The recognition of the Volksgruppe as a legal corporate body.  
3. The granting of the statutes for a Volksgemeinschaft in whose framework all 
questions of our Volksgruppe of a national, social, economic, and cultural nature 
can be debated and solved. 
4. The recognition of the leader of the Volksgemeinschaft as the single valid 
representative of our Volksgruppe to the State and its authorities. 
5. The recognition of our right to form the social order of the spirit and worldview of 
our Volk in the framework of the Volksgemeinschaft.728 
 
Hans Moser was skeptical of the Einheitsfront project from the outset. He had 
originally been invited to participate in the Einheitsfront’s founding talks as the 
Kulturbund’s representative, but had declined.  The circumstances for the creation of 
such a body were premature, he declared. Anyway, he suspected that the 
Einheitsfront would merely be a façade from behind which the Erneuerer would 
continue their claims to total leadership of the minority. All such behavior, he 
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asserted, plainly rendered impossible true reconciliation within the minority, for 
peace was a prerequisite of a true settlement.729 Ultimately, little concrete came of the 
Volksdeutsche Einheitsfront. The Kulturbund, which was still the dominant German 
organization in Yugoslavia, ignored its founding and then formally remained outside 
of the loose front.730 Important pressures for unity continued to be exerted upon the 
Swabians, however, both domestically and from the Reich.  
As we have seen, shortly after the proclamation of the Einheitsfront, Awender 
announced the Erneuerungsbewegung’s formal disassociation from Zbor and his 
intention to reach an accord with Stojadinović’s JRZ. Ultimately, the 
Erneuerungsbewegung’s formal association with Zbor was as short-lived as it was ill-
conceived. In joining Zbor, the Erneuerer had merely aligned themselves with a 
movement that was both marginal and extremist for little apparent benefit. Zbor was, 
moreover, an organization that did not endear itself to the Yugoslav government and 
consequently offended those offices and ministries of the Third Reich which desired 
placid relations between Germany and Yugoslavia. The alliance with Zbor 
complicated relations between the German minority and the Yugoslav government, 
with whom the original leadership sought good ties.  Moreover, the Zbor alliance 
provided the original leadership with an argument for why they and not their young 
challengers should be trusted with leadership and Reich support. So it was not 
surprising when, after several months of participating in Zbor rallies and exalting 
Ljotić in the pages of Volksruf, Awender and his followers withdrew from Zbor in 
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May 1938. The only way forward, Awender now announced, was through an 
accommodation with the governing JRZ.731 By that time, steps were underway which 
would culminate in a “unification” of the German minority’s principal antagonistic 
currents, though the unification would prove to be neither smooth nor comfortable for 
many involved.  
These were turbulent times for the Swabians, who became ever more suspect 
in the eyes of Yugoslav authorities as the dramatic events of 1938 unfolded. The 
Anschluss made the possibility of irredentism in Slovenia appear greater than ever 
before. No longer did Yugoslavia border on the relatively small and weak Austria but 
rather on the mighty German Reich, which was plainly hungry for treaty revision. 
The power of German unity as demonstrated by Henlein’s SdP was not lost on the 
Yugoslav people or authorities, who were growing increasingly distrustful of their 
Swabians. In order to prevent or at least reduce their political activation, Yugoslav 
authorities unleashed a wave of arrests, menacing house searches, and the 
confiscation of German newspapers which had printed the Einheitsfront’s program 
itself.732 In the international Munich Conference, Yugoslav authorities witnessed how 
skillfully the Third Reich exploited the grievances of Germans in Czechoslovakia to 
annex parts of that state. The Yugoslavs were determined that the same fate would 
not befall their country. Thus, if the European events of 1938 had been inspirational 
for Yugoslavia’s Germans, those same events filled Yugoslavia’s authorities and 
Slavic citizens with great foreboding when they recalled their own domestic German 
community.  
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As Yugoslavia moved toward new elections in December 1938, the JRZ 
sought improved relations with the Germans. Owing to the mishandling the Germans 
had already suffered during the year, the government party’s overtures at first met 
with Swabian disinterest. Nevertheless, negotiations continued and by late October 
(under some pressure from Berlin), both the Erneuerer and the original German 
leadership had agreed to support the JRZ and Stojadinović in the upcoming elections. 
Even in Croatia, the German leadership exhorted Swabians to vote for the JRZ, 
emphasizing the importance of maintaining national unity. Naturally, supporting the 
JRZ in Croatia-Slavonia was difficult for the Swabians, many of whom faced 
intimidation or worse by Croats who resented Germans electoral accommodation with 
the “Serbian” authorities, the JRZ.733 As we have seen, Croats typically regarded 
Swabian votes for parties other than their own HSS as treacherous. Nevertheless, the 
Swabian leadership in Slavonia urged Germans there to vote with their coethnics in 
Vojvodina and support the JRZ.734  
The electoral campaign provided numerous occasions, opportunities, and 
venues to trumpet German unity and call upon Swabians to bury their differences in 
order to vote as a bloc for the JRZ. The Swabians had been promised two members of 
parliament for their efforts and could thus make the case that a vote for Stojadinović’s 
party was actually a vote for the Germans.735 But of even greater importance than the 
Swabians’ agreement to vote for Stojadinović’s party was the formal reconciliation 
within the minority, which finally took place in late October 1938. The two sides had 
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held intermittent talks over the years, but the circumstances of 1938 gave those talks a 
new urgency, and all sides had plainly tired of the struggle. The Erneuerer continued 
to air personal attacks against Moser and the rest of the Kulturbund leadership 
throughout the summer, but during the autumn both Volksruf and Deutsches 
Volksblatt hinted at the possibility of renewed group unity in the Kulturbund.736  
On October 17, 1938, Grassl and Keks had met with Awender and 
successfully worked out an agreement by which the Erneuerer could return to the 
Kulturbund and the dissolved chapters could be restored. The KWVD, they agreed, 
would be folded into the Kulturbund and its local chapters combined with existing 
Kulturbund ones in those places which featured both organizations. The Erneuerer 
press finally announced the reintegration of the Erneuerer into the Kulturbund after 
the Kulturbund board had formally approved of Keks’, Grassl’s and Awender’s 
agreement at its meeting on November 20, 1938. This agreement specifically repealed 
the January 13, 1935 expulsion of Awender and the other lead Erneuerer and restored 
their membership in their local Kulturbund chapters. The agreement also provided for 
certain changes in the Kulturbund’s administrative boundaries and Altgayer’s 
installation as Chairman of the Kulturbund’s Slavonia District.737  
 Readmission into the Kulturbund did not exactly mean victory for the 
Erneuerer, but they gained much from the formal conclusion of the Swabians’ 
internal conflict. In addition to Altgayer’s reinstallation as Gauobmann, Jakob 
Lichtenberger returned to his post (now renamed Bundesjugendfueherer - a title 
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which likely reflected the idiom of the Third Reich), and Josef Beer became the 
Kulturbund’s secretary. Additionally, important Erneuerer received seats on the 
Kulturbund board at its 1938 annual congress in 1938. In Slavonia, the process of 
integrating KWVD and Kulturbund chapters where the two coexisted in the same 
town proceeded, albeit not always smoothly. Velimirovac, for example, was host to 
two such rival chapters and was the scene of some confusion and disagreement, the 
Kulturbund chapter leaders claiming that they had been the victors in the whole 
conflict with the Erneuerer and the KWVD chapter leaders observing that they had 
considerably more members.738 Ultimately the reconciliation offered the Erneuerer 
increased and important influence in the Kulturbund, but the original leadership also 
remained in place.  Perhaps most notably, the much maligned Johann Keks retained 
his post as Kulturbund Chairman. However, as we shall see in Chapter Nine, he 
would abruptly resign in early 1939, provoking a leadership crisis and unprecedented 
new opportunities for the Erneuerer. The Swabian Catholic clergy, meanwhile, 
remained sharply critical of the Erneuerer and the Kulturbund’s new and eventually 
ill-fated direction until the very end. In the following chapter we consider their 
challenge to the Erneuerungsbewegung and the more ambivalent attitude of the 
German Evangelical Church, which flirted with aspects of the Third Reich. 
 
                                                 





Novi Sad’s Habag Haus was the seat of the Kulturbund and other German organizations in Yugoslavia 
during the 1930s.739 
                                                 





















































































































































































































Chapter 8:  Swabian Catholic Resistance to the 
Erneurungsbewegung and the Lutherans’ more Ambivalent 
Stance on National Socialism 
 
Yugoslavia’s Swabian Catholics would come by and large to accept German 
nationhood and its associated movement as a fact of life. Nevertheless, the Church 
was intensely hostile to the strain of the German movement represented by the 
Erneuerungsbewegung and the extremist neue deutsche Weltanschauung. To 
counteract the Erneuerer’s excesses, leading Swabian Catholics organized a Catholic 
resistance movement, which ultimately failed to stop the Erneuerer but still caused 
much alarm in Nazi-oriented circles. Many priests and laymen participated in this 
resistance, but perhaps no figure so consistently opposed the insurrection of the 
Erneuerer as Adam Berenz, Catholic parish vicar in the town of Apatin on the 
Danube in Batschka. In his speeches and sermons across Swabian settled lands and in 
the pages of Die Donau, the Apatin weekly he edited, Berenz led the charge against 
the Erneuerungsbewegung, attacking its leadership, methodology, and ideology. 
Unfortunately, this movement led by Berenz and his collaborators was ultimately 
ineffectual, and Catholics streamed into the gleichgeschaltet Kulturbund after the 
triumph of the Erneuerer. All the same, that the Church and Berenz asserted a 
positive vision of German national identity in Yugoslavia which embraced 
Christianity but rejected National Socialism should not go unnoticed. It was also 
indicative of the degree to which national consciousness came to permeate interwar 
Swabian life, for even the Church was forced to employ the discourse of nationhood 




By contrast with the Catholics, the German Evangelical Church demonstrated 
an attitude toward National Socialism that was far more accommodating during the 
1930s.740 Indeed, the German Evangelicals under Bishop Philipp Popp developed 
ever closer ties with the Third Reich. In this they demonstrated not total approval of 
Hitler’s program but neither did they display the reflexive resistance of the Swabian 
Catholic Clergy to National Socialism and its local advocates, the Erneuerer. We 
begin with a discussion of the Catholics’ resistance, reserving our discussion of the 
German Evangelical Church’s more ambivalent position for the chapter’s latter pages.  
 
German Catholics between the World Wars in Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia’s interwar borders meant that the vast majority of Catholics in the 
country were now decidedly Croatian or Slovenian, and the Catholic Church, for 
various reasons, was broadly inclined to cater to those groups. Nevertheless, 
Yugoslavia’s Catholic population also counted a considerable number of ethnic 
Germans scattered in communities that might be purely German, purely Catholic, or 
ethnically and confessionally mixed.741 Spurred by outside forces, the Church 
increasingly came to embrace its Swabian flock as Germans in the 1930s, having 
largely ignored them as such for the country’s first decade. Certain nationally 
conscious German priests engaged their German parishioners and established 
institutions to minister to them in their mother tongue, ranging from an active German 
Catholic press to youth groups and even adult education. The Church organized 
religious pilgrimages for young Swabians in Batschka and Banat and celebrated the 
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settlement anniversaries of Catholic villages in order to create a sense of movement, 
community and common values among the country’s German Catholic population. 
Yet even as the Church sought to engage the German Catholics on the basis of 
nationhood, it rejected the national chauvinism of the Erneuerer, whose racism 
bespoke a bold “new heathenism” or Neuheidentum which the clergy regarded as un-
Christian.  
Where Catholicism had been something of a state religion under the 
Habsburgs, after 1918 Catholicism became a minority confession in a state that was 
majority Orthodox and ruled by an Orthodox monarch, who had only recently been 
Austria-Hungary’s enemy. In an important sense, thus, the tables had dramatically 
turned.742 The Vatican would later strive in vain to reach a concordat with the 
Yugoslav government, but throughout the interwar years the Church would continue 
to occupy a decidedly inferior position to the one it had enjoyed under the Habsburgs.  
The German Catholic population was drastically reduced relative to what it 
had been in old Hungary, of course, but the 1931 Yugoslav census still found 383,674 
German Catholics among the total German population of 499,969. As such, Catholics 
comprised nearly 77 percent of the country’s ethnic Germans, the rest being divided 
between two Evangelical Churches, as we have seen.743 The majority of Yugoslavia’s 
German Catholics resided in Vojvodina, Slovenia, and Croatia-Slavonia. 
 Christianity and the Church were deeply embedded in Swabian society. The 
Donauschwaben were mostly rural, of course, and their villages were often isolated 
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and characterized by conservative, traditional values. Indeed, Christianity extended 
beyond the spiritual in the Swabians’ agrarian society to take on a fundamental, 
legitimizing and world-interpreting quality, which was deeply anchored in every 
individual’s worldview. The Church stood both literally and figuratively at the center 
of Swabian communities and such celebrations as Bannerweihe (religious banner 
consecration) and Kirchweihe (church consecration) were both religious occasions 
and community events. Moreover, this centrality of religion was historic, dating from 
the original Swabian colonists, who had promptly constructed churches in the villages 
they founded or adopted. As such, the many village anniversaries celebrated during 
the interwar period were simultaneously commemorations of the establishment of the 
local parish there. In sum, Christianity extended beyond the bounds of parish and 
community and into the Swabian mind, where it informed and often defined an 
individual’s most fundamental world view. 
Despite this traditional, Christian outlook and the centrality of religion, a 
certain distance developed between many German villages and the Church in the 
decades preceding the outbreak of World War I. In Banat, the priests carried out their 
work somewhat impersonally in a climate often lacking in trust.744 In Slavonia and 
Srijem, as we have seen, there was some resentment of the Church because the 
Croatian clergy, shaped by Bishop Strossmayer, was perceived as chauvinistic and 
condescending to their German flock. According to Valentin Oberkersch, many 
priests simply became hostile toward the Swabians in the years before the First World 
War and avoided speaking German whenever possible. Nevertheless, the mutual 
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coolness the clergy and its Swabian flock felt for one another did not lead the 
Germans to properly abandon the Church. Though their inner connection with the 
Church waned and a perceptible indifference toward confessional and even religious 
questions (especially among men) emerged, the Swabians did continue to attend mass 
and participate in the various celebrations of the Church calendar.745  
The ethnic origins of the Catholic clergy in the Hungarian and Croatian lands 
that fell to Yugoslavia reflected the ethnic mosaic of the region. Identity was similarly 
complex and a priest’s ethnic origins did not always serve as a reliable indicator of 
his national inclination. In pre-Trianon Hungary, the Catholic hierarchy had long 
identified with the idea of the Magyar state and had offered considerable assistance 
and support in the construction of that state. True, in its purely Catholic pastoral care, 
the Church had served the various nationalities in their mother tongue. However, such 
pastoral care had nothing to do with Volkstumarbeit in the national sense. Rather its 
emphasis was on the Catholic and not the national. At least as far as the Danube 
Swabians were concerned, the Church did not serve as an advocate for their national 
rights or even strive for the proper implementation of the 1868 nationalities law in 
prewar Hungary.746  
 While the collapse of Austria-Hungary produced a new central European 
order, which was clearly based on the national principle, much of the Swabians’ 
parish clergy remained slow or reluctant to embrace the new national political ideas 
of the interwar period. Djakovo Bishop Akšamović was little interested in the 
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national-linguistic needs of the Swabians in his diocese and had himself to strike a 
sometimes awkward balance between Croatian and pro-Yugoslav sensibilities.747 
Likewise, Apostolic Administrator Budanović seemed a similar attitude and even 
later looked askance at the Swabian clergy’s efforts to resist National Socialism 
through a more assertively, Catholic German identity. In his study of the Catholic 
Church and the Kulturbund between the world wars, Georg Wildmann offers a 
taxonomy of the Swabian clergy (especially in Batschka and Banat) that well 
illustrates the complexity and nuances of their national views, which often 
contradicted their own ethnic origins. The Swabian clergy, he maintains, could be 
categorized as “Hungarists”, “Magyarists” and “Deutschbewusste”. 
“Hungarists”, in Wildmann’s taxonomy, were those priests who had embraced 
Hungary but not German absorption by Magyardom. They had typically been 
ordained between 1870 and the turn of the century and thus formed their character 
before 1875, after which Magyarization pressures intensified in the schools. The 
worldview of the Hungarist priest was defined by a benevolent disposition to the 
Hungarian state, whose power to integrate peoples and historical rights he respected. 
That Stephen, founder and first king of Hungary, was simultaneously a saint 
contributed to a sort of “St. Stephen’s myth”, which was embodied in Hungarian 
political literature and national feeling. St. Stephen’s kingdom had provided and 
ensured a kind Pannonian basic culture in which many ethnic groups could freely live 
their own lives. As such, the Hungarist was an opponent of Swabian assimilation by 
Magyardom but was nevertheless Hungarian-oriented. He enjoyed a kind of 
cosmopolitan Germandom, which allowed him to remain comfortably immune from 
                                                 




the more negative trends in contemporary German nationalism elsewhere in 
Europe.748  
If Hungarists were Hungarian patriots but opponents of assimilation, 
“Magyarists” had no such reservations about surrender to Magyarization. Wildmann 
dates the appearance of this type of German clergy to the year after 1890. Most of this 
Magyarist “German” clergy would have come from the Swabian villages. Having 
their roots in the nationally oriented education policy of late-nineteenth century 
Hungary, the Magyarist clergy openly acknowledged the hegemony of Magyar 
culture, which they embraced as their own. Wildman calls such priests Magyar-
national conservative in their outlook.749 Although most Magyarist priests spoke 
German quite well, some could not communicate comfortably in German. This 
sometimes meant that these priests simply communicated better in Magyar and led to 
communication problems with the Swabian flock, to which their Magyar affinities 
frequently seemed condescending. Unsurprisingly, this situation undermined relations 
between the Church and common folk.750  
 The third and final group consisted of those members of the Catholic clergy 
who were nationally conscious ethnic Germans. Though fewer in number at the outset 
of the interwar period, their ranks would increase over time, especially as younger 
Swabians emerged from the interwar Catholic seminaries and were ordained as 
priests. The national consciousness of these young priests was not the result of a 
Church program or initiative. Rather, it derived from a series of changes in the place 
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and nature of their training as well as the nationally tense atmosphere of interwar 
Yugoslavia.  
The interwar period presented new challenges to the Hungarist and Magyarist 
clergy. In their outlook, they belonged to the camp of the Magyars. However, the new 
authorities were now Yugoslav and quite concerned about the possibility of 
Hungarian irredentism. The fledgling German national movement had regarded 
Hungarists with great suspicion and Magyarists with utter derision, seeing them as 
ethnic traitors. Hungarists were regularly smeared as Magyarones by nationally 
conscious Swabians. Some of them, however, including Apatin priest Adam Berenz 
who would rise to prominence resisting the Erneuerungsbewegung and neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung in the 1930s, openly embraced the program of the Kulturbund after 
its founding in 1920. Nevertheless, such pro-Swabian priests were few in number 
during the 1920s and their efforts did not please the Apostolic Administrator, Bishop 
Budanović, in Subotica.  Likewise, Djakovo Bishop Antun Akšamović had little 
interest in attending to the national-linguistic needs of his Swabian flock. Many 
Catholic priests were distrustful of the Kulturbund, in which they believed they 
discerned Protestant currents.751 Osijek’s Catholic weekly, Christliche Volkszeitung 
was critical of the nascent German national movement.752 Similarly, the pages of 
Deutsches Volksblatt were rife with incidents of intense resistance to the Kulturbund 
by some Catholic priests but open support by others. Caught in a twice noxious 
atmosphere of Croatian chauvinism and anti-Germanism, the Swabians suffered 
neglect by the Catholic Church for many years. And where Hungarian-oriented 
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priests might have felt neutered by the changes in 1918, the Croatian clergy did not, 
leading the German consulate in Zagreb to remark in 1927 that the Swabian 
population in the Zagreb and Djakovo bishoprics were being Croatized at its bishops’ 
behest and recommend that the Church organizations of Germany move to protect 
their German coreligionists in Slavonia.753  
 
Swabian Catholics in the 1930s: A New Dawn 
German Catholics would become energized and mobilized during the 1930s as 
never before in Yugoslavia. The forces behind this transformation of the German 
Catholic community were various and the leadership in this transformation featured 
both Swabian and Reich German actors. In fact, two basic trends were evident. On 
the one hand, Rome and Reich Catholics recognized the need to better tend to the 
German flock in Yugoslavia and thus established institutions which ministered 
specifically to Germans in their mother tongue and embraced the now hegemonic 
discourse of nationhood (albeit in a specifically Christian-Catholic manner). On the 
other hand, the local Swabian clergy itself rose against the provocative challenge of 
the Erneuerungsbewegung and its unholy ideology. As such, beginning in the mid-
1930s, new institutions were founded that sought to galvanize and mobilize the 
Catholic Swabian community for Christianity and against the Erneuerungsbewegung. 
In part, this simply meant the better ministering to the Catholic Swabians through 
freer use of the German language and the establishment of a kind of German Catholic 
center in Belgrade. However, the response of especially the local clergy to the 
                                                 




Erneuerungsbewegung went further and must be understood as foresighted and 
determined resistance to National Socialism. The Swabian Catholic clergy resolved to 
meet the Erneuerungbewegung’s insurgency with a counterinsurgency of its own and 
founded an active youth movement to challenge the appeal of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung’s young “Kameradschaft”. To promote its movement and 
counteract the incessant propaganda of the Erneuerer, the Church launched an active 
press, which did not shy from decrying the “new-heathenism” (Neuheidentum) of 
National Socialism and its advocates in Germany and Yugoslavia. Inveighing in the 
press and pulpit against the excesses of the neue deutsche Weltanschauung, 
Yugoslavia’s German clergy embraced German national consciousness but urged 
Catholics to always keep Christianity at the center of their personal worldview.  
In the 1920s Swabian Catholics had often been poorly served by the Church 
and manifested their dissatisfaction by withdrawing from Church affairs. As 
discussed, the Church was a central element of earthly as well as spiritual life for the 
Swabians and thus could not be ignored. The Church calendar set the rhythm of daily 
and seasonal life for village and parish, and the Church’s sacraments retained a 
central place in life’s passage from cradle to grave. Nevertheless, a certain distance 
had developed between many Swabians and their clergy, who often seemed little-able 
or little-inclined to speak to them in their German mother tongue. Then, over the 
course of the interwar period, a new generation of young men entered the priesthood. 
Educated in the often tense, nationalist atmosphere of Yugoslavia, they quickly 
perceived their ethnic distinctiveness and gravitated toward one another to form 




Catholic life in Germany and Austria. Studying in Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, they 
discovered that their Magyar and even Croatian seminary colleagues also struggled 
on behalf of their respective mother tongues in Yugoslavia and thus became 
energized to do the same for German when they returned to their own 
communities.754 These younger priests better understood their increasingly nationally 
conscious fellow Swabians than did older generations and could moreover better 
relate to Yugoslavia’s German youth. Infused with the Catholic worldview and 
concerned about the attractions of the Erneuerer and the neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung, they turned energetically to Jugendarbeit in the Catholic spirit but 
informed by contemporary youth’s own language and aesthetic. 
Although the challenge of the Erneuerer provided a plain imperative for local 
mobilization, much of the impetus for the transformation of Swabian Catholic life in 
the 1930s came from abroad in the recognition that Yugoslavia’s German Catholics 
were being poorly served by the Church. The turning point in the history of the 
Church in Yugoslavia viz. Germans came in the early 1930s. During the previous 
decades, the Church had increasingly come to appreciate the importance of the 
vernacular (mother tongue) in Church matters in the twentieth century. Indeed, Pope 
Pius XI acknowledged a natural and supernatural right to the receipt of religious 
instruction and pastoral care [Seelsorge] in one’s native language.755 To ensure the 
proper provision of such pastoral care for the German diaspora, Pius XI named 
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Osnabrueck Bishop Wilhelm Berning protector of the auslandsdeutsche Catholics in 
Eastern Europe and overseas in 1930 and tasked him with assisting those Catholics to 
maintain their Christian faith and German nationality.756 
Just as many Reich Germans were concerned about their coethnics beyond the 
homeland’s borders on the basis of national identity, so did many German Catholics 
worry for their auslandsdeutsche co-religionists in Eastern Europe and overseas. In a 
Catholic form of homeland nationalism and Volkstumarbeit, these Reich Catholics 
advocated for their fellow German Catholics abroad, their principal organization 
being the Reich Association for Catholic Germans Abroad (Reichsverband fuer die 
katholischen Auslandsdeutschen). Klemens Popp, the association’s leader, knew of 
the neglected state of the Catholics in Belgrade and sought unsuccessfully to persuade 
Archbishop Rodić of Belgrade to permit a German priest to tend to the city’s German 
Catholics in the early 1930s. Later, on the request of Bishop Berning, the Belgrade 
archbishop consented, receiving reichsdeutsche Rector Augustin Hegenkoetter on 
May 2, 1932 and granting him permission to minister to the German Catholics in the 
archbishopric of Belgrade and the apostolic administrature of Banat. Thus did the 
Swabian Catholic community receive one of its principle drivers from abroad.  
When he visited Yugoslavia in 1933 himself, Bishop Berning discovered the 
German Catholics there to be suffering from neglect and insufficient resources. 
Swabians complained of a lack of German language religious services and German 
speaking priests. The situation in Belgrade was particularly dire, for the community 
there had been without a German mass for many years. At around 10,000 souls, 
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Swabians formed approximately one quarter of Belgrade’s Catholic population.757 
Nevertheless, anti-German sentiment lingered in the new Yugoslav capital and the 
Church found its resources tested there with the arrival of many Croatan and Slovene 
Catholics following the new state’s creation. Indeed, though German religious 
education was available, for many years neither mass nor important sacraments were 
celebrated in German in the city.758 Berning futilely pressed for the establishment of a 
German seminary in Yugoslavia and obtained some limited success in his appeal to 
allow ethnic Germans to train for the priesthood in Germany. However, the most 
lasting impact from his visit resulted from his instruction that a German Catholic 
center be established in the Yugoslav capital. From this initiative arose St. 
Raphaelsheim, a place of worship and German cultural center which would soon 
become not only the focal point of the German Catholic ministry in Belgrade but also 
a major publishing center and gathering point for Danube Swabians in the Yugoslav 
capital.  
Despite the limited number of German Catholics in Belgrade, St. 
Raphaelsheim and the men associated with it soon assumed great importance in 
Swabian Catholic community. In January 1934, Rektor Hegenkoetter and his 
reichsdeutsche colleague, Vicar Emanuel Wethmar, secured written authorization to 
introduce German into masses in Belgrade and its surroundings. The former of these 
two men became a tireless servant of the Catholic Swabians in and around the capital, 
“the soul of St. Raphaelsheim.”759 Meanwhile, his partner Vicar Wethmar devoted 
himself to the Swabian Catholic press, participating in the founding of the three 
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principle publications of St. Raphaelsheim, St. Raphaelsblatt, Wolkenschiff, and 
Jugendruf. He was likewise tireless, ministering to the Germans in Belgrade, 
providing German language religion classes, and devoting great attention to the 
organizational life of German Catholic youth.  
Related to its Christian mission, St. Raphaelsheim also became a center of 
Swabian Catholic publication and resistance to the Erneuerungsbewegung. During the 
1920s, Yugoslavia had featured a handful of German-language Catholic-oriented 
publications, such as Christliche Volkszeitung, but these newspapers differed in scope 
and orientation from those of the 1930s. Christliche Volkszeitung was primarily an 
Osijek journal of record, albeit with a Catholic (but not German nationalist) 
perspective. The Church’s Swabian press of the 1930s was fundamentally Catholic in 
its orientation, of course, but also revealed itself to be simultaneously nationally 
conscious and frequently appealed to its Catholic readers on the basis of German 
national identity. As the decade wore on and the challenge of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung grew more menacing, the Catholic press increasingly served 
as a platform for spirited sermons on religion and national identity. Moreover, it 
became a source for news and commentary on such matters by important voices in the 
Vatican and Germany itself.  
 If external forces, especially the attention of Osnabrueck Bishop Berning and  
the Reichsverband fuer katholischen Auslandsdeutschen, resulted in the revitalization 
of organized Swabian Catholic life in Yugoslavia, it was the challenge of the 
Erneuerer that spurred the local German clergy to even higher levels of activity. 




villages of Batschka, Father Josef Negele, the future editor of Familienfreund, 
observed. However, young Swabians who had studied in Germany returned to their 
communities possessed by the new ideas and methods of struggle that they had 
observed abroad. Once back in Yugoslavia, they formed small circles to discuss the 
neue deutsche Weltanschauung and occasionally parade through town singing fight 
songs (Kampfliedern) or shouting “Heil Hitler”. After the Nazis’ accession to power, 
the Erneuerer became even more brazen, holding teach-ins on the tenets of their 
movement and openly seeking adherents in the Catholic communities.760  
Meanwhile in Germany, the Nazis did not intend to allow the Catholic Church 
to escape the Gleichschaltung they demanded of other organizations in the Third 
Reich for reasons of ideology and control. With over 21 million members in the 
Reich and vast international resources, the Church was one of the strongest 
organizations in Germany. At the outset of Nazi rule, German society also featured 
Catholic trade unions and the Catholic Center Party, which had been a key supporter 
of the Weimar Republic. As such, the Nazi Party quickly resolved to limit the Church 
with the likely goal of eventually uprooting it from German society altogether. The 
Nazis also had ideological problems with the Church. In his Myth of the Twentieth 
Century, Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg had asserted a “scientific” racism based 
on blood and argued that each race was imbued with a unique religious impulse. 
According to this schema, Christianity was a foreign, Semitic import into German 
society which had wrongly alienated the old-Germanic tribes from their pagan 
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religious nature. Thus, the Church needed to be disciplined and reduced. Naturally, 
German Catholics in Germany and Yugoslavia considered this outrageous.  
The Nazis so pressured the Catholic Center Party that it felt compelled to 
dissolve itself in July 1933. The party’s dissolution did not mean a cessation of anti-
Catholic persecution, however, and it was against a background of arrests and 
threatened SA violence against Catholics, that the Vatican hastily concluded a 
Concordat with the Reich later that month. The Concordat guaranteed the Church’s 
continued right to appoint the Catholic clergy, maintain Catholic schools, hold church 
rallies, and run youth groups. In exchange, the Vatican confirmed the dissolution of 
Catholic political organizations (including the Center Party) as well as trade unions 
and certain other Catholic-oriented groups. While not ideal from a Catholic 
perspective, the terms of the Concordat nevertheless offered at least a modicum of 
formal protection for the Reich’s beleaguerd Catholics. 
 It soon became clear, however, that the Nazis did not intend to respect the 
terms of the Concordat. This disrespect manifested itself in the arrest and trials of 
outspoken or otherwise defiant priests, the persecution of Jesuits and a general 
intolerance of the Catholic Action movement, about whose manifestation among 
Swabian Catholics in Yugoslavia we shall learn more shortly. A Catholic resistance 
movement of sorts developed in Germany to document the Nazi’s abuses, including a 
series of trials designed to destroy the reputation of individual Priests and the Church. 
Finally, after witnessing several years of such Nazi abuses, Pope Pius XI issued “Mit 
brennender Sorge” or “With Burning Concern,” the 1937 Papal encyclical in which 




the Concordat, and the problems of National Socialists’ ideology generally. In 
Germany itself, outspoken priests such as Cardinal Faulaber of Munich increasingly 
faced threats or even acts of violence. Yet many, especially Faulhaber, remained 
outspoken against the excesses (including racism and anti-Semitism) of Nazism. As 
we shall see, the Swabian Catholic clergymen were aware of the difficult 
circumstances faced by their colleagues in the Third Reich and shared Pius XI’s 
concerns with their flock in Yugoslavia. It was no doubt the example of Catholic 
defiance in Germany that inspired Yugoslavia’s Swabian clergy to launch a resistance 
movement of their own. As the brash Erneuerer grew more disruptive and the scope 
of their ambitions became apparent, the concerned German Catholic clergy resolved 
to respond to their challenge directly.  
 
Catholic Counterinsurgency 
Meeting in Kula (Slavonia) in 1934, concerned German priests and laymen 
connected with the biweekly Familienfreund, including Josef Negele and Kulturbund 
Deputy Chairman Konrad Schmidt (who from his work in the Kulturbund was well 
aware of the dangerous potential of the Erneuerer), formed a working group and 
devised a program to resist the nascent Erneuerungsbewegung. Their program called 
for fighting the Erneuerer insurgency with a broad and activist counterinsurgency of 
their own. New energies would be directed at the German Catholic population and 
especially the youth. Where in previous decades the Swabian flock had been 




A number of new associations were to be established for German men and 
women, boys and girls. New, Catholic-oriented publications would specifically target 
the youth, who would be organized and mobilized as part of a broad movement of 
young Catholics in the country. In an effort to train a new cadre of Catholic youth 
leaders (Jugendfueherer), annual courses would be held at the Maria Stern (Marija 
zvijezda) monastery in Banja Luka. Similarly, religious pilgrimages would be held 
yearly inside Yugoslavia to maintain the Catholic movement’s momentum and 
involve as many people as possible. In this resistance effort, the priesthood 
consciously borrowed forms and aesthetics from the other, sometimes rival youth 
movements of the day. Their efforts were greatly facilitated by the interwar 
development of a German national identity among young Swabian priests which 
allowed them to relate to their parishes as their older colleagues had been unable to.  
Thus did the Church seek to activate and organize the Catholics, especially the 
youth, while simultaneously grappling with issues of nationhood, race, religion, etc. 
to which the Erneuerungsbewegung confidently offered answers steeped in the mores 
of National Socialism. The Catholic working group’s resistance program was 
comprehensive, appealing to all members of the family and seeking to offer Swabians 
an organizational life every bit as appealing as the marches and rallies of the 
Erneuerer but defined by a Christian worldview.  
Although the Erneuerungsbewegung’s goal was to take the helm of the 
Kulturbund and transform the Swabian minority into a properly Nazi-inspired 
Volksgemeinschaft, much of the language and appeal of their movement lay in the 




appealed to Yugoslavia’s German youth as its natural supporters, to whom it offered a 
movement that was at once rebellious but also promised a higher order. Taking cues 
from some of the younger priests and laymen, the men behind the Catholic resistance 
also sought to capture the power and spirit of youth and organized their own youth 
organizations. Indeed, under Church patronage a full blown Catholic youth movement 
began during the 1930s, seeking to replace religious ambivalence with German 
Catholic activism. This Catholic youth movement began in earnest in 1934 and grew 
stronger through the establishment of Catholic organizations for young men and 
women such as the Christian Youth, the Mary League, and the Young Troop.761 
Lectures, excursions, Heimatabende and outdoor events were held to promote the 
physical health, moral integrity, and Christian faith of all participants. Additionally, 
no small attention was lavished upon the insistent reconciliation between German 
national identity and the Catholic religion.  
This Catholic youth movement in Yugoslavia should be understood as a local 
manifestation of the “Catholic Action” movement (Katholische Aktion) called for by 
Pius XI in his 1922 encyclical and which sought to extend the reach of the Church by 
engaging and energizing the Catholic laity. The movement’s reach was increased 
through the publication of newspapers and magazines, especially those aimed at 
youth, such as Jugendruf, which began publication at the end of 1934. Ultimately, 
Catholic Action differed from political Catholicism in that it did not seek to organize 
Catholics into their own party or achieve specific political goals. Rather, Catholic 
Action aspired to shape men and women in the Christian spirit such that they might 
make choices and policies based upon Christian fundamentals regardless of the party 
                                                 




to which they belonged.762 It and the Swabian Catholic youth movement that 
developed in the 1930s aimed at nothing less than a kind of “christliche Erneuerung,” 
a “Christian renewal” of Yugoslavia’s Germans. As the Swabian Catholic monthly 
Jugendruf explained it in 1935, “The ultimate goal of Catholic Action is the 
realization of the Kingdom of God on Earth from the renewed power of belief, the 
growth of Christ’s Kingdom in individual souls, in the families and in the parishes.” 
Indeed, “the conquest of the world for Christ must above all begin in the rearing of 
the young generation. And that is why Catholic Action must particularly seize the 
souls of the young.” Thus, “Erneuerung” was an expression and concept the Church 
itself embraced and used frequently, positing in it a spiritual renewal quite at odds 
with the likes advocated by Jakob Awender, Gustav Halwax and other Erneuerer. 
The Catholic youth movement was highly active, being characterized not only 
by the above listed groups (and others) but also by a wide array of activities. These 
activities ranged from simple gatherings and day-outings to much more extensive 
excursions, summer camps, and even pilgrimages. Moreover, Catholic Action was not 
limited only to Swabian youth. Soon, older German men and women were sought to 
participate in the courses, rallies, and pilgrimages which the Church and its laypeople 
organized across the Germans’ area of settlement.  
Having formed the Swabian Catholic youth groups, the Church also sought to 
create a new cadre of Catholic youth leaders to direct them. To this end, courses in 
leadership and religion were held for the young at the Trappist monastery Maria Stern 
in Banja Luka beginning in February 1935, as we noted earlier. These popular 
                                                 
762  Wildmann, "Unterschiedliche Kulturelle Leitbilder bei der Katholischen Kirche und dem 





courses were held annually until 1940 and expanded to include older men as well. 
Again, the courses revealed the influence and importance of Reich German attention 
to the Swabian Catholic community since they were financed by the Katholische 
Auslandsdeutschen Mission, another German Catholic organization devoted to caring 
for its coreligionist Germans outside Germany, and included instruction by Reich 
German priests. Ultimately, “Through the courses for men and young men in Maria 
Stern, a new spirit had developed in the German Catholic communities of Batschka. 
One came to see that Catholic Action was indispensable. That is, one realized that it 
was absolutely necessary in order to wake German Catholic young men and men 
from their sleep and deploy them for the Church, faith and Christ.”763  
A measure of the success and popularity of the Catholic youth movement can 
be found in the annual pilgrimages that were organized in Batschka and Banat. Such 
pilgrimages were actually not unprecedented in the region but their popularity had 
faded in the years before the 1930s, when they were embraced by the new German 
Catholic youth movement. Josef Negele explains that it had been decided to hold a 
young men’s pilgrimage already at the first young men’s course in Banja Luka in 
February 1935. Under his leadership, and in consultation with Adam Berenz, Vikar 
Wethmar and Konrad Schmidt and others, this first pilgrimage of young Batschka 
men to Maria Doroslovo was held on June 23 of that year and drew participants and 
priests from communities across Batschka.764 A separate pilgrimage to Vršac was 
held on Pentecost of that year for the young men of Banat.  
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When the German clergy determined to hold these pilgrimages, it was decided 
that they would be youth-oriented affairs with a contemporary aesthetic designed to 
appeal to the era’s young people. As such, these pilgrimages were characterized by 
marching, banners and religious flags. They were intended as Christian but also mass 
affairs, and their announcement in Jugendruf regularly billed them as opportunities to 
proudly and publicly announce the strong Catholic faith of young Swabian men and 
women. Jugendruf found that 2106 young men participated in the event at Maria 
Doroslovo, marching behind Christian flags and banners accompanied by the music 
ensemble of the Catholic village of Filipovo. Moreover, it held up as evidence of the 
success of the recent Banja Luka young men’s course.765 According to Jugendruf, the 
1935 pilgrimage drew over 3000 attendees.766 In succeeding years, attendance would 
continue to grow and the tone of the events would become more confrontational as 
the conflict with the Erneuerer escalated.767 Also in later years, the young men’s 
pilgrimage movement would be joined by an annual pilgrimage for young women. 
After several smaller pilgrimages by individual Marienbund groups, the first such 
annual, all-Swabian Maedchenwallfahrt was held in 1939 and drew 3500 girls and 
women to Maria Doroslovo, where again Berenz gave the sermon.768 
 Another high point in the German Catholic youth movement occurred on the 
eve of war in Europe in August 1939 when a Congress of Catholic Men was 
organized in Sombor. Unlike the pilgrimages to Maria Doroslovo, this event was not 
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specifically German-oriented but instead drew attendees from all the nationalities in 
Batschka. It was celebrated in the German Catholic press as an example of the 
Church’s delicate balance between nation and religion. The individual ethnicities did 
hold their own meetings at Sombor, but participants recalled this event for its 
supranational and tolerant character. It was billed as a time to join together with Slavs 
and Magyars in a celebration of the Catholic faith. But for the Germans it was also an 
occasion to rally in resistance to the ascendant Erneuerungsbewegung and its unholy 
ideology. Adam Berenz attended this Sombor rally too, of course, but the day’s most 
memorable actor was perhaps the lawyer and former Kulturbund Deputy Chairman 
Konrad Schmidt, whose fiery oratory warned Catholic Swabians of the seductions of 
the neue deutsche Weltanschauung.  
 
New Voices and New Assertiveness in the Catholic Press 
Just as the German Catholic youth movement transformed life in the Church, 
so did the German Catholic press in Yugoslavia undergo a revolution in a remarkably 
short period of time. Initially, there were very few German Catholic publications in 
Yugoslavia and most Catholic literature in German was imported from Austria or 
Germany. True, the weekly Christliche Volkszeitung had existed since 1919 and 
boasted a circulation of 8000 to 10,000 in Slavonia and Vojvodina by the mid 1920s. 
Yet despite its German language, Christliche Volkszeitung was hardly a German 
national publication and its editorial staff did not foremost consider itself to be 




dismissed Christliche Volkszeitung as a clerical newspaper or simply ignored it.769 
The emergence of a more nationally conscious Swabian priesthood and the increasing 
appeal of the National Socialist worldview prompted a transformation in German 
Catholic journalism, resulting in the publication of several new periodicals and the 
reorientation of others. Below, we discuss the most important of these, Der 
Familienfreund and Jugendruf. We reserve discussion of Die Donau, interwar 
Yugoslavia’s most outspoken Swabian Catholic newspaper, for a separate section.  
One German Catholic periodical that underwent a reorientation by the end of 
the 1920s was Der Familienfreund. Launched in Crvenka (Batschka) in 1927 the 
conservative Familienfreund began with the intent to bring its German readers 
specifically Catholic, not nationalist content. After a series of editors, Josef Negele, 
who would emerge as one of the chief architects of the Swabian Catholic resistance to 
the Erneuerungsbewegung, took the helm of the newspaper in 1929. Under his 
direction, the newspaper came to include discussions of religion and nationhood as 
well as sermons and statements by leading Catholic clergy in Austria and Germany 
itself. Also under Negele’s leadership, Der Familienfreund became a publisher of 
other works, perhaps most notable of which was Can a Christian be an 
“Erneuerer”?,  which explored the contradictions between Christianity and the neue 
deutsche Weltanschauung.  
By 1933, Der Familienfreund had very much engaged in politics. To be sure, 
this engagement concerned no practical Yugoslav matters but rather reflected 
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contemporary Reich German Catholic debates on the role and nature of nationalism. 
Many such articles were in public pastoral letters and sermons by bishops in Austria 
or Germany, which grappled with the proper relationship between Christendom and 
Germandom, and Christianity and nationhood. “May a Christian be National?” 
Vienna’s Cardinal Innitzer asked shortly after Hitler’s accession to power in 
Germany. “We may be national, but we may not elevate the nation over the state and 
religion.” Moreover, he stated, as Children of God we must resist racism and 
chauvinism, recognizing virtues in all nations and being tolerant of multi-national 
states.770 Yet even the national chauvinism of the past paled next to the threat posed 
by nationalism in its latest, most pernicious guise, Der Familienfreund warned. 
“Nationalism today has degenerated into a kind of false doctrine or heresy which has 
not only divided peoples on the political level but also preaches a new worldview. It 
seeks to nationalize religion and punctuate it with narrow-minded racial theories.” 
Such distorted and excessive nationalism was irreconcilable with the supranational 
character of Christianity, the newspaper cautioned as it denounced National Socialism 
by name.771 Finally, a common theme was distinguishing between “true” (just) and 
false (unjust) nationalism. Editor Negele contributed a series of articles on this theme 
in 1939, aggressively denouncing Nazi Germany, the neue deutsche Weltanschauung, 
racism and national chauvinists. “Christian nationalism,” he wrote, “is to be found 
where one stands on the ground of Christian faith, Christian righteousness, and 
Christian love. Where this is not the case, where one overemphasizes national 
thoughts at the expense of truth and does not pay heed to righteousness and love, 
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there we have an over-exaggerated, heathen nationalism.” He continued, “heathenistic 
nationalism is therefore always bound with heavy sins against the faith, against the 
righteousness and against the main commandment of love.” Furthermore, 
“heathenistic nationalism is above all a great heresy. Indeed, one can say that next to 
Marxist Communism, it is the greatest lie and heresy of our times.”772 
Negele was also prescient enough to recognize that nationalism in the era of 
National Socialism presented an unprecedented challenge. “In the past there have 
always been exaggerated nationalists and chauvinists who lovelessly and unjustly 
treated their fellow men of different nationalities, but nevertheless did not wish to 
deny the Christian faith,” he observed. “It remained to our current time to construct 
its own “national” [voelkisch] world view and religion out of national eccentricities. 
One simply places the Volk and race in the place of God and thus carries out a kind of 
self-deification.” It was thus an era of pernicious nationalist narcissism and racist 
madness. Moreover, such heidnische Nationalismus was sinful and blasphemous, 
being ignorant of Christian virtues and knowing only “a love of Volk, race, and at the 
most a love for the ‘Fuehrer’ of the nation.”773 Against such things, the Catholic 
clergy were compelled to take a stand. For its efforts, der Familienfreund was 
denounced by Volksruf in 1936 as conducting “an unscrupulous, mendacious 
campaign of hate-mongering [Greuelpropaganda].”774 
Like Der Familienfreund, St. Raphaelsblatt, the namesake publication from 
St. Raphaelsheim in Belgrade, eschewed issues of nationhood during its initial years. 
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It then evolved over the course of its publication to address real social and religious 
concerns in Yugoslavia and even in Germany. To be sure, it was less confrontational 
than der Familienfreund, Jugendruf, and die Donau. Reading St. Raphaelsblatt. one 
could easily be forgiven for thinking one was actually in Germany, so remote did any 
Yugoslav concerns (to say nothing of national politics) seem in its pages. 
Nevertheless, St. Raphaelsblatt was definitely more than a simple church newsletter. 
It likewise opposed the neue deutsche Weltanschauung and openly came to worry 
about the emergence of heresy during 1937 and 1938. Meanwhile, the newspaper was 
very concerned about the state of Christianity and the Church in Germany and printed 
excerpts from “Mit brennender Sorge,” Pope Pius XI’s 1937 encyclical on the matter. 
In the years after the Erneuerer finally prevailed in their struggle to lead the 
Kulturbund, St. Raphaelsblatt would work ever harder to prove its German 
credentials even as it insisted on the supremacy of religion over nationhood.  
Important as these above newspapers were, however, the two most important 
publications in the Catholic resistance to the Erneuerungsbewegung were Jugendruf 
and Die Donau. Where St. Raphaelsblatt and even Der Familienfreund were 
principally Church organs, Jugendruf was a more focused publication which 
specifically targeted young people and was actively engaged in national and religious 
matters. It additionally lavished attention on the Swabian’s organized Catholic youth 
movement, which it celebrated, fostered, promoted, and guided.  
At St. Raphaelsheim in Belgrade, reichsdeutsche priests Hegenkoetter and 
Wethmar were quick to embrace their work on behalf of Yugoslavia’s Swabian 




devoted himself to the promotion of the Swabian Catholic press. When, upon the visit 
of Katholische Auslandsdeutsche Mission leader Dr. Scherer, the decision was taken 
to establish Jungmaennerkurse at the Maria Stern monastery in Banja Luka, it was 
also decided to found a magazine aimed at the German youth of Yugoslavia with 
Wethmar as publisher and editor. The fruit of this decision, Jugendruf, first appeared 
in December 1934 as a supplement to der Familienfreund and St. Raphaelsblatt but 
became a fully separate publication in 1936. The tireless Wethmar would dominate 
this “monthly journal of young German Catholics” until his recall to Germany in 
1938.775 Thereafter his successors would continue the battle to win young Catholic 
hearts and minds for the resistance against the Erneuerer and National Socialism. 
Jugendruf targeted the German Catholic youth of Yugoslavia with the aim of 
being not only a chronicle of their movement, but also a spiritual and indeed political 
guide for Yugoslavia’s German Catholic youth. In addition to chronicling the many 
courses, gatherings, festivals, and pilgrimages of the German Catholic youth 
(especially to Doroslovo in Batschka and Maria Stern in Bosnia), Jugendruf also 
exhorted young Catholics to remain true to Catholic principles at a time when the 
Erneuerungsbewegung was growing in numbers and appeal. By promoting an 
alternative movement, Jugendruf hoped to help German Catholic youth resist the 
seduction of the Erneuerungsbewegung even as ever more Catholics rushed into the 
newly “Nazified” or gleichgeschaltet Kulturbund’s ranks.  
 Jugendruf assumed a Christian supranational outlook but it was 
unambiguously written for a nationally conscious, German audience. As such, it 
explored the relationship between religion and nationhood in several essays, and 
                                                 




pointed out the many and fruitful connections between the Church and Germandom. 
It promoted German saints as heroes and increasingly adopted the language and even 
the aesthetics of its adversaries. There was increasing talk of “struggle” (Kampf) in 
Jugendruf and even an article dedicated to a Catholic interpretation of the old-
Germanic winter solstice celebration (Sonnwendfeier), which had been eagerly 
appropriated by the Nazis in Germany and the Erneuerer in Yugoslavia. In an era 
when Swabian Erneuerer increasingly greeted one another with “Heil Hitler”, young 
Catholics sometimes used their own salutation, “Treu-Heil!”776  Likewise, they 
conspicuously referred to fellow members of the young Catholic movement as 
Kameraden, much as the Erneuerer themselves did. Finally, just as a conscious 
decision had been made to embrace the banners, marching and other contemporary 
forms in young men’s pilgrimages to Maria Doroslovo, so would Jugendruf embrace 
the idealized aesthetics of struggle and heroism that were so popular with the youth of 
the day.  
The magazine printed numerous articles dedicated to reconciling the 
supremacy of religion and the importance of the nation. Its pages likewise promoted 
the glory of St. Bonifatius, about whom we shall hear more shortly, as part of a 
general effort to assert the compatibility between Christianity and the cult of heroism, 
which was so popular during the era of European fascism. Its cover art was 
particularly evocative and revealed the degree to which even the Catholic youth 
movement was compelled to subscribe to the heroic, idealized aesthetics of the day. 
Subjects included a chiseled profile of St. Bonifatius and the idealized image of a 
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strapping young Swabian farmer, who seemed borrowed directly from the Nazis’ own 
ideal of Aryan youth. The cover of the June 1939 issue, on which an eagle clutches a 
crucifix, was particularly striking and eloquently revealed the delicate marriage of 
Catholic content and heroic aesthetics for which Jugendruf and the Swabian Catholic 




Above, Jugendruf calls young Swabian men to make the annual pilgrimage to Doroslovo with the bold profile 





































































































Above, Die Donau explains that there need be no contradiction between German national identity and 
Catholicism in 1937. Photo by the author. 
 
Jugendruf began publication conscious of its mission to resist the 
Neuheidentum of the Erneuerer and grew increasingly galvanized in its resistance 
over the course of the 1930s. Richly illustrated, this magazine is an excellent source 
for the scholar on the ideological content and daily activities of the Swabian Catholic 
youth movement in Yugoslavia. It also reveals the great extent to which national 
identity had penetrated the Swabian youth and even much of its younger priesthood. 
Ultimately, the magazine sought to mobilize Swabian youth in defense of 
Christendom, reject Erneuerer declarations on the incompatibility of Catholicism and 
Germandom, and steel young Catholics to resist the attractions of the Erneuerer’s 
dynamic movement. 
Jugendruf’s mission was simultaneously one of offense and defense. In terms 
of the former, the magazine and the young Catholic movement it served took a highly 
proactive attitude toward youth matters, hoping to save young Catholic souls from 




the energy and freshness of youth. As previously discussed, the Swabian Catholic 
clergy made a deliberate decision in its preparations for the first young men’s 
pilgrimage to Doroslovo to embrace marching, banners, and other modern forms 
popular with contemporary youths. Seizing the spirit of the times, the Swabian 
activist clergy sought to embrace youth and youth culture. To this end, it recognized 
the powerful idealism of youth, which it hoped to harness for the goals of Catholic 
Action. From its inception, thus, Vicar Wethmar’s Jugendruf sought to deploy 
Christian radicalism against the excesses and errors of the neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung. “Let us be radical and become even more radical. That is, let us 
renew our selves and thereby also the church and the [Yugoslav] fatherland from the 
roots upward,” one of its earliest issues cried.777   
In terms of defense, the magazine’s editors had to parry the Erneuerer’s 
accusations that modern youth had no place in an archaic institution like the Catholic 
Church, or that Catholicism and even Christianity in general were somehow “foreign” 
to German nature and the needs of the times. The Church responded to this by 
arguing just the opposite, observing a long symbiotic relationship between the Church 
and German Volk. In order to highlight that relationship and the courageous nature of 
the Church, the Swabian activists invoked St. Bonifatius, regarded by German 
Catholics as a hero for bringing Christianity to their Germanic ancestors. As a 
missionary, they recalled, the brave Bonifatius set out from Rome to bring 
Christianity to the Germanic lands, thus correcting errant practices and delivering the 
Germans from heathen darkness. Through a half century of tireless missionary work, 
the tireless Bonifatius succeeded in bringing the proper word of God to the Germanic 
                                                 




tribes. But his mission was one of constant struggle. He labored tirelessly a half 
century against unbelief, heresy, against the open hatred of his enemies and hidden 
malice, against incomprehension among his own comrades, against weakness and 
regression in the communities.778  The parallels for the modern Church were clear: 
just as the fearless Bonifatius had fearlessly confronted the paganism of the 
Swabians’ Germanic ancestors, so must contemporary German Catholics resist the 
modern heresy of National Socialism, the Erneuerungsbewegung and its unchristian 
neue deutsche Weltanschauung.   
As “Held und Heiliger” and other such articles on St. Bonifatius suggest, the 
Swabian Catholics at Jugendruf’s and elsewhere rejected the charge that the Church 
was unsuited to meet the ideals of youth, struggle and heroism which were so 
influential between the wars. On the contrary, they argued, Christianity had a long 
history of heroism, from the fearless martyrs who perished in the Roman Coliseum to 
the many Catholic saints who succeeded them as monks and missionaries. Jugendruf 
addressed this theme directly and indirectly over the years asserting, moreover, that 
the Church had not only the strength to endure suffering but also the backbone to 
engage in struggle. From the days of Imperial Rome, to the era of Christian chivalry 
and finally the First World War, Catholicism plainly was not lacking in heroic 
bravery, Jugendruf asserted.  
Jugendruf’s editors rejected any contradiction between Germandom and 
Christendom, and regularly observed the loyal service of the Catholics to the Reich 
during the First World War, in which so many German Catholics had gallantly fought 
                                                 




and died for their Fatherland.779 While Jugendruf’s editors never suggested that 
nation should eclipse confession and would have rejected assertions that religion was 
a private matter, they nevertheless constantly exhorted Swabian youths to take pride 
in both aspects of their identity. Nations were, after all, a blessing and a creation of 
the Christian God.780  
As the 1930s progressed and the divisions among the Swabians grew both 
deeper and more acrimonious, so did Jugendruf and its sister publications grapple 
more aggressively with Erneuerer’s insurgency. Though the Church and Kulturbund 
undeniably had a history of mutual suspicion, this suspicion was hardly complete and 
there were many cases of fruitful cooperation. Many Catholics were members of the 
Kulturbund, of course, and many Kulturbund members were proud members of their 
parish communities. By 1938, Jugendruf boasted a circulation of 4000, which the 
editorship claimed translated into 15,000 to 20,000 readers.781 Many of these were 
also affiliated with the Kulturbund. 
In a lengthy speech at the 1939 Conference of Catholic Men at Sombor, 
Andreas Schmidt, Catholic lay activist, long-time opponent of the Erneuerer and 
former deputy chairman of the Kulturbund, gave a broad speech in which he warned 
of the grave dangers facing the Swabians and their Catholic Church. Jugendruf 
prominently republished this speech by the man Negele calls the “inspirer and leader” 
of the original Catholic resistance to the Erneuerungsbewegung.782 So numerous were 
these dangers, Schmidt cautioned, that the struggle at hand literally concerned the 
                                                 
779  "Deutsch und katholisch!," Jugendruf, November 1935. 
780  Franz. Germann, "Jugend im Volk!," Jugendruf, November 1935. 
781  "Wir dringen durch," Jugendruf, August 1 1938. 




future existence of Swabian Christianity. Swabian Catholicism hung in the balance. 
The Church’s opponents were tireless and had too long been allowed to conduct their 
struggle without an energetic response from the country’s Catholics. “It is already 
established in every community/parish (Gemeinde). It has its open and dastardly 
followers. It does not build a church out of wood and bricks. Its churches are built out 
of living persons, out of misguided souls. They have no priests, they are all laymen. 
But all feel called to act as preachers and apostles of this new anti-Church. All 
followers feel themselves bound to expunge Christianity with its creed from the Volk 
and introduce their new confession into our German people.” To this “antichristian” 
and “anti-Church” movement, Schmidt issued a call to arms, a cry for the Catholics to 
stand up unafraid and confront their enemies.783 His was hardly a new message in 
1939, however, and in his boldness he closely echoed the sermons, essays and 
activities of Apatin priest Adam Berenz, to whom we now turn in detail. 
 
Adam Berenz and Die Donau Confront the Erneuerer 
The tireless Adam Berenz must be singled out among Yugoslavia’s German 
Catholic clergy for his leadership, courage and his indefatigable resistance to the 
Erneuerer and their ideology. Although he should not be mistaken as the leader of a 
proper “movement” in a political sense, Berenz nevertheless deserves mention as the 
most outspoken and relentless of the opponents of the Erneuerungsbewegung and 
National Socialism in Yugoslavia. He certainly was a public figure. His criticism was 
pious, caustic, eloquent and unremitting. Josef Volkmar Senz has called him the 
                                                 




Swabians’ “spokesman in the burning conflict between the national and religious 
renewal of the Germans in Yugoslavia and later in Hungary, between the neue 
deutsche Weltanschauung and the Christian worldview.”784 In his book on Swabians 
in Batschka, Josip Mirnić asserts that Berenz was nothing less than “the central figure 
of the resistance” against National Socialism there.785  
Berenz was born in Apatin in 1898 and attended both Gymnasium and the 
primatial lyceum in Kalocsa in central Hungary, where he conducted his theology 
studies from 1918-1921. As such, he was somewhat older than the later generation of 
Swabian priests who trained for the priesthood in interwar Yugoslavia and there 
embraced German national identity. Studying in Kalocsa, Berenz’s education was 
inevitably colored by the hegemony of Magyar culture, and he was not unknown to 
spell his name in the Magyar fashion as “Berencz.” Nevertheless, Berenz was no 
stranger to German national consciousness and became an early and active member of 
the Kulturbund and advocate for the Partei der Deutschen upon his return to the new 
Yugoslav Kingdom. Indeed, “no self-aware, serious German person could conceal his 
joy that a German cultural-educational association, a German Kulturbund as it would 
soon be known, had been founded,” he declared.786 Later, no Swabian in Yugoslavia 
thundered louder longer than Berenz against the excesses of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung and in defense of Catholic Germandom.787  
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Father Adam Berenz, 
editor of Die Donau788 
 
 
The Herz-Jesu Church in Apatin.789 
 
After serving in various Church positions and parishes in Batschka during the 
1920s, Berenz became chaplain at Apatin’s main church and parish vicar of the city’s 
newly constructed and prominent Herz-Jesu-Kirche. There he would remain parish 
vicar until 1944, shortly before his arrest by the Gestapo on May 22 of that year. In 
the intervening years, Berenz thundered from the pulpit, podium and printed page 
against the young purveyors of the neue deutsche Weltanschauung, which he grimly 
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dismissed as poisonous heresy. In the process, Berenz became a hero to some, a 
traitor to others, and one of the sharpest thorns in the side of the Erneuerer.  
Berenz had been quick to join the Catholic resistance when the threat of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung became increasingly manifest and the circle of Swabian 
priests and laymen around Josef Negele and Konrad Schmidt resolved to oppose it. 
He was involved in the first young men’s pilgrimage to Maria Doroslovo and was the 
main speaker at its successor. Thereafter, he spoke at many succeeding pilgrimages, 
rallies and other important Swabian events, becoming a visible and fearless symbol of 
the Catholic resistance against National Socialism. Yet as important as such 
prominent speeches and sermons were, it is Berenz’s work as editor and contributor 
to the weekly Die Donau that must count as his most vital contribution to the 
resistance against the Erneuerungsbewegung. 
Berenz’s opposition to the Erneuerungsbewegung was complex and 
multifaceted. Though he did not say so during the interwar years, Berenz was 
ultimately a supporter of the great Hungarian state idea. As such, his struggle against 
the Erneuerer and Erneuerer-dominated Kulturbund had three main features:  it was 
antifascist, Catholic, and motivated by the ideal of Saint Stephen.790 At a fundamental 
level, one may say that Berenz shared a genuine sense of being German with the 
original leadership of the Kulturbund and even the Erneuerer, though he and the 
Erneuerer would surely qualify such a statement. He sought to oppose the 
Erneuerungsbewegung insurrection by promoting a German identity that was 
indivisible from the Christian spirit and worldview. Berenz himself embraced 
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German nationhood and the national principle in general but could not accept its 
absolute primacy, as the Erneuerer insisted. Berenz believed rather that nationhood, 
as a creation of God, should be but one (albeit important) aspect of a proper 
Christian-Catholic Weltanschauung that was also tolerant of other nationhoods in the 
spirit of Catholic brotherhood. Such an outlook precluded national chauvinism, 
obviously, to say nothing of the “scientific” racism promoted by National Socialism 
and its local advocates in the Erneuerungsbewegung.  
In any event, just as the Erneuerer and the original leadership would struggle 
for the soul and leadership of the Kulturbund by sparring over the definition of 
German nationhood, what it meant to be German, so would Berenz assert a definition 
of Germandom that was inclusive and Christian but cast those who opposed its 
fundamental Christian tenets as renegades. Worse, as a priest Berenz recognized the 
neue deutsche Weltanschauung and the Erneuerungsbewegung insurrection to be not 
confined to the institutional life of Kulturbund or even the territorial boundaries of 
Yugoslavia. On the contrary, he recognized National Socialism as constituting 
nothing less than new heathenism, which aimed to expunge Christianity from the 
German Volk and would as a consequence damn the eternal souls of its German 
adherents. Thus, as the 1930s progressed, it became clear that Berenz, using the 
language of national identity, was fighting a battle not only to silence Erneuerer 
heresy but also to save German souls. 
Die Donau, an Apatin weekly which began life somewhat unremarkably but 
soon came to rail fearlessly against the Erneuerer menace was a central element in the 




stands alone for its reach, ambition, consistency and courage. The newspaper was a 
broadsheet and appeared weekly from 1935 until 1944. It was unapologetically 
ideological, being nationally conscious, Catholic, and utterly opposed to the 
Erneuerer and their neue deutsche Weltanschauung. On one hand it pursued a 
message of positive Christian renewal and heavily promoted the German Catholic 
youth movement in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it regularly engaged in ideological 
and personal polemics and caustic debates with the leading minds of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung. Die Donau did not limit its attention to Yugoslav matters, 
however, but also struck at the leaders, excesses and heresies of National Socialism in 
the Third Reich. Covering domestic and international politics, Die Donau furthermore 
sought to be a journal of record and the only newspaper a good Catholic Swabian 
need read. Indeed, it began life as a self-described “Wochenblatt fuer 
gesellschaftliche Politik und Volkswirtschaft.” 
 Die Donau premiered in June 1935 with a circulation of 1000791 which would 
soon grow substantially.792 The newspaper remained relatively restrained for the 
remainder of that year, neither mentioning the Erneuerungsbewegung by name nor 
tangling directly with its mouthpiece Volksruf. The newspaper did not lack opinions 
but neither was it direct or aggressive. For example, rather than critique the Third 
Reich directly, Die Donau instead printed details of a harsh letter from Germany’s 
bishops to Hitler, in which the bishops expressed concern about recent attacks on the 
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Church as well as the fate of Germany. Just as the Church had overcome heathendom 
in the past, the bishops promised, so would it overcome any modern heathendom.793 
The Kulturbund received prominent attention and even a regular section in the 
newspaper’s early issues. However, the content of that section suggested that the 
Kulturbund was gradually being infected by precisely the National Socialist heresy to 
which Die Donau hoped to be the antidote. Meanwhile, the newspaper bemoaned 
contemporary youths as overly demanding, lacking respect, and pursuant of false 
ideals.794 
Berenz was heavily involved in the newspaper during 1935, but he would not 
formally assume his role as publisher and managing editor until the following 
January. As such, Die Donau spent its first year finding its Catholic readership and 
developing its core principles. Nevertheless, Berenz’s hand can be seen from Die 
Donau’s first issue, in which he contributed a front page article.795 Berenz here 
explained the newspaper’s choice of name for the binding quality that the Danube had 
exerted upon Swabians since their earliest colonization of its fertile banks in then-
southern Hungary. The fate of Catholic Apatin had long been tied to the river, Berenz 
observed, which also connected the Swabian colonists to their ancestral homeland in 
Germany. “The Danube is from its very source a thoroughly German river,” he wrote. 
“For us the Danube is a living connection with that land which was the Heimat of our 
ancestors. It is a constant reminder that we should remain mindful of our German 
essence.” As such, “the newspaper Die Donau also seeks to be German and will tend 
to the German nationhood faithfully and honestly.” Finally, Berenz promised that Die 
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Donau would demonstrate its “deep love of Apatin,” “proper loyalty to the state,” and 
“immutable loyalty to the nationality from which we stem.”796 An accompanying 
article promised objectivity and patient restraint before polemics and personal 
attacks.797 Die Donau, however, would soon find its restraint sorely tested.   
Shortly before the conclusion of 1935, Berenz contributed the first installment 
of “In the Spotlight” (Im Lichte des Scheinwerfers), a semi-regular column he penned 
under the name “Niederlaender.”798 After a relatively benign start that year, “In the 
Spotlight” became the journalistic pulpit from which Berenz would issue his most 
scathing judgments of his Erneuerer opponents and their pernicious ideology. 
Similarly, it was here that Berenz mounted his most vigorous defense of the Catholic 
worldview, taking both individuals and rival newspapers to task for views he deemed 
as heretical. Such rival periodicals in early years were primarily the Batschkaer 
Zeitung and Volksruf but in later came to include the satirical die Wespe and even 
Deutsches Volksblatt after its ultimate Gleichschaltung in the late 1930s.  
 Berenz formally assumed editorial control of Die Donau in January 1936 and 
he began his tenure with a pointed declaration that the newspaper would no longer 
restrain itself in its commentary on the neue deutsche Weltanschauung. Die Donau 
announced its intention to turn the newspaper into a “weekly newspaper for the 
Catholic German of Yugoslavia” which would be “Catholic through and through” and 
“German through and through.” The situation demanded such a newspaper, he 
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explained. In such harsh times, “We must look on almost daily as [our opponents] 
attack our Catholic worldview and our most holy sentiments with the most varied 
slogans and seek to bring our religion and our German nationality into conflict with 
one another. We must constantly experience how they strive to undermine the 
authority and reputation of the bishops of our church. We must even witness how 
they do not cease their attacks on even the Pope himself. And we stand there, without 
a press of our own ready to fight back and dam up this unchristian, indeed in essence 
un-German current.” As such, Die Donau would “stand up to all those who believe it 
possible to alienate Catholic Germandom from its Church, its spiritual leadership, and 
its two-thousand-year world view.”799 With Berenz now at the helm, Die Donau now 
would answer the challenge of the Erneuerungsbewegung with its own declaration of 
war. 
 In fact, Berenz used Die Donau both as a pulpit from which to rain down 
reproach upon the Erneuerer insurgents and also as a platform from which to defend 
himself and the Church from their attacks. As such the newspaper was a showcase for 
high principles and also a forum for caustic exchanges with the ideologues of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung, especially Jakob Kraemer, Fritz Metzger, Gustav Halwax, 
and Hans Moerbisch. Berenz rarely addressed Jakob Awender directly but his disdain 
for the Erneuerer obviously extended to their movement’s leader. Underlying every 
issue of Die Donau was the same sentiment that had prompted the Swabian Catholic 
clergy to resist the Erneuerer’s insurgency to begin with: the belief that the neue 
deutsche Weltanschauung and institutional manifestations were not merely 
                                                 




unchristian but actually anti-Christian and endangered the salvation of an entire 
nation in Europe. 
Over the years, a real dialogue developed between the Catholic press and 
Volksruf, the mouthpiece of the Erneuerungsbewegung. Catholic contributions to this 
dialogue consisted of a combination of insightful observations and a robust defense 
against the acidic commentary of the Erneuerer in Volksruf and elsewhere. In order to 
best understand die Donau and its agenda, thus, it is first important to understand the 
tactics of its opponent’s principle mouthpiece, to which we now turn. 
 
 
The Erneuerer and the Catholic Church 
Although they could not directly repudiate Christianity for fear of alienating 
the conservative Swabians, it was a long-standing tactic of the Erneuerer to seek to 
undermine the position of the Swabian Catholic clergy and question their credentials 
as proper Germans. They frequently suggested that the Swabian Catholic clergy 
represented special interests that were foreign and likely hostile to Germandom. On 
the one hand, the Erneuerer pursued the policy of character assassination by attacking 
individual priests, especially Berenz, in print and at their rallies. Similarly, the 
Catholic press was regularly denounced as a collection of “smearsheets” 
(Hetzblaetter). Another tactic was to criticize the priesthood generally as being 
insincerely or insufficiently German. Both such tactics outraged the Swabian Catholic 
clergy and were part of an overall strategy to suggest that Catholicism, with its papal 




based racism that defined National Socialism, and its roots in the Habsburg 
Monarchy, was somehow alien to Germandom.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Erneuerer understood national identity 
to be the supreme bond between persons and thus regarded it as prevailing over ties 
of history, religion or confession. Nationhood in turn was determined not merely by 
language, history, or the like but by the more voelkisch blood and destiny. 
Nationhood was inclusive of all people sharing a certain biology but exclusive of 
those not sharing such blood. Nationhood was innate, something with which one was 
born and which could not be later acquired, as one might learn foreign languages or 
customs. Such an outlook led to several points of confrontation with the Catholic 
clergy in Yugoslavia. In fact, the Erneuerer began to confront Catholicism and the 
Swabian clergy even before Die Donau commenced publication. The unsuitability of 
aspects of Catholicism for German nationalism and the neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung had been a frequent topic at early gatherings of the nascent 
Erneuerungsbewegung, of course and the movement’s leaders raised these concerns 
in Volksruf for the first time in September 1934 in response to an article in Deutsches 
Volksblatt. Written by a Swabian Catholic priest from Banat, this article suggested 
future Catholic tactics by defending the contributions to the German national 
movement by the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia while simultaneously denouncing 
the Erneuerer. The author praised the original leadership as standing on a positive, 
Christian basis and accused Volksruf’s predecessor the Pančevoer Post as pursuing a 




sharpen confessional differences. “Are we standing on the brink of a Kulturkampf?” it 
bluntly asked, darkly suggesting the affirmative. 800  
 In a theme it would repeat regularly in the future, Volksruf responded to 
Deutsches Volksblatt by asserting the principle of unity of the Volksgemeinschaft over 
any possible differences between Catholics and Protestants. Nationality, the 
Erneuerer asserted, bonds people of the same blood far stronger than confession is 
able to unite peoples of different blood. That is, nationality was the fundamental 
bond, the fundamental identity, while confession represented a more superficial 
category of ideas or identity. Using highly racist language, the newspaper reproached 
Catholics who believed otherwise and concluded “Father, remain a priest and I will 
remain a German (of the Catholic faith).”801 Recognizing that the Swabian Catholic 
clergy’s resistance movement had serious potential, the Erneuerer denounced it as a 
“schwarze Front” and its agents as “Schwarzfrontler”.802 Seeking to claim the moral 
high ground, they claimed that the conflict with the Church was unwanted and not of 
their making, since they had far more important things to do than clash with “rotund, 
baiting chaplains, fanatical trinity-worldview-theorists, and university-stuffed shirts 
who are alienated from their own nationhood.”803 Jakob Kraemer, an Erneuerer 
ideologue and regular Volksruf contributor with whom Adam Berenz would exchange 
many caustic words over the years, blasted Die Donau in 1937 as the “Kampfblatt der 
Schwarzen Front.” Resentful of the Catholics’ steady criticism of the neue deutsche 
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Weltanschauung, the Erneuerer condemned the Swabian Clergy of striving for the 
“Austrianization of the German community.” That is, “the cutting of all holy, cultural 
and worldview ties that bind us ever tighter to our mother nation, which is finally 
beginning to shake off the curse and dishonor of centuries-long division in feuding 
camps.” Indeed, he charged, the Swabian clergymen “feel no remorse, that by the 
realization of their great dream the Volksgruppe would have to fall back into the 
hopelessness and misery of the prewar Magyar spiritual-cultural suppression with no 
hope of rescue.”804 Thus, the Erneuerer saw the Swabian Catholic resistance as 
seeking to shore up the confessional divisions among Yugoslav Germans and thereby 
resist the process of German national integration, while clinging to historical models 
under which Germandom had suffered in a state of national unconsciousness.  
 The Erneuerer additionally accused the Swabian clergy of being 
fundamentally out of step with the times. In an era when the national principle had 
triumphed across Europe, the Erneuerer charged that the Catholics remained stuck in 
the outdated mindset of a supranational institution which claimed primacy over the 
nation and even had a political center of sorts in the Vatican. In sum, their accusations 
were threefold, essentially seeking to smear the Swabian clergy through association 
with the vanquished and notoriously non-national Habsburgs or the rump Austrian 
republic, slander them as agents of Vatican sponsored “politisches Katholismus”, and 
smear them as traitorous Magyarones, nostalgic for the lost Hungarian order.  
To interwar nationalists, the cosmopolitan Habsburgs could only seem an 
anachronism, a lingering hangover from a grand but outdated age. The Monarchy’s 
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chief offense to its detractors, of course, was that it had been non-national in its 
essence and had served as a “prison of nations.” Worse, the Monarchy had privileged 
some nations while allegedly allowing others to be neutered or smothered. As we saw 
in our discussion of German national activism in the 1920s, the original leadership 
considered Hungary’s Germans among the victims of the Habsburgs’ policies and 
were quick to denounce the imperial past. The Erneuerer continued this line of 
criticism in the 1930s but turned any association with the Habsburg past into a stick 
with which to beat their elder opponents. The original leadership was the initial object 
of such attacks, but the beatings were soon extended to the Swabian Catholic clergy 
and Swabian Catholic institutions. And if Austria-Hungary had been offensive, 
independent Austria was an abomination, which artificially impeded the natural and 
historic movement toward German political unity. That political Catholicism was 
strong there and that the independence of the Alpine republic received strong support 
by many in the Church was seen by the Erneuerer as further proof of the national 
treason of many German Catholics.  
Volksruf bemoaned from its earliest issues the dominance of Klerikalismus 
over voelkisch thought in Austria.805 The German people in Austria suffered under 
Austro-Hungarian “Catholic-Jewish tyranny” and today the state seeks “to loosen and 
detach the worldview ties, which bind the Auslanddeutschtum of the whole world 
with the great mother nation in the Reich” in order to use the Auslandsdeutschen as 
extra horses for the Vatican-Habsburg-Judeo-Austrian carriage.”806 And the Schwarze 
Front still worked hand in hand with its rotting sister, Volksruf charged. Austria and 
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the Church were leading a “struggle against an all-German confession.”807 Indeed, it 
inhibited natural unification of Gesamtdeutschtum by promoting a weird Austrian 
particularism. As usual, Volksruf had no good words for Die Donau, in this regard, 
since Berenz looked kindly upon Austria. The Erneuerungsbewegung’s mouthpiece 
acidly denounced Die Donau as an “illegitimate Austrian child” which worked not in 
the interests of the German Volksgruppe in Yugoslavia but on behalf of Vienna, “the 
headquarters of Habsburg propaganda.”808 
As Volksruf’s condemnation of Klericalismus suggests, the Erneuerer were 
highly critical of “political Catholicism”, of which they regularly accused the 
Church’s representatives in Yugoslavia. (In fact, here their criticism was not of the 
Church per se but rather of the Swabian Catholic clergy and the Church only as it 
concerned German affairs.) As their program stated, a principle goal of the Erneuerer 
was the exclusion of the Church from “earthly” affairs. That is, they formally asserted 
that the Church was fine as far as spiritual affairs went but saw little role for it beyond 
the parish walls, no doubt themselves recognizing the inherent contradictions between 
the neue deutsche Weltanschauung on the one hand, and the universalism and 
authority of the Church on the other. Since the Swabians lacked their own formal 
political institutions, during the 1930s, this dispute might at first seem rather 
academic. However, religion occupied a very hegemonic position in the lives, 
thoughts, and patterns of this conservative Swabian society, rendering such a 
separation complicated, as we shall see. Although it hardly shied from criticizing the 
Church, Volksruf’s commentary on political Catholicism was relatively limited during 
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its early years. However, this would change after 1937 when it published “Political 
Catholicism”, a series of articles from Das Schwarze Korps, the official newspaper of 
the SS. The authors of this series did not directly address Yugoslavia itself, but the 
series’ “revelations” about the nature of Catholicism had clear implications for 
Germans in the country. The clear intent of reprinting them was to cast deep 
aspersions on the Church using a voice draped in the authority of the Third Reich. In 
essence, this “Political Catholicism” series explored the relationship between a Volk 
and its religious order/gods. These articles also clearly revealed the close connection 
between the leading Erneuerer and the most elite and extremist of National Socialists 
in Germany, of course. 
Das Schwarze Korps assaulted the Church for its alien, oriental origins and for 
not being rooted in a “blut- und bodenbedingten Vorstellungswelt” of a single people. 
It furthermore criticized Catholic philosophy (Lehrgebaeude) for being built upon a 
universalist worldview, which had permeated all aspects of social, cultural, economic, 
and political life. It characterized Catholic norms as such that they have a “totalitarian 
character of a self–contained worldview.” Moreover, the newspaper charged, 
Catholicism sought to impose its ways upon the whole world, not only as a world 
Church but also as a Catholic based world order. With such aspirations, the Catholic 
church necessarily strove for the elimination of the personalities of individual Voelker 
and the smothering of the voice of their bloods. Far from prizing the national traits of 
individual peoples, Das Schwarze Korps charged in Volksruf, the Church held highest 
the “raceless, Catholic feeling and thinking mankind,” which could only be achieved 




ambition derived the Catholic attitude toward Volk, racial consciousness, and state, 
the article series concluded.809 The Church declared its fundamental and dogmatic 
opposition to National Socialism and its racially pure maintenance of the Volkstum. 
The Church, thus, was an enemy of Germandom, an agent of denationalization. 
The Erneuerer and the Catholic clergy also clashed over the subject of racism. 
Racism, in their heated exchanges, was closely tied to the whole matter of the 
confessional divide and Catholic universalism versus the extreme form of blood-
based nationalism being purveyed by the Erneuerer. The Erneuerer were genuinely 
racist and certainly did not hesitate to slander favorite targets, Jews or Africans, as we 
have seen. They regarded Catholic universalism as just another aspect of a 
denationalizing agenda that leads inevitably to degeneracy and the corruption of 
blood. The Erneuerer also frequently used the language of race as a tool by which to 
attack Catholic identity and undermine confessional divisions in the Volk. That is, the 
extreme example of race served as a way of exposing supposed Catholic notions of 
inclusively, exclusivity, and community as (in their minds) absurd. The Erneuerer 
pursued this tactic from the earliest issues of Volksruf in 1934, when they observed 
that “unfortunately, there are still Germans for whom dividing confession counts for 
much more than nationhood. These people would rather lend a hand to a Neger of 
their same confession than a troubled German of a different confession than 
themselves.”810 Years later, Jakob Kraemer would taunt Adam Berenz personally by 
suggesting to him a potential topic for a theological doctorate: “Who is my brother, 
the Protestant German or the Catholic Sudanneger? Does my Catholic sense of 
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community bind me more to the Catholic Sudanneger than to the Protestant 
German?”811 Such a challenge must have stung in 1939, at a time when the Nazifying 
Kulturbund was adding many new members, including many Catholics. True, those 
Catholics were not simultaneously withdrawing from the Catholic Church and the 
clashes between the Church and the Erneuerer in the villages never affected the 
deeper aspects of Christian life or faith among the Catholic Swabians. There were no 
voelkisch baptisms or marriages.812 Nevertheless, many Swabians had clearly 
determined that their Catholic identity did not preclude brotherhood with their 
German Protestant neighbors.  
In addition to damning the Swabian Catholic clergy through association with 
the Habsburgs, the Erneuerer regularly assaulted them as national or ethnic traitors, 
Magyarones, agents of Magyarization, and accomplices in the historic retardation of 
German nationhood in Hungary. They had lobbed the same charge at the original 
leadership, of course. In that case, the charge was spurious and based in large part on 
the age of the men, many of whom had been raised in Austria-Hungary, fought for it 
during the great war, learned Hungarian as a matter of course and considered one or 
both halves of the Dual Monarchy their fatherland before 1918. The accusation was 
more complex when applied to the Swabian Catholic clergy. As we saw in Chapter 
One, the Church historically had been an agent (or at least an accomplice) of 
Magyarization in the pre-Trianon era and wielded considerable influence in the 
Hungarian state. Its clergy in the prewar era was trained at Hungarian seminaries and 
often likewise accepted Hungarian language and state patriotism as uncontroversial 
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and positive. Certainly some zealously favored Magyarization while others took a 
more cautious or nuanced view. As such, the Swabian clergy were easy targets for 
allegations of Magyarophilia and the Erneuerer were not hesitant in their accusations, 
which exploded in their press in 1937.  
The Erneuerer had always suspected its Swabian Catholic enemies of 
conducting their resistance campaign on false premises. That is, the Erneuerer never 
believed the Swabian priests’ embrace of Germandom in press and pulpit to be 
genuine. On the contrary, the Erneuerer regarded the Swabian clergy as chameleons, 
proudly declaring their German orientation but so qualifying it with accompanying 
declarations of Catholic identity that the clergy seemed suspect at best. At meetings 
and in print, they regularly criticized individual priests and denounced examples of 
local resistance to their insurgency. They had little patience for the Catholic youth 
movement which they regarded as a distraction at best. Indeed, they scorned it as a 
competitive diversion to their own attempts to rally youth into the Kameradschaft of 
Erneuerungsbewegung. The Catholic press, meanwhile, they derided as simply 
treasonous and regularly dismissed as deutschfeindlich or anti-German. Catholic 
publications like Der Familienfreund did not share the values of the German national 
movement, they charged, and would not be troubled by its decline. But it was the 
outspoken Donau which clearly troubled the Erneuerer most. Indeed, Jakob Kraemer 
condemned Die Donau as being “totally un-German.” [original emphasis] Despite its 
German appearance, the newspaper merely served clerical special interests, he 
sneered.813 “Nationality, Geisteskultur, honor, blood and soil are not primary” for 
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Berenz’s weekly but rather were “secondary earthly things of little value. Primary 
above all is the afterlife and power!”814 Of course, it was a perennial 
Erneuerungsbewegung concern that the Swabian clergy sought to confessionally split 
the German community.  
Being older than many of the other nationally conscious Swabian priests and 
consequently raised and schooled in prewar Hungary, Adam Berenz was vulnerable 
to the accusation of being an ethnically traitorous Magyarone. With his emergence as 
the Erneuerungsbewegung’s principle Catholic challenger, the Erneuerer did not 
hesitate to question his credibility as a German. Volksruf confronted Berenz during 
the following year as a Magyarone. Though Berenz was at first careful to use the 
German spelling of his German name in Die Donau, Volksruf observed that he was 
also known to spell it in the Magyarized fashion as “Berencz”. “If one were of the 
opinion that nationality is determined by names, one would come to doubt whether 
[Berenz] is foremost German or a Hungarian.” If the latter, then plainly he could not 
be trusted, Volksruf warned, for Magyars would never advocate on the Germans’ 
behalf. Subsequently, Volksruf often mockingly referred to Berenz either as the 
Magyarized “Berencz” or more comically as “Berencz-Berenz”. Similarly, it 
denounced Apatin as “the center of the Schwarzfrontler “German” Donau culture, 
which sprouts from the clerical-Magyar stem.”815 The assault on Berenz as a 
Magyarone then was a key tool with which to tarnish the Swabian Catholic clergy as 
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being products of foreign Hungary, “Arpad’s children” and ultimately alien to 
Germandom.816 
In sum, the Erneuerer regarded the Swabian Catholic clergy as being little 
more than ethnic traitors and anachronistic agents of a non-national order. That they 
were supposedly Magyarones made them doubly treacherous both for the past 
damage they had allegedly inflicted upon the Swabian community and their alleged 
intention to keep that community nationally unconscious and divided by confession in 
the future. The Erneuerer’s attacks were of a highly ideological nature, but the 
conflict was also deeply personal, with one letter to the editor of Volksruf even 
sneering that “Herr Berencz” of the “ridiculous, anti-German, smear-rag, Die Donau” 





Die Donau as Catholic, German, and Defiant 
At a time that the Erneuerungsbewegung insurrection was quite openly (and 
actively) causing a split in the Swabian Volksgruppe, every side was eager to pin the 
blame for the emerging divisions in the nascent Volksgruppe on a rival group. As 
such, the Erneuerer seized upon the Catholic clergy’s natural focus on other Catholics 
as a way of accusing them of undermining German community, working against the 
Volksgemeinschaft, and thus working against the interests of the German Volk. The 
Erneuerer additionally mocked and opposed the Catholic youth movement and 
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objected to confession-based associations and confessionally-oriented celebrations. 
The Swabian Clergy’s response to such criticism was robust and uninhibited, 
consisting of pointed condemnation of their accusers and a vigorous defense against 
their allegations. In sermons, at youth rallies, and in their personal relations, the 
Swabian priests strove against the Erneuerer insurgency and its accompanying, 
National Socialist, neue deutsche Weltanschauung. Under Berenz, Die Donau became 
the loudest voice of Catholic resistance. Even before the Erneuerer began their 
printed criticism of the Swabian clergy in earnest, Berenz anticipated their attacks 
with a number of statements that Die Donau would be “thoroughly German” as well 
as “thoroughly Catholic”. From the outset, he recognized that an effective resistance 
to the Erneuerer would have to be made using the language of Germandom and rest 
upon a bold definition of nationhood that embraced Catholicism but took an 
aggressive stance toward National Socialism and the neue deutsche Weltanschauung. 
As such, the Catholics would insist that they were totally Catholic and totally 
German, define Germandom as Christian, assert that there was no incompatibility 
between Catholicism and Germandom, emphasize a long and mutually beneficial 
relationship between the Church and German Volk, and insist that the Nazi Party 
should not be mistaken for the German Volk.  
German mistrust of Catholicism was hardly unprecedented, of course, despite 
(or perhaps because of) the huge number of German Catholics. Already in the 
previous century the Catholic Church had faced enormous challenges during 
Bismarck’s Kulturkampf in the Kaiserreich. In interwar Germany, National Socialism 




ideologically and against whose Center Party it competed politically. Following the 
Nazis’ accession to power and their subsequent Gleichschaltung of the German state 
and society, German national identity increasingly came to mean National Socialism 
in the minds of many. To such people, Catholicism, with its universal outlook, 
seemed to defy the essence of German nationalism by finding confessional 
brotherhood among other nationalities. Simultaneously, Catholicism seemed to deny 
the brotherhood between Germans of different confessions, or at least dismiss such 
brotherhood as secondary. To the Erneuerer activists and other subscribers to the neue 
deutsche Weltanschauung, such Catholic transgressions suggested an incompatibility 
between the Catholicism and Germandom. 
As we have seen, many Catholic priests of Swabian origins were themselves 
conflicted about the primacy and place of German nationhood during the 1920s. 
Many Swabian Catholic priests spoke out against the Kulturbund in its early years, 
taking offense at its disregard of confessional differences. Organizing on the basis of 
nationhood, especially German nationhood, seemed to them unnatural and possibly 
blasphemous. This changed with the passage of time and the emergence of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung and National Socialism as threats to Swabians faith. Berenz, 
as a matter of fact, had never shared this early confliction or suspicion of German 
national identity. In early 1936, Die Donau wrote,  
We wish to repeat it with all the necessary emphasis: We stand in 
unshakable loyalty to the fundamentals of our Catholic world view. 
Simultaneously, however, we are and remain self-aware and sincere 
persons who embrace the German nationality from which we stem. We 
are proud that we were born from German parents, that our mothers 
sang German lullabies, that they taught us in to pray to our Lord in 
German at a most tender young age, that we may drink from the spring 




tribute to our Germanness through our noble German thought, 
thoroughly creative achievement, and great accomplishments in all 
cultural fields everywhere on Earth. We love our nationality, we love 
our mother tongue and this undissolvable love will resound even in our 
last dying breath.818 
 
The Swabian Catholics behind die Donau thus showed both pride in their 
nationhood and that there was no contradiction between being a good Catholic and a 
proud German. Far from it, they wrote. “We are Catholics above all but we are also 
Germans!” But, they warned, “we are not Auchdeutsche, we are Germans and we will 
let that be denied by no one. We are Germans, we are German Catholics.”819 And 
“there exists no contradiction between Catholic and German.” In an appeal to 
Swabian Catholic youth, Jugendruf similarly argued against any suggestion that 
German and Catholic were contradictory.820 
 Far from being mutually exclusive, Catholicism and Germandom were deeply 
intertwined, the Swabian Catholics insisted. Sheer numbers alone argued that 
Catholics, who comprised 39 percent of the world’s Germans, could not be dismissed 
as Auchdeutsche or otherwise denied, the newspaper implied. After all, Catholics 
made up one third of the Reich’s population, virtually all of Austria’s and comprised 
62 percent of the Germans outside the Reich.821 Moreover, the Swabian Clergy 
insisted that there need be absolutely no contradiction between Church and Volk. On 
the contrary, the Church and German nation had a long and mutually beneficial 
history. True, the universal nature of the Church meant that it could never be 
restricted to a particular country or nation. There could be no national Church. 
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Nevertheless, the Church had never sought to suppress the distinctness of a people, 
Die Donau claimed. Rather, the Church had respected nations’ distinctiveness and 
had even served as a repository of German nationhood and language in Hungary, 
where education and public life had been so monopolized by the state that German 
was only to be heard in the Church.822 Indeed, Die Donau insisted, “the Church has 
contributed much to the development of our German language.”823 Moreover, the 
newspaper insisted, it was only through the embrace of Christianity that the Germanic 
peoples became a Kulturvolk.824  The Church, thus, was even instrumental in forging 
German unity as a nation (if not as a state).825 Meanwhile, the German Volk had given 
the Church several Popes during their long, intertwined history.826 Finally, the history 
of Germans in Yugoslavia was also a deeply Christian history, from the devout 
German colonists who immediately built local parishes,827 to the new Swabian 
priesthood, which openly embraced nationhood and recognized Volkstumarbeit as a 
holy duty. As one such priest put it, “we do not want Germans, because they are 
Catholic, to lose their Germanness. We do not want Catholics, because they are 
Germans, to lose their faith.”828 
 Even as they highlighted the important bonds between the Church and 
German Volk, the Swabian clergy pursued a complementary strategy of exposing the 
Erneuerer, National Socialism, and the vaunted neue deutsche Weltanschauung as 
fundamentally un-Christian and indeed anti-Christian. In this, the clergy hoped to turn 
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824  Adam Berenz, "Deutschfeindlich?," Die Donau, October 16 1937. 
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826  "Was gab das deutsche Volk der Kirche?," Die Donau, August 14 1937. 
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some of the Erneuerer’s anti-Catholic arguments on their head. Just as the Erneuerer 
sought to expose the Catholics as un-German for their subscription to a universalist, 
non-national ideology, so did the clergy hope to expose the purveyors of the neue 
deutsche Weltanschauung and National Socialism as being unchristian. Having 
established the important link between Christianity and the German Volk, the 
Catholics would hence seek to question the Erneuerer’s very credentials as Germans, 
asking who was truly deutschfeindlich and who actually had Germans’ best interests 
in mind.  And as they would remind readers from the time Berenz first formally took 
the helm of the newspaper, there was a difference between the German Volk and the 
NSDAP, which was a mere political party and whose adherents could make no 
rightful claim to define “Deutsch-sein.”829 
 The Swabian Catholic resistance was loudly critical of the abuse suffered by 
the Church in the Third Reich as a way of shaming its ideological champions in 
Yugoslavia. Following the 1936 NSDAP party congress in Nuremberg, Die Donau 
stated plainly that the National Socialist Weltanschauung contained much that 
Catholics must reject, and proceeded to list a litany of transgressions against the 
church in Germany, including the “elimination of Catholic institutions, the 
impediment of Catholic schooling, the dissolution of Catholic organizations, the 
persecution of Catholic priests and laypersons, the desecration of the cross, and the 
disruption of Catholic processions.”830 Based as it was upon the National Socialist 
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Weltanschauung, the Erneuerungsbewegung was plainly anti-Christian and the 
Swabian clergy were outraged.831  
Berenz and his collaborators derived much of the ideological evidence for 
their condemnation of the neue deutsche Weltanschauung from the publications, 
speeches, and statements by Alfred Rosenberg as well as the Deutsche Christen, a 
heretical religious movement in the Third Reich about which we will read more 
shortly.832 As the “spiritual father of the neue deutsche Weltanschauung,”833 
Rosenberg was a “fanatischer Christushasser”, they declared.834 He wanted nothing 
less, they charged, than for a new faith to replace Christianity, “a faith without Christ, 
without the Church, and without lamentable priests.”835 One priest, Chaplain Paul 
Pfuhl, even sought to tarnish National Socialism through association with 
Bolshevism, observing that both odious ideologies shared a common antipathy 
toward Christianity. Moreover, despite Rosenberg’s hollow claims to embrace a 
“positive Christianity,” his Myth of the Twentieth Century (Mythus des 20. 
Jahrhunderts) was plainly anti-German, Pfuhl affirmed as a guest writer for the “In 
the Spotlight” column.836 Die Donau repeated this link between Bolshevism and the 
neue deutsche Weltanschauung often, noting that “our Erneuerer are also good and 
proper students of Rosenberg: they also want a German people without Confession 
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and without Christ.”837 Berenz himself asserted that Rosenberg was the “the 
intellectual and spiritual father of the ‘Erneuerer’, his god is Volk and race, his 
‘religion’ is the religion of blood” and that “the Erneuerungsbewegung completely 
works in this spirit.”838 It was nothing less than a new heathenism being smuggled 
into the German Volk,839 an ideology which aspired to eradicate Christianity in the 
German Volk. Indeed, its goal was nothing less than to transform the German nation 
into the first unchristian Volk of Europe. Thus, though there were no contradiction 
between Catholic and German, a person could not be a legitimate Catholic and 
genuine Erneuerer in Die Donau’s estimation. “Between the Catholic worldview and 
the neue deutsche Weltanschauung there can never be compromise,” Berenz 
warned.840 
The Swabian clergy was even critical of Volksruf’‘s Christmas issues, which 
typically omitted any mention of the holiday’s Christian content and instead 
highlighted voelkisch themes. Likewise, the newspaper’s Easter issues typically 
neglected Jesus. True, they proudly trumpeted news of “resurrection” and new life, 
but such themes were as clearly connected to the Erneuerungsbewegung’s effort to 
“renew” the German Volksgruppe as they were to Christianity. Easter issues also 
served as a useful opportunity for the Erneuerer to further fetishize youth. Likewise, 
the celebration of old Germanic customs with pagan overtones were a source of 
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Catholic concern but much Erneuerungsbewegung fascination at Christmas and 
Easter. 
For the Erneuerer, youth was a source of dynamism and strength. Die Donau 
agreed but was concerned that today’s youth was following the wrong path and 
exhorted them to embrace Christian values and groups. It held up the German 
Catholic youth movement as an example of both the vitality of Catholicism among 
Swabian youth and also as an expression of genuine German nationalism among 
Catholics. At their pilgrimage in 1936, for example, it observed the young men swore 
themselves to be “steadfastly German” but also “steadfastly Catholic” and asserted 
that “steadfastly Catholic” in no way formed an obstacle to being “steadfastly 
German.” Moreover, “they have unambiguously expressed that they have confidence 
in a “renewal” [Erneuerung] of the individual, the family, and the entire German 
people only if this renewal is carried out in Christ and through his teachings.”841 So 
while both the Swabian Catholics and the Erneuerer promoted youth and Erneuerung, 
they had rather different agendas in mind. 
The Swabian Catholic clergy also regularly discussed the regular 
transgressions against the Church in the Third Reich as a way of undermining the 
idealistic way that so many Swabians increasingly regarded Hitler’s Germany. They 
warned of a kind of “Kulturkampf” in the country by which National Socialism hoped 
to marginalize the Church and even purge the German national body (Volkskoerper) 
of Christianity. The newspaper repeated the Vatican’s warning that “in Germany 
there is truly a campaign of religious persecution.”842 Thus, the Swabian Catholic’s 
                                                 
841  Adam Berenz, "Katholiken oeffnet eure Augen!," Die Donau, July 4 1936. 




ultimate concern was not merely that the neue deutsche Weltanschauung was un-
Christian but rather that it was anti-Christian, that it sought to expunge allegedly alien 
Christendom from the hearts of Germans in its drive to achieve the creation of a 
society based on the voelkisch values of honor, blood and soil. The problem here, 
from the Swabian Catholic perspective, was that such extirpation endangered not only 
German culture but the salvation of German souls.  
Die Donau only rarely entered directly into that conflict between the 
Erneuerungsbewegung and the original leadership, preferring instead to wage its own 
battle against the Erneuerer on matters of faith and national identity. The “In the 
Spotlight” column did not take a firm and public stand behind the original leadership 
or refute the charges against them. In many ways this may seem unsurprising, since 
there were lingering concerns among some Catholics about the secularism or 
perceived Protestantism of the organization. Certainly some Swabian Catholic 
clergymen continued to not recognize in the Kulturbund an organization that fully 
shared its priorities or worldview. Indeed, as we have seen, there were important 
areas of ideological affinity between the original leadership and the Erneuerer which 
suggested that the two groups’ outlooks might not be as separate as their heated 
conflict made it seem. Moreover, the original leadership could not help be dazzled by 
the impressive successes of the NSDAP and the “new Germany,” even if they had 
questions about the neue deutsche Weltanschauung. Both received considerable 
attention in Deutsches Volksblatt, which also evinced a positive view of Adolf Hitler 
even before its own Gleichgeschaltung. (Similarly, Die Donau refrained from much 




until the Erneuerer’s triumph, seeing a greater threat in the Erneuerer than in any 
transgressions by the original leadership. 843 Likewise, the editors at Deutsches 
Volksblatt eschewed public conflict with Berenz, probably recognizing potential peril 
in tangling with such an outspoken priest in an overwhelmingly Catholic 
population.844  This would change, however. Berenz, though an early member and 
supporter of the Kulturbund, gradually grew critical of the organization as it became 
penetrated by the Erneuerungsbewegung insurgents and their ideas. After the 
Erneuerer returned to the Kulturbund and began to remake the organization in a 
National Socialist image, Berenz disdainedly pronounced it the “Erneuerbund.”845 
Following the effective Gleichschaltung of Deutsches Volksblatt, Die Donau took 
aim at that newspaper as well. 
This relative silence of Die Donau toward the original leadership did not 
indicate acceptance of the Erneuerer’s criticism of them, however. On the contrary, 
Die Donau took several opportunities to praise the Kulturbund’s founding and long 
standing leadership. For example, Die Donau marked Georg Grassl’s 75th birthday in 
1938 with a laudatory biography that highlighted the importance of his work on 
behalf of the German Volksgruppe.846 Later, in 1940 when he was honored by the 
Deutsche Ausland-Institut, die Donau praised Grassl as “the head of our 
Volksgruppe.”847 Berenz personally praised Keks in 1939 on the occasion of the 
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latter’s abrupt resignation as Kulturbund chair, of which we will read more in the 
following chapter. Berenz recognized in him a kindred spirit of unusual integrity, 
precisely whose very principles and impatience with the excesses of the Erneuerer 
had made him the target of their vitriol. In words, deeds, and moral conduct, Berenz 
declared, Keks demonstrated the importance he attached to keeping the Christian 
worldview as a central part of Kulturarbeit and Jugenderziehung. Indeed, had his 
leadership not been so challenged by the Erneuerungsbewegung, the German 
minority would have achieved a greater and more constructive unity. With the contest 
to succeed him then underway in 1939, Berenz warned darkly, “should the leadership 
fall into the hands of Kulturbund Chairman Kek’s radical enemies after his 
resignation, there would be the saddest consequences for our Volksgruppe.”848 
Tragically, as the events of the Second Word War and its aftermath would make 
clear, the prescient Berenz was to prove absolutely correct in his prediction. 
 
 
The German Evangelical Church in the 1930s 
As we saw in Chapter Five, the German Evangelical Church emerged as an 
increasingly nationally conscious institution during the 1920s under the guidance of 
its young and able leader Philipp Popp. The adoption of the Protestant Law and the 
church constitution in 1930 allowed the German Lutherans to move beyond their 
provisional institutions and formally elect Popp as bishop. With this, the German 
Evangelical Church ended its construction phase and entered into one of 
consolidation, which was later marked by important contacts with the Third Reich. 
                                                 




Ties between the German Lutheran Church in Yugoslavia and Reich Protestants 
predated the Nazis’ coming to power, of course, but Nazi-promoted changes in Reich 
German Protestantism altered those connections in the 1930s. During the 1930s, the 
German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia would continue to be a nationally 
conscious institution and would intensify its contacts with the Protestant church in the 
Reich as well as with the Reich leadership. However, the Yugoslav German 
Lutherans also remained cautious as regards certain religious trends in Germany, 
being especially disturbed by Alfred Rosenberg and the Deutsche Christen. The 
Erneuerer and the German Evangelicals would occasionally clash during the 1930s, 
but the Lutherans never engaged the Erneuerer with the directness of the Swabian 
Catholics’ resistance movement. On the contrary, the German Lutherans maintained 
close ties with the Third Reich until the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941. 
The German Lutheran church in Yugoslavia, therefore, had the mixed legacy of 
sometimes clashing with the Erneuerer but nevertheless remaining well disposed 
toward Hitler and the Third Reich, an attitude which surely influenced its German 
flock.   
 
 
Changes in Reich German Protestantism under Hitler 
Parallel to the consolidation of German Lutheran leadership and institutions in 
Yugoslavia, the Lutheran church also underwent a profound transformation in 
Germany itself in the years after 1933. It is not entirely accurate to speak of a single 
German Lutheran hurch in Germany in the early 1930s, because “the” church actually 




historical division. Since 1922 these provincial churches had been loosely organized 
into the Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenbund, a confederation of German Protestant 
churches. There had been long been talk of forming a unified church, but little 
concrete had come of these discussions. However, the Nazis accession to power and 
the subsequent, rapid Gleichschaltung of German society brought added urgency to 
these discussions on forming a single Reichskirche. Simultaneously, a radical strain in 
the Church known as the Deutsche Christen was growing in popularity and influence 
in the Reich, not least because it was favored for a time by the Nazis.  
We turn briefly to the Deutsche Christen, because their movement caused 
considerable consternation in German Protestant and Catholic religious circles in 
Yugoslavia as well. Though formally founded in 1932, the Deutsche Christen 
movement had ideological roots in the old German voelkisch tradition, which had 
found fertile soil in the political and social uncertainty of Weimar Germany. Though 
religious, theirs was a highly political program.849 Racist, anti-Semitic, anti-
Communist, and indulgent in a particularly narcissistic variety of German nationalism 
that attached great importance to blood and soil, the Deutsche Christen regarded 
religion as dynamic, not frozen in static traditions or dusty ancient texts. They 
believed in “positive Christianity”, which sought to downplay Jewish elements of 
Christianity and deemphasize the Old Testament, even recasting Jesus as a crusader 
against Judaism. Led by Pastor Ludwig Mueller, the Deutsche Christen movement 
was highly compatible with the teachings of National Socialism and quickly attracted 
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Nazi patronage. The Nazis recognized familiar beliefs in this movement and for a 
time regarded it as a means by which to subvert and control the country’s 
Protestants.850 At the April 1933 convention of the Deutsche Christen in Berlin, the 
movement’s racist extreme wing effectively demanded the Glieichschaltung of the 
Evangelical church and the introduction of the Fuehrerprinzip in its affairs.  
Moved as they were toward unification, Reich German Evangelical leaders 
were nonetheless not eager to surrender to the Deutsche Christen, who had much 
support among Protestants but had also earned much opposition. Ultimately, the 
Deutsche Christen movement was effectively hoping to hijack the unified 
Reichskirche and convert it into an “instrument of power and propaganda of the new 
state.”851 Such prospects were disturbing even to many who regarded the Nazis’ 
coming to power with cautious optimism. The German Lutheran leaders themselves 
entered into a posture of resistance to such extreme plans for their church in the 
Reich. 
In Germany, the executive committee of the Kirchenbund named a three-man 
commission of representatives from the Lutheran, Reformed and United churches to 
form a single, more unified Protestant church. Hitler appointed Deutsche Christen 
leader Ludwig Mueller to this commission as his representative in late April 1933. 
After much disagreement in Evangelical circles, on September 27, 1933, Mueller was 
appointed Reichsbischof of the new German Evangelical Church. However, the rest 
of the German Evangelical Church’s history remained marked by internal dissent and 
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opposition. The Deutsche Christen lost Hitler’s interest after it became clear they 
lacked the power to thoroughly control the Protestant church. Without that support, 
Mueller and the Deutsche Christen became ineffectual, and Protestant opposition 
forces were better able to resist the consolidation of the unified Evangelical Church in 
Germany. Their underground resistance movement, which fundamentally rejected the 
notion of any Protestant church as a state body, became known as the Confessing 
Church and was guided for a time by Martin Niemoeller. Unfortunately, Niemoeller 
and other leaders of the Confessing Church were eventually arrested and imprisoned. 
Meanwhile, the Reichskirche continued to exist but it was always a troubled project 
and relations between it and the government deteriorated after 1937.852 
At the outset, the Yugoslav German Lutherans were optimistic about the 
unified Reichskirche. In 1934, Gerhard May described the creation of a unified 
German Evangelical Church as “the fulfillment of more than a century-long wish” 
and even offered kind words to the Deutsche Christen for setting the unification 
project in motion. The religious beliefs of the Deutsche Christen were well known to 
close observers and May was quick to condemn those same Deutsche Christen for 
creating problems, however. “Their radical wing openly denies fundamental Christian 
teachings. For them, it is not about the Evangelical faith, but rather about a voelkisch 
religiosity,” he observed.853 The “Faith Movement of the Deutsche Christen” was not 
an official body of either the Reich or NSDAP, but their work had been sanctioned by 
                                                 
852  The episode surrounding the birth of the German Evangelical Church and the contested selection 
of its first bishop is instructive, for it reveals the degree to which German Protestantism had become 
penetrated by extreme nationalist and even National Socialist views in Germany. Yet serious Protestant 
resistance simultaneously existed against such views in whole or in part. And while many Protestant 
leaders may have accepted Hitler’s accession to power due to the Fuehrer’s anti-Communism and his 
promise to create order from Weimar’s political chaos, they nevertheless opposed heavy intrusion into 
their church and its theology by the state or party.  




Hitler and their extremism suggested reasons for future concern about “voelkisch 
Religiositaet” in Germany, he believed.  
Thus, at the same time that the German Lutherans in Yugoslavia were 
consolidating their own church and establishing relationships with fellow Lutherans 
in Germany, the German Evangelical Church there was itself undergoing a profound 
transformation and was engaged in a struggle against internal and external threats.  As 
such, the situation was complicated for the German Lutherans in Yugoslavia, who 
were dealing with a moving target in their relations with Germany. Bishop Popp’s 
own attitude toward the Deutsche Christen was one of reservation, at least, and 
probable rejection.854 As we shall see, however, he would not disavow the Nazi Party 
as Berenz did. 
 
Yugoslavia’s German Lutherans and Nazi Germany 
Nazism’s entry into Lutheran discourse in Yugoslavia predated the Reich 
Church’s founding and even the Nazis accession to power. As early as 1931, the 
German Evangelical Church organ Neues Leben published a critical essay by 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin Landesbischof Heinrich Rendtorff, which outlined Protestant 
suspicion of “positive Christianity” and objected to National Socialism’s elevation of 
Volk and race to the heights of idolatry.855 However, Philipp Popp came to find much 
to admire in the Third Reich, though he may have misunderstood many aspects of the 
Nazi regime like many Swabians. Either attraction to the anti-Marxist promises of 
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National Socialism or outright admiration for Hitler enabled Popp to explain away, 
forgive, or overlook many of Nazism’s transgressions.  
Popp issued an impassioned defense of Hitler’s Germany and condemnation 
of its detractors in the spring of 1933. In “Against Atrocity Propaganda 
[Greuelpropaganda],” published in both Neues Leben and Deutsches Volksblatt, 
Popp inveighed against Hitler’s critics, revealed a reflexive anti-Semitism, and 
demonstrated his own sympathy for the Nazis’ revolution. “From the Jewish-
Bolshevik side,” he charged, “a propaganda campaign of lies about the German 
people was launched on the occasion of the victory of the national revolution in 
Germany, which must fill every German, wherever he lives, with indignation.” The 
“Jewish” press abroad had evidently been predicting the persecution, imprisonment, 
and even slaughter of Jewish innocents. Such Jewish-Bolshevik defamation, Popp 
explained, was designed to influence international public opinion against the German 
people, branding them (especially the Lutherans) as a “nation of barbarians.”856 Popp 
also complained about the Yugoslav press, including one “Magyar-Jewish 
newspaper” which went so far as to claim that the Catholics were also oppressed in 
Germany. After presenting several statements by international church leaders 
expressing confidence in Germany, Popp concluded, “as the German-Evangelical 
Bishop I feel myself bound to protest against such malicious disseminations because 
such disseminations are intended to disturb the confessional peace in our ranks and in 
our country and cast German-Evangelical character in a false light before the public.” 
Thus, Popp was deeply concerned that these “Jewish-Bolshevik” lies about Germany 
would reflect poorly on Protestants even in Yugoslavia. The minor incidents 
                                                 




unavoidable in any revolution were being blown up by the press, he felt. Meanwhile, 
he was clearly offended by “Jewish” calls to boycott of German goods in Germany. 
In conclusion, Popp warned, “we want to live in peace with everyone, but we also 
wish that our nationality and our church be left in peace, and that people always 
remain within the bounds of truth when speaking of us.”857 What is not clear, is the 
degree to which Popp here understood that sometimes the truth hurts.  
Popp remained well disposed toward the Third Reich, despite certain 
ideological misgivings and the conflict over the unification of the Reich Protestant 
Church. Under him, relations between the Yugoslav and Reich Protestant churches 
would deepen, completing the Yugoslav Lutherans’ reorientation away from 
Hungary, which he and his collaborators had initiated years before after rising to 
positions of leadership. Connections with Protestants abroad intensified after 1931, 
culminating in Popp’s journey to Germany in February 1934 to formally conclude a 
friendship treaty between the German Lutheran Church in Yugoslavia and its Reich 
counterpart. Though in practical terms little may have come from this gesture, 
symbolically it was vastly important. Indeed, “the treaty was a decisive point in the 
historical development of German Protestantism in Yugoslavia: overcome were the 
historical memories of a common history with Hungarian Protestantism, the 
emotional ties to Hungarian tradition and sentiment. The new spiritual and theological 
orientation toward Germany was complete” against a background of national and 
intellectual affinity with the Germans in the Reich.858 Popp, while in Berlin to sign 
this treaty, took the opportunity to meet several leading personalities in the Third 
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Reich, including Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, Reich Bishop Ludwig 
Mueller (Popp’s treaty cosignatory), and others before finally obtaining a personal 
audience with none other than Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler.  
In 1934, an Evangelical Kirchliches Aussenamt or Church Foreign Office was 
established in Berlin with the task of maintaining church-political connections to the 
Protestant churches abroad and the ecumenical world. This office was headed by 
Oberkonsistorialrat Theodor Heckel. Heckel was well disposed toward the German 
Lutherans in Yugoslavia and generally respected the church’s independence, though 
in the mid-1930s this office did seek to coordinate the German Lutheran churches 
abroad in such as a way so as to conform somewhat with the Germany’s foreign 
policy aspirations.859 Still, Reich offices never themselves sought to influence 
relations between the Church in Yugoslavia and the Kirchliches Aussenamt. Relations 
were friendly, thus, and the church in Yugoslavia naturally became inclined to turn 
toward the Kirchliches Aussenamt for solutions to a variety of the German Lutheran 
diaspora’s needs and problems in Yugoslavia.860 
Popp’s embrace of Germany and Germandom seems to not have been 
contradictory to genuine Yugoslav patriotism. Nor did the deepened relations 
between the German and Yugoslav German Evangelical Churches signal political 
disloyalty to Yugoslavia. After all, it was also Yugoslavia’s policy for much of the 
1930s to forge closer political and especially economic ties with Germany. Popp was 
careful to maintain the independence of his church and was a welcome presence in 
Belgrade even until the Third Reich’s invasion in April 1941. Indeed, Popp was even 
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named a Yugoslav Senator in 1940. He found many words of praise for Hitler, whom 
he described in a major report at the Fourth Landeskirchentag in 1938 as the most 
important force preventing Europe from sinking into Bolshevism.861 Nevertheless, the 
local German exponents of National Socialism in Yugoslavia, the Erneuerer, were not 
exactly admirers of the Evangelical leadership and were not unknown to criticize him 
at rallies and in print.  
The Evangelical leaders, despite their admiration for many of Hitler’s 
achievements, could not help but be disturbed by the radical trends against traditional 
Christianity in Germany. On one hand, it seems that Popp and his colleagues were 
quite impressed by Hitler and Nazi Germany. On the other hand, they plainly had 
reservations about certain trends and tendencies in the country that seemed hostile to 
the churches and even Christianity in general. These reservations grew over time. 
 Catholics and Protestants naturally shared many of the same concerns 
regarding the avowed “new heathens” associated with the Deutsche Christen and 
Alfred Rosenberg. Though they did not pursue them with the venom of Adam 
Berenz, Yugoslav German Evangelicals were similarly repulsed by religious 
deviance, Rosenberg’s Myth of the Twentieth Century, and the idolatrous elevation of 
race seemed un-Christian as well as reckless. The situation was confusing, for the 
1920 Nazi Party program specifically demanded “freedom of religion for all 
denominations “ and avowed the party “to a standpoint of positive Christianity 
without binding itself confessionally to any one domination.”862 Nevertheless the 
“new heathens” continued to invoke the authority of National Socialism and assert 
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that proper Nazism excluded Christianity. Like Berenz and the Catholics, the German 
Lutherans in Yugoslavia rejected the notion that Christianity was somehow alien to 
Germandom and noted a long history of Christian-German synergy, during which 
Germans achievements would have been unimaginable without the Christian faith.863 
 As we saw in Chapter Five, under Popp and his colleagues, Yugoslavia’s 
Evangelical leadership grew enthusiastic about national identity and eagerly 
reoriented the church from its roots in Hungary toward the German heartland. 
Nationality and the mother tongue were nothing less than gifts from God, according 
to Pfarrer Heinrich Lebherz, managing editor of Kirche und Volk.864 Likewise, 
Senioratsinspektor Andreas Zimmermann noted that “the world is God’s and in this 
world nationality is the God-willed order”865 Nevertheless, this embrace of national 
identity and even its acceptance of natural order did not mean acceptance of the 
concept of race as the National Socialists so narrowly defined it. In 1937, Pastor 
Konrath of Nove Šove tackled the tricky matter of race in an article that 
acknowledged race’s validity but cut to the heart of the church’s misgivings. “Race is 
created by God,” he observed. “It belongs to the order of creation. Treasuring race, 
honoring race is the will of God. He who disdains racial thinking is a bad Christian. 
He has no right to act on the authority of the gospel. He who disdains race has gone 
mad regarding God’s basic order of life, indeed, regarding God himself.” Thus race, 
like nationhood, was an expression of God and must be respected. Nevertheless, he 
continued, “just as erroneous as disdain for race is its deification. The overdoing of 
racial thought is an offense against the first commandment: ‘you shall have no other 
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gods before me.’ As such, the supreme elevation of race fundamentally contradicted 
Christian teachings and consequently could not be tolerated. As for racial exclusivity 
in the church, he concluded, “Christian knowledge of God is not racially 
dependent.”866 In sum, the German Lutheran leadership seems to have adopted a 
relatively “moderate” tone as regards race. Just as they embraced national identity but 
recoiled from national chauvinism (the only sensible position as a minority within a 
minority in multiethnic Yugoslavia), so did they acknowledge racial thinking but 
warn against the idolization of race.  
 Like the Swabian Catholics, Yugoslavia’s German Lutherans began to expand 
their activities beyond the traditional, religious areas into matters of youth, education 
and social welfare. The Lutherans questionably voelkisch views and increased non-
religious activities drew the ire of the Erneuerer. The Erneuerer were especially 
concerned about the Church’s initiatives among youth groups, which they regarded as 
a form of competition. However, the Evangelicals’ spiritual and earthly leadership 
plainly did regard this Jugendarbeit, which reinforced the Germans’ sense of a 
distinct identity, as part of its responsibility. One leading Lutheran stated it bluntly in 
1934, when he remarked that nationality was a distinction given by God, care for 
which was a Swabian Lutherans’ duty.867  
As it turned out, German Lutheran Jugendarbiet in Yugoslavia was really 
quite limited and sporadic. Church press organs perennially discussed the importance 
of youth and the need for more coordinated Jugendarbeit but there was never great 
progress. Attempts to coordinate it in the 1930s were only modestly successful and 
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many of the church’s plans, remained just that, plans. Nevertheless, the church did 
hold youth rallies, such as the one held at Novi Sad in 1937. Three Lutheran youth 
organizations of consequence operated in Yugoslavia, the oldest of which, the Youth 
League for Decisive Christendom (Jugendbund fuer Entschiedendes Christentum, 
also known as the EC) was founded by (PdD Parliamentarian and Lutheran minister) 
Samuel Schumacher and Jakob Kettenbach in the village of Beška. The Christian 
Association of Young Men (Christliche Verein Junger Maenner or CVJM) was also 
not inconsequential, though its activities were likewise limited. Perhaps the largest 
and most distinctive of the German evangelical Jungendarbeit groups was the 
Crusaders or Kreuzfahrer, which was modeled after branches of the movement in 
Austria. These local Kreuzfahrer branches comprised the movement’s “Yugoslavia 
District”, which similarly formed part of a Bund in Germany and Austria, headed by 
Austrian Landesjugendpfarrer Georg Traar. As an international organization, the 
Kreuzfahrer also naturally proved to be a road for the exchange of persons and ideas 
with Germans abroad. Having founded local chapters in 1931, the Kreuzfahrer 
distinguished themselves from other youth groups through their scout-like uniforms, 
parading, display of banners and other such symbolism. Additionally, they conducted 
excursions much like the Wandervoegel in Germany and organized summer camps, 
especially in Fruška Gora area.868 Naturally, the Kreuzfaherer also devoted 
themselves to religious studies, as did the other Protestant youth groups discussed 
above.  
Despite its limited scope and wanting central direction, the German Lutheran 
youth movement was an unwelcome development for the Erneuerer, who regarded its 
                                                 




religious Jugendarbeit as competition for their own voelkisch brand. The 
Erneuerungbewegung’s leaders expressed their extreme displeasure in the pages of 
Volksruf in late 1937. Explicitly addressing the Lutheran leadership, Volksruf 
observed with dismay the recent increase in Lutheran Jugendarbeit. The Erneuerer 
claimed to have no problem with such work as long as it remained restricted to purely 
religious matters. However, Volksruf complained, the Lutherans’ youth activities had 
strayed beyond their mandate. Moreover, they warned, such confessionally based 
Jugendarbeit threatened to deepen the confessional divide in the Volksgruppe. 
Finally, Volksruf expressed its “long-suppressed” doubts about the genuineness of the 
German Lutheran clergy’s national orientation in Yugoslavia. The Erneuerer declared 
that it was the questionable attitude of Popp himself which had forced them to break 
their silence on the matter. Finally, the Erneuerer accused the church’s highest 
leadership of tolerating and even endorsing “a virulent political campaign against 
Germany” at a recent international Protestant conference in Oxford, which Popp and 
May had attended. The Erneuerer closed their pointed critique by asking the church 
leadership first, if it would not be better leave youth work among Swabian children to 
national movements or organizations, given the confessional divisions between the 
Lutheran and Catholic Germans; and second, what was the state of national thought 
of the German Evangelical Church’s leaders. Bishop Popp’s behavior in Oxford 
seemed to suggest to the Erneuerer that he was not qualified to raise Swabian children 
in a nationally conscious manner.869 Ultimately, the Erneuerer plainly demonstrated 
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that they considered the national attitude of the German Evangelical Church in 
Yugoslavia regretfully deficient. 
 Relations between the German Evangelicals in Yugoslavia and the troubled 
Reichskirche continued during the 1930s, finally culminating in February 1941 in an 
affiliation treaty (Verbindungs-Vertrag) between the two churches. This treaty, signed 
on February 24, 1941, only weeks before the German invasion of Yugoslavia, did not 
formally join the two churches but rather obliged the Kirchliches Aussenamt to 
provide certain resources for the maintenance and development of the church in 
Yugoslavia. It emerged as part of Popp’s long standing desire for closer relations with 
Evangelicals in Germany, of course, but it also reflected the desire in the Reich to 
gain influence in the neutral states of southeast Europe after the outbreak of war. And 
indeed, the Verbindungs-Vertrag did seem to grant the Kirchliches Aussenamt 
increased influence in Yugoslav Lutheran affairs as well as greater access for the 
Yugoslav Germans in Protestant matters in the Third Reich.870 Nevertheless, the 
treaty never achieved much significance since the German invasion of Yugoslavia in 
April would soon smash the country. Yugoslavia’s subsequent division had the effect 
of also dividing the German Evangelical Church. As such, after more than twenty 
years, the German Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia would find itself back in 
precisely the position the legal uncertainty it experienced in the wake of Austria-
Hungary’s collapse.  
In conclusion, the German Lutherans defended Hitler’s Germany but also 
expressed some criticism of its ideology, which they did not fully endorse between 
the wars. Nevertheless, the ferocity of the Lutherans’ criticism never approached the 
                                                 




determination of the Catholic clergy’s resistance. To be sure, there was no real 
equivalency between the German  Lutherans’ and Swabian Catholic’s opposition to 
the Erneuerer’s insurrection. After all, the Swabian Catholic clergy were planning 
their resistance even as Popp traveled to Berlin to meet Hitler and sign a Friendship 
Treaty with Ludwig Mueller, the Reich Church Bishop and leader of the Deutsche 
Christen. By contrast with the Catholics, the German Evangelicals were far milder in 
their critique of the Nazi ideology. Though they touched upon many of the same 
issues as the Catholics, the Lutherans did so far more rarely and in a less 
confrontational manner. Nevertheless, they were also the target of criticism by 
Awender and other Erneuerer, who considered their Jugendarbeit threatening and 
sometimes charged them with being insufficiently German. In sum, one might say 
that the German Evangelical Church’s leaders were proud Germans but eschewed 
national chauvinism. Until the very end of the First Yugoslavia, its head Bishop 
Philipp Popp achieved the impressive feat of being welcome in both Berlin and 
Belgrade. Ultimately, as the Erneuerer consolidated their control of the Kulturbund in 
1939 and the Third Reich stunned Europe with its successes in economics, foreign 






Chapter 9:  The Erneuerungsbewegung Prevails, 1939-1941 
 
The final years before the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia were heady times for 
the triumphant Erneuerer. Sepp Janko assumed leadership of the Kulturbund and 
carried out a significant reorganization such that the organization became fully 
gleichgeschaltet like other German communities in eastern Europe. This achievement 
came neither smoothly nor immediately, however, and the first months after Janko’s 
installation as the Kulturbund’s chairman in August 1939 were marked by the 
outbreak of war in Europe, a financial crisis and further strife inside the organization. 
The Erneuerer had hoped to extend this process of Gleichschaltung to other aspects of 
German life in Yugoslavia and achieved much to that end, but their efforts were 
hampered somewhat by infighting and exigencies deriving from the European 
conflagration. This last period of Swabian interwar history, which began with the 
return of the expelled Erneuerer to the Kulturbund in late 1938, concluded with the 
Third Reich’s invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941, an event which meant the end of 
Yugoslavia as a single state and new realities for the Danube Swabians.  
 
Genuine Reconciliation or Gradual Defeat? 
The process which ended in the eventual triumph of the Erneuerer began 
abruptly but endured over several subsequent months. At the meeting of the 
Kulturbund board on April 30, 1939, Keks, who had served as chairman for twelve 
years and had been the Kulturbund’s principle architect, driver, and defender during 
those years, abruptly and unexpectedly resigned, allegedly for reasons of business and 




meeting but agreed to remain in his position until such a time when a new Kulturbund 
chairman could be elected. The Kulturbund board then promptly elected Keks 
Honorary Chairman to honor his long and important service to the organization.   
 Keks’ sudden resignation produced a new situation in the Kulturbund and the 
minority, for it effectively created a power vacuum. The urgency of filling this 
sudden vacancy was not lost on the Swabian notables, the representatives of whose 
factions and ideological currents met swiftly to discuss Keks’ succession. The 
Erneuerer in particular saw opportunity in Keks’ resignation and encouraged the 
Swabian public to follow their lead. As Volksruf, observed, the possibility suddenly 
existed to permanently resolve the lingering questions inside the Kulturbund. The 
selection of a new chairman offered a way out of the Swabians’ long division, and the 
Erneuerer were determined to see it resolved in their favor.  
As the acknowledged leader of the Erneuerungsbewegung, Jakob Awender 
naturally aspired to the post of Kulturbund chairman himself. In this, he was 
supported by other leading Erneuerer, many of whom (such as Slavonia District 
Chairman Altgayer) now held important posts inside the Kulturbund. These men 
gathered to discuss the matter in May 1939 but by then the selection of the 
Kulturbund chairman was no longer a matter for Swabians to resolve on their own. 
As we have seen, Reich involvement in Swabian affairs had been increasing since the 
1920s and, while the Erneuerer’s ideological affinity may have pleased many Reich 
and NSDAP offices, it was nevertheless Reich policy to avoid situations that might 
disrupt foreign relations. Upon learning of the support for Awender as Kulturbund 




Swabian factions (including Keks, Moser and Altgayer but not Kraft) to Graz, where 
it made Germany’s opposition to Awender’s candidacy known. As we have seen, 
Hitler’s decree of July 2, 1938 conferred upon the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle the 
power to determine German minorities’ domestic leadership, and VoMi now moved 
to exercise that authority. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle regarded Awender as too 
brash. His alliance with Zbor had been a reckless embarrassment which had not made 
international relations easier for the Third Reich. It was plain that the new Kulturbund 
chairman would be an Erneuer but, to the surprise of all present, VoMi suggested the 
relatively “moderate” Erneuerer Sepp Janko of Zrenjanin. Janko was known to all the 
Swabians present, who promptly agreed to the recommendation. Keks even agreed to 
smooth the path to his formal installation at the upcoming Kulturbund annual 
congress in August 1939. Ironically, Janko was neither present at the meeting nor 
aware of his own candidacy. Nevertheless, he quickly consented to his new position 
when informed of the meeting’s proceedings. The Erneuerer, thus, had finally 
realized their goal of assuming the leadership of the Kulturbund. Unexpectedly, 
however, that new Kulturbund chairman would be the “moderate” and youthful Janko 






Einheitstracht clad Jakob Lichtenberger (left) and Sepp Janko (right) in Zemun in 1940.871 
 
Finally, May 1939 was also a defining month in the other rift in the German 
minority, the confrontation between Stefan Kraft on the one hand and Hans Moser 
and associates on the other. The court of arbitration to which they had submitted their 
mutual recriminations finally reached its verdict in May 1939. Both sides were 
compelled to withdraw their allegations and Kraft agreed to “voluntarily” resign from 
his posts and responsibilities in the Agricultural Central Loan Office 
(Landwirtschaftlichen Zentral-Darlehenskasse or LZDK) and all other cooperatives 
by June 30. Kraft, who had already turned down the JRZ’s offer of a mandate in the 
December 1938 parliamentary elections, was assured of an appropriate pension in 
honor of his many years of service to the German minority.872 He would not withdraw 
from public life entirely, but the arbitration court’s decision clearly was a blow 
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against the man who had so long stood at the center of Swabian life but had recently 
grown unpopular. In light of the fact that the court of arbitration had also ordered the 
sitting head of the huge cooperative Agraria to resign by June 30, it was clear that 
there would be big changes at the top of many of the Swabians’ leading institutions. 
Truly the possibility of a new direction in Swabian affairs appeared to exist as never 
before. 
 
From Reconciliation to Marginalization 
The original leadership and their Erneuerer rivals may have agreed to formally 
bury the hatchet at the end of 1938, but their reconciliation was only partial and 
superficial. Over the course of 1939, the Erneuerer steadily ascended to the leading 
positions inside the Kulturbund, the German system of cooperatives, and other 
Swabian institutions, most of which had been founded by the original leadership 
themselves. Unsurprisingly, the original leadership did not appreciate being displaced 
from their prominent roles in Volkstumarbeit organizations and the economic 
cooperatives by their younger rivals. The accelerating spread of Nazi ideas in the 
Kulturbund and the transformation of Swabian institutions and even youth education 
according to Nazi models and principles likewise raised concerns among the older 
generation and the Catholic Church. The installation of the relatively “moderate” 
Erneuerer Janko as Kulturbund chairman failed to mitigate the situation (indeed, he 
carried out many of the Reich-inspired changes), although his tone and methods were 
perhaps less extreme than those of the more radical Erneuerer gathered around 




Kulturbund chairman and continued to compete for power and influence in the 
organization. Conservative elements in the German minority were all the more 
disturbed by the radicals’ continued competition because the radicals were plainly 
receiving support from certain bodies in the Third Reich.873  
 The conflict between the lead Erneuerer and the Kulturbund leadership had 
been long and highly personal. Ideologically the two sides probably differed less than 
the Erneuerer often charged, but there nevertheless were important differences 
between them. They differed, for example, on many of the tenets of National 
Socialism and certainly in their subscription to its more radical forms and 
manifestations. True, more “reasonable” currents were emerging in the 
Erneuerungsbewegung in 1938, which gradually toned down its intensely 
confrontational posture and instead sought to sound more “respectable”. Nevertheless 
trust between the Erneuerer and the original leadership was not to be forged 
overnight. Meanwhile, the Erneuerer continued to push for Swabian reconciliation 
based on their principles and persisted in their highly personal attacks against the 
original leadership until the autumn of 1938. Indeed, their criticisms persisted even 
after the election of Sepp Janko as Kulturbund chairman, who spoke somewhat 
moderately but increased the competencies of the Kulturbund. Even Keks’ energetic 
endorsement of Janko as his successor should not necessarily be regarded as a sign of 
proper reconciliation between the original leadership and the Erneuerer. After all, 
Janko represented the more moderate current in the Erneuerungsbewegung. Thus 
Keks’ endorsement of Janko arguably revealed his intent to limit the 
                                                 




Erneuerungsbewegung’s radical influence, not his proper acceptance of the 
movement’s agenda or its acknowledged leader, Jakob Awender. 
Although the Erneuerer and their erstwhile opponents in the original 
leadership had hurled insults of incompetence, duplicity and even ethnic treason at 
each other, their conflict also had important ideological and methodological 
dimensions. After all, despite a shared heritage of voelkisch ideas, the men of the 
original leadership were not dedicated National Socialists. The Erneuerer leaders, 
however, basically were zealous Nazis. Upon properly securing control over the 
Kulturbund, they began a transformation of that institution according to National 
Socialist models. Both a cause and effect of the so called “reconciliation” and the 
Erneuerer’s triumph in 1938/39 was the withdrawal of the original leadership from 
most positions of public life. As we have seen, Johann Keks resigned from the 
Kulturbund, as did Matz Giljum. Stefan Kraft declined to run as a JRZ candidate in 
the December 1938 elections and was compelled to resign from his economic offices 
by the German court of arbitration the following year.  “Reconciliation” for the 
original leadership had ultimately meant the reduction of their influence and the 
triumph of ideas which they often did not share. Reconciliation was, therefore, a kind 
of gradual defeat for the original leadership. Yet even while they accepted that the 
Erneuerer and their ideas could no longer be ignored, the older generation continued 
to quietly urge a more moderate course and sought to retain some posts of influence. 





From Kulturbund to “Erneuerbund,” 1939-1941 
Although the representatives of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the 
Erneuerungsbewegung, and the original leadership had agreed on Janko’s 
appointment as chairman in May 1939, his tenure would not actually begin until 
August of that year, when the Kulturbund’s board could meet and formally elect him 
to the position. Nevertheless, the mark of the Erneuerungsbewegung preceded 
Janko’s official installation as chairman. Prominent Erneuerer including Jakob 
Lichtenberger, Branimir Altgayer and Josef Beer assumed important and visible roles 
in the organization throughout 1939. Moreover, the Kulturbund continued its 
expansion, adding new local chapters wherever possible and holding events designed 
to reinforce group identity and cohesion. Such events included Trachtenfeste, 
lectures, concerts and the like, but they now bore a clearer imprint of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung. In May and June 1939 the Kulturbund also held a series of 
massive district rallies or Gautagungen in Apatin (Batschka), Lazarevo (Banat), and 
Indjija (Srijem).874 These rivaled any previous Kulturbund gatherings in size and were 
clearly inspired by the mass politics and aesthetics of fascism. Speakers at the rallies 
included such Erneuerer luminaries as Jakob Awender and Fritz Metzger, among 
others. Yet despite the new prominence of the Erneuerer, 1938-1939 was also a 
period of shared leadership, reconciliation, and the integration of the Erneuerer and 
KWVD members into the Kulturbund, some for the first time. Keks, Giljum and 
others in the original leadership still retained their important posts for a time and 
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exercised something of a moderating influence on their new colleagues from the 
Erneuerungsbewegung.  
The fact of shared leadership did not prevent the Erneuerer from outlining 
their aspirations for the German minority and Kulturbund, and they remained 
outspoken at the 1939’s summer rallies and in the pages of Volksruf and Slawonischer 
Volksbote. The radical group around Awender retained control of Volksruf, and used 
it as a platform from which to announce its priorities. The Kulturbund rallies in 
Lazarevo, Indjija, and especially Apatin were the largest such Swabian meetings yet, 
with Deutsches Volksblatt reporting 5000 attendees in Indjija,875 another 5000 in 
Lazarevo, and fully 20,000 in Apatin. If correct, such numbers would have been huge 
for the largely rural Swabians. Leading Erneuerer shared the stage with the retiring 
Kulturbund leadership (Keks and Giljum had by now announced their planned 
retirement) and even Swabian members of parliament Franz Hamm and Josef 
Trischler.876 Never one to miss an opportunity for hyperbole, at Lazarevo Awender 
compared the recent unification of the German minority in the Kulturbund and that 
organ’s alleged infusion with the neue deutsche Weltanschauung to the breakout of 
Christianity 2000 years before. The Kulturbund was not merely an organization of 
300 local chapters, he insisted, but rather an organization of thousands of Germans 
willing to make any sacrifice for the Volk. All speakers emphasized the new solidarity 
and unity of the minority after the recent reconciliation.877  
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More than their pre-reconciliation era counterparts, the Kulturbund’s new 
rallies self-consciously adopted the aesthetics of mass politics and were regimented 
affairs notable for their marching, uniforms, and military-inspired order.878 Another 
long standing institution which had by now succumbed to the Erneuerer was 
Deutsches Volksblatt. Now essentially co-opted by its erstwhile Erneuerer opponents, 
the newspaper was buoyant in its coverage of the 1939 district rallies, such as the one 
at Apatin. “The marching column was formed at 9:00,” the newspaper explained. “At 
its head the drummers and buglers, after them the district chairman with his staff, then 
the district’s head functionaries and finally in strict order thousands and thousands of 
youths and men in Einheitstracht. The parade moved from the town’s sports field, 
through the main street to the town hall. Many thousands of Volksgenossen lined the 
street and looked in astonished enthusiasm on the sensational discipline of the 
marching parade.”879  
This Apatin parade was clearly orchestrated to demonstrate the supposed unity 
in the reintegrated Kulturbund as well as its order, discipline and celebration of youth. 
In uniform dress, the men and boys marched in rows beneath banners, their column 
led by a German brass band which announced the district rally to the city. “For the 
onlookers, it was indeed an unforgettable impression and exceptional experience,” 
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Deutsches Volkablatt continued. At the town hall, one speaker intoned, “that Apatin 
was always German and would remain German for all time.” The parade then 
continued to the nearby fairground, where participants lined up in orderly ranks 
before a tribunal, upon which the drummers and trumpeters took up position before a 
background of “great red flags with white runic characters for honor, blood, and soil.” 
These hung alongside the symbol of the district, a white Siegrune, set against a red 
field. The remaining background was filled with state flags.” Following several 
speeches, a large youth rally was held on the fairground featuring yet another speech 
by the youth leader Lichtenberger. The gathered youths then paraded in formation 
with Lichtenberger and the district chairman.880 The featured Erneuerer emphasized 
the need for a new direction in the work of the Kulturbund and the need for Swabians 
to universally adopt the neue deutsche Weltanschauung, which, Erneuerer Fritz 
Metzger reminded listeners, “did not come to our country as a foreign export ware 
from just anywhere, but rather was born from our blood and soil.” Metzger then 
closed his speech with a triple “Sieg-Heil!” 
In sum, the Kulturbund’s mass rallies of 1939 were affairs dominated by the 
values, aesthetics and leaders of the Erneuerungsbewegung and were intended to 
demonstrate and reinforce Swabian group cohesion and voelkisch ideological 
conformity within the Kulturbund. They reflected the heightened recent intrusion of 
the aesthetics of fascism into the minority and demonstrated the mobilization of 
nationally conscious youth. More than ever, they were orchestrated affairs, featuring 
participants in the Einheitstracht, which had become the acknowledged uniform of 
the Erneuerer and reintegrated Kulturbund. The rallies were also characterized by 
                                                 




marching in formation and the symbolism and trappings typical of National Socialist 
rallies in Germany. To be sure, coordinated dress, parades and the like had also been 
typical of Kulturbund rallies during the years of division in the 1930s. However, 
those rallies paled in scale and intensity compared to the 1939 district rallies and their 
aesthetics had owed as much to imitation as ideological expression. Likewise, 
synchronized outfits were certainly not an invention of the Erneuerungsbewegung and 
had not been uncommon at many Kulturbund rallies in the 1930s. Nevertheless, it 
was the Erneuerer who elevated a standardized version of Swabian Tracht into a 
virtual uniform, combining it with the proud leather boots reminiscent of fascist or 
military uniforms. The circle of Erneuerer around Awender in many ways seemed to 
dominate the district rallies, but Janko was also present and featured prominently at 
the district rallies at Lazarevo in his native Banat. The rallies’ intended message was 
clear: “there is now only one single German movement in our Volksgruppe!”881 This, 
however, was still not one hundred percent true. 
 Despite their readmission into the Kulturbund, the Erneuerer saw no reason to 
discontinue their efforts to “renew” the Swabian community. On the contrary, their 
return to the Kulturbund merely signaled the beginning of a new phase of their work. 
Reconciliation with the original leadership had largely meant the triumph of the 
Erneuerer’s methods and ideas, they realized, but they were not yet unconstrained in 
their actions. The Erneuerer had learned that their most extreme radicalism, especially 
their alliance with the Serbian fascist Zbor, could be counterproductive and was not 
usually appreciated by Yugoslav, Reich or NSDAP authorities. Such recognition did 
                                                 





not mean the abandonment of their radical agenda or language, however. In many 
ways, their criticisms and attacks were simply broader but no less biting during these 
years and even targeted Janko himself. 
 Naturally, the Erneuerer looked upon Keks’ sudden resignation in May 1939 
as a golden opportunity for themselves and their movement. Deposing Keks had been 
one of their initial goals, of course.  When VoMi decided that the Kulturbund 
chairman position would go to the “moderate” Erneuerungsbewegung lawyer Sepp 
Janko, Awender was made the head of the Swabian agricultural cooperative Agraria 
in compensation. This was an important position to be sure. Nevertheless, it was less 
powerful than even the presidency of the Agricultural Central Loan Office (LZDK), 
much less the position of Kulturbund chairman, who was the acknowledged leader of 
the German minority. Awender was disappointed and his supporters resentful.882 
  In Sepp Janko’s election as Kulturbund chairman, the Erneuerer appeared to 
have finally realized their dream of controlling the Swabians’ premier organization 
and one might have expected general elation from all quarters of their movement. Yet 
the early months of Janko’s tenure as the Kulturbund’s chief were tumultuous, being 
marked by financial strife, internal dissent, political rivalry, and the exigencies of the 
Second World War which, though it did not yet involve Yugoslavia, nevertheless had 
major implications for the country’s German minority in that critical funding from the 
Reich became suddenly unavailable and the German minority became an object of 
suspicion and fear as never before in Yugoslavia. Thus, the new Kulturbund chairman 
was immediately faced with challenges from all around: the original leadership had 
                                                 
882  The Landwirtschaftliche Zentraldarlehenskasse or LZDK was now headed by Josef Trischler, who 




stepped down but had not vanished. They did not always agree with the Erneuerer’s 
more extreme ideas or plans and sought (not always successfully) to retain current 
positions or obtain new ones in the Swabian organizations; inside the 
Erneuerungsbewegung itself, the division between the “moderate” Janko and the 
more radical group around Awender continued to fester and threatened to undermine 
the new Kulturbund chairman’s position; and the organization was in poor financial 
shape due to the long division in the German minority and recent disruptions in 
outside funding from Germany. Moreover, the outbreak of war in Europe rendered 
Yugoslavia’s increasingly strident Swabians even greater objects of suspicion and 
contempt than ever before.  
Although the Erneuerer had been readmitted to the Kulturbund and even 
secured its highest office, their renewal movement continued to exist. In this, the 
Erneuerer not only demonstrated inertia but also a certain unease with the situation in 
the Kulturbund which persisted even after Janko’s installation as chairman. Many 
were upset that Janko, not Awender, the Erneuerungsbewegung’s acknowledged 
leader, had been selected for the top Kulturbund leadership post. This discontent 
raised the real danger that the Erneuerer might reprise their role as an opposition 
current in the organization. In the immediate months after the reconciliation, many 
Swabians had called for the Erneuerungsbewegung to disband but met determined 
resistance by the movement’s champions. Among the more outspoken of the latter 
was Gustav Halwax. This extremist ideologue and one-time editor of Volksruf 
defended the Erneuerungsbewegung’s continued existence in February 1939 by 




bound by statutes, he claimed, but rather was a Maennerbund, a band of brothers 
bound by common belief, manly loyalty, shared struggle for the highest values of the 
Volksgruppe. It embodied the political will of the Volksgruppe and was the strongest 
expression of its will to live. “Our character and the value that we [the Erneuerer] 
embody are also the justification for our existence, indeed the reason why we must 
continue to exist.”883 Janko disagreed and soon determined that the 
Erneuerungsbewegung had become a problem.  
In contradiction to the Erneuerungsbewegung’s representation by its 
leadership, the movement was not monolithic, as we have seen. There were divisions 
and differences of degree, opinion, and methodology in the movement, which 
endured after the Erneuerer’s reentry into the Kulturbund. Jakob Awender may have 
been able to claim leadership of the Erneuerungsbewegung, but the movement was 
nevertheless multifaceted, as one might expect any organization of impassioned 
individuals, unconstrained by formal rules or statutes, to be. Thus, the “Awender 
group” and its voice in Pančevo, Volksruf, might lead but its directions were not 
always uncontested. Differences of opinion and strategy had emerged shortly after the 
Erneuerungsbewegung’s formal expulsion from the Kulturbund in 1935. While 
Awender led his followers into a defiant alliance with Zbor, others followed a 
different course. As we have seen, Branimir Altgayer pursued a more pragmatic path 
and established the KWVD in Slavonia, where he assured the authorities of his 
loyalty and publicly pleaded for Swabian unity. Sepp Janko likewise rejected the 
alliance with Zbor. In his memoir, he claims he too wanted to establish a new 
organization following the expulsion but Awender rejected such a course and instead 
                                                 




aligned with Ljotić. The Zbor association was controversial all around, however, 
attracting the ire of the Belgrade government and prompting some Erneuer to 
withdraw from the movement. Rather than follow Awender into Zbor, Janko claims, 
he chose to continue his social work and Volkstumarbeit by founding smaller groups 
with other Erneuerer in Banat. Janko’s activities did not meet with the approval of the 
pro-Zbor wing of the Erneueungsbewegung, however, and some Erneuerer even 
sought to exclude him from the movement. Other Erneuerer supported him, however, 
so he remained part of the Erneuerungsbewegung though out of Zbor.884 
Janko had been a significant figure in the Erneuerungsbewegung before 1939. 
He had been active in Banat for some time and was notable enough to be a featured 
speaker at the 150th settlement anniversary celebration of Nove Šove in 1936. 
Nevertheless, his nomination to the top German position in Yugoslavia surprised 
many (including Janko), since he was neither a major player in Pančevo nor a regular 
voice in Volksruf. His associations in Banat notwithstanding, he had not shown the 
independence and skill of KWVD organizer Altgayer in Slavonia. Moreover, he was 
quite young, being only 34 at the time of his installation as Kulturbund chairman. For 
VoMi, he was a logical choice, however, representing a “moderate” course but still 
demonstrating ideological kinship. Altgayer originally supported Awender for the 
Kulturbund chairman post but found Janko acceptable, as did the original leadership. 
Many of the more intense Erneuerer, however, did not and a certain disaffection 
gradually emerged in their ranks. Janko seemed illegitimate in a role they believed 
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clearly intended for Jakob Awender. Such disaffection sometimes took the form of 
passive resistance, and even talk of further insubordination. As such, Janko soon 
decided that he had had enough of the Erneuerungsbewegung as distinct if amorphous 
entity that might potentially undermine his own authority and German unity in the 
Kulturbund. In 1939, therefore, he decreed the Erneuerer should only operate in the 
context of approved Kulturbund chapters and subgroups. That is, he effectively 
dissolved the Erneuerungsbewegung as an independent force.  
 Many Erneuerer, naturally, did not accept Janko’s decree dissolving their 
movement. The move surprised them and added to concerns that he had not purged 
enough of the previous leadership and apparatus. In Janko’s telling, many such 
Kameraden rallied around Gustav Halwax, who argued that the Erneuerer should be 
recognized as a sort of vanguard or elite, which would form a distinct organization 
within the Kulturbund but under its own separate leadership.885 To neutralize Halwax, 
Janko dispatched him to Germany, where he joined the Waffen SS. Meanwhile, as 
Kulturbund chairman and later Volksgruppenfuehrer, Janko and his Erneuerer 
colleagues would enact changes that enlarged and enriched the Kulturbund, affording 
the organization a more strident profile, a more monolithic appearance, and as far as 
the Yugoslavs were concerned, a more threatening nature.886 
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886  Like other German minority leaders in eastern Europe, in 1940 Janko adopted the title 
“Volksgruppenfueherer.” This change in title from Kulturbund chairman to Volksgruppenfuehrer 
indicated a clear and public break with the tradition of the interwar original leadership and also a 
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Socialists subordinated ethnic German regional identities to more collective, corporate ones which 
suggested uniformity and monolithicness. Also implied was the recognition of National Socialist 
values and organizational principles in these German minorities, or Volksgruppen. The Fuehrerprinzip 




 The Erneuerer found the Kulturbund to be in poor financial health in August 
1939, when Janko took the reins. This situation was not improved by the outbreak of 
the Second World War, which meant the temporary suspension of Reich monies that 
had come to form a large portion of the Kulturbund’s budget.887 Janko and his 
collaborators determined to raise Kulturbund members’ annual contributions, 
effectively introducing a system of self-taxation on the German community. 
Increasing the number of members would also increase the Kulturbund’s budget as 
well, of course. This move was controversial in the German community and provoked 
much resistance. Nevertheless, it did raise considerable funds which would be 
necessary for the expanded role the Erneuerer intended for the Kulturbund. In fact, 
the Erneuerer’s new membership drives reflected not only the need for new monies 
but also their desire to make the organization coextensive with the entire German 
minority and thereby convert the cultural association into a true mass movement.   
The Erneuerer had long complained that the original leadership had yet to 
involve enough Germans in the Kulturbund. Despite the organization’s long 
existence, it nowhere near included the whole minority by 1938. To correct this, the 
Kulturbund’s new leadership launched a massive new membership drive during the 
winter of 1939 and 1940 while consolidating its position. More rallies and many 
smaller gatherings were held, where nationally conscious Swabians were called to 
join the Kulturbund and errant (Magyarized or Croatized) Germans were encouraged 
to return to the Volk. As usual, these rallies were regimented affairs, featuring all the 
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outward trappings of National Socialism, including marching columns, Germanic 
symbolism, and the quasi-uniform of the Kulturbund, Swabian Einheitstracht. The 
membership drive was highly successful.  
Why the sudden, new rush to join the Kulturbund? The conservative Swabian 
populace doubtless was pleased to learn that the clash in the Kulturbund was formally 
over. However, the new popular enthusiasm for the organization derived in great part 
from the general German pride many felt from the Third Reich’s triumphs in 
diplomacy and war. Membership in the Kulturbund, the only statewide German 
association in Yugoslavia, was the most obvious way to show one’s identification 
with Germandom and assert one’s German pride. Yet even as the population poured 
into the Kulturbund in unprecedented numbers, Janko suddenly declared a freeze on 
new memberships on July 1, 1940.888 The purpose of this freeze was twofold: on the 
one hand the Kulturbund legitimately needed time to process its many new members, 
adjust to its sudden growth and consolidate itself. On the other hand, the move was 
clearly intended to stimulate indifferent or ill-disposed Swabians to join the 
organization by highlighting their failure to join before the freeze. During the four 
month membership freeze, numerous articles and speeches cast aspersions on the 
national orientation and personal character of those who remained outside of the 
Kulturbund, such that yet more Swabians joined the organization after the 
membership freeze was suddenly lifted on November 15.  
The tactics of these membership drives were aggressive and thorough, 
extending beyond the verbal scolding in the press and from the podium to include the 
regular canvassing of homes and villages by Kulturbund volunteers. In this new era 
                                                 




for the organization, the Kulturbund’s activists were most broadminded in their 
criteria for who constituted a German, encouraging even those who no longer spoke 
the language to join the organization so long as they felt German and sometimes even 
if they did not.889 The new Kulturbund activists could be coercive as well. Shortly 
after the freeze on new memberships was lifted, police reported that some Germans 
were going door to door in one region of the Croatian banovina, pressuring the 
peasant Swabian population to join the Kulturbund. In one case, these activists 
allegedly warned that there was no time to lose since Hitler would soon rule the 
country. The time for thinking matters over was past, they explained, and Swabians 
should join the Kulturbund immediately. The police also recorded cases of 
Kulturbund activists exerting pressure on Germans, who hitherto had been oriented 
toward Yugoslavia (“jugoslovenski orijentisani”) to join their organization.890 And 
indeed, some such Swabians continued to resist the Kulturbund’s increasingly heavy 
overtures. For example the Djakovo district authority reported in late November 1941 
that Kulturbund activists were going to the homes of people with German surnames 
and pressuring them to join the organization. Nevertheless, many such people refused 
to join the Kulturbund because they felt Croatian, not German, despite the ethnic 
origins of their surnames.891  
Ultimately, the Kulturbund did succeed in bringing the majority of Swabians 
into its ranks. In part this was achieved through a system whereby one’s membership 
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extended to one’s whole family. Thus the Swabian man who joined the Kulturbund 
automatically enrolled his wife and children as well. Nevertheless, the increasing zeal 
for German nationalism was unmistakable and was reflected in surging membership 
roles. True, the membership drive met with less success in towns where the German 
Catholic clergy mounted a fierce resistance to the now Erneuerer-dominated 
organization, such as Adam Berenz’s Apatin and Bačka Palanka. Ultimately, 
however, the Kulturbund’s membership drive was a resounding success.  
In addition to expanding the membership roles of the Kulturbund, the 
organization’s new leadership also sought to expand its activities, effectively making 
it truly coextensive with the German minority in all areas of social, cultural, and 
economic activity. Kulturbund activities henceforth would be aggressively infused 
with the neue deutsche Weltanschauung. Volksruf elaborated on this in 1941, when it 
noted that the “Kulturbund, as the great organization of our national movement, seeks 
to look after and align all the aspects of life of our Volk. No single branch of our 
public life remains untouched by the influence of the Kulturbund, that is, our national 
movement. Indeed, the Kulturbund reaches deep into the so-called private life of the 
individual.”892 The Kulturbund would thus expand not only the scope of its activities 
but also its presence even into the private sphere. It furthermore expanded the number 
and kinds of associations and societies it embraced, including religious, sports, 
cultural, hunting, choral, musical, artistic and other such groups. Multiple, already 
extant organizations acting in one field were often combined and subordinated to the 
Kulturbund in a kind of local, Swabian Gleichschaltung.  
                                                 




The Kulturbund expanded its areas of economic activity and offered many 
agricultural courses and courses in leadership and administration, the latter being also 
useful for training an indigenous cadre of Swabian leaders. Meanwhile, Awender had 
moved beyond his role as head of the agricultural cooperative Agraria to become 
president of the Association of German Credit and Economic Cooperatives (Verband 
Deutscher Kredit- und Witschaftsgenossenschaften). This effectively made him the 
Swabians’ economic leader in Yugoslavia and he used the post to begin the 
consolidation of economic activity either in association with or under the auspices of 
the Kulturbund. Economics were not a goal in themselves, Awender explained, but 
rather should serve the interests of the German Volksgruppe.893 
Even Deutsches Volksblatt, traditionally the mouthpiece of the Kulturbund 
and the original leadership became remarkably less outspoken during 1938 and in 
subsequent years. Berenz made no exception for the broadsheet when he derided all 
non-Catholic German newspapers as gleichgeschaltet in 1939.894 In the wake of the 
reconciliation in the Volksgruppe, Grassl, Keks, and the like largely withdrew from 
the pages of Deutsches Volksblatt and the newspaper eagerly toed the new party line. 
 
Neighboring States and New Models 
The Erneuerer argued for a fundamental shift in the minority’s sense of self 
and its relation to the Yugoslav government, and were given new encouragement by 
recent events in Europe. In the 1920s, the Swabian activists had basically accepted 
their minority status in Yugoslavia in the wake of the Habsburg defeat. In this, as we 
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have seen, they insisted that the internationally guaranteed system of minority 
protection treaties be respected. While these early activists clearly recognized the 
Swabians as part of the greater German national body, the fact of being a minority in 
Yugoslavia apparently did not terribly trouble them. Indeed, Yugoslavia offered the 
Swabians greater national and cultural freedom than they had ever enjoyed, especially 
at the outset of the interwar period. As we have seen, however, disillusionment with 
the system of minority protection steadily grew profound among the country’s 
Germans. The promised cultural freedoms (especially German language schools) 
were often wanting or non-existent, and professional opportunities were so scarce that 
the German community became increasingly insular and the newly trained Swabian 
intelligentsia, the Erneuerer, turned on their elders in the competition for jobs. 
Inspired by resurgent German nationalism elsewhere in Europe, many Swabians 
(particularly the young and impetuous Erneuerer) chafed at their “minority” status 
and argued that they should be recognized as a Volksgruppe, not as some “minority” 
or minor community but rather as a branch of a great European people. Where a 
minority all too often evoked contempt, the Volksgruppe was understood as meriting, 
indeed demanding, respect. Swabians had been arguing for greater cultural and 
administrative autonomy since the first interwar years, when Serbian authorities were 
installed to administer the formerly Habsburg lands in Vojvodina. Though such local 
authorities were meant to be temporary, they lingered for years and became resented 
as alien and for their antipathy toward the peace treaties’ minority guarantees.  




autonomous aspirations, however, such that the Germans came to aspire for legal 
recognition as a distinct, collective legal entity.895  
The Erneuerer had always been contemptuous of the interwar minority 
protection system and regarded the original leadership as both weak and misguided 
for foolishly and futilely seeking to defend German rights within its constrictions. 
This general German dissatisfaction with their status in Yugoslavia continued to 
fester after Janko’s accession to the office of Kulturbund chairman in 1939. In spring 
of the following year, Student im Volk, a Zagreb based quarterly produced by the 
aforementioned, Erneuerungsbewegung-oriented Association of German University 
Students, summarized this general dissatisfaction with the current system that 
recognized individual, but not collective rights. “Neither the Yugoslav constitution 
nor another law recognizes a “German Volksgruppe,” Student im Volk complained. 
Today, this term lacks all legal basis, the German Volksgruppe is not a bearer of 
rights, it lacks its own state-recognized organization and there are no state approved 
statutes for the Volksgruppe. The Volksgruppe lacks all legal form and all legality, 
which would empower it and make possible a limited, independent handling of its 
cultural and economic questions by the government.”896 Such was unacceptable to the 
Erneuerer. Indeed, even their erstwhile opponents in the original leadership were 
eager for a change in the state of affairs, though they did not instinctively recoil from 
understanding themselves in Yugoslavia as a minority, as we have seen. 
For many Swabians, events in Czechoslovakia and later Romania and 
Hungary offered an altogether different and more attractive approach to minority 
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affairs than the original leadership’s to minority affairs in the years after 1938. The 
Munich Conference in October had revealed both how powerfully ethnic German 
claims to territory could be leveraged and how expendable eastern Europe’s interwar 
borders were to the continent’s West, anxious as it was for peace with Hitler. In the 
wake of Czechoslovakia’s eventual destruction in March 1939, the Germans in newly 
independent Slovakia were recognized as a Volksgruppe, or legal entity 
(Rechtsperson). Similar arrangements deriving from the protocols associated with the 
Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940 further inspired the Swabians to seek a 
comparable revision of affairs in Yugoslavia. The Second Vienna Award returned a 
large section of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and was a byproduct of war and 
the changing international situation in Europe. The ceded territories contained many 
Germans, of course, and thus the award had the effect of diminishing Romania’s 
German minority but increasing the size of Hungary’s German population. Of 
relevance to all Germans in southeast Europe, however, were supplementary 
protocols by which German matters were henceforth to be regulated in Hungary and 
Romania.897  
According to the protocol with Hungary, the Germans in that country would 
henceforth be recognized as a national collective. Implicitly, this meant that the 
Germans’ longing for recognition as a distinct legal entity would finally be granted. 
Moreover, Budapest agreed to henceforth recognize Hungarian German Franz 
Basch’s Nazi-oriented Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn (VDU) as the legitimate 
and exclusive representative of that German minority, now understood collectively as 
                                                 
897  Belgrade did make certain concessions to the Swabians that year in such fields as education, but 




a Volksgruppe. Furthermore, the protocol provided for the free expression of National 
Socialist ideas by Germans, confirmed Germans’ right to return to the original 
German forms of Magyarized German family names, and assured the minority’s right 
to conduct independent and unfettered relations with Germany itself. Additionally, 
the VDU would hence be the determiner of just who or what was a German. Such 
subjective authority to determine membership in the Volksgruppe was obviously a 
powerful and coercive tool.898 
Romania concluded a similar protocol with Germany after the Second Vienna 
Award, by which it agreed to recognize Germans there as citizens of full and equal 
rights and to further develop the position of the German minority so as to enhance its 
ability to sustain itself. This promise came to fruition on November 20, 1940, when 
the Antonescu regime decreed that the Deutsche Volksgruppe in Rumaenien would be 
recognized as a legal entity in accordance with the August 30 protocol with Germany. 
Henceforth, all German citizens were subject to the authority to the Volksgruppe, the 
bearer of whose will would be the newly founded “NSDAP der Deutschen 
Volksgruppe in Rumaenien.”899 
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The upshot of these changes was that the local German leaders’ pretensions to 
leadership and authority over all Germans in Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary were 
sanctioned by law. The German minorities were transformed from being informal 
groups of minority individuals into ethnically-based legal collectives and constituent 
components of the state. Additionally, the Volksgruppen were effectively given the 
power to determine the boundaries of their membership. Finally, the Volksgruppe 
leadership obtained certain authority which was binding over its members.  
Unsurprisingly, the changes in Hungary and Romania were not lost on the 
Germans of Yugoslavia. All the country’s Swabian leaders had long desired greater 
autonomy, of course, especially in the cultural but also in the administrative realm. 
The above changes provided clear models for which the Germans in Yugoslavia to 
strive900 And indeed the Kulturbund leadership submitted a memorandum to the 
Yugoslav government on January 20, 1941 based on the Hungarian and Romanian 
protocols. This memorandum proposed legal recognition of the country’s Germans as 
a corporate body with far reaching autonomy and responsibility under an exclusive 
Volksgruppenfueherer.901 Ultimately, however, such strivings would be in vain before 
the German invasion of April 1941.  
The dramatic changes in the legal position of the German minorities (that is, 
Volksgruppen) in Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania resulted not from their Germans’ 
own political strength or from German legal arguments, but rather from the utter 
transformation of the international situation in 1939-1940. All three countries made 
concessions to Germans out of a combination of opportunism and fear. The Slovaks 
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effectively owed Nazi Germany both the birth of their state and its survival next to 
irredentist Hungary; the Hungarians strove to recover lands lost at Trianon and 
recognized an alliance with Germany as the surest path to that goal; meanwhile, the 
Romanians meanwhile hoped to forestall further concessions in southern 
Transylvania and recover lands lost to the Soviet Union as a result of the Hitler-Stalin 
pact.  
Yugoslavia’s situation was different, however. The Third Reich desired 
smooth relations with Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia had no pressing irredentist claims 
on its neighbors. The two countries were close trading partners and Berlin recognized 
that this relationship was best served by preserving Yugoslavia as a single, 
centralized market. Germany’s major objective at this stage, thus, was to bring the 
country into its series of alliances, and so it pressured Belgrade to accede to the 
Tripartite Pact. True, Hitler had formally put all German communities outside of the 
Reich under his protection in his Feb 20, 1938 speech before the Reichstag. However, 
the Nazis were always much more interested in how Germans abroad could be of use 
to them, rather than the reverse.902 As such, Berlin regarded the fate of Yugoslavia’s 
Germans as a matter of priority only insofar as their discontent might disrupt the 
placid, if imbalanced, international relations Germany desired with Belgrade. 
 Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941. As is well known, 
by then anti-Axis sentiment had been long brewing in Yugoslavia and especially 
Serbia. The new alliance with Germany was particularly unpopular among Serbs.  A 
coup followed on March 27 and the young Prince Petar was pronounced King, while 
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General Dušan Simović assumed the post of prime minister and named Vlatko Maček 
deputy premier. These protests and similar manifestations of outrage were 
accompanied in some areas by expressions of anti-German hostility which had been 
simmering in recent months and weeks. There were some incidents of violence 
against Germans. To avoid provoking this anti-German sentiment, Janko took the 
unprecedented step of ordering all Kulturbund chapters to cease activities and lie low 
on March 28, 1941, signing his decree to this affect as the German 
Volksgruppenfueherer.903  Ironically, Janko’s authority would soon grow, just as the 
Volksgruppe which he oversaw was about to dramatically shrink.  
                                                 






As is well known, the German-led Axis invasion of Yugoslavia began on 
April 6, 1941 and formally ended with the Yugoslav army’s surrender on April 17. In 
defeat, Yugoslavia would be partitioned among its opportunistic neighbors.  The 
single, important exception to this was Croatia, which Hitler awarded independence 
as a Reich ally under the Ustaša regime of Ante Pavelić. The Yugoslav Germans’ fate 
following the Axis invasion, therefore, ultimately depended on the region of 
Yugoslavia in which they lived. Those in Batschka and Baranja were annexed by 
Reich ally Hungary and subsumed by the existing German organization there, the 
Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn. By contrast, Banat was occupied by the 
Wehrmacht as a way of forestalling competing Hungarian and Romanian claims to 
the region. There Germany conferred unprecedented authority upon the Swabians, 
who were tasked with administering the region until the war’s end as a Volksgruppe 
under Sepp Janko. In the Independent State of Croatia, the Germans found themselves 
suddenly empowered as the Deutsche Volksgruppe in Kroatien, the legal recognition 
of the corporate status Swabian activists had so long desired. Indeed, in  Croatia the 
German Volksgruppe nearly acted as a state within a state. True, the Swabians in 
Croatia did remain somewhat constrained by the wartime Croatian state, which was 
nominally sovereign. Nevertheless, Croatia’s dependence on the Third Reich afforded 
the Swabians a unique and highly privileged position in the country as well as 
unprecedented opportunities to finally realize their wildest dreams of autonomy.  
Now empowered as Volksgruppen, the Swabians became components of the 




the criminal regimes in Berlin and Zagreb. Many Swabians participated in crimes 
against Jews during the war, and Swabian armed units - including an SS division - 
conducted campaigns against Tito’s Partisans that became known for their brutality 
and transgressions against civilians. It was mostly Swabians who filled the ranks of 
this 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division “Prince Eugen”, whose emblem was the 
familiar Odal rune and which was notorious for its cruelty. Ultimately, the popular 
conflation of German and Nazi before the Second World War (which the Erneuerer 
had done so much to bring about) and the brutality of the warwould lead to the 
dislocation or destruction of nearly every Danube Swabian in Yugoslavia.  
 
How Different were the Erneuerer and the Original Leadership Really? 
It is useful at this juncture to consider just how different the Erneuerer and the 
original leadership really were. Were their views truly as antithetical as the Erneuerer 
insisted? Ultimately, the two groups were certainly not identical but neither were they 
total strangers. They are perhaps best understood as cousins, each having different 
perspectives and experiences but nevertheless sharing a similar heritage and many 
common features. The original leadership sometimes admired Hitler as a German 
leader and were plainly sympathetic to aspects of the neue deutsche Weltanschauung, 
which they themselves sometimes claimed to share. They were not National 
Socialists, however. Rather they were voelkisch-inclined pragmatists with relatively 
conservative and traditional backgrounds. That they could find much to admire in 
distant Nazi Germany without themselves being National Socialists is hardly 




same way and appreciated many Nazi accomplishments without fully endorsing the 
NSDAP’s ideology. Meanwhile, the original leadership’s pragmatism well explains 
their long contacts with German government and later also Nazi Party officials. After 
all, it had become clear already in the days of Gustav Stresemann that little of the 
Swabians’ agenda could be accomplished without Berlin’s support. As we have seen, 
Germany had become an essential funder of the Swabians’ institutions and 
additionally commanded tremendous moral authority in the German minority. This 
situation persisted after 1933, when the endorsement of Hitler’s resurgent Germany 
was also necessary for legitimacy, financing, and finally Reich sanction as a 
minority’s legitimate leadership. It was precisely during these years that the conflict 
within the minority became most pitched, of course, and the Erneuerer and the 
original leadership soon found themselves competing for influential ears in Germany. 
When Reich and NSDAP bodies made clear that they were switching their support to 
the Erneuerer, the older generation basically stepped aside, just as the German 
motherland had expected them to.  
Talk of Erneuerung predated the Erneuerungsbewegung and was a common 
theme among Germans of Catholic, Protestant, liberal, communist, and National 
Socialist persuasions, though these groups understood the concept of “renewal” 
differently. As we saw in our discussion of the voelkisch ideology, German longings 
for “renewal” predated the interwar era (and even the 20th century) and were shared 




number of articles for Deutsches Volksblatt in which he waxed despondently on the 
current state of Germandom in the world and called for a kind of Erneuerung.904  
If the men of original leadership were not Nazis, neither were they exactly the 
liberals that the Erneuerer often attempted to smear them as. That said, there is no 
denying important liberal inclinations among the original leadership. They eagerly 
participated in parliament, engaged in commerce, talked of personal rights, and 
championed constitutionalism and the blind rule of law. In many ways, they were 
nationalists in the liberal mold. Nevertheless, they also owed much to an ideology 
that was voelkisch and hardly immune to anti-Semitism. Also in 1929, Grassl penned 
a number of fascinating essays in which he defended democracy and the liberal 
notion of inalienable rights, but also called for changes in our understanding of 
democracy so as to prevent its abuse by one majority to overcome a minority, as 
seemed to him to be happening with the Germans in Czechoslovakia.905 He argued 
that the rights of man as iterated in 1789 had been inefficient and thus it was time to 
reconsider these rights. As such, he argued for a more collective notion of rights, 
including those for Volk and Rasse. The “purely individualistic view of human rights 
can be seen as having been overtaken today,” he argued, for it had too often led to the 
abuse of the weak by the strong.”906  
I would argue that original leadership represented a kind of voelkisch-
informed liberalism whose circumstances in Hungary and later Yugoslavia demanded 
a flexible pragmatism. Thus, their principle differences with the Erneuerer genuinely 
were weltumschaulich, that is based on differing world views, but they also concerned 
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methods. Of course, as Yugoslav citizens the Erneuerer were not themselves actual 
members of the NSDAP. Nor was their movement a creation of Berlin, though it had 
sympathizers in VoMi and the VDA. Nevertheless, the Erneuerer’s subscription to 
Nazi ideology and values was total. They admired mass politics and considered 
individualism tantamount to an ethnically treasonous egoism. They were racists, 
though they sometimes had to check their racism since they lived in a Slav milieu. 
They promoted a mystical sense of German destiny and celebrated the Fuehrerprinzip 
and other aspects of Nazi ideology. In sum, the Erneuerer were true devotees not only 
of voelkisch ideas but also of National Socialism, which had taken voelkisch ideology 
to its radical extreme in the desperate environment of Weimar Germany. The 
Erneuerer found tremendous value in their struggle, which they plainly believed 
resembled the Nazis’ own in Germany. 
To be sure, the original Swabian leaders were certainly sympathetic to aspects 
of National Socialist Germany, with which they sometimes had a common voelkisch 
idiom and whose frustration with the present German condition they also sometimes 
shared. Nazi Germany commanded immense respect if not admiration on the 
international stage and therefore it is unsurprising that the original leadership should 
have admired it for its undeniable successes. Though they may not have shared the 
Erneuerer’s open celebration of Nazi biological racism, many of the original 
leadership had nevertheless found inspiration in the work and person of the Banat 




Guttenbrunn, who lived in Vienna.907 For the original leadership in remote 
Yugoslavia, Hitler’s achievements were impressive and were to be admired, 
especially since the Third Reich was the source of the very financial and moral 
backing which were essential to their cause.  However, it would be an exaggeration to 
suggest that the original Swabian leaders were open or even closet Nazis.  
In a sense, the above is an argument for nuance but it is also one of qualitative 
difference. After all, if the original leadership and the Erneuerer truly were complete 
birds of a feather, why would the original Swabian leaders resist their young Nazi-
oriented challengers so long and with such great determination? Why would the 
Erneuerer assault their elders with such vehemence? Their conflict had all the 
qualities of a generation clash but it was also more than that. The quarrel clearly was 
also more than merely one oligarchy jealously clinging to power in the face of brash 
challengers (though there clearly were aspects of that as well). Rather, the original 
leadership and the Erneuerer had deep disagreements regarding methodology, the 
former regarding the latter’s disruptive tactics and reckless statements as perilous for 
the German minority as a whole. The Erneuerer, their elders believed, plainly 
undermined minority unity and threatened to undo all of the Swabians’ 
accomplishments since 1918. As Keks stated at the October 1935 Kulturbund board 
meeting where it was resolved to exclude the Erneuerer from the organization, “no 
one in the Volk or in the leadership opposes a natural renewal [Erneuerung].  The 
opinions about [this renewal] might be highly different in terms of tempo or methods, 
but even given these possible different views, it need not have come to such a deeply 
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disgraceful struggle as has been unleashed by a small group [the Erneuerer]” inside 
the Kulturbund.908  
The Erneuerer definitely did have different ideas from their elders, as 
demonstrated by the changes that Janko and his Erneuer colleagues would implement 
in their subsequent Gleichschaltung of the Kulturbund. Also worthy of note is that the 
original leadership basically faded from public life after the Erneuerer prevailed in 
their struggle to lead the Kulturbund. This indicated that there really was little room 
for compromise between the two factions. And of course the Kulturbund’s original 
leaders were not Magyarones, though they might have appeared as such to a younger 
generation which could not remember pre-Trianon Hungary, had never known life 
without the German national movement, and had never directly experienced 
Magyarization.909 Indeed, one might go so far as to say that Keks, Kraft, Grassl and 
their colleagues had been the region’s original German revolutionaries. After all, it 
was they who had so fervently campaigned against Magyarones and Auchdeutsche 
during the 1920s, when they led a nascent German movement that embraced 
Yugoslavia and rejected Hungarian irredentism.  
The original leadership did not share the Erneuerer’s aggressive tactics. The 
Erneuerer were brash and disruptive. They marched loudly, sang German songs 
provocatively, marked themselves with synchronized clothing or even uniforms, 
embraced Third Reich aesthetics, and prided themselves on not shrinking from 
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confrontation. They adopted German or Germanic symbols and often greeted one 
another with “Heil Hitler” and “Sieg Heil!” They operated not only outside of 
parliament and the Kulturbund system but even outside of the law. Their admiration 
for Germany and Hitler was so total as to inspire legitimate fears of Swabian treason 
in ordinary Yugoslavs. Inside the Kulturbund, they challenged authority, undermined 
institutions, and held extracurricular activities that bordered on (or surpassed) the 
illegal. Their insurrection also undermined the authority of the Kulturbund leaders, 
whom the Yugoslav authorities might suppose were unable to control their own 
minority. The Erneuerer claimed to stand above confession even as they clashed with 
the Swabian Catholic clergy, but the original leadership did not attack the churches. 
The Erneuerer gave German nationalism a really bad name in Yugoslavia and made it 
seem threatening, whereas the original leadership had sought to reassure Yugoslavs 
that there was no contradiction between Staatstreue and Volkstreue. The Erneuerer 
joined Zbor, a party that never amassed more than 1 percent of the Yugoslav vote but 
was a disproportionate annoyance to the Yugoslav government. By contrast, the 
original leadership actively supported the Yugoslav government. In sum, the gulf 
between the Erneuerer and the original leadership was one of ideology as well as  
tactics.  
The original leadership tired of the Erneuerer’s methods because their 
youthful pretensions to leadership seemed brash, ungrateful, and naïve. The original 
leadership had achieved much but the Erneuerer demanded more and seemed to 
potentially endanger everything in the process. Moreover, the young challengers 




even harmful to the Swabian community. The old men, they believed, had also 
steered the Kulturbund badly and only enticed a small percentage of the Swabians to 
join. Ultimately, when the Erneuerer called for Erneuerung, what they meant was a 
profound transformation of the structure and substance of the Kulturbund as well as a 
dramatic expansion of its base with an eye mass politics in Germany, Italy and 
elsewhere. Without a doubt, they shared an intellectual and cultural heritage with the 
original leadership but they interpreted this heritage in such an extreme way as to 
genuinely divide the minority and the two generations.  
 
Toward a Brutal End 
Space limitations again make impossible here a proper discussion of the 
Swabians’ dark wartime experience or their ultimate fate in Yugoslavia. Very briefly, 
most Swabians in the Independent State of Croatia fled in a hastily but well organized 
evacuation effort in fall 1944, when it was plain that their settlement area could not be 
held against the Partisans and the Soviets. Fearing reprisals by Partisans and the 
incoming Red Army, Swabians also fled Banat and Batschka, but these evacuation 
efforts were much less organized and were even spontaneous in some cases. Far 
fewer Swabians were able to successfully evacuate from Banat or Batschka. In many 
cases, those Swabians who had reason to flee did so, and those who had spent the war 
years uninvolved in politics or as non-combatants remained. To the latter group 
belonged a disproportionate number of women, children and the elderly. These 
remaining Swabians would suffer horribly over the next several years, variously 




placed in camps where conditions were so harsh as to effectively render them 
extermination centers.910  
The postwar fate of the Danube Swabians under Yugoslav communism has 
been covered in several excellent studies since the 1950s. To the former one may 
count exciting research by Serb Zoran Janjetović, Croat Vladimir Geiger, and the 
aforementioned West German series on German postwar expulsion, whose volume on 
Yugoslavia is Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien. This West German 
investigation was the earliest of these three treatments of the Germans’ fate and is a 
rich source of documents and personal testimony, featuring considerable work by 
Hans Uhlrich Wehler. In Serbia, historian Zoran Janjetović has produced an excellent 
study of German flight and the postwar internment and forced labor of those who 
remained. His book, Between Hitler and Tito additionally discusses the deportation of 
thousands of Swabians to the Soviet Union, where they languished and suffered under 
brutal conditions as forced laborers for years. (Many died there.) Janjetovic’s study is 
brief yet thorough, though he cautions that the whereabouts of many Yugoslav 
documents pertaining to the Swabians internment and deportation is unknown and 
may never be known.  
Historian Vladimir Geiger of Zagreb’s Croatian Institute for History (Hrvatski 
institute za povijest) has unearthed and published numerous documents related to the 
internment and suffering of those Swabians who remained in Yugoslavia (and 
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especially Croatia) after the Partisan takeover. These include Nestanak Folksdojčera 
(“The Disappearance of the Volksdeutsche”) and Folksdojčeri pod teretom kolektivne 
krivnje (“The Volksdeutsche under the Burden of Collective Guilt”), among many 
notable titles. Geiger’s work is very thoughtful and courageous in its investigation of 
the Partisans’ excesses in the years after the war. In a country where the Swabians are 
today usually remembered as invaders and perpetrators of abuse, Geiger should be 
commended for the courage with which he exposes many crimes by the victorious 
partisans against those Swabians who remained after most of the German war 
criminals and perpetrators of excess had already fled. Indeed, Geiger’s numerous 
works have contributed to a shift in Croatian historical memory, making possible a 
reappraisal of the country’s vanished Germans. In recent years, Croats have 
increasingly come to understand their former Swabian minority as victims of 
collective crimes as well as perpetrators of wartime abuse. In Pisma iz Krndije, a co-
edited collection of letters by Krndija concentration camp inmate Marija Mira 
Knoebl, Geiger has also given a very human face to the final chapter of the Swabians’ 
story. Knoebl’s letters highlight the paradoxes and absurdities of identity for, though 
interned as a German, she preferred to write in very colloquial Croatian, mixed with 
many German expressions. She died of tuberculosis at the young age of 21 while 
interned in the camp at Krndija.  
Finally, the American human rights lawyer Alfred-Maurice de Zayas devotes 
a section to the Danube Swabians in his treatment of the expulsion of eastern 
Europe’s Germans in A Terrible Revenge. His work is particularly valuable for both 




experience and also locating that experience in the general context of what he calls 
“the Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans” in the subtitle of his book. 
 
 
Summarizing the Swabians’ Belated National Consciousness 
The history of the Danube Swabians, a topic which at first seemed limited and 
obscure has proven to be anything but and has yielded an embarrassment of riches. 
Rather than being a small and uncomplicated group, the Swabians of Yugoslavia (and 
their coethnics in neighboring Hungary and Romania) turn out to be a subject of great 
complexity and nuance. Their story of “becoming national” or embracing national 
consciousness was an odyssey that spanned several decades and witnessed the fall of 
an empire, the triumph of the national principle in eastern Europe, and two world 
wars. As a people, they were themselves unique, being ethnically German but also 
deeply rooted in their Danubian homeland and the collective memory of its 
colonization. They were affected by the state of Germany and its intellectual crises 
during the interwar period just as they were seized by their own story in Yugoslavia. 
Transformed and shaken from their provincialism by the Great War, they then found 
themselves caught between the homeland and nationalizing nationalisms of Germany 
and Yugoslavia. In that space, they cultivated and articulated their own minority 
nationalism, celebrated their colonist ancestors and venerated Prince Eugen of Savoy 
as both the embodiment of German virtue and also as the incontrovertible proof of 
their right to their land. Their many anniversary celebrations during the 1920s and 




presence in southeast Europe. Though divided by confession, having diverse origins, 
and speaking a smattering of often quite distinct dialects, the Swabians gradually 
coalesced as a coherent group inside of Yugoslavia, even as they remained acutely 
aware of their close ties to fellow Swabians in neighboring Hungary and Romania. 
Additionally, they grew increasingly aware of Germany itself and their relationship to 
it. Ultimately, it was the connection to the distant Third Reich which sealed the 
Germans’ fate in Yugoslavia.  
 This work has sought to present a political and social history of what was 
Yugoslavia’s largest minority between the world wars with special attention to the 
manner in which that minority broadly embraced German national identity for the 
first time.911 We have discussed the history of the German national movement in 
Yugoslavia more or less from its inception until the Second World War. However, the 
simple necessity of introducing the Swabians’ complex historical narrative to the 
English speaking reader has forced me to restrain my ambitions in this work at the 
expense of exploring Swabian culture and society even moore deeply. To be sure, 
other authors have recognized the importance of the Germans’ cultural 
accomplishments. Anton Scherer, for example, is widely respected for his work on 
Swabian literature. He and others have also written works devoted to the matter of 
German education in interwar Yugoslavia. However, there remains much to be 
explored in the Swabians’ culture and sense of myth, their veneration of their 
ancestors and the place of their ancestors in their sense of self. The Swabians devoted 
considerable cultural output to these themes in the form of literature, painting and 
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even sculpture. German music and song were venerated and important efforts was 
made to restore the indigenous German stage to Yugoslavia. Even as they developed 
a kind of uniform for their movement, the Swabians settled not on the black or brown 
shirts of the Axis fascists, but instead adapted traditional Tracht to suit the aesthetics 
of the modern age (admittedly influenced by military/party uniforms). Though many 
authors have touched upon these themes, I know of no comprehensive analysis of the 
Swabians’ cultural accomplishments which takes seriously their becoming national, 
their embrace of their cultural heritage in a political and national sense. 
 My principle aims in this political and social history of the Danube Swabians 
in Yugoslavia have been several. I have sought first and foremost to restore the 
county’s German minority to the historical narrative, which I read forward from the 
First World War, not backward from the Second. Despite almost two centuries of 
settlement history, the Danube Swabians have largely disappeared from historical 
consciousness and popular awareness. I have also striven to detail the early origins of 
the modern German national movement in southern Hungary and its Croatian 
dependent with attention to the catalyzing effect of the First World War. I have also 
sought to show that German national consciousness deepened during the 1920s and 
1930s owing to encouragement from the Mutterland in the form of homeland 
nationalism and Volkstumarbeit organizations, Slavic chauvinism and nationalizing 
nationalism in Yugoslavia, and the actions of the original Swabian activists, who 
energetically developed an identity which was at once nationally German but also 
proudly local and Swabian. Their identity was also complex, nuanced, and sometimes 




consciousness emerged late and in competition with the highly developed and very 
attractive Croatian national movement. The German movement faced an uphill 
struggle in its effort to gain and organize followers in Slavonia and, as we have seen, 
many of its followers were conflicted or indifferent in their Germanness. Others were 
merely opportunistic persons who recognized material or social gain in rediscovering 
their roots, especially during the first years of the Second World War. Still other 
Slavonian Swabians wanted nothing to do with the German movement, however, and 
even opposed it. In Banat and Batschka, the chief rival to Germandom, as we have 
seen, came in the form of Magyardom or mere indifference.  
 I have also striven to show the depth of the fractures in the Swabian 
community during the 1930s and to reveal that, while there were many elements 
attracted by National Socialism, many other Swabians rejected the neue deutsche 
Weltanschauung either wholly or by degree. In any event, the largely Catholic and 
rural Swabians of Yugoslavia resisted the Nazi oriented take over of their movement 
until 1938/1939, later than the Swabians in neighboring Romania or Hungary. Even 
then, they settled on a new leader who was an Erneuerer but nevertheless sufficiently 
moderate that he faced disgruntlement from within the Erneuerungsbewegung itself.  
Under the influence of Jakob Awender and later Volksgruppenfueherer Sepp Janko, 
many Swabians embraced the forms of National Socialism and espoused its tenets. 
However, there are reasons to doubt that the depth of their faith and understanding 
reached as deep as the Kulturbund’s propaganda would have one believe. To be sure, 
the Swabians were dazzled by Hitler and served as eager components of Nazi 




mostly peasants whose German national consciousness emerged at precisely the 
moment when German nationalism assumed its most extreme and virulent form. 
Awender, Halwax, Janko, Altgayer and the like were doubtless National Socialists to 
the core. It is unlikely, however, that the broad Swabian membership in the 
Kulturbund should serve as an accurate measure of Swabians’ belief in or 
understanding of the tenets of Nazism, if this overwhelmingly rural and conservative 
population even knew what those tenets were exactly. 
Ultimately, the new realities of the Second World War allowed the recently 
empowered Erneuerer to implement their radical agenda with Reich support as 
Volksgruppen. The immediate triumph of German arms and the later exigencies of 
war and the perils of the Communist insurrection drove more Germans to participate 
in the institutions of the Volksgruppe than ever before. Nevertheless, even after April 
1941, Some Swabian resistance to the Nationalist Socialist agenda or even 
indifference toward German nationhood persisted among Swabians. We see this in 
the Ernst Thaelmann Partisan unit, in which Swabian opponents of the interwar 
regimes and the fascist occupiers were organized in 1943 as part of Tito’s partisan 
movement. Adam Berenz continued to publically oppose National Socialism until his 
arrest by the Gestapo in 1944. Ultimately, then, the Swabians’ 20th century saga was 
an aborted a coming of age story, in which an ethnic splinter group embraced national 
consciousness just as the broader ethnic group underwent a dramatic crisis, re-
imagining and radicalizing German national identity as German National Socialism. 
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